Josefa Toribio

ICREA Research Professor

Universitat de Barcelona

I am an ICREA Research Professor at the University of Barcelona. I got my PhD in Philosophy from Complutense University, Madrid, in 1988. I worked as Assistant Professor in the Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science at Complutense between 1989 and 1991. I was next awarded a postgraduate fellowship by the British Council to work in the School of Cognitive and Computing Sciences at the University of Sussex (1991-93). I have been, since then, Assistant Professor at Washington University in St. Louis (1993-2000), Lecturer in Philosophy in the School of Cognitive and Computing Sciences at the University of Sussex (2000-2002), Associate Professor at the University of Indiana, Bloomington (2002-2004), and Senior Lecturer at the University of Edinburgh (2004-2008). I joined ICREA in 2009. Between 2010 and 2016, I was the president of the Spanish Society of Analytic Philosophy (SEFA). I am currently the PI (with Esa Díaz León) of a grant funded by MICINN on the philosophy of social cognition (PID2021-124100NB-I00).

Research interests: My goal in philosophy has long been the same: to explore the nature of the mind within a naturalistic framework. What is most distinctive of my research is my ongoing effort to respect scientific findings about mental phenomena while insisting on the critical importance of the method of analysis and the theoretical tools provided by analytic philosophy. My current research focuses on the analysis of central topics in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of cognitive science, with a special emphasis on the philosophy of perception and rationally responsive unconscious mental states such as implicit attitudes.

Selection of Publications

Josefa Toribio. 2024
"Seeing Wrongness"
Journal of Moral Philosophy, forthcoming.
Josefa Toribio. 2022
"Responsibility for implicitly biased behaviour: A habit-based approach"
Journal of Social Philosophy, 53: 239-254. DOI: 10.1111/JOSP.12442
Josefa Toribio. 2021
"Una explicación aretaica del impacto de los sesgos implícitos sobre la justificación de las creencias".
In David Pérez Chico and Modesto Gómez (Eds.). Ernesto Sosa: Conocimiento y Virtud. With Miguel Ángel Fernández, pp. 187–210. Zaragoza: PUZ.
Josefa Toribio. 2021
"Implicit Bias and the Fragmented Mind"
In Dirk Kindermann, Cristina Borgoni and Andrea Onofri (Eds.), The Fragmented Mind, pp. 303–324. Oxford: OUP.
Josefa Toribio. 2021
"Are visuomotor representations cognitively penetrable? Biasing action-guiding vision".
Synthese, 198 (Suppl. 17): S4163–S4181.
Josefa Toribio. 2021
"Accessibilism, implicit bias, and epistemic justification"
Synthese 198 (7): 1529–1547.
Josefa Toribio. 2020
"La experiencia visual: rica pero impenetrable"
In Álvaro Peláez and Ignacio Cervieri (Eds.) Contenido y Fenomenología de la Percepción: Aproximaciones Filosóficas. Ciudad de México: Gedisa-UNAM, pp. 79–109.
Josefa Toribio. 2020
"Molyneux's question and perceptual judgments"
In Gabriele Ferretti and Brian Blenney (Eds.). Molyneux's Question. Oxford: Routledge, pp. 266–283.
Josefa Toribio. 2019
"Visual categorization"
In Brian Glenney and José Filipe Pereira da Silva (Eds.) The Senses and the History of Philosophy. Oxford: Routledge, pp. 292–307.
Josefa Toribio. 2018
"Implicit bias: from social structure to representational format"
Theoria. An Internation Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science 33(1): 41–60.
Josefa Toribio. 2018
"Visual experience: rich but impenetrable"
Synthese, 195 (8): 3389–3406. DOI 10.1007/s11229-015-0889-8
Josefa Toribio. 2017
"At the border between perception and cognition: An interview"
Niin & Näin, Filosofinen Aikakauslehti, 3, pp. 60–67
Josefa Toribio. 2015
"Opacity, know-how states, and their content"
Disputatio, 7(40): 61–83
Josefa Toribio. 2015
"Social vision: breaking a philosophical impasse?"
Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 6(4): 611-615
DOI: 10.1007/s13164-015-0257-0
Josefa Toribio. 2014
"Cognitive Impenetrability and the Content of Early Vision"
Philosophical Psychology, 27(5): 621–642.
Josefa Toribio. 2013

“Positing a space mirror mechanism: intentional understanding without action?”

Journal of Consciousness Studies, 20 (5-6), pp. 121-193.
Josefa Toribio. 2013

“Is there an ‘ought’ in belief?”

Teorema, 32(3), pp. 75-90.
Josefa Toribio. 2012
“Michael Dummett (1925-2011)”
Teorema, 31 (1), pp. 163-169.
Josefa Toribio. 2011
“What we do when we judge”

dialectica, 65 (3), pp. 345-367.
Josefa Toribio. 2011
“Compositionality, Iconicity and Perceptual Nonconceptualism”
Philosophical Psychology, 24 (2), pp. 177-193.
Josefa Toribio. 2010
“The Animal Concepts Debate: A Metaphilosophical Take”

Teorema, 29 (2), pp. 11-24.
Josefa Toribio. 2009
“Does seeing red require thinking about red things?”

Think, 8 (22), pp. 29-39.
Josefa Toribio. 2008
“State versus Content: The Unfair Trial of Perceptual Nonconceptualism”
Erkenntnis, 69 (3), pp. 351-361.
Josefa Toribio. 2008
“How Do We Know How?”

