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***THE DISPUTATIO RAIMUNDI CHRISTIANI ET
HOMERI SARACENI***

**A CASE STUDY OF MEDIEVAL CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM
EXCHANGE**

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by

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ABBREVIATIONS

BSAL = *Boletín de la Sociedad Arqueológica Luliana Bolletí de la Societat Arqueològica Lul·liana* (Palma, 1886-)

CCCM = Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Medievalis (Turnhout, 1966-)

CSIC = Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas sede central

IPM = Instrumenta Patristica et Mediaevalia (Turnhout, 1959-)

MOG = *Raymundi Lulli Opera omnia*, ed. by I. Salzinger, 8 vols. (Mainz, 1721-42)

NEORL = *Nova Edició de les Obres de Ramon Llull* (Palma de Mallorca, 1990-)

ORL = *Obres de Ramon Llull, edició original*, 21 vols. (Palma de Malloca, 1906-50)

PISAI = Pontifical Institute for Arabic and Islamic Studies

ROL = Raimundi Lulli Opera Latina (Palma de Mallorca and Turnhout, 1959-)

s.e. = sine editore

SW = *Selected Works of Ramon Llull (1232-1316)*, ed. by A. Bonner, 2 vols. (Princeton, N.J., 1985)

INTRODUCTION

1. RESEARCH QUESTION

In this dissertation, I aim to find an answer to the question ‘What was Ramon Llull’s own method of bringing about the conversion of Muslims at the time when he wrote the *Disputatio Raimundi christiani et Homeri saraceni* in 1308, as apparent from the text?’. In order to answer this question, this dissertation follows a tripartite approach. First, I will compare Llull’s *Disputatio Raimundi* with other works, selected from his œuvre. This step is meant to establish the evolution of Llull’s thought, and to put the *Disputatio Raimundi* into perspective. Second, I will compare Llull’s theological arguments in the *Disputatio Raimundi*, both of the character of ‘Umar and of Llull’s own self-insertion character, Raimundus. This second step will explain the particular way in which Llull dealt with Islamic philosophy, and how he sought to interpret Islamic views on the divine in order to better build his own argumentation. The comparison will also illuminate which philosophical questions of Muslims needed to be answered according to Llull in order to bring about their conversion. The third step comprises a comparison of Llull’s own views and the views of some of his contemporaries, which will shed light on how Llull’s view differed from the standard way in which 13th century missionaries would deal with Islam. This contrastive method will make Llull’s own voice more discernable.

Attached to the question concerning the authenticity of Llull’s own voice are also two sub-questions. The first subquestion is the following: “What precisely is the idiosyncrasy of Llull’s own voice and his very new outlook on interreligious encounters between Muslims and Christians?” Rather than vilify the dogmatic dissent of Muslims towards Christian doctrine, Llull sought to acknowledge and answer Islamic critique of Christians, and to incorporate the nuance of Islamic philosophy in his own thought. Moreover, Ramon Llull did not shy away from facing the increasing pressure from the Islamic side of the divide that the core Christian dogmas should be proven – and not just defended – in order to be able to take the call for conversion seriously. This resulted in Llull’s own theological mechanism – which he wrote down in the various versions of his own philosophical manual, the *Ars*. This work explained the Trinity and the Incarnation on a purely logical level. This logic, called the ‘correlative theory’, was Llull’s own invention. Contrasting the intellectual motivation of Llull’s dealings with Islam with the attitude of his contemporaries can lead to interesting conclusions about the reason behind Llull’s argumentation and philosophical inventions.

The second subquestion is the following: “In how far can we call the *Disputatio Raimundi* a fictional work?”. While Llull wrote this work as a supposed recollection of his conversation with an Islamic scholar during his incarceration in Bijāya, it would be interesting to know whether Llull reflected an authentic Islamic point of view when he wrote the character of ‘Umar, or whether ‘Umar did not seem to loyally follow the Islamic traditions concerning the divine. This question will be answered in the second step of this

thesis. Another matter which could point to the alleged fictionality of the *Disputatio Raimundi* is the role of literary tendencies and commonplaces, which are present in Lull's œuvre. This matter will become more discernible in the first step of this thesis.

Throughout my dissertation, I will label certain thinkers as "philosophers", and others as "theologians". I will also label certain thoughts as "philosophy" and others as "theology". The main reasoning behind this is to adequately refer to the nature of the thought. I will attach the term "philosophy" to logic independent from theological dogma, or at least to logic which moves from a purely rational point of view. The use of logic which depends greatly on the notion of the divine or which is meant to underline established theological doctrines, will be named "theology". It is important to note that when it comes to Islamic thinkers, I will always refer to them as "philosophers" and to their thought as "philosophy", due to the independence of Islamic philosophy in their time.

2. METHODOLOGY

Every step of the argumentation in this project will coincide with a separate part of the thesis. In the first part of the thesis, I will devote my first chapter to the explanation of the theology of Lull during the time when the *Disputatio Raimundi* was written. Then, I will introduce four works with which I will compare the *Disputatio Raimundi*, being the *Llibre de contemplació en Déu* (1271-1273), the *Llibre del gentil e dels tres savis* (1274-1283), the *Cent noms de Déu* (1292), and the *Ars generalis ultima* (1305-1308). In the second and third chapter of part I, I will compare every attribute of God, which is present in the *Disputatio Raimundi*, with the same attributes in as many of the aforementioned works as possible. I will then distill the evolution of the attributes of God in Lull's œuvre. I will also sketch the literary logic and commonplaces as apparent throughout his works.

The second step of my research will be discussed in the second part of my thesis, where I compare the divine attributes of the *Disputatio Raimundi*, as explained by both 'Umar and Raimundus, with the interpretation of these attributes in the works of Islamic authors, being Ibn Sīnā (980-1037), Ibn Rušd (1126-1198), al-Ġazālī (1058-1111) and al-Ġuwaynī (1028-1085). These authors represented a philosophical current which greatly influenced Lull, and through a structural comparison of the attributes of God in the *Disputatio Raimundi* and the Islamic philosophers just mentioned, I will distill the main tendencies in Lull's adaptation of Islamic philosophical concepts.

The third step of the thesis will be the subject of the third part, where I will compare relevant passages from two Dominican missionaries, Ramon Martí († after 1284) and Riccoldo da Monte di Croce (1243-1320), to Lull's own missionary approach as apparent in the *Disputatio Raimundi*. I will limit myself to these two Dominican authors, due to their proximity and similarity to Ramon Lull and due to the importance of the Dominican order in the medieval Iberic context (especially in the case of written dialogues between Muslims and Christians). This is not to say that Ramon Lull did not have any affinity with the Franciscan order. I will, however, limit myself to Riccoldo and Martí due to the particular relevance of these two authors.

Throughout my thesis, I will base my approach on textual comparison. Even though Lull never quoted his sources, which was by no means abnormal in the late Middle Ages,

it is still relevant to compare the works of Ramon Llull with relevant sources from both Islamic and Christian authors. However, there will be a slight change in method between this chapter and the previous two. While the first two parts of my thesis are based on a systematic discussion of the attributes of God as they are mentioned in the *Disputatio Raimundi*, the third part will be based on the comparison of certain relevant passages in the works of Riccoldo da Monte di Croce and Ramon Martí on the one hand, and the *Disputatio Raimundi* on the other. This difference in method is based on the specific requirements of each part. While the first and second part of this thesis deal with the construction and comparison of the specific arguments of Llull in the *Disputatio Raimundi*, the third part is based on the general outlook on mission as apparent from the *Disputatio Raimundi* and the works of Riccoldo and Martí. While the first two parts of the dissertation deal with the specific arguments used in the *Disputatio Raimundi*, the third part deals with the general motivation and views behind the *Disputatio Raimundi*.

Throughout my project, I have been working from the original Latin and Catalan texts, written by Llull in order to make sure that my interpretation of the *Disputatio Raimundi* profits from intertextual comparison on the basis of the original phrasing. However, these originals made way for translations in order to make the text of the thesis more readable and to keep its length within the limit required. I will, each time, cite the *ORL*, *NEORL* or *ROL*-editions of Ramon Llull's works without quoting them in full, since these editions are easily accessible. Rarer works, for example the editions of Riccoldo da Monte di Croce or Ramon Martí, will be quoted in full in the footnotes. When it comes to Arabic sources, I will either quote them in their Latin translation to bridge the gap to the medieval reception of the source or to facilitate my textual comparison, or I will refer to them in English translation when the complexity or the length of the matter demands a clear and more accessible rendition of the text.

3. THE RELATION OF THE DISSERTATION TO THE *STATUS QUAESTIONIS*

The connection between Ramon Llull and Islam has been the subject of great debate in academia over the last few decades. It is generally accepted that Ramon Llull borrowed directly from al-Ġazālī since he devoted his first ever work, the *Compendium logicae Algazelis*, to a summary of al-Ġazālī's *Maqāsid al-falāsifa*. Llull originally wrote this work in Arabic. Charles Lohr's doctoral thesis on Llull's *Compendium logicae Algazelis*¹ explains the particularities of Llull's contact with al-Ġazālī, and his (at least partial) affinity with the original Arabic text. Apart from al-Ġazālī, Llull also mentioned various passages from Ibn Rušd's commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* throughout his œuvre.

Hans Daiber systematically discussed Islamic influences on the *Disputatio Raimundi* in his chapter in *Juden, Christen und Muslime: Religionsdialoge im Mittelalter*, written in 2004.² He focussed especially on the influence of Ibn Sīnā. I will follow his train of thought

¹ Charles Lohr, *Raimundus Lullus' Compendium Logicae Algazelis, Quellen, Lehre und Stellung in der Geschichte der Logik*, PhD thesis (Freiburg I Br.: Freiburg University, 1967).

² Hans Daiber, "Raimundus Lullus in der Auseinandersetzung mit dem Islam: Eine philosophiegeschichtliche Analyse des *Liber disputationis Raimundi christiani et Homeri saraceni*," in *Juden, Christen und Muslime: Religionsdialoge im Mittelalter*, ed. by Matthias Lutz-Bachmann, Alexander Fidora (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2004), 136-172.

throughout the second part of my dissertation, but discuss the matter more at length. Two decades earlier, in 1980, Dominique Urvoy reflected on the general connection between Llull and Islam in his monography *Penser l'islam*,³ without keeping a sole focus on the *Disputatio Raimundi*. His work focuses on the larger tendencies in the borrowing of Islamic dogma in the works of Ramon Llull, and also on the political and social context of both Majorca and North Africa. This work forms an exhaustive background of Llull's contact with Islam. Dominique Urvoy likewise wrote on the Lullian concept of a 'christianus Arabicus', which he sought to define and contextualize by its historical background. Charles Lohr discusses the meaning Llull attached to the concepts, and his intellectual ambitions dealing with Islam.⁴ Lohr also reflected on this particular topic in his 1984 paper "christianus arabicus, cuius nomen Raimundus Lullus".⁵ In this article, Lohr discusses Llull's knowledge of Arabic, the influence of Islamic thinkers on his philosophy, and the proposal of one certain Arabic source for the thought of Ramon Llull. Lohr especially suggests a comparison between Llull and Ibn Sab'īn of Murcia, who wrote the *Budd al-ārīf*, which contained a thorough introduction of Islamic metaphysics. In 1989, Miguel Cruz Hernández expressed the opinion that it would be pointless to seek concrete Islamic sources for Ramon Llull. He believed any Arab influence on the writings of Llull did not come from any direct contact with Islamic sources, but from the presence of Islamic culture and intellectual paradigms in the life of Ramon Llull.⁶ This theory is mentioned in the conclusion of the article of Anna Akasoy and Alexander Fidora, "Ibn Sab'īn and Raimundus Lullus: the Question of the Arabic Sources of Lullus' Logic Revisited,"⁷ where its validity as an end-all-be-all conclusion is nuanced. In the same article, Akasoy and Fidora seek to reinvestigate the influence of Ibn Sab'īn on Llull, which had been proposed by Lohr, and come to the conclusion that a direct borrowing would be rather unlikely. I will not venture into a discussion of Ibn Sab'īn and his potential influence of Llull's thought, since my focus will mainly be on the *Disputatio Raimundi*, where the findings are not immediately applicable. Even though I aim to seek substantial parallels between Llull's thought and philosophical paradigms reflected in Islamic sources, this does not mean that I will attempt to point out any concrete cases of intertextual borrowing between Llull's *Disputatio Raimundi* and concrete Islamic philosophical works, as

³ Dominique Urvoy, *Penser l'islam: les presupposes islamiques de l'art de Lull* (Paris: Vrin, 1980).

⁴ Dominique Urvoy, "L'idée de 'christianus Arabicus'," *Al-Qantara* (Madrid) 15, no. 2 (1994): 497-507.

⁵ Charles H. Lohr, "Christianus arabicus, cuius nomen Raimundus Lullus," *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 31, no. 1-2 (1984): 57-88.

⁶ Miguel Cruz Hernández, "El símbolo del árbol en Ramón Llull e Ibn al-Jatīb," in *Studia Lullistica: Miscellanea in honorem Sebastiani Garcias Palou* (Palma de Mallorca: Maioricensis Schola Lullistica, 1989), 24.

⁷ Anna A. Akasoy and Alexander Fidora, "Ibn Sab'īn and Raimundus Lullus: The Question of the Arabic Sources of Lullus' Logic Revisited," in *Islamic Thought in the Middle Ages: Studies in Text, Transmission and Translation in Honour of Hans Daiber*, ed. by Anna A. Akasoy and Wim Raven (Leiden: Brill, 2008), pp. 450-451: "Miguel Cruz Hernández was adamant in his rejection of any debate of specific Arabic sources of Raimundus Lullus and ascribed the obvious parallels to a global influence of Islamic culture on the Catalan missionary. Our research into this question has led us to the conclusion that this statement contains both right and wrong elements. On the one hand we share his criticism that many comparisons with specific texts are based on rather scant evidence which is quite often taken out of context. Yet, this should not lead us to abandoning the question of specific influences altogether."

Benlabbah did in her comparison between the works of Ibn ‘Arabī and Ramon Llull.⁸ I will discuss the influence of Islamic ideas, represented by the works of certain philosophers which could have inspired Llull, but not as literal, concrete sources which can be proven to have directly influenced him.

In more recent times, the connection between Llull’s works and the Qur’ānic Names of God has been discussed by Simone Sari. He wrote extensively on the *Cent noms de Déu*, and he discussed its connection to the Islamic background of the work.⁹ Sari translated the *Cent noms de Déu* together with Robert D. Hughes, and published this translation online through *Manicula*.¹⁰ Throughout my dissertation, I will make use of his translation whenever I discuss the *Cent noms de Déu*. Sari also wrote on the Arabic translation of Llull’s works, and on the intended Islamic audience which Llull had in mind while writing his works in his paper “‘Saracenus non considerat nomen Dei ita altum, sicut christianus’, Arabic in Llull’s linguistic politics and God’s (co)essential attributes”. The paper was written for the online conference “Dialogue in the Dungeon” (May 2021), hosted by professor Annemarie C. Mayer and myself. Sari mainly discusses the *Cent noms de Déu* and the *Disputatio Raimundi* in this instance.¹¹

In 2021, the Pontificio Istituto di Studi Arabi e d’Islamistica (PISAI) hosted an international congress dedicated to the connection between Ramon Llull and Islam. The papers which were published on behalf of this conference shed light on the special intellectual and moral outlook of Ramon Llull on conversion and interreligious debate. Of those papers, Simone Sari’s contribution (“I nomi di Dio in Ramon Llull”) has already been mentioned. Fatiha Benlabbah also devoted her paper on the purely Islamic side of the Beautiful Names of God.¹² In 2008, she also wrote an article on the intertextual connection between Ramon Llull and the Andalusian scholar and mystic Ibn ‘Arabī, concerning the unity of humankind. The role of direct intertextuality in her article is especially notable.¹³ Annemarie Mayer’s contribution is dedicated to the Islamic theological background of Ramon Llull. She discusses several of the authors which will be relevant in this dissertation,

⁸ Cf. Fatiha Benlabbah, “The Idea of Human Unity in Ibn Arabi and Ramon Llull,” *Ramon Llull and Islam, the Beginning of Dialogue / Ramon Llull y el islam, el inicio del diálogo*, Quaderns de la Mediterrània 9 (2008): 31-35.

⁹ Simone Sari, “One God, Many Names: Llull’s Hundred Names of God in its Christian and Islamic religious context,” *Studia Lulliana* 60 (2020): 5-36. Also: Simone Sari, “I ‘Cent noms de Déu’ di Ramon Llull: Il Corano e l’epica romanza,” *Carte Romanze* 8/1 (2020): 173-197; and Simone Sari, “I nomi di Dio in Ramon Llull,” in *Il beato Raimondo Lullo: Il personaggio e il suo rapporto con l’Islam*, Studi arabo-islamici del PISAI 24 (Rome: PISAI, 2021), 175-202.

¹⁰ Ramon Llull, “Hundred Names of God,” trans. by Simone Sari and Robert Hughes, *Manicula: Taller d’edició i anotació de textos*, ed. online in *manicula.narpan.net*, 2020: <https://manicula.narpan.net/obres/hundred-names-god>.

¹¹ Simone Sari, “‘Saracenus non considerat nomen Dei ita altum, sicut christianus’, Arabic in Llull’s linguistic politics and God’s (co)essential attributes” (Turnhout: Brepols, 2024).

¹² Fatiha Benlabbah, “*Asmā’ Allāh al-husnā*: Los nombres más bellos de Dios,” in *Il beato Raimondo Lullo: Il personaggio e il suo rapporto con l’Islam*, Studi arabo-islamici del PISAI 24 (Rome: PISAI, 2021), 149-173.

¹³ Fatiha Benlabbah, “The Idea of Human Unity in Ibn Arabi and Ramon Llull,” *Ramon Llull and Islam, the Beginning of Dialogue / Ramon Llull y el islam, el inicio del diálogo*, Quaderns de la Mediterrània 9 (2008): 31-35.

such as Ibn Sīnā, al-Ġazālī and Ibn Rušd.¹⁴ Hans Daiber's article in this work is devoted to Llull's outlook on interreligious debate. He describes Llull's belief in interfaith dialogue which moves from common values, shared between Christianity and Islam.¹⁵

The current debate about Llull's theology has been greatly influenced by the renewed interest in his particular style of vernacular writing, discussed by Lola Badia, Joan Santanach and Albert Soler.¹⁶ Especially Lola Badia's theory concerning the autoreferentiality of Ramon Llull in his œuvre will be a defining theory throughout my study of the *Disputatio Raimundi*, where I will underline the difference between Ramon Llull as the historical writer, and the manner in which Llull refers to himself as the character 'Raimundus'. The focus on the role of literary paradigms which particularly belong to Llull's œuvre is a great background to re-evaluate the truth claim of the events of the *Disputatio Raimundi*.

Most notably, Jordi Gayà's work "*La teoría luliana de los correlativos. Historia de su formación conceptual*" explains the evolution of the correlative theory in the life and works of Ramon Llull. Jordi Gayà devotes part of this work to explaining Llull's theology in the *Disputatio Raimundi*.¹⁷ Bonner's work "The Art and Logic of Ramon Llull: a User's Guide"¹⁸ should also be mentioned as a method to contextualize the *Disputatio Raimundi* in the greater œuvre of Ramon Llull. Bonner divides the evolution of the *Ars* into two phases: the quaternary phase (where the *Ars* contains twelve attributes of God, or a few sets of four) and the ternary phase (where the number of attributes comes down to nine, or a few sets of three). The correlative theory is typical for the ternary phase, and can be seen in the *Ars generalis ultima*.

Ramon Llull's connection with the Dominicans has been discussed by Anthony Bonner in his 1990 article "Ramon Llull and the Dominicans".¹⁹ Robin Vose also wrote several works about the connection between Llull and the Dominicans. His monography *Dominicans, Muslims and Jews in the Medieval Crown of Aragon* deals with the history of Dominican interreligious mission in the Crown of Aragon, independently from the influence of Ramon Llull.²⁰ For the conference "Dialogue in the Dungeon", Robin Vose wrote the article "Preachers, Teachers and Fools, Dominican Influence in Ramon Llull's

¹⁴ Annemarie C. Mayer, "The Contribution of Islamic Doctrines to the Thought of Ramon Llull," in *Il beato Raimondo Lullo: Il personaggio e il suo rapporto con l'Islam*, Studi arabo-islamici del PISAI 24 (Rome: PISAI, 2021), 91-125.

¹⁵ Hans Daiber, "Universal Values – A Starting Point for Ramon Llull's Interreligious Dialogue," in *Il beato Raimondo Lullo: Il personaggio e il suo rapporto con l'Islam*, Studi arabo-islamici del PISAI 24 (Rome: PISAI, 2021), 299-317.

¹⁶ Lola Badia, Joan Santanach and Albert Soler, *Ramon Llull as a Vernacular Writer: Communicating a New Kind of Knowledge*, trans. by Robert Hughes (London: Tamesis, 2016). In particular the epilogue, Lola Badia, "Ramon Llull's Œuvre as a Whole: Autobiographism and Self-Referentiality," 265-310.

¹⁷ Jordi Gayà Estelrich, *La teoría luliana de los correlativos: Historia de su formación conceptual*, (Palma de Mallorca: s.e., 1979), p. 173.

¹⁸ Anthony Bonner, *The Art and Logic of Ramon Llull: A User's Guide*, Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 95 (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2007).

¹⁹ Anthony Bonner, "Ramon Llull and the Dominicans," *Catalan Review*, Vol. 4, *Homage to Ramon Llull* 4 (1990): 377-392.

²⁰ Robin J. E. Vose, *Dominicans, Muslims and Jews in the Medieval Crown of Aragon* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

Dialogue with Islam”.²¹ Here, he discusses the Dominican influence on Ramon Llull more directly. I will incorporate his findings in this dissertation, especially in part three, which is dedicated to the comparison of Ramon Llull with Dominican writers. Harvey Hames’s article “Through Ramon Llull’s Looking Glass: What was the Thirteenth Century Dominican Mission Really About?”²² discusses Llull’s mission as a typically Dominican venture. The connection of Ramon Llull to the Dominican language schools was discussed by Bonner and Vose. Moreover, a very thorough discussion on Dominican language schools, independent from Ramon Llull, has been made by Ángel Cortabarría Beitia in particular in his article “Los ‘Studia Linguarum’ de los dominicos en los siglos XIII y XIV”.²³

The question about a possible connection between Llull and Ramon Martí has long been the subject of heated academic debate. In 1969, Ephrem Longpré focused in particular on Llull’s opinion on Ramon Martí in his article “Le B. Raymond Lulle et Raymond Martí O.P.”²⁴ There, Longpré discussed the alleged references Llull made to Martí in several of his works. In 2012, however, Alexander Fidora discusses the influence of the *Pugio fidei* on Ramon Llull in an article.²⁵ In this article, Fidora nuances the findings of Longpré, questioning their absolute certainty. The influence of Ramon Martí on Ramon Llull has recently been more thoroughly debated in academia. Only recently, a collection of studies under the supervision of Görg Hasselhof and Alexander Fidora has been devoted to Martí’s *Pugio fidei* in particular.²⁶ The collection discusses the particularities of the text, both religious and literary. Another article by Ángel Cortabarría Beitia discusses the knowledge of Islam by both Llull and Martí, and compares the approaches of the two authors.²⁷ In this dissertation, I aim to provide the reader with a detailed comparison of Ramon Llull’s theology as apparent in the *Disputatio*, and the theology of Ramon Martí in as far as it represents certain aspects of Dominican intellectual culture in the thirteenth century. Whether the two authors influenced each other directly, or whether we can speak with certainty of a direct intertextual borrowing between Llull and Martí, will not be the main topic of this dissertation.

The comparison between Ramon Llull and Riccoldo da Monte di Croce has been made less often in recent academic publications. John Tolan juxtaposes Llull’s opinion on Islamic

²¹ Robin J. E. Vose, “Preachers, Teachers and Fools, Dominican Influence in Ramon Llull’s Dialogue with Islam” (Turnhout: Brepols, 2024).

²² Harvey J. Hames, “Through Ramon Llull’s Looking Glass: What was the Thirteenth-Century Dominican Mission Really About?,” in *Ramon Llull i el lul·lisme: pensament i llenguatge: Actes de les jornades en homenatge a J.N. Hillgarth i A. Bonner*, ed. by Maria I. Ripoll and Margalida Tortella, Col·leccio Blaquerna 10 (Palma: Universitat de les Illes Balears; Barcelona: Universitat de Barcelona, 2012), 51-74.

²³ Ángel Cortabarría Beitia, “Los ‘Studia Linguarum’ de los dominicos en los siglos XIII y XIV,” in *La controversia judeocristiana en España (Desde los orígenes hasta el siglo XIII): Homenaje a Domingo Muñoz León*, ed. by Carlos del Valle Rodríguez (Madrid: CSIC, 1998), 253-276.

²⁴ Ephrem Longpré, “Le B. Raymond Lulle et Raymond Martí, O.P.,” *Estudios Lullianos* 13 (1969): 197-200.

²⁵ Alexander Fidora, “Ramon Martí in Context: the Influence of the *Pugio fidei* on Ramon Llull, Arnau de Vilanova and Francesc Eiximenis,” *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales* 79 (2012): 373-397.

²⁶ *Ramon Martí’s Pugio fidei: Studies and Texts*, ed. by Görg K. Hasselhoff and Alexander Fidora, Exemplaria Scholastica, Textos i estudis medievals 8 (Santa Coloma de Queralt: Obrador Edendum, 2017).

²⁷ Ángel Cortabarría Beitia, “Connaissance de l’Islam chez Ramon Lulle et Raymond Martin O.P. Parallèle,” *Cahiers de Fanjeaux* 22 (Toulouse: Privat, 1987), 33-55.

thought and culture with both Ramon Martí and Riccoldo da Monte di Croce (together with Roger Bacon) in his article “Saracen Philosophers Secretly Deride Islam”.²⁸ In Tolan’s monography “Saracens”,²⁹ he gives an overview of an extensive number of medieval Christian authors who wrote about Islam, from the seventh to the fourteenth century, and provides a description of their views as apparent from their works. He discusses Ramon Martí, Ramon de Penyafort and Riccoldo da Monte di Croce as typical examples of thirteenth century Dominican missionaries. Tolan also discusses Ramon Llull in a separate chapter, devoted to the special place of Llull’s œuvre in the thirteenth century. Tolan makes the occasional comparison between Llull and Martí or Riccoldo, but he never provides an extensive, systematic overview of the similarities and differences between these authors.

²⁸ John Tolan, ““Saracen Philosophers Secretly Deride Islam,”” *Medieval Encounters: Jewish, Christian, and Muslim Culture in Confluence and Dialogue* 8, no. 2-3 (2002): 184-208.

²⁹ John V. Tolan, *Saracens: Islam in the Medieval European Imagination* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), pp. 234-242 (Ramon Martí); pp. 245-254 (Riccoldo); pp. 256-274 (Llull).

PART I: THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES IN LLULL'S ŒUVRE

CHAPTER 1: LIFE AND WORKS OF RAMON LLULL, AN OVERVIEW.

1. THE SITUATION IN MAJORCA

A few years before the birth of Ramon Llull, in 1229, the city of Medina Mayurqa was conquered by King James I. The city was consequently renamed according to the Catalan interpretation of the Islamic name: Ciutat de Mallorca. Some, but not all, of the Catalan knights, notables and merchants stayed in the conquered territory. Among them was the family of Ramon Llull. The conquering of the city later led to the formation of the Kingdom of Majorca, which came about by the political union between many of the Balearic islands, and a part of the mainland.³⁰

The Ciutat de Mallorca, where Llull was born, held a very multicultural society. There was a large Muslim population, which had been present on the island since before the conquering of the island. They had been offered a choice to either leave the island, or to stay under Christian rule. Unlike other newly Christian states, where the Muslim population was given relative freedom due to their indispensable value as craftsmen and labourers,³¹ the island of Majorca did not offer protection for the Muslim population, which had now been rendered politically and religiously very vulnerable. Rather, a major part of the Islamic population of Majorca was held captive and enslaved. There remained only a small number of free Islamic merchants and artisans. Majorcan Muslims were not allowed to practice their religion in public. There were no Muslim quarters in Majorca, there was no clear circulation of Islamic legislative texts which would apply for the Majorcan Muslims, and there seems to have been a complete absence of mosques. Islamic communities were also forbidden to write their own legislative texts. During the first three decades, Majorca also saw the occasional arrival of Muslims from Menorca, after a royal decree of 1231 had promised them free and safe travel opportunities between Majorca and Menorca. After the fall of Menorca, however, the Islamic population of Majorca started to dwindle, and an increasing number of Muslims fled to North Africa and Granada.³²

The life of Ramon Llull must be placed in a context of a multicultural society, the presence of Arab thought, and sometimes interfaith exchange – even though contacts between Muslims and Christians did not happen on equal terms in the Balearic islands. Ramon Llull's own family, which was of Barcelonense origin, co-financed the conquering of Majorca. Llull's family mainly consisted of members the middleclass bourgeoisie, who had accumulated wealth from their participation in slave trading and the selling of textiles.

³⁰ Alexander Fidora, and Josep E. Rubio, *Raimundus Lullus: An Introduction to His Life, Works and Thought*, trans. by Anna A. Akasoy (Turnhout: Brepols, 2008), *CCCM*, 214, *ROL*, Supplementum Lullianum II, p. 15.

³¹ Cf. also Marianne Moyaert, *Christian Imaginations of the Religious Other: A History of Religionization* (Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 2024), p. 119.

³² Fidora, Rubio, *Raimundus Lullus*, *CCCM*, 214, *ROL*, Supplementum Lullianum II, pp. 16-18.

