Market Design and Experiments

Index

General Information

Estimated learning time

Competences / Learning outcomes

Learning objectives

Teaching blocks

Teaching methods and general organization

Official assessment of learning outcomes

Reading and study resources

General Information

Course unit nameMarket Design and Experiments
Course unit code573105
Academic year2024/2025
CoordinatorMarina Nuñez Oliva
DepartmentDepartment of Economic, Financial and Actuarial Mathematics
Credits5
Single programS

Estimated learning time

Total number of hours : 125 Hours
ActivitiesType of trainingHoursObservations
Face-to-face and/or online activities40
- Lecture with practical component Face-to-face 40
Supervised project42.5
Independent learning42.5

Competences / Learning outcomes to be gained during study

  • — Ability to address relevant economic problems with accuracy in such areas as market regulation, industrial organization and public policy decision-making, and to propose solutions to these problems, drawing on the techniques of theoretical or empirical analyses and simulation.
  • — Ability to apply knowledge of quantitative economics to the analysis of economic policy and business management.
  • — Ability to write scientific articles that can be published in journals of economics and ability to present corresponding papers at international scientific conferences.
  • — Ability to read and assess research papers in economics critically, and to identify their essential contributions to advancing the frontier of knowledge.
  • — Ability to formulate original research questions and hypotheses within a relevant theoretical framework that can be tested empirically.
  • — Skills to foster lifelong, self-directed/independent learning.
  • — Ability to apply the knowledge acquired to problem solving in new or relatively unknown environments within broader (or multidisciplinary) contexts related to the field of study.
  • — Ability to acquire the knowledge that fosters originality of thought in the development or application of ideas, above all in a research context.

Learning objectives

Referring to knowledge

— In relation to markets and auctions, know different models of two-sided markets, in which agents on one side have preferences over potential partners on the other side of the market.

— Understand the notion of stable matching and know how to find one using a deferred acceptance algorithm.

— In relation to two-sided matching with money, where the profits of each partnership can be shared by means of prices or salaries, recognise the core of the market and the set of competitive equilibrium prices.

— For cases of single sellers with many identical units on sale, analyse equilibrium bids under different auction forms.

— Have a good understanding of the most common behavioural economic models.

— Have a good, up-to-date knowledge of recent developments in the field of behavioural economics.

— Be familiar with some of the most impactful research carried out in experimental economics.

Referring to abilities, skills

— Extract from the literature some of the applications of matching theory and auction theory to real markets and be able to write essays on them and present the ideas orally.

— Learn how to evaluate competing behavioural theories and understand their implications for different areas of economics.

— Learn how to design and run experiments in economics.

Learning objectives

Referring to knowledge

— In relation to markets and auctions, know different models of two-sided markets, in which agents on one side have preferences over potential partners on the other side of the market.

— Understand the notion of stable matching and know how to find one using a deferred acceptance algorithm.

— In relation to two-sided matching with money, where the profits of each partnership can be shared by means of prices or salaries, recognise the core of the market and the set of competitive equilibrium prices.

— For cases of single sellers with many identical units on sale, analyse equilibrium bids under different auction forms.

— Have a good understanding of the most common behavioural economic models.

— Have a good, up-to-date knowledge of recent developments in the field of behavioural economics.

— Be familiar with some of the most impactful research carried out in experimental economics.

Referring to abilities, skills

— Extract from the literature some of the applications of matching theory and auction theory to real markets and be able to write essays on them and present the ideas orally.

— Learn how to evaluate competing behavioural theories and understand their implications for different areas of economics.

— Learn how to design and run experiments in economics.

Teaching blocks

  • 1 Two-sided Matching

  • 2 Behavioural and Experimental Economics

Teaching methods and general organization

The methodology is centred on a series of lectures in which theoretical concepts and their applications to various models are presented and discussed. Mathematical proofs of the main theorems are also presented. Students are required to read and discuss various seminal papers in the field.

Official assessment of learning outcomes

Students are asked to read a paper in Market Design discussing an application of matching theory or auctions to real markets, and then to give a presentation about this application (40% of the grade). Students are provided with a list recommended papers during the course for this activity. Additionally, students sit a short written exam on the algorithms studied in class (10%).

The grades for the Behavioural Economics and Experimental Economics sections of the course are determined by the weighted average of a number of different assignments:

  • An in-class presentation (25%) to be delivered in the final weeks of the semester. The paper will be either theoretical or empirical in nature and will address the application of a behavioural model analysed in class or a different type of behavioural bias/theory. Students are provided with a list recommended papers for this activity.
  • Students can opt to write either an essay or a referee report (25%). More specifically,
    a) An essay describing a lab or a field experiment that they have conceived, in which an existing or a novel theory is tested. Students need to discuss their motivation for undertaking the experiment, highlighting the originality of the idea and its contribution to the extant literature. Details need to be presented of the structure of the design and the empirical strategy employed. The essay should serve as a spring board for the students’ future research work endeavours but it is not expected to be a detailed polished study at this stage (max. length 5/6 pages).
  • A referee report of a recent research paper selected from a list provided by the instructor. The papers will be unpublished studies and the students, acting as reviewers, have to provide a summary, assess the paper’s contribution to the extant literature, identify any shortcomings and make recommendations as to how to improve the paper, mentioning possible extensions and/or potential locations for future research. Students are provided with detailed instructions at the beginning of the course.

A list of articles is made available during the course.

Examination-based assessment

The final examination takes place on the date determined for that purpose. It consists of the following activities:

  • The presentation of an article examining the application of matching theory or auctions to a real market (40%).
  • A written exam on the algorithms studied in class, including the deferred acceptance and top trading cycle algorithms (10%).
  • The presentation of either a theoretical or empirical paper concerning the application of a behavioural model previously analysed in class or of a different type of behavioural bias/theory (25%).
  • A written essay on an original lab or field experiment or a referee report on a recent paper (25%).

Reading and study resources

Book

Camerer, C. (2003) Behavioral Game Theory, Princeton University Press

Comment:

Book

Holt, Charles, A. (2007) Markets, Games and Strategic Behavior, Pearson.

Comment:

Book

Krishna, V. (2010) Auction Theory, Academic Press.

Book

Milgrom, P. (2004) Putting Auction Theory to Work, Cambridge University Press.

Comment:

Book

Roth, A. and Sotomayor, M. (1990) Two-sided matching, Econometric Society Monographs, 18, Cambridge University Press.

Comment:

Article

Abdulkadiroglu, A. and Sönmez, T. (2003) School choice: a mechanism design approach. American Economic Review, 93, 729-746.

Comment:

Links:
Article

Crawford, V. and Knoer, E.M. (1981) Job matching with heterogeneous firms and workers. Econometrica, 49, 437-450.

Comment:

Links:
Article

Demange, G., Gale, D. and Sotomayor, M. (1986) Multi-item auctions. Journal of Political Economy, 94, 863-872.

Comment:

Links:
Article

Gale, D. and Shapley, L.S. (1962) College admission and the stability of marriage. The American Mathematical Monthly, 69, 9-15.

Comment:

Links:
Article

Roth, A.E., Sönmez, T. and Ünver, U. (2004) Kidney exchange. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119, 457-488.

Comment:

Links:
Article

Shapley, L.S. and Scarf, H. (1974) On cores and indivisibility. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1, 23-37.

Comment:

Links:
Article

Shapley, L.S. and Shubik, M. (1972) The assignment game I: The core. International Journal of Game Theory, 1, 111-130.

Comment:

Links:
Checked by UB Language Services.