Research Group
in Analytic Philosophy

Philosophy of Science, Objectivity and evidence: epistemic and non- epistemic values (PoS)

In the first term, the Philosophy of Science (PoS) reading group will focus on scientific confirmation and the role of values in science. We will begin by discussing the SEP entry on confirmation:

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/confirmation/

From there, we will select three or four additional papers from the references, covering different theories of scientific confirmation, to be discussed in the following sessions. After that, we will discuss some of the following papers:

  • Thomas S. Kuhn (1977). “Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory Choice.” In The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change, University of Chicago Press, pp. 320-339.
  • Ernan McMullin (2012). “Values in Science.” Zygon 47(4) pp. 686-709.
  • Helen Longino (2004). “How Values Can Be Good for Science.” In Science, Values, and Objectivity, edited by Peter Machamer and Gereon Wolters. University of Pittsburgh Press, pp. 127-142.
  • Heather Douglas (2000). "Inductive Risk and Values in Science.” Philosophy of Science, Vol. 67, No. 4, pp. 559-579.
  • Phyllis Rooney (1992). "On Values in Science: Is the Epistemic/Non-Epistemic Distinction Useful?" PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Vol. 1992, Vol. 1, pp. 13-22.
  • Hugh Lacey (2017). “Distinguishing Between Cognitive and Social Values.” In Current Controversies In Values And Science. https://works.swarthmore.edu/fac-philosophy/474
If you want to join us or be included in the mailing list of the PoS RG, please, write to Albert Solé (Albert.sole “at” UB "dot" edu).

Sessions and readings

1. October 24, 11:30 - 13:30

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/confirmation/

2. November 6, 11:30 - 13:30

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/confirmation/      &

Okasha, S., 2011, “Experiment, Observation, and the Confirmation of Laws”, Analysis, 71: 222–232.



Convenor:

Albert Solé