Several older members of Llull's family had been included into the Majorcan *Llibre de repartiment*, which listed the names of every participant of the conquering of Majorca as well as their part in the capturing and enslavement of its Muslim population. For their efforts in the conquering of Majorca, Llull's relatives received a large compensation.³³

2. LLULL'S CONVERSION

Ramon Llull's early life was devoted to fulfilling his set role in his family, and of accepting his place in court. Llull married Blanca Picany, a woman from a politically active Catalan family, and they had at least two children, Magdalena and Domènec. He did not engage in considerable learning in the first part of his life, which would not have been customary for a man of his occupation. He did learn 'grammar' or how to speak and write with flair. Llull had a knowledge of literature and rhetorics, which suited someone who had the background of a troubadour. However, Llull would have to find a way to work with his relative lack of literary learning and, especially, his lack of skills in Latin. His own evaluation of his pre-conversion life was rather negative. In his *Vita coetanea*, he recounted that he was not by any means a loyal husband, and that he engaged in excesses typical for a courtly life. Ramon Llull recounts his own conversion story from his vain past in almost hagiographical terms. The *Vita coetanea* recounts the story of how Llull, while writing a love poem, was suddenly struck by a vision of Christ on the cross. This inspired Llull to accept a "conversion to penitence".³⁴ According to Alexander Fidora and Josep E. Rubio, this divinely inspired conversion moment was, in fact, commonplace in stories about lay piety, which were increasingly common in the 13th century.³⁵ The outcome of Llull's conversion was that he would take on three goals, all serving the conversion of non-Christians. Ramon Llull would attempt to convert non-Christians to Christianity; he would write a book, containing philosophical theory by which non-Christians (Muslims in particular) might be converted; he would attempt to persuade both secular authority and the Church to found monasteries dedicated to the study of the languages of non-Christian peoples, to prepare monks for travelling as a missionary.³⁶ The *Vita coetanea* then recounts how Llull decided to follow the example of Saint Francis, sold his belongings (except the essentials which were necessary for the survival of his wife and children), and went on a pilgrimage to various holy places within the Christian world.³⁷

3. THE ART

After Llull's conversion he devoted nine years to the study of the Arabic language and philosophy. Llull eventually decided to leave Majorca and travel to Barcelona and Paris, where he wished to study grammar at the university. When he was dissuaded by Ramon de Penyafort from doing so, Ramon Llull travelled back to Majorca, where he bought a

³³ Fidora, Rubio, *Raimundus Lullus*, CCCM, 214, ROL, Supplementum Lullianum II, pp. 22-24.

³⁴ Raimundus Lullus, *Vita coetanea*, ed. by Hermogenes Harada (Turnhout: Brepols, 1980), CCCM, 34, ROL, VIII, pp. 272-273.

³⁵ Fidora, Rubio, *Raimundus Lullus*, CCCM, 214, ROL, Supplementum Lullianum II, p. 37.

³⁶ Fidora, Rubio, *Raimundus Lullus*, CCCM, 214, ROL, Supplementum Lullianum II, p. 38; Cf. Lullus, *Vita coetanea*, CCCM, XXXIV, ROL, VIII, pp. 274-276.

³⁷ Lullus, *Vita coetanea*, CCCM, XXXIV, ROL, VIII, pp. 277-278.

Muslim slave, whom he employed as his teacher of Arabic.³⁸ However, at the end of a nine-year period during which Llull studied Arabic, tragedy struck. Llull had heard from his servants that the slave had allegedly insulted Christ while he was away, to which Llull retaliated by hitting the slave across the face. When the slave attempted to stab his master and former pupil, Llull managed to escape, having suffered only an injury to his stomach. Llull ordered the slave to be locked up in a prison, where the latter committed suicide. Despite the grave emotional turmoil that accompanied the event, Llull felt relieved by the slave's sudden end, since he was now free from the prospect of having to punish him.³⁹

After nine years, Llull travelled to mount Randa to rest and contemplate. A week later, Llull received a divine revelation, which consisted of the contents of the book he had intended to write at the beginning of his conversion. Llull left his place at the mountain, and began composing the first version of his book in a nearby monastery, which he first called the *Ars maior* and later the *Ars generalis*.⁴⁰ He later returned to the mountain, where he stayed for another four months of contemplation. After this intermezzo, the *Vita coaetanea* mentions that Llull was invited by the King of Majorca to Montpellier, where he resided.⁴¹

During his nine years of study and contemplation, Llull began writing his first books. The contents of those books were mainly reworkings of his *Ars*. The first was the *Logica Algazelis* (1271, Montpellier),⁴² then the *Llibre de contemplació en Déu* (1273, place unknown),⁴³ and the *Ars compendiosa inveniendi veritatem* (1274, Majorca).⁴⁴ Llull also wrote his *Doctrina pueril*, a work in the vernacular which he devoted to his son, with the intention of providing him with a bundle of life lessons, suitable for a young child.⁴⁵

4. LLULL'S JOURNEYS

4.1. MONTPELLIER, PARIS AND ROME

After Llull finished writing his first works, and after his discovery of the *Ars*, the *Vita coaetanea* skips a decade of Llull's life. During this period, in 1276, King James I of Aragon passed away. Peter III became the king of Aragon, and James II became king of Majorca. In 1287, Llull travelled to Rome, with the purpose of convincing the pope of his vision (being his plans for the conversion of Muslims, and the promotion of his *Art*). Llull

³⁸ Lullus, *Vita coaetanea*, CCCM, XXXIV, ROL, VIII, p. 278.

³⁹ Fidora, Rubio, *Raimundus Lullus*, CCCM, 214, ROL, Supplementum Lullianum II, pp. 43-44. Cf. Lullus, *Vita coaetanea*, CCCM, XXXIV, ROL, VIII, pp. 278-280.

⁴⁰ Lullus, *Vita coaetanea*, CCCM, XXXIV, ROL, VIII, pp. 280-281.

⁴¹ Fidora, Rubio, *Raimundus Lullus*, CCCM, 214, ROL, Supplementum Lullianum II, p. 46. Cf. Lullus, *Vita coaetanea*, CCCM, XXXIV, ROL, VIII, pp. 281-282.

⁴² Edition: Charles Lohr, *Raimundus Lullus' Compendium Logicae Algazelis: Quellen, Lehre und Stellung in der Geschichte der Logik*, PhD thesis (Freiburg I Br.: Freiburg University, 1967).

⁴³ Ramon Llull, *Llibre de contemplació en Déu, Volum I: llibres I-II. Volum II: llibre III*, ed. by Antoni I. Alomar, Montserrat Lluch, Aina Sitjes and Albert Soler (Palma: Patronat Ramon Llull, 2015), NEORL, XIV.

⁴⁴ Ramon Llull, *Beati Raymundi Lulli Opera*, ed. by Ivo Salzinger I (Mainz: Häffner, 1721; reimpr. F. Frankfurt: Stegmüller, 1965), MOG, I, 47-74.

⁴⁵ Ramon Llull, *Doctrina pueril*, ed. by Joan Santanach i Suñol (Palma de Mallorca: Patronat Ramon Llull, 2005), NEORL, VII.

also travelled to Paris and Montpellier to teach his philosophy. Llull also attempted to find diplomatic footing in the Franciscan world, at the French court, and among the politicians of the Venetian Republic.⁴⁶ Ramon Llull wrote the *Cent noms de Déu*⁴⁷ in this period, which was an initiative which supplemented Llull's request to the pope.⁴⁸

Between 1287 and 1289, Llull stayed in Paris to teach the theology of his *Ars*. He joined the Collège de Sorbonne, where he met with Peter of Limoges. Peter collected a number of works written by Llull, and made his own copies of a few of them. Llull also met with Thomas Le Myésier. However, the *Ars* was not widely accepted in the hearts and minds of the Parisian academics, who criticized its philosophy.⁴⁹ After his journey back to Montpellier, a disappointed Ramon Llull revised his *Ars*, and he wrote the *Ars inventiva veritatis*⁵⁰ and the *Ars amativa boni*⁵¹ in the winter of 1289.⁵²

During his stay in Montpellier, Llull seemed to have been in close contact with the Franciscan order. Llull probably witnessed the moment when Gaufredi was elected Minister General of the order in May 1289. Gaufredi wrote a letter to the Ministers of Apulia, Syria and Genoa, praising Llull's character and underlining his level of trust in him, asking them to grant Llull permission to teach the *Ars* in their monasteries. This story shows the possibility of Llull's affinity for Franciscan ideas and doctrines. According to Fidora and Rubio, however, Llull's supposed rejection of Dominican views in benefit of Franciscan views cannot sufficiently be proven by historical and literary examples alone.⁵³

In 1289, the city of Tripoli, which was still a Latin Christian bastion at the time, fell under the Egyptian, Islamic forces. The last crusader territory, Acco, was taken in 1291, after the Latin Christians had been trapped inside the city for a while. Help from Christian crusaders, who wished to save the Latin Christians from their entrapment, came sporadically. The fall of both Tripoli and Acco spurred Llull to reflect on the spread of Christianity to the Islamic world, and which spiritual and military tactic would secure the spread of the Christian faith. Llull travelled to Rome shortly after the events, where he

⁴⁶ Fidora, Rubio, *Raimundus Lullus*, CCCM, 214, ROL, Supplementum Lullianum II, 54-55.

⁴⁷ Ramon Llull, *Obres de Ramon Llull: Rims, vol. I, Cent noms de Déu*, ed. by Ramon d'Alòs-Moner and Salvador Galmés (Palma de Mallorca: Comissió Editora Lulliana, 1936), ORL, XIX, 75-170.

⁴⁸ Fidora, Rubio, *Raimundus Lullus*, CCCM, 214, ROL, Supplementum Lullianum II, p. 56.

⁴⁹ For a more recent and complete work dealing with the reactions of Parisian academics to Llull's *Ars*, cf. Josep E. Rubio, "La présentation de l'Art lullien en milieu universitaire: Paris 1289," in *Les formes laïques de la philosophie: Raymond Lulle dans l'histoire de la philosophie médiévale*, ed. by Dominique de Courcelles (Turnhout: Brepols, 2018), IPM, 81, 105-121; cf. also in the same volume: Jacques Verger, "L'intérêt des maîtres parisiens du XIIIe siècle pour les textes non universitaires, latins ou vernaculaires" in *Les formes laïques de la philosophie: Raymond Lulle dans l'histoire de la philosophie médiévale*, ed. Dominique de Courcelles (Turnhout: Brepols, 2018), IPM, 81, 123-138.

⁵⁰ Raimundus Lullus, *Ars inventiva veritatis*, ed. by Jorge Uscatescu Barrón (Turnhout: Brepols, 2014), CCCM, 265, ROL, XXXVII, cxxii-513.

⁵¹ Ramon Llull, *Obres de Ramon Llull: Ars amativa, Arbre de filosofia desiderat*, ed. by Salvador Galmés (Palma de Mallorca: Institut d'estudis catalans de Barcelona, 1933), ORL, XVII, 1-388.

⁵² Fidora, Rubio, *Raimundus Lullus*, CCCM, 214, ROL, Supplementum Lullianum II, pp. 57-63.

⁵³ Fidora, Rubio, *Raimundus Lullus*, CCCM, 214, ROL, Supplementum Lullianum II, pp. 67-68. Cf. also Armand Llinarès, "Raymond Lulle à Montpellier: La refonte du 'Grand Art'," in *Raymond Lulle et le Pays d'Oc*, Cahiers de Fanjeaux 22 (Toulouse: Privat, 1987), 17-32 and Jordi Gayà, "El ambiente científico de Montpellier en los siglos XIII y XIV," *Estudios Lullianos* 21 (1977): 59-67 for more information about Llull and the intellectual environment of Montpellier.

wrote the *Liber de passagio*,⁵⁴ which contained his own plans on how to convert non-Christians (or “infidels”), and how to conquer the Holy Land. In the *Liber de passagio*, Llull saw military strategies and missionary work as two sides of the same coin. While Llull had been sceptic towards the use of force in his earlier writings, he suddenly seemed more willing to believe that conversion should be facilitated by the use of force as a threat against those who would be unwilling to convert.⁵⁵ Llull dedicated his *Liber de passagio* to Pope Nicholas IV. He also repeated his plea to establish monasteries, devoted to the teaching of the languages of non-Christians.⁵⁶

4.2. TUNIS

Ramon Llull achieved very little with his pleas to the pope. In 1291, he left Rome and travelled to Genoa, from where he wanted to find a way into the Islamic world. In 1292, Llull intended to board a ship heading for Tunis. However, just prior to boarding, Llull experienced a great fear of the consequences of his plans, i.e. fear of death or imprisonment. The fear made him gravely ill, and he decided to stay in Genoa. However, he soon felt a great remorse for the disappointment he caused for the Genoese, who had marveled at Llull’s religious zeal and ambition.⁵⁷ During the feast of Pentecost in 1293, which Llull celebrated in the Dominican monastery of Genoa, Llull fell into an even deeper depression. He was carried to a bed, where he received a vision of the monastery being illuminated, with a voice saying: “In this order, you will be saved.” Thereupon, Llull wished to join the Dominican order. However, due to the prior’s absence, he could not join immediately. After short deliberation, Ramon Llull decided to change his original plan. He recalled that the Franciscans had accepted his *Ars* more enthusiastically, and that he had already established a positive connection to the order. Therefore, Llull decided to turn to the Franciscan order instead of obeying what he believed was a divine calling to join the Dominicans.⁵⁸ Even though Llull’s believe in his mission and his *Ars* remained unchanged, his disobedience to the vision of God, ordering him to enter the Dominican order, left him uncertain of his salvation.⁵⁹

In 1293, Ramon did eventually leave for Tunis. His plan was to discuss faith with the local intellectual elite. Ramon Llull entered the society of Islamic intellectuals, and

⁵⁴ Raimundus Lullus, *Liber de passagio*, ed. by Blanca Garí and Fernando Domínguez Reboiras (Turnhout: Brepols, 2003), CCCM, 182, ROL, XXVIII, 255-353.

⁵⁵ Fidora, Rubio, *Raimundus Lullus*, CCCM, 214, ROL, Supplementum Lullianum II, pp. 71-72. For a complete overview of Llull’s views on the crusades: cf. also Pamela M. Beattie, *Evangelization, Reform and Eschatology: Mission and Crusade in the Thought of Ramon Llull*, PhD thesis (Toronto: University of Toronto, unpublished, 1995), and by the same author: Pamela M. Beattie, “‘Pro exaltatione sanctae fidei catholicae’: Mission and Crusade in the Writings of Ramon Llull”, in *Iberia and the Mediterranean World of the Middle Ages: Studies in Honor of Robert I. Burns S.J.*, ed. by Larry J. Simon (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 113-129 and Pamela Beattie, “Ramon Llull’s Crusade Treatises,” in *A Companion to Ramon Llull and Lullism*, ed. by Amy M. Austin and Mark D. Johnston (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 176-214; cf. also Gabriel Ensenyat, “Pacifisme i croada en Ramon Llull,” in *Ramon Llull i l’islam: L’inici del diàleg*, Origenes 129 (Barcelona: La Magrana, 2008), 232-245.

⁵⁶ Fidora, Rubio, *Raimundus Lullus*, CCCM, 214, ROL, Supplementum Lullianum II, p. 70.

⁵⁷ Raimundus Lullus, *Vita coaetanea*, CCCM, 34, ROL, VIII, pp. 284-285.

⁵⁸ Raimundus Lullus, *Vita coaetanea*, CCCM, 34, ROL, VIII, pp. 286-287.

⁵⁹ Fidora, Rubio, *Raimundus Lullus*, CCCM, 214, ROL, Supplementum Lullianum II, pp. 75-77. On the acceptance of Llull’s thought by the Franciscans: cf. Jordi Gayà Estelrich, “Adscripción de la teología trinitaria de Ramón Llull a la escuela franciscana,” *Estudios Franciscanos: Volumen homenaje al Beato Ramón Llull en el VII centenario de su muerte (1316-2016)* 117 (2016): 485-520.

proposed a debate based on logical arguments. The Islamic scholars would be allowed to bring forth arguments against Christianity, to which Lull would reply, using the *Ars*. If the arguments put forth by the Islamic intellectuals would prove sufficient, Lull would convert to Islam. The local authorities of Tunis were at first very interested in the possibility of such a debate, and wished to officially approve its taking place. However, fearing the political consequences, they finally decided to banish Lull from Tunis altogether. On his way to a Genoese ship heading for Christian territory, Lull was almost stoned by the onlookers. Initially, Lull escaped from the ship to re-enter the shores of Tunis. But due to the aggravated tensions which rose from his presence, he decided to sail back to Naples.⁶⁰ Later, Lull obtained permission from Prince Charles Martel of Anjou (1271-1295) to preach to the Muslim population in the city. However, it is unknown whether Lull indeed went to Lucera to preach.⁶¹

4.3. SECOND JOURNEYS TO ROME AND PARIS

The appointment of Celestine came with a great deal of anticipation of Christian reform and spiritual renewal. This could have been an interesting environment for Ramon Lull to put his missionary ideas forward.⁶² However, after the new pope abdicated from the papacy, the office was attributed to Boniface VIII (pope from 1294 to 1303). Ramon Lull petitioned Boniface with the same words as he did Celestine. However, even though Boniface theorized and speculated about the crusade as a tool for the acquisition of wealth and papal power, he never seemed too keen on actually carrying out his ideas. Lull would endlessly follow the pope as he travelled while trying to advertise his ideas. In 1295, Boniface signed a peace treaty between the House of Aragon and the House of Anjou, while residing in Anagni. This, for Ramon Lull, was a sign to leave Anagni and head back to Rome. The series of unfortunate events was accompanied by an intellectually fruitful period, during which Lull wrote continuously. Among his works written during this period were the *Arbor scientiae*⁶³ and the *Desconhort*.⁶⁴ The *Arbor scientiae* is one of the most complete overviews and adaptations of Lull's *Ars*. The work is a reaction to the lack of support from the papacy for Lull's goals and plans. The *Desconhort* was a poem which expressed Lull's grievances and his disappointment with his lack of success and appreciation. Ramon Lull expressed his worries and solitude in the face of his failure to live up to his divine mission, but also expresses his belief in God's mercy and grace.⁶⁵

⁶⁰ Fidora, Rubio, *Raimundus Lullus*, CCCM, 214, ROL, Supplementum Lullianum II, pp. 77-78.

⁶¹ Akasey, Fidora, Rubio, *Raimundus Lullus*, CCCM, 214, ROL, Supplementum Lullianum II, p. 79.

⁶² Raimundus Lullus, *Vita coaetanea*, CCCM, 34, ROL, VIII, pp. 293-294.

⁶³ Catalan: Ramon Lull, *Obres de Ramon Lull: Arbre de sciencia*, vols. I-III, ed. by Salvador Galmés (Palma de Mallorca: Comissió Editora Lulliana, 1917, 1923, 1926), ORL, XI-XIII. Latin: Raimundus Lullus, *Arbor scientiae*, ed. by Pere Villalba i Varneda, Turnhout: Brepols, 2000, CCCM, 180, ROL, XXIV-XXVI.

⁶⁴ Ramon Lull, *Obres de Ramon Lull: Rims, vol. I, Desconhort*, ed. by Ramon d'Alòs-Moner and Salvador Galmés (Palma de Mallorca: Institut d'estudis catalans de Barcelona, 1936), ORL, XIX, 217-254.

⁶⁵ Fidora, Rubio, *Raimundus Lullus*, CCCM, 214, ROL, Supplementum Lullianum II, pp. 82-83. For a more thorough explanation of the connection between the *Desconhort* and the *Arbor Sapientiae*: cf. Anthony Bonner, "A Background to the *Desconhort*, *Tree of Science*, and *Apostrophe*," in *Religion, Text, and Society in Medieval Spain and Northern Europe: Essays in honor of J.N. Hillgarth*, ed. by Thomas E. Burman, Mark D. Meyerson and Leah Shopkow, Papers in Medieval Studies 16 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2002), 122-133; and on the *Arbor scientiae*, cf. also *Arbor scientiae: der*

After his failed attempts to convince the papal court of his ideas, Llull travelled to Paris, where he gave public lectures on the *Ars*. He stayed in Paris from 1297 to 1299. He also met with the King of France, whom Llull tried to convince of his crusading plans. During his stay at the university, Llull participated in the intellectual tendencies of the time. For example, he wrote his own commentary on the *Sententiae* of Peter Lombard (the *Disputatio eremitaie et Raimundi super aliquibus dubiis quaestionibus Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi*)⁶⁶ all while staying loyal to his typical disputational genre. Llull also wrote a few works on scientific topics, for example, the *Tractatus novus de astronomia*,⁶⁷ and the *Liber de geometria nova*.⁶⁸ Later, Llull wrote a new version of the *Ars* (the *Ars compendiosa*).⁶⁹ After the *Ars compendiosa*, Llull wrote his *Declaratio Raimundi*,⁷⁰ a commentary of the list of Averroist statements which were part of the 1277 condemnations of Paris. A number of these statements were current interpretations of Averroist doctrines concerning cosmology and the nature of the divine. This did not mean that the ideas which were condemned in 1277 were only inspired by Ibn Rušd's works, or that they were completely loyal to his original thought. However, the *Declaratio Raimundi* formed an interesting meeting point between Ibn Rušd's original work, the effect on Western philosophy, and their place in the works of Ramon Llull.⁷¹

Ramon Llull negatively evaluated his stay in Paris since, according to him, he had not reached the purpose of his journey. After his stay in Rome and Paris (taking up the years from 1294 to 1299), Llull travelled back to Majorca, where he attempted to garner support from King James II. With his permission, Llull preached in the Majorcan mosques and synagogues. During this period, Llull reflected on the work done so far, and his works written during that period were composed differently, with more emphasis on the vernacular and with a looser connection to the *Ars*.

Baum des Wissens von Ramon Lull: Akten des Internationalen Kongresses aus Anlass des 40-jährigen Jubiläums des Raimundus-Lullus-Instituts der Universität Freiburg i. Br., ed. by Fernando Domínguez Reboiras, Pere Villalba i Varneda and Peter Walter (Turnhout: Brepols, 2002), *IPM*, Subsidia Lulliana, I.

⁶⁶ Raimundus Lullus, *Beati Raymundi Lulli Opera, Disputatio eremitaie et Raimundi super aliquibus dubiis quaestionibus Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi*, ed. by Franz P. Wolff and Johann M. Kurhummel (Mainz: Häffner, 1729; repr. F. Stegmüller Frankfurt, 1965), *MOG*, IV, 225-346.

⁶⁷ Raimundus Lullus, *Tractatus novus de astronomia*, ed. by Michaela Pereira and Theodor Pindl-Büchel (Turnhout: Brepols, 1989), *CCCM*, 79, *ROL*, XVII, 63-218.

⁶⁸ Raimundus Lullus, *El libro de la "Nova geometria" de Ramon Lull*, ed. by José M. Millás Vallicrosa (Barcelona: Asociación para la Historia de la Ciencia Española, 1953).

⁶⁹ Carmello Ottaviano, *L' "Ars compendiosa" de R. Lulle, avec une étude sur la bibliographie et le fond Ambrosien de Lulle*, Études de Philosophie Médiévale XII (Paris: Vrin, 1930).

⁷⁰ Raimundus Lullus, *Declaratio Raimundi*, ed. by Michaela Pereira and Theodor Pindl-Büchel (Turnhout: Brepols, 1989), *CCCM*, 79, *ROL*, XVII, 219-402.

⁷¹ Fidora, Rubio, *Raimundus Lullus*, *CCCM*, 214, *ROL*, Supplementum Lullianum II, p. 87. Cf. Antoni Bordoy Fernández "Ramon Llull y la condena parisina de 1277: nuevas aproximaciones al estudio de la *Declaratio raimundi per modum dialogi edita*," *Caurensia* 8 (2013): 165-190. For an overview of Ramon Llull's philosophical tactics concerning Averroism; cf. Anthony Bonner, "Syllogisms, fallacies and hypotheses: Llull's new weapons to combat the Parisian Averroists," in *Aristotelica et Lulliana magistro doctissimo Charles H. Lohr septuagesimum annum feliciter agenti dedicata*, ed. by Ruedi Imbach, Theodor Pindl, Peter Walter and Fernando Domínguez, Instrumenta Patristica XXVI (Steenbrughe; The Hague: Abbatia Sancti Petri; Martinus Nijhoff International, 1995), 457-475.

4.4. BIJĀYA

Over two years, when Llull travelled between Genoa and Montpellier, Llull finished about eighteen books. One of the works was the *Liber de praedicatione*,⁷² a book on preaching Christian dogma according to the *Ars*. Llull also wrote *Lectura artis, quae intitulata est Brevis practica tabula generalis*.⁷³ Apart from this work, Llull also wrote the *De ascensu et descensu intellectus* and the *Liber de fine*.⁷⁴

The *De ascensu et descensu intellectus*⁷⁵ is a work in which Llull guides the human intellect to a better understanding of God by considering the created truth (following philosophy) and then moving up the mind towards God. The work follows the *Ars* completely, and seems to be the most thorough and loyal compendium of Llull's philosophy. The *Liber de fine*⁷⁶ is a work where Llull addresses the crusades and his plans to conquer the Holy Land. The *Liber de fine* discusses both the necessity of preaching and the necessity of an armed crusade.

Ramon Llull travelled to Bijāya (called "Bugia" in Latin) in 1307, armed with his convictions and a nuanced vision of the workings of his *Ars*. While standing on the main square in the city, he loudly professed in Arabic that Islam was a false and erroneous religion.⁷⁷ The reaction of the Islamic bystanders was to start a heated theological debate, where Ramon Llull attempted to defend his point of view by referring to the *Ars*. After a few days, Llull's Islamic debate partners decided to call on the authorities, and to have him imprisoned. According to the description of the *Vita*, Llull's treatment by the locals was violent, and according to Fidora and Rubio, his fate as described in the *Vita* resembled the "passion" of Christ.⁷⁸ When the authorities were discussing whether they would continue their debate with Ramon Llull, they were discouraged from doing so by one of their own scholars who already knew Llull from an encounter with him in Tunis. He argued that the arguments of Ramon Llull would be hard to refute.⁷⁹ Ramon Llull was imprisoned for six months, first in a very discomforting cell, and then in better circumstances when the Catalan and Genoese communities asked for a modicum of leniency. During his imprisonment, Llull recounts having been visited by some Islamic scholars, who sought to convert him to Islam. However, while Llull did engage in a debate with them, he did not yield for their

⁷² Raimundus Lullus, *Liber de praedicatione*, ed. by Abraham Soria Flores, Palma de Mallorca, Maioricensis Schola Lullistica, 1961-3, *ROL*, III-IV.

⁷³ Raimundus Lullus, *Lectura artis, quae intitulata est Brevis practica tabula generalis*, ed. by Jordi Gayà Estelrich (Turnhout: Brepols, 1995), *CCCM*, 113, *ROL*, XX, lxxviii-494.

⁷⁴ Fidora, Rubio, *Raimundus Lullus*, *CCCM*, 214, *ROL*, Supplementum Lullianum II, pp. 97-98.

⁷⁵ Raimundus Lullus, *De ascensu et descensu intellectus*, ed. by Aloïsius Madre (Turnhout: Brepols, 1981), *CCCM*, 35, *ROL*, IX, 1-199.

⁷⁶ Raimundus Lullus, *Liber de fine*, ed. by Aloïsius Madre (Turnhout: Brepols, 1981), *CCCM*, 35, *ROL*, IX, 233-291. The hagiographical tendencies in Llull's *Vita coetanea* have been discussed at length in Antonio C. Ocaña "Llull's A Contemporary Life: *Narratio vera* or Auto-hagiographic Account?," *eHumanista/IVITRA A. Monogràfic Llull: filosofia, filologia, pedagogia, storia. Napoli all'epoca di Llull. Antepima* 10 (2016): 50-57.

⁷⁷ Raimundus Lullus, *Vita coetanea*, *CCCM*, 34, *ROL*, VIII, p. 297.

⁷⁸ Fidora, Rubio, *Raimundus Lullus*, *CCCM*, 214, *ROL*, Supplementum Lullianum II, pp. 100-101.

⁷⁹ Cf. Raimundus Lullus, *Vita coetanea*, *CCCM*, 34, *ROL*, VIII, pp. 298-299.

arguments. After the King of Bijāya issued a decree that Llull was to be expelled from the city, both his imprisonment and the ongoing debate came to an end.⁸⁰

5. THE SITUATION IN BIJĀYA

Around the early fourteenth century, Bijāya was made up of Andalusian Muslims, ruled by their sheikh, and Berbers, being the dominant group from which the qadis usually came. The city of Bijāya, at the time of Ramon Llull's visit in 1307, had gone through a long political evolution, which defined its relation to the West. During a period of intense political turmoil, beginning in the middle of the eleventh century, the city had first been the capital of the Hammamid state (1067-1152), and later it had become one of the capitals of the Almohad empire (1152-1230). The Almohad empire held a more rigid view of theology, with less room for debate and interfaith dialogue. However, from 1230 to 1510, Bijāya became a part of the Hafsid empire. During this lengthy period, the city experienced a great economic and cultural growth.⁸¹ Bijāya became closely involved with Western politics, in particular with the Crown of Aragon. In 1271, Peter of Aragon secured the rights of Catalan merchants in Hafsid territory, by seeking an agreement with Tunis. After that, the rulers of both Aragon and Bijāya kept close, cordial relations with one another. In 1279, Peter II of Aragon gave his support to the Emir of Bijāya, Abū Ishāq, who was engaged in a civil war with al-Watīq of Tunis. Even though the war turned out to be in favour of Abū Ishāq, and the Hafsid empire was now under the authority of the Emir of Bijāya, according to Djamil Aïssani, this did not mean that Abū Ishāq submitted his empire to the Crown of Aragon.⁸² However, Bijāya, Majorca and the Crown of Aragon would engage in particularly successful trade-relations over the years, for which they received permission from Pope Gregory IX (who added the warning that Christians could not sell anything to Muslims which they could use to fight Christians, such as weapons).⁸³ When Ramon Llull ventured into Bijāya, a treaty between Majorca and Bijāya, made around 1302, secured the safety of Majorcan travellers in the city. According to Aïssani, Ramon Llull could work in complete freedom during his stay in the city.⁸⁴

Bijāya became an important intellectual centre in the twelfth century, attracting scholars from the Islamic world and the Latin West. Bijāya was a particularly popular centre for higher education. The city played a pivotal role in the transmission of scientific knowledge between different Islamic cities and spheres of influence, and between the Islamic and the Latin Christian world.⁸⁵ During the thirteenth century, the intellectual life of Bijāya was especially devoted to the restitution of the religious laws of Malikism, while the city had previously been organized according to the laws of Almohadism. Especially the

⁸⁰ Raimundus Lullus, *Vita coetanea*, CCCM, 34, ROL, VIII, pp. 299-300. Cf. Fidora, Rubio, *Raimundus Lullus*, CCCM, 214, ROL, Supplementum Lullianum II, pp. 100-101.

