Mental Activity (MA)

The aim is to discuss some papers in the philosophy of mind / action, with a special focus on new computational / mechanistic approaches to the mind / psychological explanation, philosophy of perception (in particular perception of evaluative properties and perceptual particularism), and the role of volition and control over action (see suggested readings below, and please give further suggestions to me).

 

Suggested readings:
 
Jennifer Church (2010). Seeing reasons. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (3): 638–670.

Robert Cowan (2013). Perceptual intuitionism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (1): 164–193.

 

Bence Nanay (2016). Imagination and perception. In Amy Kind (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Imagination. London: Routledge, pp. 124–134. 

 

Eric Mandelbaum (2017). Seeing and conceptualizing: Modularity and the shallow contents of perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research doi: 10.1111/phpr.12368.

 

Matthew McGrath (2017). Knowing what things look like. Philosophical Review 126 (1): 1–41.

 

Wayne Wu (2016). Experts and deviants: the story of agentive control. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93(1): 101–126.

 

Marcin Miłkowski (2013). Explaining the computational mind. Cambridge: MA. MIT. Chapters  1. Computation in Cognitive Science: Four Case Studies and a Funeral, and 4. Computation and Representation.

Catherine Stinson (2016). Mechanisms in psychology: ripping nature at its seams. Synthese, 193: 1585–1614.

 

Susanna Schellenberg (2016). Perceptual particularity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (1): 25–54.
 
Joshua Shepherd (2015). Conscious control over action. Mind & Language 30(3): 320–344.

Joshua Shepherd (2016). Conscious action/Zombie action. Noûs 50(2): 219–244.

Jing Zhu (2004). Intention and volition, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 34(2), 175–192.

Jing Zhu (2004). Understanding volition, Philosophical Psychology, 17(2), 247–273.
 
 

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