Research Group
in Analytic Philosophy

Topics in the Philosophy of Mind (TPM)

This reading group will cover papers on different topics in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of cognitive science. 

We will meet every other Tuesday, 11:00-13:00, starting February 1st, 2021.

Suggested papers include (but do not exhaust): 

Martha Nussbaum (2004). Emotions as Judgments of Value and Importance. In R. C. Solomon (Ed.), Thinking about feeling: Contemporary philosophers on emotions (pp. 183–199). Oxford University Press. 
 
Paul Boghossian (2014). What is inference? Philosophical Studies 169: 1–18.
 
Josh Shepherd, J. (2017). Halfhearted Action and Control. Ergo, 4.
 
Frédérique de Vignemont (2018). Peripersonal Perception in Action. Synthese, 198 (Suppl 17): 4027–4044.

Jake Quilty-Dunn and Eric Mandelbaum (2018). Inferential transitions. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 96(3): 532–547.

Shannon Spaulding (2021). Beliefs and biases. Synthese. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03129-0

Adam Bradley (2021). The Paradox of Pain.  Philosophical Quarterly, 71(4). https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqaa084

Fabrizio Calzavarini (forthcoming). The conceptual format debate and the challenge from (global) supramodality. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.

Jake Quilty-Dunn (ms. 2022). Unconscious rationalization, or: How (not) to think about awfulness and death.



Convenor:

Josefa Toribio

Sessions

  • Emotions as Judgments of Value

    Martha Nussbaum (2004). Emotions as Judgments of Value and Importance. In R. C. Solomon (Ed.), Thinking about feeling: Contemporary philosophers on emotions (pp. 183–199). Oxford University Press.

    01 February 2022

    11:00, online

  • What is inference?

    Paul Boghossian (2014). What is inference? Philosophical Studies 169: 1–18.

    15 February 2022

    11:00, online