⁸¹ Djamil Aïssani, "Relations between Bugia and the Crown of Aragon during Ramon Llull's Stay in the City," in *Ramon Llull i els Diàlegs Mediterranis/ Ramon Llull and the Mediterranean Dialogues* (Barcelona: Institut Europeu de la Mediterrànea, 2015), p. 211.

⁸² Aïssani, "Relations between Bugia," p. 212 (cf. footnote 81 above).

⁸³ Aïssani, "Relations between Bugia," p. 213 (cf. footnote 81 above).

⁸⁴ Aïssani, "Relations between Bugia," p. 218 (cf. footnote 81 above). For a complete work on the economic and political workings between Bijāya, the Maghreb and the Christian West, cf. Dominique Valérian, *Bougie: Port Maghrébin, 1067-1510* (Rome: Publications de l'École française de Rome, 2006).

⁸⁵ Aïssani, "Relations between Bugia," p. 215 (cf. footnote 81 above).

implications to the doctrine of Ibn Tūmart, the founder of Almohadism who specialized in a rational approach of both the Qur’ān and the *aḥadīth*, had been very influential throughout the history of North Africa. However, the followers and successors of Ibn Tūmart had a wider range of approaches to areas such as theology, logic and philosophy. Philosophy had been especially influential in the upper echelons of society, while Sufism was much more popular in the society of Bijāya as a whole.⁸⁶ Ramon Llull engaged actively with Arab philosophy, and also incorporated different elements of Sufism in his works (for example, in the *Llibre d’amic e amat*, 1276-1283).⁸⁷ The intellectual life of Bijāya was marked by a moderate form of Sufism, judicial orthodoxy, and the revival of philosophy and science. Dominique Urvoy stresses that, by the beginning of the fourteenth century, there seems to have been more or less some intellectual decline in Bijāya, or at least a stagnation. If Ibn Sīnā was discussed, it would be in the spirit of linguistics, not for his philosophical thought. According to Urvoy, the knowledge about Christianity was only fragmentary, more so in the East than in the West, and the attitude towards tolerance was less often marked by genuine openness, and more by a form of curiosity and a desire for polemics.⁸⁸

6. THE DISPUTATIO

Ramon Llull finished his *Liber disputationis Raimundi christiani et Homeri saraceni* in the year 1308, in Pisa. As Llull recounted, he wrote the *Disputatio Raimundi* from memory, since he allegedly lost his original notes of the discussion in a shipwreck before the coast of Pisa.⁸⁹ The work consists of two major parts. The first part contains the arguments of ‘Umar against Christianity. The second part contains first the answer of Llull’s auto-insertion character Raimundus to each of the arguments made by ‘Umar in chapter one, and in the second chapter, a comparison of Islamic culture with Christian standards.

The discussion between Raimundus and ‘Umar is based on an overview of the attributes of God. The character ‘Umar is the first one to deliver his arguments. He divides the list of attributes into two major parts: the essential attributes of God, which describe the Godhead (such as necessary entity, infinity, and eternity) and the non-essential attributes of God, which define God’s act within or in relation to creation. These attributes are not inherently part of God’s essence. Rather, they are “rooted” within God’s essence, without defining it. Raimundus will discuss the same attributes, in exactly the same order, but he will deny the need to divide the attributes into the two categories which were proposed by ‘Umar. Llull believes that every attribute of God belongs to His essence, and that there are no non-essential attributes.

⁸⁶ Urvoy, *Penser l’Islam* (cf. footnote 3 above), p. 233.

⁸⁷ Ramon Llull, *Llibre d’amic e amat*, ed. by Albert Soler i Llopart, Els nostres Clàssics. Col·lecció B 13, Barcelona: Editorial Barcino, 1995. For an overview of the influence of Sufism on the works of Llull, cf. Natália M. Lopes Nunes, “O amor divino n’O livro do amigo e do amado: influencias do sufismo em Raimundo Lulo”, in *En torno a Ramon Llull: Presencia y transmisión de su obra*, ed. by Francisco J. Díaz Marcilla and José Higuera Rubio, Textos e estudos de Filosofia Medieval 11 (Vila Nova de Famalicão: Edições Húmus, 2017), 117-131; Mustapha Chérif, “La pensée soufie, altérité et raison,” *Ramon Llull and Islam, the Beginning of Dialogue / Ramon Llull y el islam, el inicio del diálogo.*, Quaderns de la Mediterrània 9 (2008): 25-30.

⁸⁸ Urvoy, *Penser l’Islam* (cf. footnote 3 above), p. 234.

⁸⁹ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, III, pp. 261-262.

The main question at stake in the *Disputatio* is whether Christian doctrine can be proven to be true or not. While the character ‘Umar denies the possibility of a triune God, believing it to be contradictory to God’s attributes and damaging to His unity, Raimundus attempts to prove the necessity of the Trinity. In order to establish proof of the Trinity, Raimundus refers to the “correlative theory”. The main idea behind this theory is that the attributes are one with God’s essence, and that they are forever in act (since they can never be idle and workless). They therefore require an effect and an agent. These three elements (being act, agent and effect) all refer to one Person of the Trinity. The act refers to the Holy Ghost, the agent to the Father and the effect to the Son. Throughout the first chapter of part 2, which is devoted to the arguments of Raimundus, the Trinity and the Incarnation are defended against any critique which might stem from a logical point of view, reflected by ‘Umar in the first part.

The second chapter of part 2 is devoted to the proof of the superiority of Christian religious traditions. While the first part establishes necessary evidence for the validity – and reality – of Christian doctrines, the second part shows the exaltedness of the Christian tradition as a whole. The second chapter of part 2 consists of the discussion of a number of Christian concepts. First, Raimundus discusses the Ten Commandments, next the Sacraments, next he lists the Seven Virtues, the Seven Sins, and lastly, the nine “orders or principles” (being a list of practices, establishments and rites within the Catholic faith, such as the Church, fasting, and almsgiving). One should note that Raimundus is only interested in making a comparison between the Christian concepts and Islamic doctrines in as far as this comparison shows the superiority of Christianity. In the section on the Virtues, Raimundus discusses justice, prudence, fortitude, temperance, faith, hope and charity. These virtues consist of four philosophical virtues, being justice, prudence, fortitude and temperance, and three theological virtues, being faith, hope and charity. Almost the same list of virtues is mentioned by al-Ġazālī, who distinguished between philosophical and theological virtues. The list of al-Ġazālī includes wisdom, courage, temperance and justice.⁹⁰ Raimundus does not mention the Islamic interpretation of the virtues, reflected in the thought of al-Ġazālī, but merely discusses the Christian interpretation of the virtues, followed by a cautionary tale on the absence of these virtues in Islamic societies or traditions. Moreover, in the sections devoted to the nine orders or principles, Lull discusses the tradition of almsgiving or fasting in Christianity. However, he refrains from giving a full overview of the same traditions in Islam, and simply states that Christians practice these customs more often, or more fully.

In the third part, or rather, the *postscriptum*, where Lull provides the reader with an overview of the general purpose of the *Disputatio Raimundi*, Lull recounts his plans of writing an Arabic version and sending it to the Islamic establishment of Bijāya in order to receive their comments. In his own version of the story, he was rebuffed, and subsequently banished from the country. He fled to Christian territory, aiming for the coast of Italy. Lull next recounts the unfortunate events during his shipwreck, and his arrival in Pisa, where he re-wrote the entire *Disputatio Raimundi*. He then continues by telling how he sent his work to the Holy See. Lull next recounts his propositions to the pope, concerning the things which he believed needed to be done in order to battle Islam in a religious sense, being the

⁹⁰ Cf. Mohamed A. Sherif, *Ghazali’s Theory of Virtue* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1975).

founding of monasteries devoted to the teaching of languages of the “infidels”, the tactical placement of military orders (such as the Knights Templar or the Knights Hospitaller) at the frontiers of Christianity, and the providing of tithes by the Church to the Christian kings, in order to facilitate their passage into the Holy Land. Llull also underlines the connection between the aftermath of the *Disputatio Raimundi* and the *Liber de fine*, where he expounds on the practicalities behind the relations between Islam and Christianity more at length. One might argue that, while the *Disputatio Raimundi* showed step by step how to defend Christian doctrine against an Islamic opponent and at the same time keep one’s own Christian faith by working with the *Ars generalis ultima*, the *Liber de fine* showed the tactical side of the relations – and frictions – between Christianity and Islam.

7. LLULL’S STAY IN PISA, HIS THIRD JOURNEY TO PARIS AND HIS FINAL MISSION IN NORTH AFRICA

After Llull’s banishment from Bijāya, he decided to sail back to Genoa. However, he experienced a shipwreck on his way, and stranded in Pisa. There, in the monastery of *San Donino*, he was forced to rewrite his entire *Disputatio*, since he had lost each and every one of his books.⁹¹ During his stay in Pisa, he finished the *Ars generalis ultima*,⁹² which is the most complete and general version of the *Ars*,⁹³ but also the *Disputatio Raimundi christiani et Homeri saraceni*,⁹⁴ and also *De centum signis Dei*,⁹⁵ and *Liber clericorum*.⁹⁶

In 1309, Llull decided to travel back to Paris. During his stay, his lectures on the *Ars* were well attended by students and professors. During his stay at the university of Paris, Llull had found a new ‘enemy’ in Averroism. Ramon Llull believed that countering Averroism was an important goal of the *Ars*, which would suffice to answer every question or debate put forth by the Averroists. Ramon Llull stressed the need to condemn Averroism by the King of France in the *Liber natalis parvuli Christi Iesu*.⁹⁷ As time progressed, however, Llull felt more and more that the systems of leadership of the university of Paris were too intricate and cumbersome to be thoroughly reformed. Ramon Llull became increasingly embittered, and wished to solicit the King of France and Pope Clement to seize control of the situation.⁹⁸

⁹¹ Fidora, Rubio, *Raimundus Lullus*, CCCM, 214, ROL, Supplementum Lullianum II, pp. 103-104; cf. Raimundus Lullus, *Vita coaetanea*, CCCM, 34, ROL, VIII, pp. 300-301.

⁹² Raimundus Lullus, *Ars generalis ultima*, ed. by Aloisius Madre (Turnhout: Brepols, 1986), CCCM, 75, ROL, XIV.

⁹³ I will consult the edition by Brepols, edited by Aloisius Madre (Raimundus Lullus, *Ars generalis ultima*, ed. by Aloisius Madre (Turnhout: Brepols, 1986), CCCM, 75, ROL, XIV, 4-527).

⁹⁴ Raimundus Lullus, *Liber Disputationis Raimundi christiani et Homeri saraceni*, ed. by Aloisius Madre (Turnhout: Brepols, 1998), CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, 172-264.

⁹⁵ Raimundus Lullus, *De centum signis Dei*, ed. by Aloisius Madre (Turnhout: Brepols, 1998), CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, 265-304.

⁹⁶ Raimundus Lullus, *Liber clericorum*, ed. by Aloisius Madre (Turnhout: Brepols, 1998), CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, 305-354.

⁹⁷ Raimundus Lullus, *Liber natalis parvuli Christi Iesu*, ed. by Hermogenes Harada (Turnhout: Brepols, 1975), CCCM, 32, ROL, VII, 19-73.

⁹⁸ Fidora, Rubio, *Raimundus Lullus*, CCCM, 214, ROL, Supplementum Lullianum II, pp. 108-110; cf. Raimundus Lullus, *Vita coaetanea*, CCCM, 34, ROL, VIII, pp. 302-303.

When in 1311, Clement V called for a general council in Vienne (with the main goal to dismantle the Knights Templar), Llull provided a list to the council, consisting of his requests and plans to facilitate the conversion of non-Christians and the battle against Averroism at the university of Paris. A few of those demands were the establishing of language schools in Rome, Paris and Toledo; the suspension of philosophers from academia when they attacked theological doctrines; the commencement of a series of sermons in mosques and synagogues on Fridays and Saturdays; and the reform of both law and medical studies. Llull pressed the council to heed his words and not sit idle, which is especially apparent in his poem *Lo concili*,⁹⁹ which Llull dedicated to the council.¹⁰⁰ Ramon Llull eventually came to evaluate his own reputation as that of a “madman” or a “fantasist” as he puts it in the *Disputatio Petri clerici et Raimundi phantastici*.¹⁰¹

In the period during and right after his stay in Paris, Llull’s works were written as tests for new possible methods of arguing, especially in matters of debate. After Llull returned to Majorca, he wrote a work dedicated to King Frederick III of Sicily. In this work, the *Liber de participatione christianorum et saracenorum*,¹⁰² Llull proposed that the King entered into dialogue with scholars of Tunisia to defend Christianity. He proposed a list of arguments to prove the Trinity and the Incarnation. Inspired by the openness and readiness for dialogue displayed by Frederick III, Ramon Llull ventured to Sicily in the hope of persuading the King to organize interreligious conversations, which would lead to a universal peace between Christianity and Islam, as he explained in the *Liber de participatione*.¹⁰³

It is unclear whether Llull’s endeavours to persuade Frederick III were successful, or whether he was once again disappointed. By any means, after his stay in Sicily, Llull had decided to venture to Tunis under the protection of James II of Aragon.¹⁰⁴ Ramon Llull kept a correspondence with his patron, and asked him to command brother Simó Puigcerdà to translate some of his Catalan works into Latin. The end of the correspondence was around October 1315. By 1316, Llull had passed away on his native island of Majorca.¹⁰⁵

8. RAMON LLULL’S OUTLOOK ON INTERRELIGIOUS EXCHANGE WITH ISLAM

During the whole of Ramon Llull’s career, he strongly believed in his *Ars*, and in its power to bring about the conversion of the intellectual elite. Ramon Llull believed in the use of necessary reasons in order to procure the conversion of Muslims, and not authority. The preferability of Christianity could be proven by using a purely logical form of evidence. Ramon Llull believed in an open, rational dialogue, moving from common grounds, and he

⁹⁹ Ramon Llull, *Obres de Ramon Llull: Rims, vol. II, Lo Concili*, ed. by Salvador Galmés (Palma de Mallorca, Institut d’estudis catalans de Barcelona, 1938), *ORL*, XX, 155-188.

¹⁰⁰ Fidora, Rubio, *Raimundus Lullus*, *CCCM*, 214, *ROL*, Supplementum Lullianum II, pp. 112-113.

¹⁰¹ Raimundus Lullus, *Disputatio Petri clerici et Raimundi phantastici*, ed. by Michel Senellart, Fernando Domínguez and Antoni Oliver (Turnhout: Brepols, 1988), *CCCM*, 78, *ROL*, XVI, 1-30.

¹⁰² Raimundus Lullus, *Liber de participatione christianorum et saracenorum*, ed. by Michel Senellart, Fernando Domínguez Reboiras and Antoni Oliver (Turnhout: Brepols, 1988), *CCCM*, 78, *ROL*, XVI, 246-260.

¹⁰³ Raimundus Lullus, *Liber de participatione christianorum et saracenorum*, *CCCM*, 78, *ROL*, XVI, p. 246. Cited in Fidora, Rubio, *Raimundus Lullus*, *CCCM*, 214, *ROL*, Supplementum Lullianum II, p. 121.

¹⁰⁴ Fidora, Rubio, *Raimundus Lullus*, *CCCM*, 214, *ROL*, Supplementum Lullianum II, pp. 123-124

¹⁰⁵ Fidora, Rubio, *Raimundus Lullus*, *CCCM*, 214, *ROL*, Supplementum Lullianum II, p. 124.

did not see the benefit of entering into a debate which had as its sole purpose the destruction of another person's faith. Ramon Llull believed conversion should be achieved by positive arguments, meaning the proof for Christian dogma, and not by negative arguments, being the destruction of the faith of the other. By moving from shared doctrines, such as the attributes of God, Llull believed he could find a way to make Christian doctrines understandable, instead of demanding blind faith from potential converts.¹⁰⁶ Llull believed that by converting the intellectual elite – and by procuring their true devotion and intellectual acceptance of Christianity – he would be able to Christianise the entire Islamic world, since faith would trickle down from the elite to the populace.¹⁰⁷ If anything, Llull believed the Islamic elite to be so developed intellectually, that they would have no problem accepting the Christian faith. Llull believed the Islamic elite was already doubting certain Islamic doctrines, and that they would be easily persuaded that Christianity is the better option, if only they would be presented with the proper reasoning to explain and 'prove' Christian dogma.¹⁰⁸ In Ramon Llull's view, the Islamic population could and should be convinced of Christian dogma. However, Ramon Llull saw a special need for intellectual honesty and empathy as a Christian preacher would go about his mission. First of all, Llull acknowledged that it would not be enough to demand faith from Muslims without providing an understandable exposition of Christian dogma. He realized that the evidence of Christianity should not be based on a circular argumentation, which would mean proving Christianity by referring to Christian sources, or by providing "evidence" for the Trinity which would only work for those who already accept the Trinity. Instead, Llull advocated for arguments which proved Christian dogma *ex nihilo*, moving from neither the acceptance of the Christian sources, nor the affinity with Christian dogma or the initial will to believe.¹⁰⁹ At the time Llull wrote the *Disputatio*, however, he did seem to realize that, in

¹⁰⁶ Annemarie C. Mayer, "'Since for a long time we have had dealings with unbelievers...'" Ramon Llull and the Dialogue with Judaism and Islam," in *Actes del Congrés d'Obertura de l'Any Llull: "En el setè centenari de Ramon Llull: el projecte missional i la pervivència de la devoció"*. Palma, 24-27 de novembre de 2015, ed. by Lola Badia, Alexander Fidora and Maribel Ripoll Perelló, Col·lecció Blaquerna 12 (Barcelona: Universitat de Barcelona; Palma de Mallorca: Universitat de les Illes Balears, 2017), 165-184. For an overview of Llull's attitude towards Jewish converts, cf. Harvey Hames, "Quia Nolunt Dimittere Credere Pro Credere, Sed Credere Per Intelligere: Ramon Llull and His Jewish Contemporaries," *Mirabilia: Electronic Journal of Antiquity & Middle Ages* 5, no. 5 (2005): 112-141.

¹⁰⁷ This opinion becomes apparent in a passage of the *Doctrina Pueril*: Ramon Llull, *Doctrina pueril*, ed. by Joan Santanach i Suñol (Palma, 2005), *NEORL*, VII, accessed online: <https://www.narpan.net/ben/indexdp.htm>: "Amable fil, aytals sarrayns qui an soutil enteniment e qui no creen que Mafumet sia propheta, serien leugers a convertir a la fe catholica si era qui la fe los mostrás e-ls preycás, e qui amás tant la honor de Jesuchrist e a qui membrás tant la passió sua, que no duptás a sostenir los trebays que hom ha per apendra lur lenguatge ne tamés lo peril de la mort. E per lo convertiment que hom faria en aquels per vertut de martiri, e cor els son ja en openió que Mafumet no es missatge de Deu, los altres sarrayns convertir-s'ien si veyen que los mayors savis lurs se faessen crestians."

¹⁰⁸ Cf. John Tolan, "'Saracen Philosophers Secretly Deride Islam,'" *Medieval Encounters: Jewish, Christian, and Muslim Culture in Confluence and Dialogue* 8, no. 2-3 (2002), pp. 200-205.

¹⁰⁹ Ramon Llull's attitude towards conversion, as mentioned in this passage, has been discussed by Annemarie Mayer throughout her oeuvre. Cf. Annemarie C. Mayer, *Drei Religionen ein Gott?: Ramon Lulls interreligiöse Diskussion der Eigenschaften Gottes* (Freiburg i. Br.: Herder, 2008), especially pp. 25-37, where she summarizes the main tendencies of Llull's behaviour towards the religious other. Cf. also, Annemarie C. Mayer, "'Ramon Llull and the Indispensable Dialogue,'" *Ramon Llull and Islam, the Beginning of Dialogue / Ramon Llull y el islam, el inicio del diálogo*, *Quaderns de la Mediterrània* 9 (2008): 19-24; Annemarie C. Mayer, "The Future of Interreligious Dialogue in the Light of Ramon Llull's Contribution to the Encounter of Religions," in *The Past, Present, and Future of Theologies of Interreligious Dialogue*, ed. by Terrence Merrigan and John Friday (Oxford: Oxford University Press,

order for conversion to be established, Muslims should not have a real aversion against the Trinity or be completely attached to their original faith, even if they had no initial motivation to believe. This is where the political power of Islam – and the societal benefits which accompanied remaining a Muslim in Islamic lands – became an obstacle.

Throughout his œuvre, Llull held different views concerning the effectivity of armed crusade as an accompaniment of preaching. In the first part of Llull's life, he did not agree with the idea of crusading. Llull believed that peaceful preaching was the only way to bring about conversion. Whenever Llull accepted the crusading practice, he still saw it as inferior to spiritual warfare.¹¹⁰ After the fall of Acre, this idea shifted, and Llull started to defend the crusade as being a part of the greater plan to spread Christianity. Llull started to propagate the “two-swords doctrine”, which said that the Church has two methods to defend or assert herself: one being the spiritual sword, or preaching, and one being the material sword, i.e. military violence wielded by the Church.¹¹¹ This is the idea Llull espoused when he wrote the *Disputatio*. In many of his later works, he wrote down his own opinions on how to tackle the Islamic world – both spiritually and with military force.

2017), 47-63; Annemarie C. Mayer, “Llull and Inter-Faith Dialogue,” in *A Companion to Ramon Llull and Llullism*, ed. by Amy M. Austin and Mark D. Johnston (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 146-175.

¹¹⁰ Cf. For example Raimundus Lullus, *Liber contra antichristum*, ed. by Pamela. M. Beattie (Turnhout: Brepols, 2015), *CCCM*, 264, *ROL*, XXXVI, p. 123.

¹¹¹ Cf. Raimundus Lullus, *Liber de fine*, ed. by Aloisius Madre (Turnhout: Brepols, 1981), *CCCM*, 35, *ROL*, IX, pp. 254-255. Cf. Benjamin Z. Kedar, *Crusade and Mission: European Approaches towards the Muslim* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 189-203.

CHAPTER 2: WHAT ARE THE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD REALLY ABOUT?

Throughout the works of Ramon Llull, as in the *Disputatio Raimundi*, one of the main questions is the nature of God and the divine. Llull sought to provide his reader with a schematic overview of the main elements of God's being, or what could be said of God. He attributed a list of characteristics to God's essence, which he called 'virtutes' or 'qualitates', or also 'dignitates'.¹¹² These 'qualities' or, more commonly, attributes of God's essence were very real and visible in their effect on this world, and at the same time abstract, immaterial concepts, depending on God's being. These predicates included His infinity, His eternity, and His wisdom, to name a few. If a scholar or 'artist', a follower of Llull's *Ars*,¹¹³ knew all these elements of God's essence, he could gain true knowledge of the divine and, of course, of the created world which came directly from God. Knowledge of the divine attributes could also, according to Llull, serve as a tool for converting adherents of other (monotheistic) faiths, since they were all more or less familiar with them. In the first part of this chapter, I will focus on a few main questions. Where did the attributes of God come from? What was their place in Lullian thought, and in the Christian world?

1. THE LADDER OF THE UNIVERSE: HOW THE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD ARE FORMED BY LLULL

In the *Art* of Ramon Llull, much space is dedicated to discussing the attributes that God possesses, sometimes independently, sometimes in relation to other logical standards which are also mentioned in the *Ars*. The attributes of God in the *Ars* include truth, power, will, glory, goodness, greatness, virtue, duration. The choice of attributes discussed by Llull differs in each of his works, but the attributes just listed could be seen as his ultimate collection, in the final version of his *Ars*.¹¹⁴ In his article "The New Logic of Ramon Llull," Charles Lohr analyzes the sources of these attributes. According to him, the first attribute of God (goodness) reflects the neoplatonic axiom "*Bonum est diffusivum sui*," the attributes power, wisdom, and love reflect the "Latin triad of *potestas, sapientia, benignitas*, common in the 12th century".¹¹⁵ God's greatness is one of Llull's 'modern' adaptations, coming,

¹¹² Annemarie Mayer, "Ein Gott und viele Eigenschaften – zur Konstruktion von Lulls Gottesbild im *Llibre de contemplació*," in *Gottes Schau und Weltbetrachtung: Interpretationen zum "Llibre de contemplació" des Raimundus Lullus* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2011), p. 123. Annemarie Mayer uses the common theological term "attributes" throughout her article. Since this is the most common term signifying God's properties, I will consistently use this term in my dissertation.

¹¹³ Anthony Bonner, *The Art and Logic of Ramon Llull* (cf. footnote 18 above), p. 31.: "(...) the first two provide the tools with which the 'artist', as Llull calls the user of his system, can study and manipulate them."

¹¹⁴ Ramon Llull designed his own logic, or *Ars*, to map out his Christian philosophy on God and the universe. His earliest version is the *Ars Compendiosa Inveniendi Veritatem*, written in 1274, but critique to the complexity of the work drove him to redesign his *Ars* multiple times. The most complete version of the *Ars* is the *Ars Magna* or the *Ars generalis ultima* (1305-1308), accompanied by the *Ars Brevis*, a manual to the *Ars Magna*. I will consult the edition by Brepols, edited by Aloisius Madre (Raimundus Lullus, *Ars generalis ultima*, ed. by Aloisius Madre (Turnhout: Brepols, 1986), *CCCM*, 75, *ROL*, XIV, 4-527).

¹¹⁵ Charles Lohr, "The New Logic of Ramon Llull," *Enrahonar: Quaderns de Filosofia* 18 (1993): p. 26.

according to Lohr, from Anselm's *id quo maius cogitari nequit*.¹¹⁶ These elements are not only inherent characteristics of God, but, by necessity, also of the world He created. In one of his earliest works, the *Llibre de contemplació en Déu* (1271-1273) in which a few of the same attributes of God are described, Llull underlines in chapter 178 how he can arrive at these very attributes by deducing them from finite attributes.¹¹⁷

Llull compared the order of the universe with a ladder. God was the highest tier of this ladder, being the source and the summit of all the properties that shaped reality. The lower things, beginning with the angels down to the elements, were created in likeness to the perfect attributes that God inherently possessed. Created good was only good, insofar as it was created by and according to the divine good, God. It was the extrinsic act of the divine good, or God's working outside Himself. Since the perfect goodness of God had to be eternal, and since God could not be anything but eternally good, God's own goodness could never be a separate entity, or a non-essential accident which belonged to Him. God was His own goodness, since a divine entity could only ever be good, never evil. Charles Lohr describes the sameness of God and His attributes as a consequence of His being the ultimate and perfect being: since in God, everything becomes superlative, the differences between Him and His divine attributes disappear.¹¹⁸ Moreover, without the existence of a substance which is entirely good, lower forms of created goodness would not be able to exist, even though they were already diluted with imperfection due to their finite nature.

Since, therefore, created entities reflect the divine principles without which they could not be good or great, it was possible to deduce the nature of the divine by observing God's working in the created world – by climbing up the ladder. On the other hand, knowledge of the divine was held to be capable of showing humanity the truth, and guide us in our daily existence – this time by descending the ladder.¹¹⁹ Ramon Llull was not the first scholar who proposed this ladder or hierarchy of being. Other scholars of Llull's time also held similar views, although opinions varied on why humanity was not able to see the true nature of God. Hugh of Saint Victor (1096 – 1141), for example, developed his own theory about the ladder of being, and saw in it a system of descent: by viewing the invisible, one could gain access to the visible.¹²⁰ In any way, according to Hugh of Saint Victor, the descent from

¹¹⁶ Lohr, "The New Logic of Ramon Llull" (cf. footnote 115 above), p. 26.

¹¹⁷ Ramon Llull, *Llibre de contemplació en Déu*. vol. II, ed. by Antoni I. Alomar i Canyelles, Montserrat Lluch, Aina Sitjes and Albert Soler (Palma: Patronat Ramon Llull, 2015), *NEORL*, XIV, llib II. dist. 29, chap. CLXXVIII, p. 85 (cf. Mayer, *Llull and the Divine Attributes*, p. 140): "Con hom aperceb e conex que aqueles causes que hom apela calitatz en Deu son en Deu causes essencials e que no son causes accidentals." Cf. also Annemarie C. Mayer, "Contemplatio in Deum - or the Pleasure of Knowing God via his Attributes," in *Knowledge, Contemplation, and Lullism: Contributions to the Lullian Session at the SIEPM Congress - Freising, August 20-25, 2012*, ed. by José H. Rubio (Turnhout: Brepols, 2015), *Subsidia Lulliana* 5, 135-152.

¹¹⁸ Lohr, "The New Logic of Ramon Llull" (cf. footnote 115 above), p. 26: "On this superlative level the differences we had encountered on the first two levels disappear. Because God is the best in the superlative degree, it is no longer possible to distinguish Him as such from the greatest or the most powerful. At the superlative degree of reality the mystic discovers the supreme being in whom all the divine names coincide or fall together."

¹¹⁹ Annemarie C. Mayer, "Llull and the Divine Attributes in 13th Century Context," *Anuario Filosófico* 49.1 (2016): pp. 139, 143.

¹²⁰ Cf. Hugo de Sancto Victore, *Super ierarchiam Dionisii*, ed. by Dominique Poirel (Turnhout: Brepols, 2015), *CCCM*, 178, lib. IX, cap. XIII, p. 681: "Hoc est quod dicit: haec, scilicet claritas, procedens ex remotis causis diuinitatis, a qua diuinitate exiens perficit omnes sacros intellectus, id est rationales mentes, illustrando eos superessentiali occultatione, id est ualde occulta et secreta aspiratione; ex illis inquam remotis causis procedens ad manifestationem, primum manifestior fit quomodo est, id est secundum uerum

God to the created virtues in this world was ever primary, while the ascending movement could only be secondary.¹²¹ Hugh of Saint Victor believed there could exist a certain bond between faith and science, and he proposed the use of *rationes necessariae* to rationally uncover theological truths.¹²²

Ascent, or the acquiring of knowledge on the divine through knowledge of the universe, was of special importance in the thought of Thomas Aquinas (1225- 1274). A part of his *Summa Theologiae*, part I, *Quaestio* 13, is dedicated to the attributes of God and the question as to whether these attributes belong to God substantially. Aquinas wonders how we could know whether the attributes of God belonged to Him substantially, or rather, if they were mere descriptions of His actions within the created world. Thomas Aquinas eventually chose the former option, and believed that God's attributes had to belong to Him essentially. However, he concluded, the attributes we ascribe to God inevitably fall short of knowing His true, essential nature, since the only knowledge of God accessible to us, is knowledge formed by ascent, which inevitably comes from observation of the created (and imperfect) world.¹²³

“Since we come to know God from creatures and since this is how we come to refer to Him, the expressions we use to name Him signify in a way appropriate to the material creatures we ordinarily know.”¹²⁴

Ramon Llull acknowledged the impossibility of the human intellect to truly know the essence of God, since the boundary between the world of the finite and the world of infinity was, according to him, unbridgeable by the human mind. However, knowledge of the divine attributes, by ascent or descent, could very well be accessible to the human mind. Bonaventure (1221 – 1274) also showed a keen interest in the divine attributes, going forth from the assumption that attributes viewed in the created world must exist in an infinitely perfect form, as mentioned above. These perfect predicates could, according to him, only be found within God. Bonaventure's conclusion was that God alone contains the divine principles and attributes in their purest form, and that the created world only participates in

esse suum, altissimis uirtutibus circa se positus, et manifestat et distribuit semetipsam illis magis quam aliis, et deinde post illas manifestat secundis se, deinde novissimis, postremo etiam nostris intellectabilibus uirtutibus, id est rationalibus mentibus; et sic a primis usque ad ultima descendens, conducit illuminationem suam per singulas uirtutes, sic, hoc est intantum, manifestam in singulis quantum unaquaeque uirtus existit ab ipsa, scilicet claritate, secundum deiforme, hoc est secundum dei conformitatem.”

