Duration: 2019 - 2022
Code: PGC2018-095909-B-I00
Jules Holroyd (Sheffield)
Indrek Reiland (Edinburgh)
Susanna Schellenberg (Rutgers)
Miguel Ángel Sebastían (Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM)
Susanna Siegel (Harvard)
This project tackles important questions arising at the intersection of philosophical and scientific studies of the mind. It addresses central philosophical issues about perceptual experience while also seeking to make progress on two additional fronts. On the one hand, we are interested in the introspective knowledge that we obtain from our own self-awareness of such experiences and its relation to our sense of agency. On the other hand, and following a recent and renewed philosophical and scientific interest in states and mental processes of which we are not aware, but which are rationally sensitive, the present project tackles different aspects of a subset of such states: implicit biases.
The general hypothesis that drives this project is that an analysis of the conceptual and empirical foundations of the continuum perception- cognition-action needs to focus not only on events of which we are aware, but also on events and processes of which we are self-aware and unaware. Each vertex of this triangle has a restrictive research domain so as to make the project manageable: (i) the metaphysics of perceptual (awareness); (ii) both the introspection of the contents of such experiences and their role in our sense of agency (self- awareness); and (iii) the nature and modulation of implicit biases, and our responsibility for themisolated as an importantly relevant philosophical, psychological and social phenomenon in the realm of non-conscious cognition (unawareness).
The project is structured around four general objectives:
(1) To discuss the arguments for and against Representationalism and Naïve Realism so as to better understand the metaphysics of perceptual experiences.
(2) To examine the role of perceptual experiences as a source of self-knowledge, drawing on philosophical analyses of first-personal thought as well as scientific studies of relevant cognitive processes such as metacognition and attention.
(3) To examine the nature and mechanistic underpinnings of agentive phenomenology and its contribution to action control.
(4) To provide a better philosophical understanding of a particular kind of mental states of whose influence we are typically unaware: implicit biases.
Total budget: €60.500
1 FPI Fellow
Josefa Toribio. 2022
Journal of Social Philosophy, 53: 239-254. DOI: 10.1111/JOSP.12442
Josefa Toribio. 2021
Synthese, 198 (Suppl. 17): S4163–S4181.
Josefa Toribio. 2021
In Dirk Kindermann, Cristina Borgoni and Andrea Onofri (Eds.), The Fragmented Mind, pp. 303–324. Oxford: OUP.
Josefa Toribio. 2021
In David Pérez Chico and Modesto Gómez (Eds.). Ernesto Sosa: Conocimiento y Virtud. With Miguel Ángel Fernández, pp. 187–210. Zaragoza: PUZ.
Josefa Toribio. 2020
In Gabriele Ferretti and Brian Blenney (Eds.). Molyneux's Question. Oxford: Routledge, pp. 266–283.
Josefa Toribio. 2020
In Álvaro Peláez and Ignacio Cervieri (Eds.) Contenido y Fenomenología de la Percepción: Aproximaciones Filosóficas. Ciudad de México: Gedisa-UNAM, pp. 79–109.
Josefa Toribio. 2019
In Brian Glenney and José Filipe Pereira da Silva (Eds.) The Senses and the History of Philosophy. Oxford: Routledge, pp. 292–307.