Philosophical Explorations, 11 (1), pp. 39-52.
Josefa Toribio. 2007
“Nonconceptual Content”
Philosophy Compass 2/3, pp. 445–460
Josefa Toribio. 2003
“Free Belief”

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2 (2), pp. 327-336.
Josefa Toribio. 2002
“Semantic Responsibility”
Philosophical Explorations, 1, pp. 39-58.
Josefa Toribio. 2002
“Perceptual Experience and Its Contents”

The Journal of Mind and Behavior, 23, (24), pp. 375-392.
Josefa Toribio. 2002
“Mindful Belief”

Theoria. A Swedish Journal of Philosophy, 68 (3), pp. 224-249.
Josefa Toribio. 2002
“Modularity, Relativism, and Neural Constructivism”

Cognitive Science Quarterly, vol. 2 (1), pp. 93-106.
Josefa Toribio, A. Clark. 2001
“Sensorimotor Chauvinism?” Commentary on O’Reagan, J. Kevin and Noë, Alva, “A Sensorimotor account of vision and Visual Consciousness”

Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24 (5), pp. 979-980.
Josefa Toribio. 2001
“Normativity: The Hard Problem”

Kognitywistyka i media w edukacji (Cognitive Science and Media in Education), 1 (1), pp. 67-86. Reprinted in Theoria et Historia Scientiarum, vol. IX, 2003 / 2.
Josefa Toribio. 1999
“Naturalism and Causal Explanation”

Communication and Cognition, 32 (3/4), pp. 243-258.
Josefa Toribio. 1999
“Meaning, Dispositions, and Normativity”

Minds and Machines, 9 (3), pp. 399-413.
Josefa Toribio. 1999
“Extruding Intentionality from the Metaphysical Flux”

Journal of Experimental and Theoretical AI, 11, 1999, pp. 501-518.
Josefa Toribio. 1998
“Meaning and Other Non-Biological Categories”

Philosophical Papers, 27 (2), pp. 129-150.
Josefa Toribio. 1998
“The Implicit Conception of Implicit Conceptions. Reply to Christopher Peacocke”

Philosophical Issues, 9, pp. 115-120.
Josefa Toribio. 1997
“Ecological Content ”

Pragmatics and Cognition, 5 (2), pp. 257-285.
Josefa Toribio. 1997
“Twin Pleas: Probing Content and Compositionality”

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 57, (4), pp 871-889.
Josefa Toribio. 1997
“Pulp Naturalism”

Il Cannocchiale, Rivista di Studi Filosofici, 2 [special issue on Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science], pp. 185-195.
Josefa Toribio. 1995
“Ruritania and Ecology: Reply to Ned Block”

Philosophical Issues, 6, pp. 188-195.
Josefa Toribio, A. Clark. 1994
“Doing without Representing?”

Synthese, 101, pp, 401-431.
Josefa Toribio. 1991
“Causal Efficacy, Content and Levels of Explanation”

Logique et Analyse, 135-136, pp. 297-318.
Josefa Toribio. 1991
“Why There Still Has to Be a Theory of Consciousness”

Consciousness and Cognition, 2 (1), pp. 28-47.

Links

My personal page at ICREA contains links to pre-publication versions of some papers:

Research Groupin Analytic Philosophy

Josefa Toribio

Contact

Curriculum Vitae

Selection of Publications

"Seeing Wrongness"

"Responsibility for implicitly biased behaviour: A habit-based approach"

"Una explicación aretaica del impacto de los sesgos implícitos sobre la justificación de las creencias".

"Implicit Bias and the Fragmented Mind"

"Are visuomotor representations cognitively penetrable? Biasing action-guiding vision".

"Accessibilism, implicit bias, and epistemic justification"

"La experiencia visual: rica pero impenetrable"

"Molyneux's question and perceptual judgments"

"Visual categorization"

"Implicit bias: from social structure to representational format"

"Visual experience: rich but impenetrable"

"At the border between perception and cognition: An interview"

"Opacity, know-how states, and their content"

"Social vision: breaking a philosophical impasse?"

"Cognitive Impenetrability and the Content of Early Vision"

“Positing a space mirror mechanism: intentional understanding without action?”

“Is there an ‘ought’ in belief?”

“Michael Dummett (1925-2011)”

“What we do when we judge”

“Compositionality, Iconicity and Perceptual Nonconceptualism”

“The Animal Concepts Debate: A Metaphilosophical Take”

“Does seeing red require thinking about red things?”

“State versus Content: The Unfair Trial of Perceptual Nonconceptualism”

“How Do We Know How?”

“Nonconceptual Content”

“Free Belief”

“Semantic Responsibility”

“Perceptual Experience and Its Contents”

“Mindful Belief”

“Modularity, Relativism, and Neural Constructivism”

“Sensorimotor Chauvinism?” Commentary on O’Reagan, J. Kevin and Noë, Alva, “A Sensorimotor account of vision and Visual Consciousness”

“Normativity: The Hard Problem”

“Naturalism and Causal Explanation”

“Meaning, Dispositions, and Normativity”

“Extruding Intentionality from the Metaphysical Flux”

“Meaning and Other Non-Biological Categories”

“The Implicit Conception of Implicit Conceptions. Reply to Christopher Peacocke”

“Ecological Content ”

“Twin Pleas: Probing Content and Compositionality”

“Pulp Naturalism”

“Ruritania and Ecology: Reply to Ned Block”

“Doing without Representing?”

“Causal Efficacy, Content and Levels of Explanation”

“Why There Still Has to Be a Theory of Consciousness”

Links

Research Group
in Analytic Philosophy