¹²¹ Mayer, “Llull and the Divine Attributes in 13th Century Context” (cf. footnote 119 above), p. 144.

¹²² Lohr, “The New Logic of Ramon Llull” (cf. footnote 115 above), p. 27.

¹²³ Mayer, “Llull and the Divine Attributes in 13th Century Context” (cf. footnote 119 above), pp. 145-146.

¹²⁴ Thomas Aquinas. *Summa theologiae*. Leonina edition, Rome, 1888, edited by Roberto Busa; edited online by Enrique Alarcón in *Corpusthomicum.org*, <https://www.corpusthomicum.org/iopera.html>, I^a pars, q. 13 a. 2 co: “Intellectus autem noster, cum cognoscat Deum ex creaturis, sic cognoscit ipsum, secundum quod creaturae ipsum repraesentant. (Ostensum est autem supra quod Deus in se praehabet omnes perfectiones creaturarum, quasi simpliciter et universaliter perfectus. Unde quaelibet creatura in tantum eum repraesentat, et est ei similis, in quantum perfectionem aliquam habet, non tamen ita quod repraesentet eum sicut aliquid eiusdem speciei vel generis, sed sicut excellens principium, a cuius forma effectus deficiunt, cuius tamen aliqualem similitudinem effectus consequuntur; sicut formae corporum inferiorum repraesentant virtutem solarem.)” Translation: Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, trans. by Thomas Gilby (Garden City: Doubleday, 1969), p. 197.

them. However, also in the thought of Bonaventure, the human intellect falls short of knowing God. According to Bonaventure, this is due to the sinful nature of humanity.¹²⁵

Llull's attributes of God also meant to explain the Trinity, and provide it with a logical proof. According to Llull, God's attributes did not merely exist, they were always acting their own essence. God's goodness was forever 'bonifying', and His greatness was forever 'magnifying' in a perfect, eternal act. If this were not the case, God's goodness would be idle and workless, since His attributes could only be outed in their act within the finite world, and therefore they would forever be dependent on finite things that could not *in se* be perfect. This infinite act was transitive according to Llull, and required a subject – the principle which performed the act of the divine attribute – and an object which underwent the action. God's intrinsic goodness required an act: to bonify, an object: the bonifiable – and a subject, performing the action: the bonifier. Llull equated the active principle to the Father, the patient or the effect to the Son, and the act itself to the Holy Ghost – coming forth from the Father and the Son alike. These three principles, which were only conceptually different, could be found in all of reality. Therefore, Ramon Llull saw traces of the Trinity everywhere, in all aspects of the world, and all existing forms of logic and categories.¹²⁶

Ramon Llull's view of God depended greatly on the divine attributes. His choice for the attributes as a shaping factor in his theology, was motivated by the discussion of – more or less – the same attributes in Judaism and Islam. Since Ramon Llull's most ardent intention was to convert other monotheist religions to Christianity, it would make sense to design a motivation of Christianity, which started from this common root. Islamic, Jewish and Christian thinkers all tried to unravel the truth behind God's being. Two important problems that arose were, first, what attributes God really possesses, and second, in what way these attributes could ever belong to God without ever harming His unity or simplicity. In this second issue, the main question was whether the attributes of God belonged to God essentially, or rather not. First and foremost, the multiplicity of the divine attributes held its own challenges. In order to accept a multitude of divine attributes without harming God's unity, and in order to avoid proposing the existence of a composed God, Islam and Judaism attempted to distance God's attributes from His divine essence. However, non-essential attributes of God, which had to be, in some respect, 'co-eternal' with Him, came with their own obstacles. Posing a series of values or virtues, which existed eternally outside of God, damaged His unity as well. Making the difference between them merely conceptual could not provide the definition of God that religion needed.¹²⁷ Ramon Llull will answer these doubts in other faiths according to his own logical construction around the divine attributes: God's attributes did belong to His essence, according to Llull, and they also proved the Trinity and the Incarnation.

¹²⁵ Bonaventura, *Quaestiones disputatae de mysterio Trinitatis*, Quaracchi, Florence: Ex typ. Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1891, quaestio: 1, articulus: 2, conclusio, col.: 1, linea: 33, p. 55: "Cum vero per peccatum hominis oculus caligavit, speculum illud factum est aenigmaticum et obscurum, et auris intelligentiae interioris obsurduit ad illud testimonium audiendum."

¹²⁶ Lohr, "The New Logic of Ramon Llull" (cf. footnote 115 above), p. 28.

¹²⁷ Mayer, "Llull and the Divine Attributes in 13th Century Context" (cf. footnote 119 above), p. 149.

2. THE ATTRIBUTES THROUGHOUT LLULL'S WORKS

Ramon Llull's works dealt with the matter of the divine attributes with a twofold purpose. Firstly, he wanted to make a construction of the divine attributes, belonging to the divine essence, in a way that would be acceptable to both Islamic and Jewish scholars – always taking God's unity and singularity into account. He did this in order to close the debate on God's nature with a final word on all the matters at stake. Secondly, the answer Llull provided would move from the common ground of all religions, towards the incontrovertible evidence of Christianity. It was not enough, therefore, to redesign the question of the attributes: the answer had to lead anyone to the Christian truth. This becomes especially clear in the Lullian *Ars* (and most of his works which are based on his *Art*), although the *Ars* seldomly mentions the Incarnation or the Trinity to begin with. The Christian truths are always implied as the necessary base of logic, and are only to be accepted later on.¹²⁸ I made a schematic overview of the attributes of God, in the *Llibre de contemplació*,¹²⁹ the *Ars*,¹³⁰ the *Disputatio Raimundi*¹³¹, the *Llibre del gentil e dels tres savis*,¹³² and the *Cent noms de Déu*.¹³³ As we can see in this overview, the list of the attributes of God throughout Ramon Llull's works is not constant at all times. In the *Llibre de contemplació*, there is a clear distinction between two kinds of divine attributes. Some are inherently part of God's inner Self, and constitute His inward nature: those are the *attributa quoad Deum*. They include, for example, abstract concepts such as infinity and eternity. On the other hand, there are the *attributa quoad nos*, or attributes by which God acts within creation, and communicates with humanity. These attributes include creation, ordinance and re-creation, among other things. I have listed the attributes that can be found in the *Disputatio Raimundi*, as they will be relevant for this chapter.

¹²⁸ Fidora, Rubio, *Raimundus Lullus*, CCCM, 214, *ROL*, Supplementum Lullianum II, pp. 244-245.

¹²⁹ Throughout this dissertation, I will use the following edition: Ramon Llull, *Llibre de contemplació en Déu. Volum I: llibres I-II. Volum II: llibre III*, ed. by Antoni I. Alomar, Montserrat Lluch, Aina Sitjes and Albert Soler (Palma: Patronat Ramon Llull, 2015), *NEORL* (cf. footnote 117 above).

¹³⁰ Raimundus Lullus, *Ars generalis ultima*, ed. by Aloisius Madre (Turnhout: Brepols, 1986), CCCM, 75, *ROL*, XIV, 5-527, accessed online through [clt.Brepols.net](http://clt.brepols.net): http://clt.brepols.net/LLTA/pages/TextSearch.aspx?key=MLULL0128_.

¹³¹ Raimundus Lullus, *Ars generalis ultima*, ed. by Aloisius Madre (Turnhout: Brepols, 1986), CCCM, 75, *ROL*, XIV.

¹³² Ramon Llull, *Llibre del gentil e dels tres savis*, ed. by Anthony Bonner (Barcelona: Publicacions de la Abadia de Montserrat, 2015), *NEORL*, II.

¹³³ Ramon Llull, *Obres de Ramon Llull: Rims*, Tom I, ed. by Ramon d'Alòs-Moner and Salvador Galmés (Palma de Mallorca, Institut d'estudis catalans de Barcelona, 1936), 75-170.

<i>Llibre de contemplació</i>	LDG, I, 1	AGU, Pars 9	CNDD	DRCHS, I, 2
Att Quoad Deum	1 Bonea-granea	1 Bonitas	3 Unitat	1 Entitas
2 Infinitat	2 Granea-eternitat	2 Magnitudo	8 Singularitat	Necessaria
3 Eternitat	3 Eternitat-poder	3 Eternitas	10 Necessitat	2 Unitas
4 Unitat	4 poder-saviea	4 Potestas	14 Simplicitat	3 Singularitas
5 Trinitat	5 Saviea-amor	5 Sapientia	16 Vida	4 Infinitas
6 Poder	6 Amor-perfeccio	6 Voluntas	17 Infinitat	5 Eternitas
7 Sciencia	7 Bonea-eternitat	7 Virtus	18 Eternitat	6 Simplicitas
8 Veritat	8 Granea-poder	8 Veritas	20 Bonea	7 Vita
9 Bonea	9 eternitat-saviesa	9 Gloria	21 Granea	8 Natura
Att Quoad Nos			22 Poder	9 Substantia
10 Creacio			23 Saber	10 Bonitas
11 Ordinacio			25 Volentat	11 Magnitudo
12 Recreacio			26 Veritat	12 Potestas
13 Volentat			27 Glòria2	13 Sapientia
14 Senyoria			28 Justicia	14 Voluntas
15 Saviea			59 Misericordia	15 Virtus
16 Dretura			100 Fi	16 Veritas
17 Larguea				17 Gloria
18 Ajuda				18 Perfectio
19 Humilitat				19 Iustitia
20 Misericordia				20 Misericordia
21 Gloria de Parays				
22 Acabament				

2.1. THE LLIBRE DE CONTEMPLACIÓ EN DÉU (1271-1273)

The *Llibre de contemplació*¹³⁴ apparently aims at a Christian audience, one which is somewhat versed in theology, but seeks an emotional, spiritual connection with learning. It forms an encyclopedic compendium which teaches to understand and love God, in all His unity and virtues. This book seeks to help its reader to lead a virtuous life, according to divine will, and to be ready to convert unbelievers.¹³⁵ Ramon Llull mentions a number of attributes within God, which he divides in two main kinds: the divine *attributa quoad Deum*, which elaborate on God's true essence, and there are the divine *attributa quoad nos*, which seek to describe the attributes of God's working within the created world. Thus Ramon Llull includes two ways of looking at the attributes of God in one work: first, the idea that divine attributes are implied by the very nature of God, and secondly, that the attributes of God describe the way God works in the created world.

The work as a whole is divided into three parts, each divided into five books. This division has a clear numerical symbolism: the three parts of the work symbolize the Trinity, the five books symbolize the five wounds of Christ. The unity of the work reflects the unity

¹³⁴ Ramon Llull, *Llibre de contemplació en Déu. Volum I: llibres I-II. Volum II: llibre III*, ed. by Antoni I. Alomar, Montserrat Lluch, Aina Sitjes and Albert Soler (Palma: Patronat Ramon Llull, 2015), *NEORL*, XIV (cf. footnote 117 above).

¹³⁵ Fidora, Rubio, *Raimundus Lullus*, *CCCM*, 214, *ROL*, Supplementum Lullianum II, p. 136.

of God.¹³⁶ The attributes of God are of special importance in part I and II of the *Llibre de contemplació*, since this part teaches on how to understand and contemplate on these attributes. God's actions are discussed in the second part, together with the senses of human beings (fit for recognizing God's actions). The third part contains diagrams with which to formulate principles.¹³⁷

The *attributa quoad Deum* are infinity (*infinitat*), eternity (*eternitat*), unity (*unitat*), Trinity (*trinitat*), power (*poder*), knowledge (*sciencia*), truth (*veritat*), and goodness (*bonea*). One should note that here, one of the main attributes is Trinity. This is not the case at all in Lull's *Disputatio Raimundi*, or the *Ars*, where the Trinity has to be proven throughout the work in order to be accepted. But since the *Llibre de contemplació* expects a Christian audience, Lull will include this attribute of God *ab initio*.

The *attributa quoad nos* are creation (*creació*), ordinance (*ordinació*), re-creation (*recreació*), will (*volentat*), dominion (*senyoria*), wisdom (*saviea*), justice (*dretura*), generosity (*larguea*), help (*ajuda*), humility (*humilitat*), mercy (*misericordia*), glory of paradise (*gloria de parays*), and perfection (*acabament*). Some of these attributes occur in Islamic theology as well – such as help (*ajuda*) and mercy (*misericordia*).

2.2. THE LLIBRE DEL GENTIL E DELS TRES SAVIS (1274-1283)

The *Llibre del gentil e dels tres savis*¹³⁸ is a fictional debate held by a group of scholars, a Jew, a Christian and a Muslim, in order to enlighten an unbeliever (referred to as 'gentile') who suffers from an existential crisis and fear of death. At the invitation of the allegorical Lady Intelligence, they sit together by five trees, each one carrying flowers of wisdom in which divine attributes, and human virtues and vices are combined. These elements of meaning are directly derived from the *Ars*. Discussing the content of each flower, the scholars prove the existence of God and the truth of their respective religions, according to sound logic. The debate is peaceful and courteous, although Ramon Lull does voice his opinion on Judaism and Islam openly. The gentile gets to choose his faith in the end, although the scholars do not wish to hear the answer and the reader never truly gets to know. The tone of the entire work is rational, and all characters listen to each other's views without clear bias or stating absolute truth claims.¹³⁹ The *Llibre del gentil e dels tres savis* is a perfect example of an idealized debate between representatives of religions, based on Ramon Lull's logical principles, which makes this work relevant for the discussion of the *Disputatio Raimundi* – an actual and less ideal performance of the Lullian rational debate.

In the *Llibre del gentil e dels tres savis*, the attributes of God are represented as flowers of a "first tree". They are all listed in pairs each time. The *Ars* already clarified that God's attributes were 'convertible', or combinable – that means: God's goodness is great, and God's greatness is good. In the *Llibre del gentil*, they are grouped in potential pairs, although more combinations are possible. The attributes, beginning with goodness and greatness, are listed as a means to prove the existence of God – although Lull says one

¹³⁶ Fidora, Rubio, *Raimundus Lullus*, CCCM, 214, ROL, Supplementum Lullianum II, p. 136.

¹³⁷ Fidora, Rubio, *Raimundus Lullus*, CCCM, 214, ROL, Supplementum Lullianum II, p. 136-137.

¹³⁸ Ramon Lull, *Llibre del gentil e dels tres savis*, ed. by Anthony Bonner (Barcelona: Publicacions de la Abadia de Montserrat, 2015), NEORL, II (cf. footnote 132 above); Translation: Anthony Bonner, *Selected Works of Ramon Lull (1232-1316)*, I (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 91-304.

¹³⁹ Fidora, Rubio, *Raimundus Lullus*, CCCM, 214, ROL, Supplementum Lullianum II, pp. 142-143.

could use any potential pairing of attributes to do so. These include goodness-greatness, greatness-eternity, goodness-eternity, goodness-power, greatness-power, goodness-wisdom, greatness-wisdom, goodness-love, greatness-love, goodness-perfection, power-wisdom, greatness-perfection, power-love, eternity-power, power-perfection, eternity-wisdom, wisdom-love, eternity-love, wisdom-perfection, eternity-perfection, love-perfection. Each time, one of these flowers will be taken from the tree, and then they will be discussed by the scholars in order to show the truth of their own religion. The *Llibre del gentil* discusses Judaism, Christianity and Islam in a seemingly impartial manner, but it is clear for the attentive reader that Llull means to extoll Christianity while pointing out certain faults in other faiths. In the prologue of the *Llibre del gentil e dels tres savis*, Llull claims to have fashioned a new kind of logic.

“Since for a long time we have had dealings with unbelievers, and have heard their false opinions and errors; and in order that they may give praise to our Lord God and enter the path of eternal salvation, I, who am blameworthy, despicable, poor, sinful, scorned by others, unworthy of having my name affixed to this book or any other, following the manner of the Arabic *Llibre del gentil e dels tres savis*, wish to exert myself to the utmost—trusting in the help of the Most High—in finding a new method and new reasons by which those in error might be shown the path to glory without end and the means of avoiding infinite suffering.”¹⁴⁰

The *Llibre del gentil e dels tres savis* is divided in four major parts: in the first book, Ramon Llull wishes to show that God exists, that He contains the “flowers” or attributes of the first tree, and that the resurrection exists. He does this by linking God’s attributes to one another, and saying that all attributes need to be eternal in order to function in a logical way. In the second book, the Jewish scholar tries to prove that his religion is the truest. In the third book, the Christian scholar attempts to prove his own religion, and at the end the Islamic scholar explains his.

The Christian book of the *Llibre del gentil e dels tres savis* is dedicated to proving the main Christian articles of faith. These are the existence of one God, the Trinity, re-creation,¹⁴¹ glorification, virgin birth, and crucifixion. Ramon Llull uses a combination of the attributes of God, but also the virtues and the vices to show the truth of his faith articles. The Trinity is proven by the combination of goodness and greatness, but also by various combinations of power, wisdom and love (or will). The article of re-creation is, again, proven by a combination between goodness and greatness, but also between power and charity. Glorification is backed up by a combination of virtues and vices: prudence versus sloth or accidie, and justice and pride. The Crucifixion is proven with hope and avarice. One could argue that the Crucifixion and glorification are given virtues and vices instead of the attributes of God as a proof, since they cover the created reality in combination with the divine instead of God Himself (being His Trinity). The combination of goodness and greatness can be found in each of the three chapters dealing with different faiths. The Jewish scholar, in the second book, uses the combination of goodness and greatness to prove the

¹⁴⁰ Llull, *Llibre del gentil e dels tres savis*, NEORL, II, Del prolech, p. 5. Translation: Bonner, *SW* (cf. footnote 138 above), p. 110.

¹⁴¹ Llull, *Llibre del gentil e dels tres savis*, NEORL, II, 3, 6, p. 115: the terminology used here in Catalan is “*recreació*”. It signifies the Incarnation and the unity between humanity and God in Christ, to which the entire universe is directed.

use of the “Old Law” or the Old Testament. The Islamic scholar, in the fourth book, uses the combination of goodness and greatness as a proof that Muhammad is a prophet.

2.2. THE CENT NOMS DE DEU (1292)

Ramon Llull wrote his *Cent noms de Déu* in 1292, in Rome, as a way to promote his *Ars*, and as a way to present himself as a mediator between Christianity and Islam. The text takes the form of a long poem that rhymes systematically, since Llull meant to emulate the poetic style of Islamic *saj‘*, the elevated language in which Islamic sacred texts, such as the Qur’ān, were written. Every chapter of the poem consists of ten stanzas, a reference to the number of Christian psalms.¹⁴² The *Cent noms de Déu* is a bridge between the Islamic and Christian traditions concerning the names of God, which come from both the Qur’ān and the Bible. The work contains hundred names, attributes and characteristics of God, all seemingly in a random order. The *Cent noms de Déu* was written as a reaction to the Islamic ninety-nine beautiful names of God, which was a collection of every Qur’ānic name which can be ascribed to God. Especially the form of the *Cent noms* is reminiscent of the Islamic ninety-nine beautiful names (the *Cent noms* contains a hundred chapters, written in embellished rhyme). However, Llull mainly discussed Christian names, such as Father or Son, but also directly translated or adapted certain Islamic names of God (such as the Great, the Merciful, Life, etc.). According to Dominique Urvoy, Llull had probably read or come in contact with al-Ġuwaynī’s *The Guide to Conclusive Proofs for the Principles of Belief*, which was widely read in Islamic Iberia. Al-Ġuwaynī discusses eighty names of God, and the twenty names which he does not include are likewise not discussed in the *Cent noms de Déu*.¹⁴³ In the *Cent noms de Déu*, Llull makes no difference in order between what he usually considers attributes, such as ‘goodness’, in his works, and what can more likely be considered ‘names’ or characteristics such as ‘constructor’, or ‘saviour’. However, most of what can typically be considered attributes are listed at the beginning of the work. In the Islamic tradition concerning the beautiful names of God, there is a difference between divine names (*asma’*) and attributes (*ṣifāt*), even though attributes belong in the larger category of the names of God. The attributes are the elements that constitute God’s essence, and the names are how God can be described based on these elements.¹⁴⁴ According to Llull, the names of God were largely attributed to Him by human convention. However, he saw a difference between ‘relative’ (or in relation to creation) and ‘real’ names (only in

¹⁴² Simone Sari, “One God, Many Names” (cf. footnote 9 above), pp. 19-20. Cf. also Ángel Cortabarría Beitia, “La connaissance des textes arabes chez Raymond Martin O.P. et sa position en face de l’Islam,” trans. by Réginald Alvès de Sà, Cahiers de Fanjeaux 18 (Toulouse: Privat, 1983), pp. 44-45.

¹⁴³ Dominique Urvoy, “Dans quelle mesure la pensée de Raymond Lulle a-t-elle été marquée par son rapport à l’islam?,” *Ramon Llull and Islam, the Beginning of Dialogue / Ramon Llull y el islam, el inicio del diálogo*, Quaderns de la Mediterrània 9 (2008): pp. 41-42: “D’une part, on peut aller plus loin que la remarque précédente: vingt-huit termes lulliens sont une traduction exacte des termes islamiques, mais cinquante-neuf noms lulliens correspondent à soixante noms musulmans si l’on tient compte des synonymies, des variantes dans l’interprétation ou des sens allégoriques communément admis. D’autre part, il faut prendre en considération le fait que le théologien musulman dont l’œuvre a été la plus utilisée en Espagne, l’ash’arite Juwaynī (XIe s.), n’a étudié dans son Kitāb al-irshād que quatre-vingts noms, et les termes qu’il délaisse sont, à trois exceptions près, les mêmes que ceux que Lulle ignore, à savoir ceux qui concernent les rapports de Dieu à ses créatures (péché, grâce...), pour les remplacer par des termes propres au christianisme ou à son Art.” The passage is also quoted in Sari, “One God, Many Names” (cf. footnote 9 above), p. 17.

¹⁴⁴ Sari, “One God, Many Names” (cf. footnote 9 above) 14-15.

relation to His own essence), and distinguished the names that could only be said about God, such as ‘necessary entity’.¹⁴⁵

Llull meant the *Cent noms de Déu* to be a work which guides private devotion. Every name of God is discussed as a meditation, or an explanation of what the name means for the nature of God and for our everyday conduct and personal life. The tone is often moralizing and spiritual. This particular use of the names of God can be found in both Christianity and Islam. In Christianity, the names of God were believed to hold special powers, for example, the power to heal. The Franciscans in particular meditated on the name of Jesus. In Islam, the names of God were of great importance in Sufism. According to Simone Sari, this is a reason why Llull’s *Cent noms de Déu* can be seen as a bridge between Christianity and Islam.¹⁴⁶ The work is an interesting comparison in a comparative study of Llull’s works, since it shows a clear influence of the *Ars*, and since it illuminates the devotional side of Llull’s theology. The *Cent noms de Déu* is from a later stage in Llull’s thought than the *Llibre de contemplació*, and shows a clear and systematic argumentation based on devotional meditation.

2.3. THE ARS GENERALIS ULTIMA (1305-1308)

Throughout his works, Ramon Llull has always used the same kind of logic, which he would, at times, explain in various versions or ‘*Arts*’. This logic was mainly an *exposé* of Llull’s grand vision of God, His attributes, and their place in logic and the universe. After forty years of philosophical contemplation, Ramon Llull, aged 72, wished to conclude his logic with one final, exhaustive version of the *Ars*, the *Ars generalis ultima*.¹⁴⁷ His *Ars generalis ultima* was supposed to offer a steady foundation of knowledge and thinking, which was based on firm logic and formed a beacon against loose thinking or unfounded opinions. The *Ars* was meant to be a general science, with non-specific categories common to all thinking. The *Ars* explained general rules, also applying them to the specific.¹⁴⁸

Since, according to Llull, the entire universe was directed to God,¹⁴⁹ it followed that most of the *Ars generalis ultima* explains God’s logical nature. The work contains most of Llull’s main attributes of God in figure A. These include, as mentioned above, truth, power, will, glory, goodness, greatness, virtue and duration. Even though some of Llull’s works put their own emphasis when discussing the nature of God, the logic of the *Ars* can be found in most of Llull’s works. Reading the *Ars* is an important first step in discovering the true meaning of certain Lullian passages. However, an avid reader will soon discover that, in many of his works, Llull’s thoughts are more or less veiled. He took it upon himself to show

¹⁴⁵ Sari, “One God, Many Names” (cf. footnote 9 above), pp. 9-10; cf. also Charles Lohr, “The Islamic Beautiful Names of God and the Lullian *Art*,” in Elena Lourie and Harvey J. Hames, *Jews, Muslims, and Christians In and Around the Crown of Aragon : Essays in Honour of Professor Elena Lourie* (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 197-206.

¹⁴⁶ Sari, “One God, Many Names” (cf. footnote 9 above), p. 21.

¹⁴⁷ Raimundus Lullus, *Ars generalis ultima*, ed. by Aloisius Madre (Turnhout: Brepols, 1986), CCCM, 75, ROL, XIV; Translation: Computerized version: *Raymond Lull’s Ars Magna*, trans. by Steven Abbott and Yanis Damberg (Gatineau, Quebec, Canada, March 2009), online version, accessible through Narpan.net.

¹⁴⁸ “*Ars generalis ultima*” in Fidora, Rubio, *Raimundus Lullus*, CCCM, 214, ROL, Supplementum Lullianum II, pp. 192-193.

¹⁴⁹ Cf. section 1 above, dealing with the Ladder of the Universe in Llull’s works.

a different side or angle of his thought system, each time adapting his writing to his perceived audience.¹⁵⁰

In Ramon Llull's *Ars*, each attribute of God corresponds to a certain letter, as a means to simplify combinatory formulae, but it is never used in a mathematical, propositional or algebraic way.¹⁵¹ Goodness, for example, is symbolized by the letter B, greatness is C, and so on. This is not the only possible significance of the letters, however, as I will explain. The letters are the first and foremost part of understanding the *Ars*, since every other chapter is more or less based on the combination of possible meanings of these letters. The letters of the *Ars* are put into various possible combinations in figures. The first figure, or figure A, combines the attributes of God, or the first meaning of all letters, in a circle. According to Ramon Llull, every attribute can be linked or 'converted' with the other, to describe one whole, otherwise unknowable divine essence A. The attributes of the *Ars* are mainly meant to signify the attributes of the pseudo-hypothetical 'perfect eternal being A'. They are inevitably also the attributes of God, the only perfect eternal being which can be rationally believed in.

¹⁵⁰ Cf "Style and Genre in the Writings of Ramon Llull," in Badia, Santanach, Soler, *Ramon Llull as a Vernacular Writer* (cf. footnote 16 above), p. 102.: "Llull would develop his most characteristically 'Lullian' interpretations and approaches in works intended for a more highly educated audience who was familiar with the doctrines circulating within the European faculties of philosophy and theology, rather than in the Instruction of Children." Cf. also Harvey J. Hames, *The Art of Conversion: Christianity and Kabbalah in the Thirteenth Century* (Leiden: Brill, 2000), p. 195: "Llull explains the Trinity in different ways depending on his audience and who he presumes will read the work. In many of his works, as for example in the *Llibre de vertuts e de pecats*, written in Majorca in 1313, knowing that his audience is Christian, and that the work is not intended for conversion purposes, the Trinity appears in an orthodox guise."

¹⁵¹ Cf. Anthony Bonner, *The Art and Logic of Ramon Llull* (cf. footnote 18 above), p. 18.: "One might be induced to think it is by the fact that Llull announces it as 'demonstrative', or by the semi-algebraic look of some of Llull's discourse: "The goal of E is A V Y, and thus E is the origin of . . ." (SW I, 367). These letters, however, represent constants and not variables as they have in formal logic since Aristotle's time."




Figure A, *Ars Magna*¹⁵²

The attributes are not the only rational standard which is mentioned in the *Ars generalis ultima*. Together with the attributes, the letters also stand for rational principles derived from metaphysics, such as majority, minority, beginning, middle, end, and so on. They also stand for questions, such as “why?,” “whether?”; principles, such as God, heaven, angels and humanity; virtues, such as charity, and sins, such as gluttony. Throughout the *Ars generalis ultima*, all the elements which the letters can signify are combined to form new truths.

B	goodness	difference	Whether?	God	justice	avarice
C	greatness	concordance	What?	angels	prudence	gluttony
D	duration	contrariety	of what?	heaven	fortitude	lust
E	power	beginning	why?	man	temperance	conceit
F	wisdom	middle	how much?	imagination	faith	acedia
G	will	end	what quality?	senses	hope	envy
H	virtue	majority	when?	vegetation	charity	wrath
I	truth	equality	Where?	elements	patience	lies
K	glory	minority	how and with what?	instruments	mercy	inconstancy

Part 1 of the *Ars generalis ultima* discusses the alphabet and its meaning. The second part combines the letters schematically in many possible combinations. The first chapter of part 2 discusses the first meaning of the letters, being the attributes of God. The second chapter discusses these same letters, but this time in their second meaning, beginning with

¹⁵² Picture from the *Ars generalis ultima*, from Abbott, Damberg, *Raymond Lull's Ars Magna* (cf. footnote 147 above).

“difference” and ending with “minority”. This chapter will be less interesting in this part of our study. In the third figure, all the letters are listed in all their possible combinations and meanings. The fourth figure in chapter four contains all figures within itself.

