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Anthony Bonner. *The Art and Logic of Ramon Llull: A User's Guide*. Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, 95. Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2007. Pp. xx + 333. Cloth, \$150.00.

Ramon Llull was acutely aware of Islamic and Jewish divergences from Christian belief. He undertook a quest for “necessary reasons” to show that, where these belief systems diverged, Christian belief is true. Though largely self-taught, Llull managed three (perhaps four) stays at the University of Paris. Encounters between the incandescent Mallorcan and academic orthodoxy contributed hugely to Llull’s changing conception of necessary reasons. These changes are abundantly documented in Anthony Bonner’s *The Art and Logic of Ramon Llull*.

Llull’s understanding of necessary reasons is different in the *Ars magna*’s quaternary phase, its ternary phase, and a post-Art logical phase. In the quaternary phase, necessary reasons are often presented as demonstrative; fully ten works use the term in their title. Although Llull meant ‘demonstration’ in a sense broader than Aristotle’s, Parisian academics objected, mistakenly thinking he was trying to prove dogmas like the Trinity and Incarnation through Aristotelian demonstrations *propter quid* and *quia*. As Bonner conjectures, this may be why no work from the ternary phase mentions demonstration in its title and why demonstration is given a “very reduced role” in this phase (187). Finally, in the post-Art phase, necessary reasons take syllogistic form to approximate Aristotelian demonstrations and engage Averroists of the Faculty of Arts on their own ground.

In these shifting configurations, then, necessary reasons are frequently understood as demonstrative. But Llull used broad and narrow senses of ‘demonstration’. The broad sense includes any persuasive argument (267). The narrow sense, which is “discussed almost obsessively throughout [Llull’s] career” (269), admits three types of demonstration: *propter quid*, *quia*, and *per aequiparantiam* (65, 266–69). The first two are the classic Aristotelian structures; the third is Lullian.

To see what Llull meant by *demonstratio per aequiparantiam* (demonstration by equivalence), recall his view of the divine “dignities” such as goodness, greatness, power, will, justice, etc. He refers to three of these dignities in the following sketch of demonstration by equivalence (DBE):

[W]hen a demonstration is made by means of things equal to one another, as for instance when one demonstrates that God cannot sin because his power is of the same essence as his will, which in no way desires to sin, and this will is of the same essence as justice, which is completely opposed to sin, which accords with injustice. (65)

Although Llull emphasizes the theological uses of DBE, he indicates non-theological applications as well (65, 221–22, 224). Potentially, then, DBE is an extremely fecund idea. But here we encounter both the chief virtue and major limitation of this volume. The virtue is that the work succeeds admirably in the aim announced in its subtitle: to provide a user’s guide to Llull’s Art and logic. In particular, it lets us see how DBE was supposed to work. The corresponding limitation is frankly acknowledged by Bonner from the start. His aim, he says, “has not been to defend Llull, but rather to remain neutral in the matter of possible judgments upon his Art and logic” (xiv). Hence the critical evaluation that DBE demands is not undertaken here.

Critical points that might be developed include the following. (i) In the above-quoted passage, Llull says the dignities have the same essence; elsewhere, that they are “one in number” (271, 286). Are essential identity and numerical identity coextensive? Or does numerical identity imply essential identity, yet not the reverse? (ii) Could DBE function with a weaker relation like material equivalence? (iii) Because the dignities are supposed to be essentially and numerically equal, they convert: goodness is great, and greatness is good. But how could even divine goodness be equivalent to divine greatness? Bonner cites Cornford’s view that Platonic Forms blend and suggests that this is also true of the dignities (203–04). Perhaps so, but this would require defense of a specific form of Neoplatonism.

(iv) Such a defense would seem to presuppose that truth is structured more like a concept than a proposition, as Cornford recognized (203). Llull's quaternary works do presuppose such a structure, yet the ternary works have propositional bases. Bonner seems to regard this as a matter of expository convenience (275), but the convertibility of dignities would seem to entail something like the quaternary approach.

Bonner's decision to leave critical evaluation for another occasion appears to have been a prudent one. The result is a guide to Llull's Art and logic unlikely to be surpassed for a long time. Despite occasional typographical errors, the volume is meticulously produced. Special features include eight color illustrations, thirty black-and-white illustrations, and appendices on Martin Gardner's flawed reading of Llull and a chronological list of Llull's works.

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Peter J. Casarella, editor. *Cusanus: The Legacy of Learned Ignorance*. Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2006. Pp. xxxii + 280. Cloth, \$74.95.

The past years have seen the official completion of the *Opera Omnia* of Nicholas of Cusa and have witnessed, as well, the production of a plethora of new studies on this fifteenth-century thinker. It is no longer enough, however, to be familiar with scholarship in German, Italian, and English in order to have a comprehensive view of the newer Cusanus research. One must also have a command of Spanish and Portuguese as well. An informal survey of the *Philosopher's Index*, by no means exhaustive, of the secondary literature on Cusa reveals that over the last decade, the ratio approaches 1:1 when one compares Spanish and Portuguese entries on Cusa with those in other languages. Although Cusa was already a figure of interest in these two countries in the early 1960s, due in no small part to the work of Eusebio Colomer involving Ramon Llull, and that of Mariano Álvarez-Gómez, one can now see the work of these earlier scholars bearing fruit in the work of their students and their students' students. This scholarship, while it may be categorized broadly as history of philosophy or ideas, has tended to focus primarily on three fields of philosophical interest: philosophy of language, epistemology, and metaphysics. It has involved a community of scholars not only from Spain and Portugal—João Maria André bears mention here—but also in Brazil and in Argentina, where Claudia D'Amico, together with others, recently organized a major international conference on Cusa held in Buenos Aires and attended by many, including Peter Casarella, the editor of the work under review here, who himself presented in Spanish.

The studies in this present volume—the fruit of a conference held at The Catholic University of America in October 2001—present, by contrast, the work of many of the most prominent American interpreters of Cusa, including Louis Dupré, Bernard McGinn, Karsten Harries, Jasper Hopkins, Paul Sigmund, Cary Nederman, Elizabeth Brient, and Il Kim, as well as offerings from some of their counterparts in Germany and the Netherlands, including Wilhelm Dupré, Regine Kather, Thomas Prügl, and even Walter Andreas Euler of the Theological Faculty of Trier University, who, in April 2007, was appointed the new director of the Institut für Cusanus-Forschung at Trier. There is also an English translation included of one of the rare vernacular sermons of Cusa, which was the subject of a workshop during the conference; the translation is by Frank Tobin and it is accompanied by an illuminating introduction by Nancy Hudson. There is a short preface by Morimichi Watanabe, who just last year retired as the founding President of the American Cusanus Society, and the whole book is more than capably introduced by the editor, who makes an insightful contrast between the papers that came out of a 1964 conference in Brixen (*Nicolo' Cusano agli inizi del mondo moderno* [Firenze, 1970]), which commemorated the 500<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Cusa's death, in 1464, just as this conference celebrates the 600<sup>th</sup> anniversary of his birth, in 1401.