Part 3 of the *Ars generalis ultima* is devoted to making rationalizations with the first and second meaning of the letters, or the principles.

Part 8 is of greater importance when discussing the attributes of God. It contains a discussion of the principles, or the first and second meanings of the letters, in combination with each other. Section 1 of this part deals with the combination of each principle with the others. Every first and second meaning of the letters are combined with the first and second meaning of the other letters. For example, goodness is combined with concordance.

Part 9 is a theologically significant part to discuss in relation with Ramon Llull’s other works on the divine attributes. It provides a classification of beings, beginning with God (section 1) and ending with “instruments” or virtues and vices (section 9). The most interesting section is, however, the first one which deals with God and His attributes. Chapter 1 aims to investigate the divine attributes, chapter 2 deals with the intrinsic acts of these divine attributes, chapter 3 explains the infinity of the divine attributes, chapter 4 explains the infinity of the acts of the divine attributes, chapter 5 and 6 combine God with the first and second meaning of the letters. As a whole, part 9 will have a reflection in part 11, where, in the fourth chapter, questions will be asked and resolved which are based on the mixing of principles and rules to which part 9 is dedicated.

The *Ars generalis ultima* forms a blueprint for many of Llull’s works, and he will always use the logic described here as a starting point. Many of the arguments of the *Disputatio Raimundi christiani et Homeri saraceni* can be traced back to the logic of the *Ars*. The attributes of God are also explained in the *Ars generalis ultima*, in all their possible meanings and combinations. It is therefore important to include this work in my comparison, since it forms the origin of most of Llull’s thinking.

2.4. THE LIBER DISPUTATIONIS RAIMUNDI CHRISTIANI ET HOMERI SARACENI (1308)

The last book on my list to discuss, and the one which is the basis of my dissertation, is of course the *Disputatio Raimundi christiani et Homeri saraceni*, or shorter, the *Disputatio Raimundi*,¹⁵³ written right after the *Ars generalis ultima*. In this work, both ‘Umar and Raimundus discuss their vision of God by each of His attributes. ‘Umar begins, and he discusses the main attributes of God. Seven of these are essential to Him: necessary entity, unity, singularity, infinity, eternity, simplicity, and life. Then there are eleven non-essential attributes, being goodness, greatness, power, wisdom, will, virtue, truth, glory, perfection, justice and mercy. Each time, ‘Umar seeks to prove a few objections against Christianity: a) that God is not His attributes, but that the attributes are merely rooted in His essence, b) that God cannot be triune, and c) that the Incarnation cannot be real. For example, when ‘Umar discusses justice, he denies that justice is intrinsically God, and he says that the Incarnation would go against God’s innate justice, since God could not want Himself to be

¹⁵³ Raimundus Lullus, *Liber disputationis Raimundi christiani et Homeri saraceni*, ed. by Aloisius Madre (Turnhout: Brepols, 1998), CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, 172-264.

material and thus to be debased throughout His human life. ‘Umar also discards the attributes of God, saying that God does not have a nature and is not a substance in the classical meaning of the word. God cannot have accidents, since He is ultimately singular and perfect. Moreover, in His infinity, eternity and perfection He does not have a sense of direction or purpose in which to move or grow.¹⁵⁴

Raimundus disagrees with ‘Umar from the beginning of the second part onwards, and sets up a parallel discussion. He lists the same attributes of God, although this time not making a difference between essential and non-essential attributes, but still keeping the exact order of ‘Umar’s arguments. However, when discussing the non-essential attributes of God, Llull adds two, being nature and substance. According to Raimundus, God does have a nature, and He is a substance, but not in a material way.¹⁵⁵ These two added attributes do not appear in any of Llull’s other works. The main reason why they are added here is to form a basis for the following claims: a) God’s attributes belong to His essence, moreover they *are* His essence, b) God has a Trinity, this is forever the nature of His essence, and c) God’s very essence is logically inclined to incarnate, making the Incarnation the logical outcome of who God really is.

The attributes of God serve to prove the Trinity and the Incarnation in the first chapter of part 2 (which deals with Raimundus’ direct answer to ‘Umar’s exposé).¹⁵⁶ This will be the basis of this chapter. However, the role of the divine attributes does not stop there. Raimundus also mentions the attributes of God in some passages from his second chapter in part 2, which deal with a systematic overview of the differences between the Christian and Islamic creed.¹⁵⁷ Raimundus mentions a few religious tenets held by Christianity, such as, among others, the heavenly virtues, to which Raimundus adds the four Platonic cardinal virtues to reach an amount of 7, and the seven deadly sins. He compares the way in which Christians and Muslims look at virtue and sin. He concludes that at times Christian believers are more averse to sin and more inclined to virtue, since every sin or virtue corresponds to an attribute (for example, will) which can be found in the human mind, but also as an attribute of God. And since Christians believe the attributes of God belong to His essence, this means, according to Raimundus, that virtues in Christianity are of greater importance.

2.5. CONCLUSION

There are a few intersecting differences in how Llull uses his thought and how he discusses the divine attributes. First, there is a potential difference in audience: Llull puts certain emphasizes when he argues against rivaling faiths, and changes his tone again when arguing against adherents of his own faith. Furthermore, Llull argues differently depending on the degree of learning of his perceived audience. The *Llibre de contemplació* could be perceived as somewhat more naïve and mystical, though still learned, whereas the *Llibre del gentil e dels tres savis* deals with more scholarly matters, since the main characters of this work are all depicted as men of learning. Also, whereas the *Llibre de contemplació* assumes a Christian readership and only deals with Christian theological matters, the *Llibre*

¹⁵⁴ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, I, 2, 4, p. 186.

¹⁵⁵ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 7, p. 214.

¹⁵⁶ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, pp. 195-238.

¹⁵⁷ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 2, pp. 239-261.

del gentil e dels tres savis is based on the common ground between the three monotheistic faiths.

Apart from the obvious nuance throughout Llull's œuvre in the way in which he interpreted the divine attributes, whether it be mystical or naïve, or scholarly, there was also a subtle shift in register and tone throughout his works. While the tone of the first books remained friendly, up to the *Ars generalis ultima*, the *Disputatio Raimundi* becomes more vitriolic and more focused on proving a point. The *Ars generalis ultima* also contains the call for a more heated kind of debate. One might argue that as the goal of Llull's writing shifted, the style of writing became less gentle and irenic. This might have something to do with Llull's changing attitude towards interfaith encounters, especially after the fall of Acre, but it might also be a natural consequence of the specific goal of the *Disputatio*, which was a recording of a – supposedly – factual debate between Llull and an Islamic scholar. When it came down to the actual application of the *Art* in an interfaith debate, Llull seemed to write less from an idealistic point of view, and he engaged in a more argumentative style of writing. The shift in (emotional) register, which can be discovered in the development of Llull's œuvre, denotes a shift in attitude towards Muslims throughout Llull's life, but also a change in the way in which Llull sought to utilize his arguments, whether it be for the sake of educating fellow Christians, or for an actual debate with Islamic scholars.

CHAPTER 3: THE FIRST SEVEN ATTRIBUTES OF GOD IN LLULL'S ŒUVRE: AN OVERVIEW

1. INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, I will discuss what 'Umar calls the "essential" attributes of God according to their appearance in the *Disputatio Raimundi*, and compare them with those same attributes, as they appear in the other texts by Llull, which I described above.

The main question I would like to answer is "what is Llull trying to achieve with the attributes of God?" An attribute such as goodness can be mentioned as a proof of the existence of God, the existence of the Trinity, the creation or Incarnation of Christ, or the creation of the world. The purpose of the work should be taken into account: the *Llibre del gentil* will initially seek to prove the existence of God, since the wise men are addressing a non-believer. The *Disputatio Raimundi* will aim to defend God's Trinity against Islamic notions of unity, while the very existence of God is assumed *ab initio*. The *Llibre de contemplació* will assume an audience which believes in the existence of God and the Trinity and will again treat God's goodness in a different way.

I will discuss every attribute of God according to their occurrence in Llull's œuvre. It should be mentioned that Ramon Llull discussed certain attributes (such as goodness) more frequently than others (such as necessary entity). I will, therefore, limit myself to discussing every attribute of the *Disputatio Raimundi*. The order of the attributes in the *Disputatio Raimundi* will be respected throughout this chapter. The so-called "essential attributes" and "non-essential attributes" will also be discussed separately. This division was made at the beginning of part 1 by the character 'Umar, who argued that, while God has certain attributes which describe His very essence, He also has attributes that become apparent by His action and operation in the universe. Raimundus does not make such distinction, and considers every attribute co-essential to God. However, since the division made by 'Umar in the first part of the *Disputatio Raimundi* defines the entire order of the attributes mentioned, I will respect the distinction in this part of my thesis which deals with the context of Llull's œuvre, and in the second part, dealing with the Islamic background. Even though 'Umar's part precedes the presentation of the arguments by Raimundus, I will begin with the latter part of the text, in order to better compare the arguments (which have a purely Christian background) to the other works written by Llull.

2. NECESSARY ENTITY

2.1. DISPUTATIO RAIMUNDI

Raimundus divides necessary being into two kinds: first, being "not preceded by another being" (which is God), and second, created being.¹⁵⁸ Raimundus explains the first kind of

¹⁵⁸ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 1, p. 196.

necessary entity. According to him, God's divine goodness and He Himself are convertible. God's goodness is, likewise, infinite, since He brings forth infinite goodness. Since God's goodness is forever good, it is part of the essence of God. This leads Raimundus to explain the correlative theory: the being that necessarily produces goodness is the Father, the necessitated goodness is the Son, and both the Father and the Son necessitate the Holy Ghost.¹⁵⁹ Raimundus argues that God can only be a necessary being as long as He has the intrinsic correlatives – or a Trinity. According to Raimundus, God has to have an intrinsic act in order to truly be a necessary entity, since an entity is more necessary when it acts than when it simply exists. A necessary being is also more necessary when it has correlatives, the same way that understanding is more real when it has an object of understanding.¹⁶⁰

Raimundus disagrees with 'Umar's argument that, if the Trinity existed, the Son and the Holy Ghost would be less necessary than the Father. According to Raimundus, the Son and the Holy Ghost are as necessary as the Father, since they are wholly, essentially stemming from the Father. This means that the Son and the Holy Ghost are God, as much as the Father. Raimundus makes a comparison in order to explain his opinion to 'Umar:

“Although it is a crude example, for instance, like a nail necessitates that iron itself exists, since it is made out of the material of iron, so the Son and the Holy Spirit are God, since they are of God the Father and of the divinity which is a necessary essence.”¹⁶¹

Raimundus next defends the Incarnation. In God, will and understanding are equally great, and there is no time or sequence in Him, which is why God always understood and willed the greater end of the world. This end consists in the birth of Christ within the created world, so that the first divine end (the Person of the Son) would be bound to the first created end (the Incarnation). This means that the Incarnation does not imply the existence of time and sequence within God.¹⁶² Lastly, Raimundus disagrees with 'Umar's statement, that an infinite and eternal entity cannot bind itself to something which is finite and can therefore not incarnate. According to Raimundus, God's power should not be limited. If God's will can love it, and His intellect think it, then His power can accomplish it, since these three attributes are the same.¹⁶³

2.2. CENT NOMS DE DÉU

In the *Cent noms de Déu*, as in the *Disputatio Raimundi*,¹⁶⁴ Llull mentions the fact that the necessary entity must have correlatives. He uses the correlatives of perfection and infinity to prove his point.

¹⁵⁹ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 1, pp. 196-197.

¹⁶⁰ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 1, p. 197.

¹⁶¹ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 1, p. 197. Translation by Annemarie C. Mayer.

¹⁶² Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, I, 2, 1, pp. 197-198.

¹⁶³ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, I, 2, 1, p. 198.

¹⁶⁴ Cf. Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, I, 2, 1, pp. 196-197.

“2. It is necessary for the infinite to infinitise,
just as it is necessary for perfection to perfect,
without which perfection one would be unable to sustain oneself.”¹⁶⁵

Just like in the *Disputatio Raimundi*, Llull sees the correlatives as necessary for the existence of divine perfection and infinity. Without the correlatives, neither of the attributes is capable of existing, which would mean that we would not be able to “sustain ourselves.” This means that the perfection of the attributes of God is necessary for creation to exist. Llull devotes most of the section on necessary entity to the defense and the explanation of the divine correlatives. He continues to defend the divine eternity, without which there is no creator. If eternity (or God) did not exist, and if it was not at the base of creation, it would mean that the created world brought itself into being – which is impossible.

“3. Were eternity not to exist,
it would necessarily follow
that whatever exists would have been self-initiated.”¹⁶⁶

Llull continues that, within God, there exists power, and that by His will may be known the lover, lovable and love. According to Llull, every attribute of God is convertible and the same, since power, wisdom and will constitute the same single nature, which means that God’s unity is preserved. The correlatives are driven by the internal act, which necessarily needs to be eternal or “as great as His existence,” so that God can have eternal deifying. In other words, if God’s act is not as great as God Himself, He becomes idle, workless and less divine. Llull summarizes the internal mechanism of the correlatives by saying that within God, there exists concurring, differentiating and equalling. These three elements constitute the bond between the three correlatives: concurring means that the correlatives are bound together, and are in accord. Differentiating means that the correlatives are different among themselves. They are not convertible, like the attributes. Equalling means that the three correlatives are equal to one another, since they are the same being, God.

“4. It is necessary that in God there exist power,
and that in will may be known
the lover, the loveable and love.

5. In God power, wisdom and will
necessarily constitute a single nature,
so that He may be infinite in <His> unity.

6. It is necessary that in God His operation
be as great as His existence,
so that in Him there may obtain <the act of> deifying.

7. <The acts of > concurring, differentiating and equalling

¹⁶⁵ Llull, *Cent noms de Déu*, ORL, XIX, XI, p. 91. Translation: Sari, Hughes, “Hundred Names of God” (cf. footnote 10 above).

¹⁶⁶ Llull, *Cent noms de Déu*, ORL, XIX, XI, p. 91. Translation: Sari, Hughes, “Hundred Names of God” (cf. footnote 10 above).

are necessary in God,
so that He may not be idle.”¹⁶⁷

Llull explains that God, in His necessity, has no need for anything except Himself. Since God is perfect goodness, He is necessitated by His own internal operation. This means that God, as the only entity in the universe, eternally causes Himself. Without God as the necessary being, created being would not survive. God’s goodness is the primordial goodness, which sustains and orders the universe. The created matter needs the primordial goodness of the necessary entity to be led and sustained, since the created is finite and thus contingent.

“8. God has no need of anything apart from Himself,
since He is perfect in every goodness,
for within Himself He possesses operation and <the> operated.

9. God is necessary to us,
for, in His absence, created being would not be sustained,
nor led towards any goal.

10. It is necessary for man to love,
know, serve and honour God,
in Whom there fittingly resides mercy and forgiveness.”¹⁶⁸

Like the *Disputatio Raimundi*, the *Cent noms de Déu* attempts to explain how God is a necessary entity, and what that means for the nature of His essence. Ramon Llull discusses the correlatives of God and their necessity, which leads to the defense of the Trinity. God’s attributes are necessary, infinite, eternal and therefore part of His essence, since God cannot be without His attributes, and since they are also necessary for creation. The creation of the universe is also mentioned as contingent on God, while God remains independent of any other entity apart from Himself – since He necessitates Himself, due to His internal act. This is the ultimate Lullian definition of the necessary entity.

2.3. CONCLUSION

God as a necessary entity constitutes His primordial nature, His lack of beginning and end, and the necessity of His existence to uphold creation. Logically, infinity must exist to create the finite world, and the world needs to be directed to a perfect creator. Ramon Llull explains that it is necessary that something exists which is without a beginning, and which lies at the base of the created universe. If every finite entity was self-initiated, this would constitute an irregularity. If the world was not directed to God, it would cease to exist.

God as a necessary being is the first attribute of the first list mentioned by both ‘Umar and Raimundus. The fact that a necessary being needs to exist is the main philosophical reason to believe in the existence of God, for Christians and Muslims alike. It is also the main defining trait of God, since it validates His perfection and infinity. The Trinity and

¹⁶⁷ Llull, *Cent noms de Déu*, *ORL*, XIX, XI, pp. 91-92. Translation: Sari, Hughes, “Hundred Names of God” (cf. footnote 10 above).

¹⁶⁸ Llull, *Cent noms de Déu*, *ORL*, XIX, XI, p. 92. Translation: Sari, Hughes, “Hundred Names of God” (cf. footnote 10 above).

the Incarnation need to be reconciled with God's infinity and His necessity due to the fact that they are brought forth from God. Lull must prove that the Trinity and the Incarnation do not posit a sequence or beginning within God.

Lull needs to explain that God's necessity and lack of beginning does not negate the existence of a Trinity. If God is without a beginning, and if He is primordial, how does one explain the internal generation and spiration? Ramon Lull uses the divine correlatives to explain the Trinity. God's internal correlatives are necessary, since His internal act is necessary. Without it, God would not be able to be perfect. Moreover, there is no real beginning within God, since His generation and spiration are eternal, and stand above time itself.

The Incarnation of God within the finite world is only discussed in the *Disputatio Raimundi*.¹⁶⁹ The Incarnation would create a connection between God and the finite, since God would be born (and thus have a beginning), and He would be finite and limited in human form. According to Lull, this does not pose a problem. The eternity of the will of God to incarnate makes the Incarnation eternal in and of itself. Moreover, God can possess the will and the power to incarnate into a finite form, because His power cannot be limited in any way.

3. UNITY

3.1. DISPUTATIO RAIMUNDI

Raimundus believes that there are two kinds of unity: the unity of God, which is infinite and eternal, and the unity of Christ, which is the highest of the created unities. Raimundus first states that the unity of God is not perfect if it does not have an infinite act, without which it would be idle. This theory brings Raimundus to the correlatives: the internal act of the unity of God is brought about by the agent and patient, or the unifier and the unified.¹⁷⁰ Raimundus parries 'Umar's attack against the Trinity, that God's unity means that He cannot have internal plurality. According to Raimundus, this does not work for the divine essence, since every Person of the Trinity is the same entity. Raimundus uses the example of a pair of pliers made from what was originally a metal hammer. Even though the hammer is now another instrument, they are both made from the same metal.¹⁷¹ Raimundus also denies the claim, made by 'Umar, that there cannot be a connection between multiple infinite beings, because if there were, these beings would border and limit each other and make each other finite again. This argument does not work for the correlatives, according to Raimundus, since the correlatives of will do not mean a multitude of wills, to name an example.¹⁷² Moreover, Raimundus continues by defending the Trinity against 'Umar's claim that this would imply polytheism, repeating his view that the three Persons are essentially the same entity. Raimundus likewise defends the Incarnation, by declaring it the ultimate object of God's higher will and understanding:

¹⁶⁹ Cf. Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 2, p. 198.

¹⁷⁰ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 2, pp. 198-199.

¹⁷¹ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 2, p. 199.

¹⁷² Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 2, p. 199.

“Philosophically it has been proved that every agent takes more pleasure in producing something that is like it than in producing that which is not so like it. Therefore, God, who is the all-One, through His supreme unity, takes greater pleasure in bringing forth one supreme created being than as many created non-supreme beings as possible, so that the supreme things may unite in one Christ, who is one person, namely, God-man. And this is intelligible by the divine understanding, and loveable by the divine will, and realizable by the divine power, and good-makeable by the divine goodness, and great-makeable by the divine greatness, etc. Whereupon it follows that God became flesh.”¹⁷³

Raimundus also refutes ‘Umar’s statement that God’s attributes are meant to divide Him in many entities. According to Raimundus, there is a difference in Persons, but the attributes are essentially the same. They are the essence of God, and they are not accidental. However, due to the correlatives, and due to the fact that every attribute has an act, the attributes of God are known by us to be many.

“But on this account I do not suppose that there is a diversity in the divine attributes, so that the one is not the other; rather I say that they are essentially the same, so that their infinity is not destroyed, and they remain undivided in the essence of God, and that there is no place in them for any accident. Yet I say that as power is known by its act, namely, goodness by making good, greatness by making great, etc., so God, with His correlatives and the diversity between them, without which they could not exist, recognizes His many attributes, by objectifying and counting that they are many.”¹⁷⁴

God’s attributes can be discerned by their effect in the created world, and by their effect in generating one Christ. The three Persons of God are the same essence: as the Father brings forth the Son, He brings forth one goodness, one greatness, etc. The difference between the attributes does not work like the difference between, for example, the goodness and greatness of heaven, since they are essentially different beings. The fact that God’s attributes have correlatives does not diminish God’s unity, since the attributes are convertible and therefore one, while the correlatives are not.¹⁷⁵

Raimundus replies to ‘Umar’s statement, that the correlatives would pass on to the divine essence, substance, eternity, and so on. According to Raimundus, there is a difference between the correlatives, but the attributes are convertible. This means that God’s essence, substance and eternity are convertible with one another, and they together have attributes. Every divine Person is, therefore, still a singular entity.¹⁷⁶

Raimundus also disagrees with ‘Umar’s critique of the Incarnation, that an eternal and infinite entity cannot bind itself to a finite entity. According to Raimundus, this is not true according to the laws of the supernatural, but only according to the laws of the natural.¹⁷⁷ Lastly, Raimundus defends the Incarnation one last time, when ‘Umar claims that God

¹⁷³ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 2, p. 199. Translation by Annemarie C. Mayer.

¹⁷⁴ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 2, p. 200. Translation by Annemarie C. Mayer.

¹⁷⁵ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 2, pp. 200-201.

¹⁷⁶ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 2, p. 201.

¹⁷⁷ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 2, p. 201.

should have incarnated with multiple natures, since He is infinite. According to ‘Umar, it would not make sense for an infinite being to incarnate into only one nature. Raimundus disagrees with this, since it would destroy God’s unity. God can, due to His unity, only incarnate into one man, being Christ.¹⁷⁸

3.2. LLIBRE DE CONTEMPLACIÓ

Divine unity, as we read it in the *Llibre de contemplació*, is divided into two basic meanings. The first meaning is that there can only ever be one God. A multitude of gods is metaphysically impossible. The second meaning is that God’s essence cannot be composed, and can only ever be one essence. Ramon Llull first explains in chapter VIII that there can be no other God in being, except God, since He alone is divine. God’s divine essence is so noble, that no other being has the power to become God, nor does it have the virtue, grace, or wisdom to order that which the divine essence is supposed to order – which is why there is only one God. What is meant here is that God alone, as the eternal and divine being, can be God, since the created world does not share in His primordial infinity, eternity and perfection, and because He alone is the necessary entity.¹⁷⁹

Chapter IX of *Distinctio IV* is dedicated to the fact that God’s essence is only one substance. Llull explains that God’s essence cannot have two substances and, most notably, not three either.

“Oh one God, for whom there cannot be found a companion or equal! You are not two substances, nor three or more than three, but You are one substance, which is simple, and non-composite, nor conjoined, nor disjoined in itself.”¹⁸⁰

God’s unity means His essence is one, simple, and “non-composite,” which means that His essence consists of one entity. Llull then explains the unity of the attributes: first, he says that God only has one life, and He Himself is completely living. God is love, and He is His love, and that love is one with His essence. Likewise, God has one power, one wisdom – which knows His entire divinity, one will, and one eternity. There are multiple attributes of God, but they are one entity in and of themselves. Since the attributes are convertible with each other, according to Llull’s theology, this means that the attributes of God are essentially one.¹⁸¹ Ramon Llull here uses the same theory as can be found in the *Disputatio Raimundi*, where Raimundus also explains the convertibility of God’s attributes, which do not cause internal division.¹⁸² The chapter on unity in the *Llibre de contemplació* also describes the eternity of God in the same way as the *Disputatio Raimundi*:¹⁸³ in the *Llibre de contemplació*, Llull writes that the eternity of God knows no prior or posterior, no antecedent nor consequence. This would diminish the unity of God. Llull also explains that God’s essence is one in nature, nor is He conjoined with another nature.¹⁸⁴

¹⁷⁸ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 2, p. 202.

¹⁷⁹ Llull, *Llibre de contemplació*, NEORL, XIV, I, 4, 8, 3-6, p. 51.

¹⁸⁰ Llull, *Llibre de contemplació*, NEORL, XIV, I, 4, 9, 1, p. 55.

¹⁸¹ Llull, *Llibre de contemplació*, NEORL, XIV, I, 4, 9, 2-6, p. 55.

¹⁸² Cf. Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 2, pp. 200-201.

¹⁸³ Cf. Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 2, pp. 197-198.

¹⁸⁴ Llull, *Llibre de contemplació*, NEORL, XIV, I, 4, 9, 7, p. 55.

3.3. CENT NOMS DE DÉU

In the *Cent noms de Déu*, Ramon Llull begins by defining the meaning of unity in God's essence. According to Llull, God's unity implies that there are no multiple gods, since only one God can be eternal or infinite. The existence of multiple eternities or infinities would harm God's unity. The *Cent noms de Déu* explains the impossibility of polytheism, just like the *Llibre de contemplació*.¹⁸⁵ The *Disputatio Raimundi* does not mention this theory, however.

“2. Were there to exist many Gods, either one of them would be finite or the other would be infinite,
<and the latter> would not be great in its singularity.

3. It is fitting, therefore, that there should exist one God alone, so that there may be great goodness and great perfection,
<a God> omnipotent in His unity.”¹⁸⁶

Llull explains how the unity of God must mean that there are correlatives within His essence. According to Llull, the innate act of God's unity is necessary, lest God should be “idle”. This can also be found in the explanation of the correlatives in Llull's *Disputatio Raimundi*, in the part on unity – and more often.

God's unity is all the greater, because He has an internal act of unifying. The patient of unifying, the unified, is enjoyed by unity as its internal object. The object differs from other correlatives, such as the unifier and the unifying, since there is a clear difference between the correlatives (which are not convertible like the attributes of God). The internal act of unifying has to be present within unity, otherwise the other attributes, with which unity is convertible, would also lack an internal act. This would render the attributes of God idle. God's act is inseparable from His attributes, since they “pertain to each other,” meaning they are two necessary aspects of one being. This explanation of the unity and the Trinity of God mentions the correlative theory in the same way as the *Disputatio Raimundi*.¹⁸⁷

“4. The greatness of divine unity resides in the fact that as such it enjoys <the> great unified, distinct from the unifier and unifying as regards the Trinity.

5. Were unifying to be absent from the divine unity, great power, wisdom and love would also be lacking, and as such it would remain idle.

6. Unity and unifying pertain to each other as do perfection and its perfecting, which is why unity and unifying cannot be separated.”¹⁸⁸

According to Llull, God's unity has such a great power in unifying, that it can form the Trinity and still remain one substance. Unity is more powerful than the human will or

¹⁸⁵ Cf. Llull, *Llibre de contemplació*, NEORL, XIV, I, 4, 8, 3-6, p. 51.

¹⁸⁶ Llull, *Cent noms de Déu*, ORL, XIX, III, p. 84. Translation: Sari, Hughes, “Hundred Names of God” (cf. footnote 10 above).

¹⁸⁷ Cf. Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 2, pp. 198-199.

¹⁸⁸ Llull, *Cent noms de Déu*, ORL, XIX, III, p. 84. Translation: Sari, Hughes, “Hundred Names of God” (cf. footnote 10 above).

senses, or any other human faculty. God's unity is divine, and its great power makes it necessary to form an internal act, and therefore, the Trinity. Ramon Llull explains the correlatives by referring to the superlative nature of His attributes, which does not exist in created or sensory entities.

“7. Unity has greater power in terms of unifying
than does a sensible nature in terms of the acts of its senses
or the human will in its desiring.

8. Divine unity possesses such great power
that it can exist distinctly as a Trinity
yet remain one in terms of its substance.”¹⁸⁹

Ramon Llull states that God has one oneness, which describes an entity which is one. This means that God, who is the subject of this attribute, is inherently one. God's oneness is both “proper” and “common”. Going back to the previous passage which dealt with the correlatives, it is clear that every correlative has its own separate state of being, and is at the same time essentially the same substance. This paradigm means that God is essentially one.

In the *Cent noms de Déu*, the Incarnation is also explained by God's unity. According to Llull, God revealed the power of His unity by the Incarnation, during which He became a single human being, in whom deity and humanity were united. In the *Disputatio Raimundi*, Raimundus explains the unity of the Incarnation in the same way: the one divine essence of God incarnated in one human being (and not many).¹⁹⁰ In the *Cent noms de Déu*, Llull also claims that within the Incarnation, humanity and divinity are joint together without losing their one nature. Raimundus uses the same argument in the *Disputatio Raimundi*, in the chapter on singularity.¹⁹¹

“9. Just as God's oneness must pertain to one,
so too must He be one,
so that He may be both proper and common.

10. God wished to reveal the power of his unity
by becoming <a> man united with divinity,
a single person consisting of deity and humanity.”¹⁹²

Just like in the *Disputatio Raimundi*, Llull explains the necessity for the attributes of God to have correlatives, and the fact that the correlatives are essentially one and the same entity. This means that God's unity is never damaged – moreover, His unity is made purer with the correlatives than without. Ramon Llull also explains the Incarnation in roughly the same terms as in the *Disputatio Raimundi*. The passage from the *Disputatio Raimundi* and the *Cent noms de Déu* stem from the same theories.

¹⁸⁹ Llull, *Cent noms de Déu*, *ORL*, XIX, III, p. 84. Translation: Sari, Hughes, “Hundred Names of God” (cf. footnote 10 above).

¹⁹⁰ Cf. Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, *CCCM*, 114, *ROL*, XXII, II, 1, 2, p. 202.

¹⁹¹ Cf. Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, *CCCM*, 114, *ROL*, XXII, II, 1, 3, pp. 203-204.

¹⁹² Llull, *Cent noms de Déu*, *ORL*, XIX, III, pp. 84-85. Translation: Sari, Hughes, “Hundred Names of God” (cf. footnote 10 above).

3.4. CONCLUSION

The unity of God has two general meanings in the works of Ramon Llull: it means, on the one hand, the absence of a multitude of gods, and on the other, the absence of internal composition. This latter meaning makes the belief in a Trinity somewhat difficult. Likewise, the belief in co-essential attributes is complicated when upholding a strict view on unity, as Llull does in most of his mentions of divine unity.

Ramon Llull explains the Trinity by referring to the correlatives. Even though the correlative of agent (or the Father) is not the same as and cannot be interchanged with the correlative of patient (or the Son), all of God's correlatives are still Persons of one essence, God. Since every correlative is essentially God, His unity is not damaged in any way. The correlatives are not material or temporal, which means that they can have the same essence while also being internally different from each other.

Llull explains the co-essential attributes by referring to their convertibility. Since every attribute is convertible with the other, and since, for example, God's goodness is also great, and His greatness is also perfect, it means that all of God's attributes constitute the same being. This being is God Himself. Within God, the differentiation between the attributes disappears, and every attribute becomes so perfect that they flow over into one another. This means that, even though God's essence possesses a multitude of attributes, His unity is still untouched.

4. SINGULARITY

4.1. DISPUTATIO RAIMUNDI

Raimundus explains that God is one, and He alone is infinite. He also explains that this is why God needs correlatives: He is more singular by His internal act of infinitizing than when He would just exist as infinity alone, because singularity in itself has a greater infinity if God has the act of infinitizing.¹⁹³ Raimundus uses the example of fire to prove that an infinite act is possible within God.

“And this is made clear by fire, which is singular through infinity, inasmuch as it has the potential of burning an infinite amount of wood, provided that such would exist, and of multiplying itself into infinity. But because it has no infinite wood at its disposal, therefore it cannot have infinite burning; and if it had, it would be more singular than it is.”¹⁹⁴

According to Raimundus, ‘Umar does not ascribe perfect singularity to God, since he does not agree that God is infinite acting. God alone is so unique that He needs to have the internal act, so that His singularity is respected. Raimundus uses another example:

“Provided that the sky were mobile from eternity to eternity, it would itself be singular in multiplying days in infinite numbers by its being and acting. But if it

¹⁹³ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 3, p. 202.

¹⁹⁴ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 3, p. 202. Translation by Annemarie C. Mayer.

were not mobile, it would have an infinite disposition to multiply days infinitely. Yet it would not be so much singular without acting as with acting.”¹⁹⁵

Beside the internal action of God, Raimundus explains that God must also be a Trinity in order to be truly singular. Otherwise, God’s singularity would have nothing by which it is complete or by which it can be unique. Of course, this can be explained by referring to the correlatives, which Raimundus considers an ontological necessity for a perfect being which is one and eternal. The singularity of the three Persons of the Trinity is also explained. According to Raimundus, it is necessary that there is one singular Father within God and not another Father, one Son and not another Son, and one Holy Ghost. Otherwise, the singularity of God is not respected. However, this does not mean that the Son *is* the Father, or that they are fully interchangeable. There remains a difference between the divine Persons. Raimundus uses the example of the human intellect: if the understander would become the understood, this would mean that it ceases to be the understander.¹⁹⁶

According to Raimundus, God cannot be eternally singular without the Trinity. It is likewise primordial that God incarnated. During the Incarnation, He is a singular Person in both uncreated singularity, and created singularity. For this reason, Christ is necessary. Raimundus explains the singularity of the Incarnation:

“On the basis of this supreme singularity follows that supreme singular designation which cannot exist for any other subject because it does not exist, namely, Christ is God; Christ is man, God is man, man is God, God is Christ, a man is Christ.”¹⁹⁷

Raimundus next replies to ‘Umar’s argument against the Incarnation, that God cannot be conjoined to a mortal being, like hot and cold cannot mix. According to Raimundus, it is not possible in the human nature, which is not singular, but it is possible in the nature of the Incarnation. In the Incarnation, both the divine singularity and the created singularity view each other.¹⁹⁸ Moreover, Raimundus disagrees with ‘Umar’s comparison of the Incarnation with the mixture of hot and cold. This argument might be appropriate for the mixture of opposites, but in the experienced world, for example, it is quite natural for various elements to mix in order to form a greater good. In the Incarnation, God’s essence enters into humanity without being altered by it, which means that God’s essence does not become imperfect. Raimundus compares this to the example of water in a cooking pot, which is heated by the fire, and is given the capacity to boil meat.¹⁹⁹ As his last point, Raimundus voices his disagreement with ‘Umar’s statement, that God cannot incarnate in one man, since one is not enough for an infinite God. Raimundus replies that, if God had incarnated into multiple people, His singularity would have been destroyed.²⁰⁰

¹⁹⁵ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 3, p. 202. Translation by Annemarie C. Mayer.

¹⁹⁶ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 3, pp. 202-203.

¹⁹⁷ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 3, p. 203. Translation by Annemarie C. Mayer.

¹⁹⁸ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 3, pp. 203-204.

¹⁹⁹ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 3, p. 204.

²⁰⁰ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 3, pp. 204-205.

4.2. CENT NOMS DE DÉU

Ramon Llull connects the singularity of God with His infinity and eternity. God is more eternal if eternity exists as a singularity and not as a duality. Ramon Llull immediately connects God's singularity with His internal act, which is necessary for His singularity. Llull describes God as a being who is singular in His internal acts of infinitizing and eternalizing. Since the attributes of God are convertible, the acts of infinitizing, eternalizing, deifying and unifying are also singular, and the internal act of God's singularity is infinite and eternal.

“1. O Being, who art singular
in Your infinitising and eternalising!
To You alone do I give my love.

2. Eternity is far greater
if it exists as a singularity
than if it were to exist as a duality.

3. Since God is singular in <His> infinity,
He must be singular in <His> eternity,
so that within Him these may enjoy equality.

4. God is singular as regards infinitising,
eternalising and perfecting,
and also as regards deifying and unifying.”²⁰¹

Ramon Llull next explains how the singularity of God can still constitute many attributes, and how these attributes can remain singular while having the divine correlatives. He makes the same nuance as he did in the *Disputatio Raimundi*: God's attributes are convertible (they exist as a singularity), and God's love consists of one action only, and the correlatives of the beloved and the lover.²⁰² As Raimundus says in the *Disputatio Raimundi*, the correlatives are essentially the same. In the *Disputatio Raimundi*, we can see this element mainly in the chapter on Unity. However, the correlatives are not convertible like the attributes, since they still contain a clear difference without which they would not exist.²⁰³ This is only hinted at in the *Cent noms de Déu*, but in the *Disputatio Raimundi*, it is much more concrete.

“5. In God power, wisdom and will
exist as a singularity,
insofar as together they constitute a single unity.

6. Love's action is singular in <the> love
of <the> beloved and <the> lover,
and the same applies to praise.

²⁰¹ Llull, *Cent noms de Déu*, ORL, XIX, VIII, p. 89. Translation: Sari, Hughes, “Hundred Names of God” (cf. footnote 10 above).

²⁰² Cf. Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 3, pp. 202-203.

²⁰³ Cf. Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 3, pp. 202-203.

7. Good greatness exists as a singularity in virtue of goodness,
and it is loved <as such> by the will,
and, <in terms of its> material cause, it is a creature of creation.”²⁰⁴

Ramon Llull defends the Incarnation by referring to the fact that God incarnated into one, “singular” human being. This theory is reminiscent of the *Disputatio Raimundi*, when Raimundus argues that God can only incarnate into one human being and not into many, in order to preserve His singularity.²⁰⁵ The *Cent noms de Déu* only states that God incarnated into a single human nature, without defending the dogma against an opponent who claims it would logically be the opposite. The negative version of this idea, that God cannot incarnate in many people, is mentioned in the *Disputatio Raimundi* but not in the *Cent noms de Déu*.

“8. God assumed a single human nature,
so that by means of a singular thing
the Incarnation might possess greater goodness.”²⁰⁶

Ramon Llull concludes his chapter on singularity with saying that God needs to be an eternal act of loving, due to the endlessness of His love. The singularity of God is likewise necessary for the ‘one-ness’ or unity of God’s attributes. If God’s attributes and His correlatives were not singular, His unity or oneness could not exist. God’s singularity is bound with the unity and oneness of His internal act and His attributes, but also defines His greatness and the singular nature of His worth and honour as God. No other entity shares in God’s divine grace.

“9. A singularity which exists as <the act of> loving
causes love to increase so greatly
that it can never tire of <such loving>.

10. In God, were there not to exist singularity
as regards His proper properties,
His unity would fail to be great.

11. Since God is singular in terms of His worth,
to Him belongs singular honour,
greater than any other.”²⁰⁷

4.3. CONCLUSION

Ramon Llull explains the singularity of God as His ‘one-ness’, or the fact that He must be unique, in every aspect of His being. In some ways, the singularity of God overlaps with

²⁰⁴ Llull, *Cent noms de Déu*, ORL, XIX, VIII, p. 89. Translation: Sari, Hughes, “Hundred Names of God” (cf. footnote 10 above).

²⁰⁵ Cf. Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 3, pp. 204-205.

²⁰⁶ Llull, *Cent noms de Déu*, ORL, XIX, VIII, p. 89. Translation: Sari, Hughes, “Hundred Names of God” (cf. footnote 10 above).

²⁰⁷ Llull, *Cent noms de Déu*, ORL, XIX, VIII, p. 89-90. Translation: Sari, Hughes, “Hundred Names of God” (cf. footnote 10 above).

the meaning of the unity of God, and sometimes arguments which belong to unity can be used in the chapter on singularity. The first way in which Lull explains God's singularity is by referring to God's infinity. According to Lull, it is impossible for a being that is infinite to not be singular. There can be no two infinities living parallel to one another, since one infinity would border the other, and leave no room for infinity to exist. In the *Disputatio Raimundi*, Raimundus and 'Umar both hold this point of view. However, a challenge in the *Disputatio Raimundi* and the *Cent noms de Dieu* is to explain how God can be singular, and at the same time be triune. The Trinity would imply the existence of three separate infinities at the same time. Lull explains this in the *Cent noms de Dieu* and the *Disputatio Raimundi* by saying that the correlatives deepen God's singularity or His infinity. Without the correlatives, God's singularity would be empty, workless and idle. The Persons of the Trinity are likewise singular, since there is only one Son, one Father and one Holy Ghost, which are all part of one essence.

Lull does not only have to reconcile God's singularity with the Trinity, but also with the Incarnation. God's infinity and singularity need to be reconciled with the Incarnation of the Son into an entity which is not singular, but finite and particular. Ramon Lull explains that the Incarnation, as a divine event, is singular. God incarnated once, in one man, and not in multiple men. This means that the singular Incarnation is part of the singular God: there is only one Christ, one Person of the Son and one God as man.

5. INFINITY

5.1. DISPUTATIO RAIMUNDI

Raimundus immediately begins his argumentation of God's infinity by stressing the importance of the correlatives. According to Raimundus, an infinite eternal being must be infinite in its existence and act in order to be simply, absolutely infinite. If He did not have the internal act of infinitizing, God would not be infinite *in se*, because He would be workless, like an eye which is blind without the act of seeing.²⁰⁸ According to Raimundus, there can be a Trinity within God's infinity, even if 'Umar says that there can only be one infinity within God. According to Raimundus, the infinity of God can count a number of infinities, which come down to Him being one infinity. If this were not the case, God's infinity would be finite and limited in possibility.

“Moreover, simple infinity requires that one infinite be many infinities, and vice versa, lest infinity be hindered and limited by infinite conversion, namely, that one be several and several one; for otherwise several infinities would not be related to one infinite, nor one infinite to several infinities. And so simple infinity would be restricted and consequently finite; this is impossible. And because the divine simplicity is simply infinite, it is proven that God is one and several. From this it follows that there is a Trinity in God.”²⁰⁹

²⁰⁸ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 4, p. 205.

²⁰⁹ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 4, pp. 205-206. Translation by Annemarie C. Mayer.

With the several infinities, Raimundus means the divine correlatives, which are convertible with one another. The generation of the Son, which is eternal and continuous, does not imply that the Father empties His essence into the Son and is destroyed, as ‘Umar previously thought. According to Raimundus, God’s essence cannot be emptied, since He is infinite, and since the generation of the Son is infinite and eternal. Only a finite being can ever be “emptied”.²¹⁰

Raimundus defends the Incarnation, by saying that it happened because God’s will is more predisposed to create that which is more similar to Himself. The Incarnation, which is the highest tier of material being, is the creation of God’s ultimate self-representation in the world. This is why God is forever predisposed to Incarnate. If He did not will the Incarnation, His intellect would be prior in the understanding of the highest creation, and His will would be posterior in the objection against it. This is impossible, since will and intellect are one within God: if He understands the highest creation, His will wills it.²¹¹

The often repeated opinion of ‘Umar, that the infinite cannot be bound to the finite and that the Incarnation can therefore not be true, is again contradicted by Raimundus. According to him, this does not count for the Incarnation. During the Incarnation, the highest tier of material creation is lifted with the highest form of elevation, and it is unified with God by the highest contraction. In other words, the Incarnation is so high on both the material and spiritual ladder, that the unifying of Jesus Christ and God is made possible. Raimundus mentions the example of sin and forgiveness, when God’s humility lifts up the sinner with the highest form of mercy. God descends to the human being, while the human being is lifted up towards God. If this can be possible, the Incarnation should be even more possible.²¹²

5.2. LLIBRE DE CONTEMPLACIÓ

Ramon Llull begins the distinction on infinity by explaining the greatness and endlessness of God, and he contemplates how the human intellect is nothing compared to the greatness of the intellect of God. God’s grace alone can make the love of humanity great enough to be able to love Him sufficiently. Ramon Llull explains the metaphysics of God’s infinity, by stating that God is not only great without end, but also without beginning. Since God is endless and infinite, it is also logical that He has no beginning and that He existed before creation. Since God has no beginning, end or middle, He is above quantity and space. The manner in which Llull explains this is quite devotional: no other being should be on your mind but God, who is infinite. If God is infinite and eternal, and if He is above quantity, beginning, middle and end, there is no reason why any other finite entity would entertain our thoughts more than Him. Ramon Llull believes we should continuously consider God due to His infinity: from our waking moment, to mid-day and late at night, our mind should be directed towards the divine and the eternal.²¹³

Llull compares the infinity of God with the nature of humanity, which is not just finite, but also imperfect since it is removed from the absolute perfection of God. Ramon Llull

²¹⁰ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 4, p. 206.

²¹¹ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 4, p. 206.

²¹² Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 4, pp. 206-207.

²¹³ Llull, *Llibre de contemplació*, vol. I, NEORL, XIV, I, 4, 16-18, p. 38.

says that all persons are sinful in and of themselves due to their finite nature, but that humanity can still count on receiving redemption from God, even when our nature is so far removed from His.²¹⁴ This is reminiscent of the explanation of the Incarnation in the *Disputatio Raimundi*, when Llull makes the comparison to God’s mercy, which descends to the level of humanity and lifts the sinner up towards forgiveness – even despite his imperfect nature.²¹⁵

5.3. CENT NOMS DE DÉU

Ramon Llull explains shortly in the *Cent noms de Déu* that God is infinite in His operation due to His generation and spiration, being the Trinity or the correlatives. Llull argues that God’s act is infinite, since generation and spiration are infinite within Him. In Llull’s theology, the infinity of God’s internal act necessarily acquires an infinite internal object and an infinite eternal agent.

“2. God is infinite in His existence
and infinite in His operation
by virtue of generation and spiration.”²¹⁶

Ramon Llull next explains the need for God’s infinity to be singular and to stand above quantity. This abstraction of infinity, as something which stands above quantity, was also a theme in the *Llibre de contemplació*.²¹⁷ The lack of quantity within God means, most importantly, that God’s infinity does not have a beginning, middle and end, and that there is also no inner composition within God’s infinity. God’s infinity would be finite if it held a certain quantity. Quantity would imply a set number and, therefore, a beginning and an end, which denotes composition and finiteness. This is impossible, which means that God’s infinity rules out quantity. God’s infinity is bound with His singularity, which implies God alone can be infinite, and His infinity cannot be composed by number or quantity.

“3. Infinity can only exist
in a singularity
wherein resides no quantity.”²¹⁸

Ramon Llull again stresses the need for God’s infinity to have correlatives, without which it would not be perfect. God’s attributes and their correlatives are convertible with the correlatives of infinity, otherwise they would not be infinite. Throughout the works of Ramon Llull, it becomes apparent that the correlative theory and God’s infinity cause each other in the theology of Ramon Llull: without the correlatives, God could not be infinite (since His infinity would be idle), and the correlatives exist due to God’s infinity (meaning that God must have Himself as an object since He is the only infinite entity). Moreover, without the perfection and the internal act of God’s infinity, God would not be able to fulfil our prayers or, in other words, to have an act here on earth. God’s infinity is necessary as

²¹⁴ Llull, *Llibre de contemplació*, vol. I, *NEORL*, XIV, I, 5, 17-18, p. 41.

²¹⁵ Cf. Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, *CCCM*, 114, *ROL*, XXII, II, 1, 4, pp. 206-207.

²¹⁶ Llull, *Cent noms de Déu*, *ORL*, XIX, XVII, p. 96. Sari, Hughes, “Hundred Names of God” (cf. footnote 10 above).

²¹⁷ Cf. Llull, *Llibre de contemplació*, vol. I, *NEORL*, XIV, I, 4, 16-18, p. 38.

²¹⁸ Llull, *Cent noms de Déu*, *ORL*, XIX, XVII, p. 96. Sari, Hughes, “Hundred Names of God” (cf. footnote 10 above).

an attribute which lies at the base of all finite creation, and God's working in the finite world.

“4. God is infinite in goodness,
by virtue of the bonifier and the bonified,
<both of which are> eternified by bonifying.

5. Were infinitising not to exist in God,
His power could not fulfil
our desires by means of infinity.”²¹⁹

Ramon Llull explains that God's act of infinitizing means the generation of the Son for eternity. This emanation is beyond time and space or “without quantity or movement,” which do not exist within God. This means that the generation of the Son happens forever, and is infinite by nature. The Son also does not constitute quantity or plurality within God, since both Persons are the same entity. Without the internal act of infinitizing, God's infinity itself would be finite in “power, time and quantity”. This means that God's infinity would be idle and less eternal if it did not have the internal act, which makes infinity last forever, and which is above time. The argument that the generation of the Son is eternal and above time can also be found in the *Disputatio Raimundi*, where it is used, *mutatis mutandis*, by Raimundus to explain how there is no emptying of the Father's essence in the generation of the Persons.²²⁰

“6. Power, wisdom and will
are infinite in the unity
of nature and deity.

7. God the Father infinitely
infinitises the Son extensively
without quantity or movement.

8. To infinitise pertains to infinity
without which <such infinitising> would be finite
in terms of power, time and quantity.

9. It is pleasing to consider
the infinitising of understanding and loving
in an eternity without end.

10. Whoever loves moveable finitude
more than unmoved infinitude
is extremely foolish and ungrateful.”²²¹

²¹⁹ Llull, *Cent noms de Déu*, ORL, XIX, XVII, p. 96. Translation: Sari, Hughes, “Hundred Names of God” (cf. footnote 10 above).

²²⁰ Cf. Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 4, p. 206.

²²¹ Llull, *Cent noms de Déu*, ORL, XIX, XVII, p. 97. Translation: Sari, Hughes, “Hundred Names of God” (cf. footnote 10 above).

The eternity of God's love makes Him more deserving of our love, and His enduring presence in the world and in our lives makes Him the primordial object of our devotion, Lull explains. Anything temporal cannot be loved more than God, who is infinite in His love and understanding. This argument can also be found in the devotional contemplation of God's infinity in the *Llibre de contemplació*, where Lull argues that, because God Himself is infinitely good, our devotion, love and remembrance of God should therefore also be continuous and greater than any love we bestow upon the temporal.²²²

5.4. ARS GENERALIS ULTIMA

In the *Ars generalis ultima*, God's infinity is not seen as a separate attribute of God which is discussed independently. However, God's infinity is mentioned extensively in part 9 of the *Ars generalis ultima*, where Lull explains the inherent infinity of the divine attributes. Lull devotes two chapters to the convertibility of every attribute of God with infinity. In chapter 3 of part 9, Lull simply explains the infinity of the divine attributes, and in chapter 4, he explains the infinity of the actions behind God's attributes. The infinity of God is explained in the *Ars* as something that all divine attributes have in common by the nature of their divinity.

Lull explains in chapter 3 that the attributes are convertible with each other, and with infinity. It is due to the infinite greatness of the attributes that they are divine, and that they can produce their internal act. For example, God's goodness is that by virtue of which God produces goodness. Goodness cannot produce eternal goodness (or the correlatives) unless it is infinitely great.

“10. Divine goodness is a reason for good to produce good. We already proved in chapter 2 that it has its act of bonifying. Hence, just as greatness is the being by reason of which goodness is great, so is goodness the reason for good to greatly produce great good. And as eternity is the reason for goodness and greatness to last eternally, so is goodness the reason for good to produce great and eternal good; but goodness cannot be such a reason unless it is infinitely immense: therefore, infinite goodness must necessarily exist.”²²³

Lull explains the infinity of the acts of God's attributes in chapter 4. He argues that every divine attribute is convertible with infinity and with each other. Since the attributes are infinite, their internal acts are also infinite. God's goodness is the object of the other attributes, such as greatness, which makes it great; eternity, which makes it eternal; power, which makes it capable of existing and acting; intellect, which understands it; will, which wills it; virtue, which makes it virtuous; truth, which makes it true; and glory, which makes it glorious. The attribute's own act must, therefore, also be infinite, just like every other attribute of God is infinite.

“Divine goodness is a reason for good to produce good while goodness is great by reason of greatness, eternal by reason of eternity, able to exist and to act through power, it is understood by the intellect, loved by the will, virtuous by reason of

²²² Cf. Lull, *Llibre de contemplació*, vol. I, *NEORL*, XIV, I, 4, 16-18, p. 38.

²²³ Lullus, *Ars generalis ultima*, *CCCM*, 75, *ROL*, XIV, 9, 1, 3, p. 192. Translation: Abbott, Damberg, *Raymond Lull's Ars Magna* (cf. footnote 147 above), p. 119.

virtue, true by reason of truth and glorious by reason of glory. It necessarily follows that the bonifying act of goodness must be infinite just as goodness is infinite and just as all the other divine reasons or dignities are infinite.”²²⁴

As shown in the passages above, Llull mentions that every attribute of God, which is mentioned in his *Ars generalis ultima*, is convertible with the other. Chapter 3 and 4 of part 9 are devoted completely to converting God’s attributes with His infinity. However, infinity itself is not mentioned as an attribute of God. This shows that, within the *Ars*, infinity is a very fundamental aspect of the divinity, and forms the base of God’s attributes, and the background of the correlatives.

5.5. CONCLUSION

God’s infinity is generally explained in the works of Ramon Llull by His absence of beginning and end. God is not a particular entity, but He is beyond quantity and number. The fact that God is infinite is also closely tied to His singularity. According to Llull, there can be only one infinite being, otherwise it would be bordered by another infinite entity, and become finite. This is why God’s infinity also implies His singularity.

Llull needs to explain how God’s Trinity, or the correlatives, can share in God’s infinity without destroying it. According to Llull, God’s correlatives are necessary for His infinity since without them, God’s infinity would be imperfect and idle. Moreover, the generation and spiration of the Persons is infinite and above quantity, since it is infinitely created by God’s essence.

The Incarnation poses its own kind of problem, which is only mentioned in the *Disputatio Raimundi*. The man Jesus Christ is not infinite, since His life has a beginning and an end. This would mean that God, who is infinite, would incarnate in a finite being. Raimundus explains that during the Incarnation, the highest material creation (being Jesus) is contracted with the Person of the Son. The finiteness of the man Jesus Christ does not have to pose a problem, since God is still infinite, and He is merely contracted or bound with the man Jesus Christ.

6. ETERNITY

6.1. DISPUTATIO RAIMUNDI

Raimundus argues that, in order for God to be perfect, He needs a co-essential act of eternifying. This act also requires the correlatives of the agent and object. Without those correlatives, God’s eternity would be idle and empty. God has the potential to be eternal and infinite and to have eternal and infinite correlatives. Raimundus gives the example of the potentially infinite act of the created beings: an angel has the potential infinite act to create more angels, a human being to create more humans, a plant to create more leaves, flowers and fruit, and lastly, fire could have an infinite act of burning if it had a sufficient amount of wood. This means that God Himself should be even more predisposed to having

²²⁴ Lullus, *Ars generalis ultima*, CCCM, 75, ROL, XIV, 9, 1, 4, p. 193. Translation: Abbott, Dambergs, *Raymond Lull’s Ars Magna* (cf. footnote 147 above), p. 120.

an eternal, infinite act, since He is infinite in and of Himself, and the created beings are finite.²²⁵

Raimundus next parries the comment made by ‘Umar, that God cannot have the divine correlatives, since His internal act would imply agent and patient, which, in turn, would imply the existence of time and motion within God. According to Raimundus, ‘Umar’s argument is valid when speaking of temporal matters, since he is only talking about creaturely begetting and not about the bringing forth of the Son and the spiration of the Holy Ghost. These Persons of the Trinity, which are forever brought forth from the Father’s essence, are beyond time and motion, since they are eternal and divine. Raimundus’ indirect message in this passage is that ‘Umar does not understand the Trinity correctly, and that he is only directed by the knowledge he has of natural science.²²⁶

Raimundus further defends the internal act of God. First, he disagrees with ‘Umar’s statement, that an act implies the sequence of “happening” and then “having happened” and that this would bring time and sequence in God, and thus division or multitude. Again, Raimundus explains that this is not true in an infinite eternal being. Raimundus defends the Trinity against ‘Umar’s claim that in a being in which there is no beginning and end, there can be no Trinity. According to Raimundus, God is His own beginning, since He forever generates the Son. The Holy Ghost forms the middle, spirated by both the Father and the Son.²²⁷

Raimundus turns to the Incarnation. According to him, the Incarnation is necessary for God to be able to create the material world. Without the Incarnation to mediate between the finite and “new” on the one hand, and the infinite and eternal on the other, the creation of the world would not be possible.²²⁸

6.2. LLIBRE DE CONTEMPLACIÓ

Ramon Llull explains the eternity of God in a few steps. In chapter VI of *distinctio* III, he explains the fact that God is eternal, and has no beginning. This stands in contrast to human beings, whose being and intellect are caused and begun, and who are therefore finite.²²⁹ Ramon Llull also implicitly compares God’s eternity to Him being a necessary entity. According to Llull, human beings have a beginning and an end, and is not so far removed from privation or non-being since they are not dignified in and of themselves to exist. Since God does not have a beginning, He is forever removed from privation, and His existence is dignified in and of itself. A necessary entity is uncaused, has no beginning and is therefore eternal and without end. The finite and created being is imperfect, and the uncreated is perfect.²³⁰

While God’s essence is eternal, so is His justice and His judgement over our souls. This means that our fate after death depends on His eternal forgiveness or damnation. Our blessed or accursed state in heaven or hell will be eternal, just like God’s justice. Ramon

²²⁵ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 5, pp. 207-208.

²²⁶ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 5, p. 208.

²²⁷ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 5, p. 208.

²²⁸ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 5, pp. 208-209.

²²⁹ Llull, *Llibre de contemplació*, NEORL, XIV, III, 6, 1-5, pp. 43-44.

²³⁰ Llull, *Llibre de contemplació*, NEORL, XIV, III, 6, 7-8, p. 44.

Llull describes the tremendous wish that he will belong to the few who will be eternally blessed:

“Oh Lord, in whom is all justice and truth! How great is the bliss for them, who will endure in glory without end, and how great is the bad for the miserable, who go through infernal punishment, and will endure without end! Which is why I beg You the favour, that it would please you, that I would be among the blessed.”²³¹

Llull next repeats the statement he made earlier, in the chapter on infinity, that God is more deserving of love than any other creature due to Him being boundless and without beginning or end.²³² Since God is eternal and without beginning and end, the only everlasting, real and divine love we can feel is for Him. This means, that God is the only possible eternal object of our love, since He alone is eternal. Every other being is finite, and will perish together with our love for it. Attachment to these matters is of less importance, and will even lead to our own undoing.²³³

6.3. LLIBRE DEL GENTIL E DELS TRES SAVIS

In the first book of the *Llibre del gentil*, under the heading ‘goodness-eternity’, it is explained by the attributes of both goodness and eternity why the human body will resurrect at the end of times. According to Ramon Llull, God’s goodness and His eternity are interchangeable. Since this is the case, eternity is a greater good than what is not eternal. God is naturally disposed towards the greater good. If God created the human body to be eternal, this would mean that a greater good were accomplished than if the human body was not eternal. Since within God only the greatest good can be achieved, this means that God is naturally disposed towards the creation of an eternal goodness, making the creation of the material human body eternal.

“The goodness of God is eternal, and the eternity of God is the goodness of God. Now, since eternity is a much greater good than something that is not eternal, if God has created man’s body to be everlasting, there is even greater goodness in the purpose (that is to say, the reason for which God created the human body) than would exist if the body had an end (that is to say, nonbeing), after which it did not exist. This being the case, if man’s body rises up again and lasts forever after the Resurrection, God’s goodness and eternity will be exhibited in greater nobility and in greater results. And since, according to the conditions of the trees, one should attribute greater nobility to God, therefore it necessarily follows, according to divine, eternal influence, that through that influence there come grace and blessing to the human body, by which it may achieve resurrection and be everlasting to the end of time. [...]”²³⁴

The connection of the bodily resurrection with God’s eternity and goodness is not repeated in the other works by Ramon Llull, but it does follow the same logic. Since God’s eternity and His goodness are convertible, His effects must be eternally good. Usually Llull

²³¹ Llull, *Llibre de contemplació*, NEORL, XIV, III, 7, 12, p. 48. Translation by Margot Leblanc.

²³² Cf. Llull, *Llibre de contemplació*, NEORL, XIV, I, 4, 16-18, p. 38.

²³³ Llull, *Llibre de contemplació*, NEORL, XIV, III, 7, 17-18, p. 48.

²³⁴ Llull, *Llibre del gentil e dels tres savis*, NEORL, II, I, 1, 7, p. 20. Translation: Bonner, *SW* (cf. footnote 138 above), p. 124.

uses this paradigm to prove the Incarnation or the Trinity, but here, he proves the resurrection.

Ramon Llull also discusses the Resurrection by referring to the combination of wisdom and eternity. Since wisdom and eternity are in accord, God is forever disposed to making the most just decision. In this world, many sinners live their life without punishment, and many saints, who detach themselves from their own wellbeing for God, are left without reward. It is only logical that God punishes or rewards human beings after their life. Humanity can only be humanity due to its human body, which means that the Resurrection is necessary.²³⁵

In book III of the *Llibre del gentil*, where the Christian scholar discusses his religion, the combination of eternity and perfection is used to explain the Trinity. According to the Christian scholar, it is infinite power which creates infinite power, infinite wisdom and infinite love; infinite power that does the same with infinite wisdom and love; infinite love that begets infinite wisdom and infinite power; and infinite wisdom, power and love that spring forth from the eternal begetter and the eternal begotten, are more strongly in accord with power, love and wisdom than a single essential power, will or love if they were not composed of the three correlatives (being the begetter, begotten and act of begetting). That which is most in accord with God's eternity and perfection should be attributed to God. Otherwise, humanity would better understand the nobility of the eternity and perfection which exists in something other than God, which would mean that God's eternity and perfection were limited and have an end.²³⁶

6.4. CENT NOMS DE DÉU

According to Llull, eternity has to exist, otherwise creation would be logically impossible. If eternity were not to exist, and if only the finite world was in being, it would mean that every being which is in existence would exist by and through itself. Non-being, or that which is not in act, would be in potentiality by its own accord and not by the causation of another entity, which is logically impossible. This, again, shows the link between God being a necessary entity and His eternity.

“1. Were it true that eternity did not exist,
whatever does exist would have its origins within itself
and non-being would constitute its <own> potentiality.”²³⁷

Ramon Llull then explains the internal act of God's eternity as essential for the wholeness of His eternity. If God did not have an internal act, His eternity would be idle and workless, thus rendering it too inert to create the world. The primordial act of God's eternity (eternifying) and the other correlatives (eternifier and eternified) are necessary for God's power. Without the internal act of eternifying, the eternity of God would not be fully and perfectly eternal, and it would not suffice for being the eternal object of God's love and intellect (which are eternal, and thus require an eternal object).

²³⁵ Llull, *Llibre del gentil e dels tres savis*, NEORL, II, I, 1, 9, pp. 21-22.

²³⁶ Llull, *Llibre del gentil e dels tres savis*, NEORL, II, III, 2-4, p. 95.

²³⁷ Llull, *Cent noms de Déu*, ORL, XIX, XVIII, p. 97. Translation: Sari, Hughes, “Hundred Names of God” (cf. footnote 10 above).

“2. Without doubt, then, does eternity exist,
wherein must reside
<the> eternifier, <the> eternifiable and eternifying.

3. Were eternifying not to obtain within eternity,
the power <of the latter> would be too meagre as well as idle,
and it would fail to be loveable and glorious.

4. To eternify must pertain to eternity,
in the absence of which <former> the understood and the beloved
would not suffice for eternifying.”²³⁸

God’s eternal act of eternifying forever upholds God’s internal attributes. Through the attribute of eternity, God forever generates the Son and spirates the Holy Ghost. The eternal generation and spiration of the Trinity, or the correlatives, are pleasant to consider since they uphold God’s creative force within the material universe, and since they have caused the salvation of humankind (through the Incarnation of the Person of the Son). Ramon Llull does not concretize why the generation and spiration is joyful for humankind, but the meaning can be deduced from his earlier discussions of the correlatives.

Despite the connection of the eternal correlatives with joyful remembrance, it also constitutes something much more formidable. As God’s essence is eternal, so is His judgement and the fate of the souls after death. Once God condemns a soul to the eternal damnation of hell, this damnation will be as eternal as His justice itself. This should strike a true believer with terrible fear. Ramon Llull mentioned this theory in the *Llibre de contemplació* as well, where he explains the eternal joy or suffering of the souls after they are judged by God.²³⁹

“5. It is pleasing to remember
within eternity <the act of> eternifying
in relation to generation and spiration.

6. It is dreadful to consider
<having to> abide in eternal fire,
under the wrath of God without <the prospect of> forgiveness.”²⁴⁰

Eternity is, first and foremost, directed towards God’s own goodness (and also towards His other attributes). Llull says that God has “greater power” over His own goodness. The meaning of this statement is closely knit with the eternity of God’s attributes. God’s intrinsic act is eternal, which means that God needs to have Himself as His primordial object due to His own eternity. The created world is only God’s secondary object. Llull next argues that God needs to be singular in order to do justice to His eternity. If God was not singular and if there was more than one eternal being, God’s eternity would remain as

²³⁸ Llull, *Cent noms de Déu*, ORL, XIX, XVIII, p. 97. Translation: Sari, Hughes, “Hundred Names of God” (cf. footnote 10 above).

²³⁹ Cf. Llull, *Llibre de contemplació*, NEORL, XIV, III, 7, 12, p. 48.

²⁴⁰ Llull, *Cent noms de Déu*, ORL, XIX, XVIII, p. 97. Translation: Sari, Hughes, “Hundred Names of God” (cf. footnote 10 above).

it was, but His infinity would be greater than His eternity – since there would be a greater quantity due to the existing of two infinities that share in one eternity. Infinity would consist of two infinities, instead of one.

The connection between infinity and eternity is further demonstrated in the case of the created universe. Llull mentions philosophers, who believe that the world is eternal and uncreated (or without beginning). Their theory is impossible, Llull says, since that which is eternal must be infinite as well. The world is finite, imperfect and, therefore, created. A finite object or creature is not a necessary being and, therefore, not eternal.

“7. By virtue of His eternity God enjoys greater power over the goodness of His nature than <He does> over any good that He has created.

8. Were it true that eternity had its equal, in virtue of the latter God would not be singular, and infinitising would be of greater worth than would eternifying.

9. Whoever says that the world is not created has no knowledge of eternity, <inasmuch as> he does not know the equality <that obtains> between the infinite and the eternal.”²⁴¹

From this passage, it becomes even more apparent that Llull believed that God’s infinity and His eternity were co-extensive, and that each implied the existence of the other. If God is beyond space, He is also above time, and vice versa. Any kind of quantity would imply temporal sequence and movement. This stands in contrast to the finite and the temporal, which has a definite position within space, and therefore also in time.²⁴²

6.5. ARS GENERALIS ULTIMA

In chapter 9 of the *Ars generalis ultima*, Ramon Llull connects the divine correlatives with the eternity of God. God’s eternity needs to have correlatives. Ramon Llull explains how God’s eternity produces the correlatives, namely the ‘eternified being’, or the Person of the Son. Without this correlative (which we call the ‘patient or effect’), there can be no act. The three correlatives necessitate each other, and are necessary for God to be infinite. Every other attribute of God contains the correlatives, and has an eternal intrinsic act, so that these attributes are convertible with God’s eternity.

“God is eternal and He is His own eternity. Thus, God necessitates His own production of the eternalized being without which eternity cannot be infinite with an infinite act. All the dignities with their acts concur in this act so that eternalized

²⁴¹ Llull, *Cent noms de Déu*, ORL, XIX, XVIII, p. 97. Translation: Sari, Hughes, “Hundred Names of God” (cf. footnote 10 above).

²⁴² Cf. Ricardo da Costa, “A Eternidade de Deus na filosofia de Ramon Llull (1232-1316),” *Revista Dominicana de Teologia* V /10 (2010): 103-118, where the concept of eternity and timelessness (or eternity above time) in Llull’s thought is discussed, based on several of Llull’s works (such as, the *Arbor scientiae* and the *Liber correlatiuorum innatorum*), which are not discussed in this dissertation. Cf. also Ricardo da Costa, “A infinidade e a eternidade divinas no *Livro da contemplação* de Ramon Llull”, *Scinitilla. Rivista de Filosofia e Mística Medieval* 3, 1 (2006): 107-133.

being is infinitely bonified, magnified etc. and the dignities actually exist and have their acts in eternal infinity. This sublime production arouses great wonderment in the human intellect.”²⁴³

Ramon Llull proceeds to explain how God, Who is an infinite creature, can create the world, which is finite. The fact that the world was created at a certain point in time, makes one wonder why the creation of the world is not as eternal as God Himself, if it comes from an eternal being. Ramon Llull explains that God has the eternal will to create the world, but cannot create the world “from eternity”. According to Llull, earth and heaven are not eternal, since they are finite and are “clothed in the habits of quantity, surface, shape and movement.” However, “heaven can exist in the eternal aevum” which is gifted to it, so that angels and humans can forever “praise God’s supreme production.”

“As God thus considers His eternalizing, He understands with regard to himself that He is disposed and ready to produce the world from eternity and in eternity, but that He cannot create the world from eternity, because the world does not have that which exists even before the world began to exist. Indeed, the world is finite just as heaven is finite, for it does not exist from eternity and it is not immensely infinite because its body is clothed in the habits of quantity, surface, shape and movement. Nevertheless, heaven can exist in the eternal aevum so that angels and humans can know, love, remember and praise God’s supreme production.”²⁴⁴

Ramon Llull sees the eternity of God as a necessary part of the correlatives. God’s correlatives are eternal, since they are made eternal by the correlatives of eternity. Since God’s attributes are mutually convertible, the eternity of the attributes comes from their convertibility with the attribute of eternity, in the same way as the goodness of the attributes comes from the convertibility with the attribute of goodness. The attribute of eternity is therefore a very important element of the correlative theory.

“Let us begin by answering the first question, which asks – ‘Is goodness so great as to be eternal?’ – I answer that goodness is so great as to be eternal, and the definitions of goodness, greatness and eternity show this. If goodness is a being because of which good does good, if greatness magnifies goodness and eternity; and if eternity’s definition makes goodness and greatness last forever, then the act of goodness must be infinite and eternal, and consequently, the essence of goodness must be infinite and eternal as well. Thus, we conclude that goodness is eternally great, because it cannot have its eternally great act of bonifying without greatness and eternity; now rule B confirms this, as do the second species of rules C and D. Further, the first species of rule D confirms the affirmative answer. As eternity is a primordial essence beyond which there is no other preceding thing, and as its primordial quality is good and great, it necessarily follows that some goodness must be eternally great. In addition, the third species of rule D signifies on the one hand that no contrariety of any kind can rule in eternity, and moreover, on the other hand, that contrariety would rule over eternity if

²⁴³ Lullus, *Ars generalis ultima*, CCCM, 75, ROL, XIV, 9, 1, 5, 3, p. 197. Translation: Abbott, Dambergs, *Raymond Lull’s Ars Magna* (cf. footnote 147 above), p. 122.

²⁴⁴ Lullus, *Ars generalis ultima*, CCCM, 75, ROL, XIV, 9, 1, 5, 3, p. 197. Translation: Abbott, Dambergs, *Raymond Lull’s Ars Magna* (cf. footnote 147 above), p. 122.

eternity did not have great and primordial goodness. However, this is impossible, and therefore, goodness is so great as to be eternal.”²⁴⁵

God’s infinity and His eternity are often bound together. Throughout Lull’s works, it is apparent that God’s eternity and His infinity are very important elements of God’s correlatives. Infinity and eternity are what makes the divine correlatives, and what justifies their existence. God’s attributes cannot be divine and eternal without the existence of eternity, with which they are convertible.

6.6. CONCLUSION

The eternity of God and the infinity of God are quite similar: while infinity applies to God being beyond space, eternity means He is beyond time. Lull explains that God has no beginning or end, and that He is beyond time, movement and sequence. This means Lull has to explain the internal act of God and the generation of the Person of the Son, and how the act of divine generation does not imply temporality and sequence. According to Lull, the internal act of God’s eternity is necessary, since without it, He would not be as perfect as with it. The link between the necessity of the correlatives and the absoluteness of eternity is explained by Lull especially in the *Cent noms de Déu*²⁴⁶ and the *Disputatio Raimundi*.²⁴⁷

The internal generation of the Son, stemming from God’s internal act, is likewise infinite, has no beginning and no end, and is therefore above time and space. While natural generation and action is posited in a temporal sequence, this is not the case for the eternal generation of Christ.

In the *Llibre de contemplació*,²⁴⁸ the *Llibre del gentil*²⁴⁹ and the *Cent noms de Déu*,²⁵⁰ God’s eternity is also explained in connection to justice and mercy, and the eternity of the afterlife. God is eternal, and so is His judgement of humankind. God’s will and ordinance never change or alter, and this defines Lull’s view on eschatology and life after death. Ramon Lull mentions eternal fire in the *Cent noms de Déu*, which is as eternal and unyielding as God’s judgement. In the *Llibre de contemplació*, Lull says that damnation is infinite, just like God Himself. In the *Llibre del gentil*, Lull explains that God is disposed to create a greater, more eternal good, which makes the bodily resurrection a necessary part of eschatology. There is no coming back from creation and life, and there is no altering of God’s judgement.

7. SIMPLICITY

7.1. DISPUTATIO RAIMUNDI

According to Raimundus, God’s simplicity is much more simple if it has an act of simplifying than if it has not. The act of simplifying also requires the agent (simplifier) and

²⁴⁵ Lullus, *Ars generalis ultima*, CCCM, 75, ROL, XIV, 5, p. 51. Translation: Abbott, Damberg, *Raymond Lull’s Ars Magna* (cf. footnote 147 above), p. 126.

²⁴⁶ Cf. Lull, *Cent noms de Déu*, ORL, XIX, XVIII, p. 97.

²⁴⁷ Cf. Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 5, pp. 207-208.

²⁴⁸ Cf. Lull, *Llibre de contemplació*, NEORL, XIV, III, 7, 12, p. 48.

²⁴⁹ Cf. Lull, *Llibre del gentil e dels tres savis*, NEORL, II, I, 1, 9, pp. 21-22.

²⁵⁰ Cf. Lull, *Cent noms de Déu*, ORL, XIX, XVIII, p. 97.

the patient (simplified). These three elements constitute the Trinity. Even though they are essentially the same, the correlatives have to be different among themselves, otherwise they are compound. This explains the possibility of difference between the correlatives of God.²⁵¹

The fact that ‘Umar believes that the correlatives are a sign of composition is criticized heavily by Raimundus. In his opinion, ‘Umar judges the higher correlatives by the standards of the lower. The correlatives in the created world are compound, since they consist of form and matter. Raimundus states the human will as an example, which has willing, the willer and the willed. These correlatives are compound, since they come from a being which is composed of form and matter (in the spiritual sense). The same applies to seeing, which has the correlatives of seeing, the seer and the seen, and likewise comes from the composition of form and matter. The same is true of the animate or vegetative faculty. The material has the correlatives of materializing, materializer and materialized, which, again, come from the composition of form and matter. Propositions follow the same logic, since they are formed with two premises and a conclusion. All of these things, mentioned by Raimundus, are different from the higher, supreme being, or God. Within God, the correlatives are not composed, since they belong to a higher being which is fully simple and not composed.²⁵²

Raimundus argues that God has simple correlatives since He is simple, when he refutes an argument by ‘Umar, that God cannot have the correlatives since there is no earlier or later in His essence. Raimundus retorts that the generation of the divine Persons does not happen in a temporal sequence – which is an argument he used in the section on eternity as well.²⁵³ According to Raimundus, simple essence does not know earlier and later. What Raimundus means is that God has simple correlatives, since He Himself is simple (here, this means that He is above sequence and time). God’s correlatives are above the created correlatives, and have no composition of form, matter, or temporal sequence.²⁵⁴

According to Raimundus, ‘Umar falters when he believes that the Father is common to the Son and the Holy Ghost. The Father is not the Son, since He Himself generates the Son from His entire essence. The Father and the Son are not superior to the Holy Ghost, since they together forever spirate the Holy Ghost from their essence. The Father is not compound and He is not common to the Son and the Holy Ghost, since He is not entirely the same as the other Persons.²⁵⁵

Raimundus claims that the Trinity does not mean that the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost are three substances. God is one substance as a whole, but not a compound one: only beings composed of form and matter are compound. Raimundus again mentions the example of fire, which would have the unlimited act of burning if it only had a sufficient amount of wood.

“In order that your mind may rise to the understanding of the highest substance, I will give you this example: Fire is a substance, and it itself is composed of form and

²⁵¹ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 6, p. 209.

²⁵² Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 6, pp. 209-210.

²⁵³ Cf. Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 5, p. 208.

²⁵⁴ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 6, p. 210.

²⁵⁵ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 6, p. 210.

matter, and it itself has, with respect to its form, the potency to burn infinite wood, if it had that at its disposal; but because it lacks wood, it cannot burn it.

So, if the form of fire, which is a creature, has in itself potentially an infinite act without matter, the highest substance, which is a pure act, has even more a simple and infinite act; and so it is simple without matter.”²⁵⁶

If a material creature has an infinite potential act, then God much more so, who is above matter and who is not impeded by finiteness. This means that God has infinite correlatives which are simple, and which possess no division in form and matter.²⁵⁷

Raimundus next disagrees with ‘Umar’s statement, that God possesses two accidental acts, being generating the Son on the one hand and spirating the Holy Ghost on the other. According to Raimundus, these acts of God are not accidental, since this would mean that they transcend to a finite, compound and contingent substance, and not to a simple and eternal one. This means that the two acts of God are consubstantial and not accidental.²⁵⁸

According to Raimundus, the correlatives are an important element of God’s perfection, and they do not make Him compound. Raimundus claims that every perfect being has a “ruled” and an “unruled” principle. Within God, the ruling, unruled principle is the Father. The Son is both ruling and ruled over by the Father, and the Holy Ghost is only ruled over. These three elements constitute God’s perfection. God’s perfection is made perfect by the combination of an even and an odd number. According to Raimundus, ‘Umar’s denial of this argument would mean the denial of the perfection of God. Moreover, it would mean that ‘Umar claims that, when God made the world, He made a new principle without the prior existence of a (corresponding) internal principle within Him, which is impossible.²⁵⁹

According to Raimundus, the Incarnation is the highest sign of simplicity, higher than which none exists. In the Incarnation, the divine nature is joined to the nature of a human being, which is composed of soul and body. The Person of Christ is one and composed, since He has both divine and human natures, but the divine nature of Christ in itself has no composition.²⁶⁰

Raimundus refutes ‘Umar’s statement, that a simple, infinite and eternal being cannot be bound to the finite and temporal. According to Raimundus, God’s infinity means He has infinite power, and that there are no limits to His power. Therefore, God can make the Incarnation happen, and temporal logic cannot resist.²⁶¹

7.2. CENT NOMS DE DÉU

Just like in the *Disputatio Raimundi*,²⁶² Ramon Llull describes how God’s simplicity is transferable to His Trinity. God is simple as a Trinity, which is also unity, since every Person is of the same essence. In the *Disputatio Raimundi*, likewise, Ramon Llull posits

²⁵⁶ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 6, p. 210. Translation by Annemarie C. Mayer.

²⁵⁷ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 6, pp. 210-211.

²⁵⁸ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 6, p. 211.

²⁵⁹ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 6, p. 211.

²⁶⁰ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 6, pp. 211-212.

²⁶¹ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 6, p. 212.

²⁶² Cf. Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 6, p. 209.

God's internal act of simplifying, and the correlatives of simplifier and simplified, as necessary for God's perfect simplicity. In the *Cent noms de Déu*, Ramon Llull explains that God "simplifies the simplified, which is generated in simplicity".

“1. Since God consists in His <own> simplicity,
He is as simple in <His> Trinity
as He is in <His> unity.

2. In God resides simplifying
in virtue of generation and spiration:
in Him the compound cannot exist.

3. God, by means of His simplicity,
simplifies the simplified,
<which is> generated in simplicity.”²⁶³

Ramon Llull also writes that, within God, there is no “beforehand or afterwards,” which means that He is one in His action and in His operation. The correlatives and the act of generation and spiration are eternal, beyond time, and do not happen in a temporal sequence. God's internal act is likewise eternal, and has no beginning or end. This matter is also mentioned in the *Disputatio Raimundi*, where ‘Umar turns the argument on its head and argues that God cannot be a Trinity since that would require a temporal sequence, because the action of generating has to be positioned in a temporal order. Naturally, Raimundus retorts by denying the existence of time and sequence within God.²⁶⁴

“4. God is simple as regards His existence
and simple as regards His operation,
since He has no beforehand or afterwards.”²⁶⁵

Ramon Llull next argues that, within God, there resides simple power, wisdom and will, which render Him capable of enjoying His simplicity. The simplicity of God is, therefore, enabled, willed and loved by the divine power, wisdom and will – which makes it necessary to exist. The goodness of God, and of every other of His attributes, has the correlatives, in which alone it can truly exist. The equality of power, wisdom and will is stressed by Llull, who says that concordance and equality constitute God's simplicity. Raimundus likewise defends the simplicity of God in the *Disputatio Raimundi*, by underlining the equality and the difference between the correlatives.²⁶⁶ In the *Cent noms de Déu*, Ramon Llull speaks of “concordance and equality,” concordance signifying the unity between differences, brought about by the correlatives.

“5. In God resides simple power,
simple wisdom and simple will,
which is why He is capable of enjoying simplicity.

²⁶³ Llull, *Cent noms de Déu*, *ORL*, XIX, XIV, p. 94. Translation: Sari, Hughes, “Hundred Names of God” (cf. footnote 10 above).

²⁶⁴ Cf. Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, *CCCM*, 114, *ROL*, XXII, II, 1, 6, p. 210.

²⁶⁵ Llull, *Cent noms de Déu*, *ORL*, XIX, XIV, p. 94. Translation: Sari, Hughes, “Hundred Names of God” (cf. footnote 10 above).

²⁶⁶ Cf. Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, *CCCM*, 114, *ROL*, XXII, II, 1, 6, p. 210.

6. Goodness merely consists
in the bonifier and the bonified,
breathed forth by means of bonifying.

7. In God, concordance and equality
constitute simplicity
in virtue of the Trinity.”²⁶⁷

7.3. CONCLUSION

Ramon Llull mentions the attribute of simplicity in his *Disputatio Raimundi* to explain that God is not composite, even if He is a Trinity. Llull does not discuss simplicity in the other works mentioned in this chapter, except in the *Cent noms de Déu*. In both works, the Trinity is the most important subject. Llull explains that the simplicity of God needs the correlatives in order to be divine, complete and perfect. Apart from that, he also explains that the Persons of the Trinity, which Llull compares to the correlatives, do not constitute a division or composition within God. The three Persons are essentially the same, and are therefore one.

Simplicity, unity and singularity are very similar to one another, with the exception that simplicity only denotes the lack of internal composition within God. The word *simplex* means ‘one-fold’, and refers here to the fact that even though God is a Trinity, He is not *triplex* or ‘three-fold’. God still consists of one entity, undivided in His essence.

8. LIFE

8.1. DISPUTATIO RAIMUNDI

Raimundus explains that God is more living with an internal act of life than without. The internal act of God’s life also means that He has the correlatives of vivifier and vivified. The three correlatives signify the three Persons of God. They are different from each other but still the same being, God.²⁶⁸

Raimundus next defends the Trinity against ‘Umar’s claim, that God cannot be a Trinity due to His eternal life. According to ‘Umar, God has eternal life in which there is no ‘living’, since living would require an agent and a patient, which are accidental. This is the subversion of the correlative theory, which Raimundus corrects in his part of the *Disputatio Raimundi*. According to Raimundus, ‘Umar is right when he speaks about accidental active and passive properties, but not when he speaks of the essential active and passive of the correlatives.²⁶⁹

Raimundus next explains how God could have died on the cross without being diminished in His infinite, eternal life. When Christ died on the cross, His human nature

²⁶⁷ Llull, *Cent noms de Déu*, *ORL*, XIX, XIV, p. 94. Translation: Sari, Hughes, “Hundred Names of God” (cf. footnote 10 above).

²⁶⁸ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, *CCCM*, 114, *ROL*, XXII, II, 1, 7, p. 212.

²⁶⁹ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, *CCCM*, 114, *ROL*, XXII, II, 1, 7, pp. 212-213.

died, since His soul and body separated, but His divine nature was still very much alive. God's divine soul was linked to the separated soul of Christ, and with His body that died on the cross.²⁷⁰

Raimundus refutes 'Umar's claim that God cannot bind Himself to a human being, since He is eternal and the human being is temporal. According to Raimundus, this is not true, since God's power, His life and His will are eternal and interchangeable, and are capable of any effect. Moreover, Raimundus wonders why God cannot be bound to humanity if the rational soul, which is immortal, can be bound to the human body. During the Incarnation God is both mortal and immortal: He is mortal as regards to the nature of humanity, and immortal regarding His divine nature. Raimundus mentions a comparison with water, which is not heated in and of itself, but only when it is warmed by an external force, the fire.²⁷¹

8.2. CENT NOMS DE DÉU

Ramon Llull begins by underlining the correlatives of life. First, he says that infinite goodness lives within God. This infinite goodness has the correlatives of bonifier, bonifiable and bonifying. Since God's goodness is convertible with God's life, this means that the correlatives of goodness are alive within God. It also means that God's goodness is connected with His life, or that goodness *is* life. The act of generation and spiration, which is present in the correlatives, is the act by which God gives Himself life. God's life is also tied to redemption. God is eternal life, without death, meaning that His mercy and compassion for humanity are imperishable. As long as God is alive to forgive and have mercy upon humanity, nothing horrible can ever befall us in afterlife. As God is immortal, our salvation is immortal as well.

“1. O divine, eternal and holy Life!
Infinite goodness lives in You
<and is filled> with the bonifier, the bonifiable and bonifying.

2. God lives in the lover, the loveable and the loving,
the vivifier, the vivifiable and vivifying,
by virtue of generation and spiration.

3. God is alive, without mortality,
and in Him live mercy and compassion,
which is why no one should despair.”²⁷²

Ramon Llull next argues that our own goodness in life is tied to God's eternal life. Worthy understanding comes from loving, loving comes from honourable thoughts, and understanding and loving come from valid remembrance. In other words, one needs purity of heart and mind to truly understand, and honourable thoughts and goodness are tied to

²⁷⁰ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 7, p. 213.

²⁷¹ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 7, p. 213.

²⁷² Llull, *Cent noms de Déu*, ORL, XIX, XVI, p. 95. Translation: Sari, Hughes, “Hundred Names of God” (cf. footnote 10 above).

one another. Goodness, which drives understanding, love and remembrance, and greatness, are mutually dependent on each other's intrinsic act. Goodness thrives on magnifying, while greatness thrives on bonifying. This means that our inner goodness depends on greatness and being, and on the achievement of greater good. The opposite of great good is evil, which is the negation of goodness. Goodness perishes through the commission of evil, because it cannot stand non-being or non-goodness, which is smaller than being. Since goodness, life, and mercy are convertible within God, this means that a person who has honourable thoughts will live on, since he or she is directed to God's attributes and His life, and since goodness and life are connected within humanity, as it is connected within God. If humankind is not directed towards goodness, it cannot receive God's forgiveness and redemption. This means that humankind will receive an eternal punishment in hell. According to Lull, evil people who live ignobly, "perish daily" since they are not part of God's internal attributes. Good people cannot die, since their disposition towards goodness makes them partake in everlasting life.

“4. Worthy understanding thrives upon virtuous loving,
and loving upon honourable thoughts,
and understanding and loving thrive upon valid remembrance.

5. Goodness thrives upon magnifying
and greatness upon bonifying,
but goodness perishes through the commission of evil.

6. He who entertains honourable thoughts lives,
while he who commits sins dies,
and he who loves God more than his relatives flourishes.

7. Whoever desires to live for the sake of receiving honours
brings about their own death in the burning fire,
<where he shall be> dishonoured in perpetuity.

8. It is better to die honourably
than to lead a long and despicable life,
because whoever lives ignobly perishes daily.

9. One who lives virtuously cannot die,
nor can one who lives wickedly be of service to God
or achieve <everlasting> life.

10. One should not live for the sake of eating,
nor for that of honours or idle repose,
but rather for the purpose of serving and honouring God.”²⁷³

²⁷³ Lull, *Cent noms de Déu*, *ORL*, XIX, XVI, p. 96. Translation: Sari, Hughes, “Hundred Names of God” (cf. footnote 10 above).

Unlike in the *Disputatio Raimundi*, a great part of the passage on God's eternal life in the *Cent noms de Déu* is focused on the redemption of the human soul, and the eternity of the lives of the faithful if they align themselves with the eternal life of God. The *Disputatio Raimundi* does not discuss the same topics, but only explains the trinitarian or Christological implications of God's eternal life. As usual, only the *Cent noms de Déu* focuses on the role of God's life for the redemption and spiritual life of the faithful, while the *Disputatio Raimundi* mainly seeks to provide philosophical evidence for Christian dogma, being the Trinity and the Incarnation.

8.3. CONCLUSION

Ramon Llull does not often mention God's attribute of life. The *Disputatio Raimundi* and the *Cent noms de Déu* are the only works here discussed which contain this attribute. In both works, Llull stresses the importance of the internal correlatives of God's life, being vivifying, vivifier and vivifiable. The correlatives are what makes God's life whole and perfect instead of empty and idle. The discussion of the correlatives is an essential part of every attribute of God, especially in Llull's later works, and is often mentioned first.

There are some major differences in how the *Disputatio Raimundi* and the *Cent noms de Déu* treat God's life. In the *Disputatio Raimundi*, Raimundus is given the task to explain how God can incarnate and die on the cross, despite His eternal life. If eternal life incarnates and becomes an entity which does not possess eternal life, and which will die at a given point, how does God's eternal life remain unscathed in the process? Raimundus explains that the soul of God, the soul of the man Jesus Christ and the body of Jesus are different entities, and one is not essentially the same as the other.

In the *Cent noms de Déu*, there is a greater focus on the contemplation of life as human beings reach their end. A life in the name of God's virtues and faith is a life that will ultimately lead to spiritual immortality. A life which is devoted to the opposite, to sin and to the worldly, will eventually lead to eternal death, and to infinite perishing. We are confronted with this dichotomy in our daily life, but also in life after death. The eternal fire is, in fact, the eternal perishing. This passage in the *Cent noms de Déu* shows us again that in this work, the focus is more on the contemplation and redemption of the believers, and their meaning for humankind. In the *Disputatio Raimundi*, on the contrary, the focus will be more on the metaphysical and logical proof of God's attributes, the Trinity and the Incarnation. The focus here is not on the spiritual wellbeing of the reader or the religious person, but on understanding God.

9. CONCLUSION

When discussing the attributes which 'Umar considers essential (or descriptive of God's essence), a few things stand out. First, the division between the 'essential' and 'non-essential' attributes is only present in the *Disputatio Raimundi*. In no other work by Llull is there any explicit mention of the two categories. The distinction made in the *Llibre de contemplació* between *attributa quoad Deum* and *attributa quoad nos* cannot be compared to the division made in the *Disputatio Raimundi*: while the *Llibre de contemplació* considers every attribute essential to God, but only makes a distinction in as far as the

attributes define only God's essence, or define God's essence and His relation to creation, the voice of 'Umar in the *Disputatio Raimundi* explicitly defines certain attributes as descriptors of God's essence, and others not. However, the distinction made in the *Llibre de contemplació* and the *Disputatio Raimundi* do have a similar literary function. In both works, the dividing of the attributes of God into two categories serves an organizing function, which makes the work more comprehensible. While the first category in the *Disputatio Raimundi* contains many attributes which are very general, they serve to enhance the knowledge of the second category of attributes, by allowing the character Raimundus to explain why they are one with God's essence. The fact that the 'non-essential' attributes are explained first, is because many of the attributes in this category are essential for understanding the nature of attributes in general (for example: the attributes of necessary entity, infinity and unity need to be explained first, in order to make the correlative theory comprehensible).

It should also be noted that there are certain attributes in the first category of the *Disputatio Raimundi* which cannot be found in most other texts by Llull. Two examples are life and singularity, which can only be found in the *Disputatio Raimundi* and the *Cent noms de Déu*. The attribute of nature and substance, which are mentioned by Raimundus as part of the first category, are only mentioned in the *Disputatio Raimundi*, and not in the other works here discussed. It seems that, in the first category, the metaphysical concepts which are essential for comprehending God as a necessary entity are made into attributes which can be discussed together with the attributes which Llull discusses normally in his œuvre. The reason is that, in his discussion with Islam, Raimundus needs to re-establish and re-reconcile the metaphysical nature of God with Islamic critique of the Trinity. Raimundus needs to describe and explain concepts such as infinity and simplicity in such a way that they allow for the existence of a Trinity within God, without posing a threat to God's infinity and eternity. Raimundus also needs to explain why God has a nature and a substance, which he would not have to establish when addressing a Christian audience.

CHAPTER 4: THE NEXT ELEVEN ATTRIBUTES OF GOD IN LLULL'S ŒUVRE: AN OVERVIEW

1. INTRODUCTION

The attributes in the next part of the *Disputatio* are what 'Umar calls 'conditions' of God. According to 'Umar, they are not descriptors of God's essence, but rather of His action within and connection to the created world. In the mind of 'Umar, the "non-essential" attributes are non-essential, because their effect cannot be eternal and infinite. However, Raimundus will prove that the "conditions" are indeed co-essential to God, and that their act is indeed eternal, since its working is intrinsically part of God's essence.

The following eleven attributes have a much clearer footing in Lull's larger œuvre. There are no 'fringe attributes' anymore, which can only be found in the *Disputatio* and not in most other works here discussed. The reason might be, that the previous list of attributes was meant to establish a logical, metaphysical framework in the part of Raimundus, which would enable him to prove Christian doctrine. The evidence derived from the following list of attributes, starting with God's goodness and greatness, can already lean on the correlative theory and a Christian interpretation of the divine (for example, the combination of God's unity, eternity and infinity with the Trinity), since these ideas have already been established in the previous chapter. Raimundus attempts to elucidate each time how the next eleven attributes can have a co-essential effect (by stating each time that they have the correlatives), and how Christian doctrine does not go against the attributes of God (for example, that the Trinity and the Incarnation are not against God's justice).

Even though Raimundus stresses the fact that all of God's attributes have their primary action within God Himself, the inherent connection of the following eleven attributes with creation is very clear. While the previous list did indeed describe attributes which could only be attached to God (for example, eternity, infinity and necessary entity), the following eleven attributes are more clearly connected to God's bond with creation. The first two attributes, goodness and greatness, are usually found together in Lull's œuvre. Usually, goodness is the first attribute which will be mentioned in Lull's works. God's creation is inherently good, and all things are ordered towards His goodness. Likewise, creation partakes in God's greatness, in as far as created beings have their own spatial body. God's power is what enables Him to create, and shows His reign over all that exists. His will or love means that the world is ordered according to God's will, and that He wills creation into existence. God's understanding means He knows creation. Understanding or knowing creation and bringing it about or making it come to be, have a close inherent connection within God. God's virtue also lies within creation, as moral virtues, remedies and benefit can be found in all that which is oriented towards God's goodness. God's truth can likewise be compared to the (changeable and imperfect) truth of creation, which partakes in God's eternal and forever active truth. Perfection within creation is a more difficult matter, as every created being partakes in God's perfection in an incomplete way. When it comes to justice and mercy, they are inherently connected to define God's relation with the created,

which He judges according to His justice, but forgives according to His mercy. The connection of God's justice and mercy with creation is the most obvious aspect of these attributes.

Raimundus argues that, while the primary effect of God's attributes is eternal and perfect due to their co-essential nature, this is only possible due to the fact that they operate within God's essence. Raimundus does acknowledge that an eternal and perfect effect in creation would be impossible, which was already posited by 'Umar. In creation, there is no being eternally in act, and being and non-being are inherently mixed, which is why creation partakes in God's perfection (and the other attributes) in a non-fundamental way. This does not mean that there is no co-essential act within God, however. Raimundus explains the difference by referring to the correlative theory, which proves that there is a difference between the primary, intrinsic act of God, and the secondary, extrinsic act of God.

2. GOODNESS

2.1. DISPUTATIO RAIMUNDI

The character of Raimundus begins his exposé on the most important attribute of God, by proving the first step of his logic. According to him, God's goodness is intrinsically part of God's essence, moreover, it *is* God Himself. God, being His own divine goodness, precedes creation and all secondary goodness that comes after Him. In this way, Raimundus proves that one ultimate goodness has to exist in order to create new goodness. If God's goodness were not infinite, there would have to be a pre-existing goodness at the base of it, which in turn would have to be infinite. Therefore, the existence of an infinite goodness is an undeniable fact. The existence of goodness from infinity would be necessary to create goodness within time.²⁷⁴

Raimundus says that God's goodness is definitively His essence, and not merely His accident. With this goodness, he says, God directs the world towards good. The objection against this made by 'Umar, that sinners would cease to exist if God's goodness was eternal, is quickly denied by Raimundus, since, according to him, God allows sinners to exist so His justice can still act within this world.²⁷⁵

After Raimundus proved that God's attributes are essentially His, he proves the rest of the *Ars*, by explaining the correlatives within God's goodness. First he explains that God's goodness is forever in act. God's goodness has to have an act, or it would be workless. And since God has an act, He does have the divine correlatives.²⁷⁶

As I mentioned before, Ramon Llull (the author) believed that the whole created universe is directed to God's goodness.²⁷⁷ Moreover, the world is hierarchically ordered.

²⁷⁴ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 8, p. 217.

²⁷⁵ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 8, p. 218.

²⁷⁶ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 8, p. 218.

²⁷⁷ Cf. chapter 2, section 1 "The Ladder of the Universe", p. 17 above.

The apex of the materially created universe is humankind, which can understand God's goodness, and is closest of all created beings to the spiritual realm.

The higher a creature is, the character of Raimundus continues, the more it is loved by the divine will. In this way, the Incarnation of the Son follows, in which the two goodnesses, both God's goodness and the created goodness, are conjoined so highly, that their bond cannot become higher. All the materially created goodnesses are directed to this union of divine and material goodness.²⁷⁸

By the existence of God's goodness and material goodness, and by the necessity of a hierarchical 'ladder of being', it follows by necessity that Christ, as the highest created tier of material existence, forms the ultimate bridge between the created and the divine, without which the world could not be directed to God. Not only has Raimundus proven the Trinity by divine goodness, but also the Incarnation. However, Raimundus does nuance one element in the Incarnation: God's essence does not mix with humanity. In Christ, divine and human goodness do not become one, they are joint together. And the divine goodness does not become less because of this conjunction. In the same way, Raimundus concludes, a soul does not become decrepit and old when the body ages.²⁷⁹

2.2. ARS GENERALIS ULTIMA

The main points concerning divine goodness, which are proven in the *Ars*, are (i.) God's goodness contains correlatives, (ii.) God's goodness is the driving cause behind all created and natural things, (iii.) God's goodness is eternal, and (iv.) God is His own goodness.

In part 6, chapter 3, Ramon Llull emphasizes goodness as a created being:

"Goodness initiates. Does goodness initiate anything? We reply that it does so by definition, as it is the reason for good to produce good. The definitions of beginning and difference in the ladder of sensual and sensual etc. prove this, where goodness is a general principle, from which descends the good difference that exists between one plant and another, as well as between all good causal and accidental principles. Why is initiating goodness a causal and accidental principle? Referring to the ladder of beginning we confirm by rule B and the first species of rule E, that goodness is a causal or formal principle due to its bonifier, bonifiable and bonifying. In addition, by the second species, goodness is an accidental or final principle so that other good principles can be subject to it as goodness clothes them with good habits."²⁸⁰

Ramon Llull means to say in chapter 3 of part 6, that goodness, as it descends from God, becomes the driving force of nature, for example, of vegetation, and initiates growth or change. Within nature the goodness of God is differentiated and adapted to the part of creation it pertains. As God's goodness comes from His essence, with the correlatives, and enters the world, nature will be formed according to divine goodness.

²⁷⁸ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 8, pp. 218-219.

²⁷⁹ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 8, p. 219.

²⁸⁰ Lullus, *Ars generalis ultima*, CCCM, 75, ROL, XIV, 6, p. 81. Translation: Abbott, Dambergs, *Raymond Lull's Ars Magna* (cf. footnote 147 above), p. 45.

In part 9, section 1, chapter 1, Lull will mention the divine attribute of goodness, and the necessity behind it which makes goodness a necessary attribute in God's being.

“God exists, and His existence is good; but His existence cannot be good without goodness just as coloured things cannot be coloured without colour: therefore, His goodness must exist for His existence to be good.”²⁸¹

Part 9, section 1 chapter 1 can be compared to the *Disputatio Raimundi*, when Raimundus says that the existence of God's eternal goodness is inevitable.²⁸² God's goodness must exist as primordial, divine goodness. In order for created goodness to exist, there must be a divine goodness, which must be eternal since goodness cannot be created first, without fundamentally underlying goodness. Therefore, the fundamental, divine goodness should be uncreated.

More is said on God's intrinsic goodness in part 9, section 1, chapter 5. This is a very important chapter of the *Ars*, when discussing God's goodness. Ramon Llull links God each time with His own attributes, and discusses the fact that God *is* that attribute, and that this attribute has a consequence within the created world. Ramon Llull links God with His own goodness, and discusses the consequences of divine goodness. “God is good and He is His own goodness,” he begins, “hence, it follows that goodness is a reason for Him to necessarily produce good.”²⁸³ God's goodness converts with His very essence. Just as the vegetative power of a plant drives it to produce vegetative being, so does God's intrinsic goodness drive Him to produce bonified being.

Lull continues by saying that God knows His producing of bonified being is good, and He knows it is good to produce beings that have the spiritual and intellectual capacity to understand and love Him, so that He can bonify these powers. For this reason, God gave humans and angels a rational mind, consisting of memory, intellect and will, so that they can enjoy and understand Him. This intention behind creating rationality is understandable by human beings.

2.3. LLIBRE DE CONTEMPLACIÓ EN DÉU

The ninth distinction of the *Llibre de contemplació* deals with God's goodness. Chapter 27, the first one of this distinction, deals with Lull's theory, which says that God's goodness belongs to His essence.

“When our imaginative power fails to imagine the great nobility of Your essence, Lord, it so happens that we go back to our rational power, that understands that You are better and nobler, than a human being can imagine and understand. That's why we confess and proclaim, that Your goodness is in greater excellence and nobility of virtue, than we could imagine or understand. That is why we go back to the power of affirmative speaking, and we honour and praise your divine goodness.

²⁸¹ Lullus, *Ars generalis ultima*, CCCM, 75, ROL, XIV, 9, 1, pp. 189-190. Translation: Abbott, Damberg, *Raymond Lull's Ars Magna* (cf. footnote 147 above), p. 117.

²⁸² Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 8, p. 217.

²⁸³ Lullus, *Ars generalis ultima*, CCCM, 75, ROL, XIV, 9, 1, pp. 195-196. Translation: Abbott, Damberg, *Raymond Lull's Ars Magna* (cf. footnote 147 above), p. 121.

Good King of glory, full of all delight and piety! Since we understand that Your goodness is infinite, eternal and omnipotent, therefore we know, that there is no other goodness that can be measured to or compared with Your goodness.

For since You, Lord, are infinite and eternal and omnipotent, and since it is impossible that anything else is infinite, eternal and omnipotent, it can be understood that nothing can compare itself to You as regards goodness.”²⁸⁴

Here, Ramon Llull describes God, and God’s goodness, as the ultimate good – greater than which none is imaginable. The created good cannot be compared to it, and the created intellect does not always suffice to comprehend it. However, even if we fall short of understanding God, with both imagination or reason, professing the Christian faith by making positive statements about God (and not apophatic ones) can let us praise God. A few lines further, Llull mentions that not only does God lack any equal in goodness, but also, He has no direct opposite in evil, as infinite as Himself. God is so worthy in His goodness that no other entity can be of equal magnitude in evil.²⁸⁵ Naturally, Llull says, since God alone is perfect and eternal, an opposite entity in evil could not exist.

The next part of distinction 9 is chapter 28, which is entitled ‘That God is Good in all His Works’. The main focus of this chapter is that everything that comes from God, creation and God’s actions in the world, shares in God’s intrinsic goodness. The chapter begins as follows:

“Oh God, Father and Lord of all that exists! Your great goodness manifests itself in the things You created and did, in heaven, and in angels, and in the elements, and in plants, and metals and in animals.”²⁸⁶

Almost every tier of the ‘ladder of being’, except humankind, is listed, but not in the usual order. The polysyndetic repetition of the conjunction “e” (“and”) emphasizes the greatness and vastness of the number of things created by God. A few lines further, Ramon Llull continues:

“Perfect Lord, King of Glory! It is no strange thing from Your great goodness to come and derive things which are by necessity also good.”²⁸⁷

If by Your works, Lord, you show Yourself to us as being good, it is no wonder, Lord, that these works are good. And if our works show us as being vile, it is no wonder, that we are bad and our actions are vile.”²⁸⁸

God’s goodness, and its working in creation, is shown by Llull as closed and in some ways circular: God’s goodness shows itself in the world. If creation derives from God’s goodness, it is no wonder that it is also good. And then, if God shows Himself as good, His works have to be good in themselves, manifesting a good God.

²⁸⁴ Llull, *Llibre de contemplació*, NEORL, XIV, I, 9, XXVII, 3-4, p. 127. Translation by Margot Leblanc.

²⁸⁵ Llull, *Llibre de contemplació*, NEORL, XIV, I, 9, XXVII, 7, p. 128. Translation by Margot Leblanc.

²⁸⁶ Llull, *Llibre de contemplació*, NEORL, XIV, I, 9, XXVIII, 1, p. 131. Translation by Margot Leblanc.

²⁸⁷ Llull, *Llibre de contemplació*, NEORL, XIV, I, 9, XXVIII, 7, p. 131. Translation by Margot Leblanc.

²⁸⁸ Llull, *Llibre de contemplació*, NEORL, XIV, I, 9, XXVIII, 9, p. 132. Translation by Margot Leblanc.

Connecting this part to chapter 27, we see that the idea of God as essentially good, or of God's goodness belonging to His essence, is the primordial first step behind creation. If God's goodness were not infinite, and if it were not forever part of His essence, the created world would not partake in goodness the same way. The world would not be intrinsically directed to good, if there was no ultimate, divine goodness, lying at the base of it, which is manifested and existentially proven by created goodness – goodness created in its image.

2.4. LLIBRE DEL GENTIL E DELS TRES SAVIS

Ramon Llull's *Llibre del gentil e dels tres savis* discusses the use of divine goodness in interreligious debate. As Judaism, Islam and Christianity are discussed by the attributes of God and their place in the respective faiths, God's goodness is mentioned in several passages.

First, in book I, Llull examines the attributes of God from a neutral perspective. The (here still unnamed) scholar uses goodness as an example of how we should understand the attributes of God. Since the attributes of God are always linked to one another, Ramon Llull discusses goodness together with greatness. Most importantly, he mentions that goodness and greatness correspond with being, since greater good leads to a greater essence. The opposite of good, says Llull, corresponds with evil – which is simply non-being.²⁸⁹

He goes on, saying that created goodness is finite and limited. If God did not exist, there would be no infinite goodness, or goodness in accord with infinity, and all created goodness would be in accord with limited, finite being. Infinity would accord with non-being. This, for Ramon Llull, is impossible:

“Since, however, finite good accords with lesser being and infinite good with greater being (because infinity and greatness are in accord, as are finiteness and smallness); therefore it is revealed and demonstrated that if finite goodness, which is lesser and in accord with non-being, is in being, how much more fitting, without any comparison, that there should exist an infinite good and that it be in being. And this good is, my dear friend, our Lord God, who is the sovereign good of all goodness, without whose being there would follow all the above-mentioned inconsistencies.”²⁹⁰

Thus, Ramon Llull uses God's goodness and greatness as a way to prove that God's attributes are infinite, and that God, in His infinite essence, has to exist. The existence of eternal good, and therefore of God, is an ontological fact. If smaller goodness, which is more in accord with non-being, is capable of existing, then infinite goodness, which accords with greater being, should definitively exist.

Book II, in which the Jewish scholar describes his faith, mentions God's goodness in accordance with His eternity. God's infinity has to be good, he says, otherwise infinity and

²⁸⁹ Llull, *Llibre del gentil e dels tres savis*, NEORL, II, I, 1, p. 15. Translation: Bonner, SW (cf. footnote 138 above), p. 119.

²⁹⁰ Llull, *Llibre del gentil e dels tres savis*, NEORL, II, I, 1, p. 16. Translation: Bonner, SW (cf. footnote 138 above), pp. 119-120.

being would be opposed by goodness, which would accord to non-being. This means all creatures would long to not-exist.

The Jewish scholar goes on to discuss a more complex statement, which describes the necessity of both God and the world to be eternal.

“The Jew said to the Gentile: ‘If the world is not eternal and God did not create it, then the world must have received its beginning from itself or from something else. From itself it could not have received it, for nothing cannot begin something; for if it did, nothing would be something. And if the world had received its beginning from something else that was not God, and if that something had received its beginning from something else which had had a beginning, and so on to infinity, and if God had not been the beginning of any of these beginnings or things begun, it would follow that goodness would be more in accord with begun beginning than with eternity, which is impossible. By this impossibility it is shown that if the world had a beginning, it must have received it from eternal goodness, or from something else that had received it from eternal goodness. And since we have proved the existence of only one God, in whom there is eternal goodness, it is therefore made manifest that if the world had a beginning, it must have received it from God, or from something else that had received its beginning from God.’”²⁹¹

The created world is imperfect, though, since it contains a division of good and evil, which is absent in infinite good. Also, the world is created, and therefore, its goodness has a beginning and is finite. In the end, the gentile asks the Jewish scholar whether God created evil. He replies that evil as an act of wrong-doing cannot have been created, but that God has created the evil of suffering, as a form of divine justice.²⁹²

This part again describes the necessity of goodness to be infinite, since there has to be a “primal cause” behind the created universe. This primal cause needs to be infinite, since creation ultimately needs to start with perfection. This could be seen as the second step in Llull’s discussion of divine goodness: not only is there divine goodness, which is ontologically implied, infinite goodness must be at the base of creation. This step is first discussed in the second book, by the eldest monotheistic faith, Judaism.

The link between goodness and greatness is mentioned again by the Jewish scholar, when he discusses the value of the “Old Law,” or the Old Testament:

“If God has given a law to His people with commandments as to what things a person should do to honour and obey God and to attain supreme happiness, and what things a person should not do in order to avoid God’s malediction, then the greater is the goodness revealed in God and the greater the demonstration given of celestial glory and infernal punishment, than if God had given no law nor made commandments as to what man should do or should avoid doing.”²⁹³

²⁹¹ Llull, *Llibre del gentil e dels tres savis*, NEORL, II, II, 2, p. 53. Translation: Bonner, SW (cf. footnote 138 above), p. 157

²⁹² Llull, *Llibre del gentil e dels tres savis*, NEORL, II, II, 2, p. 53. Translation: Bonner, SW (cf. footnote 138 above), pp. 157-158.

²⁹³ Llull, *Llibre del gentil e dels tres savis*, NEORL, II, II, 3, p. 61. Translation: Bonner, SW (cf. footnote 138 above), p. 166.

God made a commandment, since it inspires to do good: doing good is in accord with being, and not doing good is in accord with non-being. If God had not made a commandment, “God would have made a concordance of commandment and non-being, and of good and evil against commandment, being and good, insofar as commandment, would not exist. And if this were the case, it would follow that in God there would not be great goodness in power, wisdom, love, perfection; and since one must attribute great goodness to God, according to the conditions of the trees, it is therefore evident that God gave the Law to man.”²⁹⁴ The commandment has to exist, because it has to be directed to goodness and being, and cannot be directed to non-being and the absence of good.

In the third book, in which the Christian describes his faith, God’s goodness also plays an important role, together with His greatness. To begin with, it is used to describe God’s Trinity:

“It is clear that the greater the good, the more strongly it accords with eternity, power, wisdom, love; and the lesser the good, the closer it is to imperfection, imperfection, which is contrary to perfection. Thus, if in God there exists one begetting good which is infinite goodness, greatness, eternity, power, wisdom, love, perfection, and which begets a good infinite in goodness, greatness, power, wisdom, love, perfection, and if from this begetting good and this begotten good there issues forth a good infinite in goodness, greatness, power, wisdom, love, perfection, then the flower is greater in God than it would be if the above-mentioned things did not exist in God; for each of the above-mentioned things is as good or as great by all the flowers of the tree as would be God’s unity without the existence in it of Trinity.”²⁹⁵

According to Ramon Llull’s Christian, God’s begetting must be in line with perfection, and must therefore beget an entity which shares that perfection. If this were not the case, God’s goodness would not be as infinite and perfect as was necessary. This is how Ramon Llull proves the Trinity. However, the gentile has a certain disagreement on this:

“Question. The Gentile said to the Christian: ‘According to what you say, it follows that God’s unity would be in a state of greater goodness if there were four or five or an infinite number of those good things you mentioned, than there would be with only three; for goodness, greatness accord better with the number four than with three, or with five than with four, or with an infinite rather than a finite number. This being the case, therefore, according to what you say, in God there should be an infinite number of good things—begetters, begotten, and issue.’”²⁹⁶

The Gentile wonders why a Trinity would be enough, why there is no need for an infinite number of elements in God’s being, if God is infinite. The Christian answers the following:

²⁹⁴ Llull, *Llibre del gentil e dels tres savis*, NEORL, II, II, 3, p. 61. Translation: Bonner, *SW* (cf. footnote 138 above), pp. 166-167.

²⁹⁵ Llull, *Llibre del gentil e dels tres savis*, NEORL, II, III, 2, p. 91. Translation: Bonner, *SW* (cf. footnote 138 above), p. 194.

²⁹⁶ Llull, *Llibre del gentil e dels tres savis*, NEORL, II, III, 2, pp. 91-92. Translation: Bonner, *SW* (cf. footnote 138 above), pp. 194-195.

“If in God there had been more than one begetter, one begotten and one issue, then each begetter would not be infinite in goodness, greatness, eternity, power, wisdom, love, perfection, for it would not be sufficient unto itself, as a begetter, to beget a thing sufficient so that an infinite goodness, greatness, power, wisdom, love, perfection could be begotten; nor would each begetter and each begotten be sufficient to bestow infinite goodness, greatness, etc. on an issue from both; nor would all the infinite number of begetters, begotten, or issue be sufficient to have perfection of goodness, greatness, eternity, power, etc., for infinite number cannot have perfection, since increase of infinite number and perfection are in disaccord. This being the case, there would, therefore, according to the perfection of the flowers, exist imperfection in God, and the flowers would be contrary to one another, if in God there were infinite begetters, begotten, and issue.”²⁹⁷

Within the Trinity, says the Christian, there is unity. If there were more than one begotten, begetter and begetting, God would not exist as one anymore. It is therefore primordial that God has only these three aspects in His being, not more.

Next, God’s goodness in combination with greatness is mentioned to describe His Incarnation. First of all, Llull says, no good comes from nothing – otherwise, nothing would be something. So if God creates good from nothing, His goodness seems even greater. If, however, God takes a good thing, coming from another good, and makes this good one with His own person,...

“...the result would be greater good in the good that would be one with Him and in the good from which that good came, than in the good which is created from nothing. And this is due to the nobility of the divine good, of the good coming from some other good and united to God, and of the good from which came the good united with the divine good. For the good which is created from nothing is only a single good with respect to creation; but God’s good, the good united with the divine good (that is, Jesus Christ’s humanity), and the good from which came Christ’s humanity (that is, our Lady Saint Mary) are three goods, which is why there is greater good in this arrangement than in creating good from nothing. And if this were not a greater good, the goodness, greatness, eternity, and other flowers of God would be contrary to perfection and majority, which is impossible; for if it were possible, minority and imperfection would be in accord with the flowers of the first tree, which is impossible.”²⁹⁸

This passage brings us back to the passage from the *Disputatio Raimundi*²⁹⁹ where Ramon Llull calls the Incarnation the highest created good. Here, Ramon Llull sees the Incarnation as a “threefold goodness,” being God’s good, Christ’s humanity, and the source of Christ’s humanity, Mary. The Incarnation is seen as the ultimate consequence of goodness from God’s creation, to which the entire world is directed.

²⁹⁷ Llull, *Llibre del gentil e dels tres savis*, NEORL, II, III, 2, p. 92. Translation: Bonner, SW (cf. footnote 138 above), p. 195.

²⁹⁸ Llull, *Llibre del gentil e dels tres savis*, NEORL, II, III, 6, p. 116. Translation: Bonner, SW (cf. footnote 138 above), p. 218.

²⁹⁹ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 8, pp. 218-219 (cf. footnote 278 above).

2.5. CENT NOMS DE DÉU

Ramon Llull first says that God's goodness is convertible with every element of His being. God's goodness is convertible with His attributes, and with His correlatives. According to Llull, God's unity, His Trinity and His Incarnation are all good. This is true because God consists in His goodness. Since God's goodness is a necessary part of God's essence, it also contains the correlatives of agent, patient and act. Ramon Llull explains this theory by saying that God has greater internal power over His own goodness, which is its first effect. The internal generation and spiration of the correlatives is God's most necessary effect while the created universe, which is imperfect, is only a secondary outing of God's goodness. The goodness of God has a greater effect, and can accomplish a greater good in having itself as an object, than in having anything else as its object. This is true because God Himself is infinite, and in having Himself as an object of the internal act of His goodness, He can obtain a goodness which is, in itself, infinite.

- “1. God is good and consists in His goodness,
whereby <His> unity, <His> Trinity
and the incarnate God are <likewise> good.
2. God enjoys greater power over His great goodness
than He does over everything He has created,
on account of His generating and spirating.
3. More perfect goodness can obtain
in an infinite being
than <does so> in a finite and divided goodness.”³⁰⁰

Ramon Llull continues by saying that God has so much good will, that He became incarnate and that He surrendered to crucifixion. God's Incarnation is seen in the *Disputatio Raimundi* as the highest created goodness, and the higher effect of God's will.³⁰¹ The Incarnation is God's most loved effect, which is so good that nothing can ever be better. It can also mean that God is benevolent towards His creation, which He blessed with the ultimate sacrifice: the Incarnation and the Crucifixion.

- “4. God possesses so much good will
that by reason of His goodness He has surrendered Himself
to become a crucified man.”³⁰²

Goodness is not only a matter of understanding God's essence. In the theology of Ramon Llull, and also in the *Cent noms de Déu*, goodness is a matter of devotion. By concentrating on God's goodness, a Christian can be guided to the right path. Goodness in morals, by which we partake in moral conduct, is worthier than anything we can possess. Material gain is worth less than what is directed to God's essential goodness. Moreover, by directing ourselves to the laws and harmony of God's goodness, we are receiving the gift of God

³⁰⁰ Llull, *Cent noms de Déu*, ORL, XIX, XX, pp. 98-99. Translation: Sari, Hughes, “Hundred Names of God” (cf. footnote 10 above).

³⁰¹ Cf. Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 8, pp. 218-219.

³⁰² Llull, *Cent noms de Déu*, ORL, XIX, XX, p. 99. Translation: Sari, Hughes, “Hundred Names of God” (cf. footnote 10 above).

Himself. According to Llull, God created man to do good, or to be directed towards Him, so He can give Himself to humanity. Considering the place of humanity in the scale of being, God created humanity as the highest tier of the material world, since humanity partakes in God's morality by doing good. This means that humanity has a special bond with God, out of all material creatures.

“5. Goodness is worthier in good loving
than <it is> in gold, <in> silver or in receiving honours,
<or> in a <decent> livelihood and in taking pleasure.

6. Goodness makes good people agreeable,
humble, free, generous and grateful,
and it protects them from sin.

7. God has created man to do good
so that He may give Himself
to those who seek to love the good.”³⁰³

Ramon Llull concludes his exposé by extolling spiritual goodness, which he places above sensible goodness. Llull believes that God is better served by spiritual deeds, such as the cultivation of knowledge and desire (or meditation in God), than by any “sensible good”. This could mean that any ostentatious, outward display of religion is less valid than the truth of one’s own faith. The inner wealth of one’s faith, which is achieved by study and contemplation, is a greater wealth than anything finite and worldly. Of course, this fits into Llull’s worldview: the material, sensible and earthly is finite and imperfect, but knowledge, intellect and all that is spiritual and non-material is eternal and infinite. Spiritual wealth is, therefore, a sign of greater, ‘real’ wealth.

“8. Whoever thinks he can better serve
God by means of a sensible good
than of worthy knowledge and virtuous desire, is a fool.

9. From spiritual good man can derive
great and certain wealth,
which he fails to do from worldly such.”³⁰⁴

According to Llull, there is not only a difference in importance between material or sensible goodness and spiritual goodness. There is, likewise, a difference between goodness that is directed towards the individual, and goodness that is directed towards others. Ramon Llull places the “public goodness” above the “personal goodness,” and posits that he is more inclined to love the public goodness, rather than what would be good for him

³⁰³ Llull, *Cent noms de Déu*, ORL, XIX, XX, p. 99. Translation: Sari, Hughes, “Hundred Names of God” (cf. footnote 10 above).

³⁰⁴ Llull, *Cent noms de Déu*, ORL, XIX, XX, p. 99. Translation: Sari, Hughes, “Hundred Names of God” (cf. footnote 10 above).

personally. The importance of public goodness is greater because it is selfless and charitable, and more virtuous.

“10. It is better to love a good that is public
than one that is a personal,
for which reason I am obliged to love the public good.”³⁰⁵

The goodness of God is discussed in the *Cent noms de Déu* as the ultimate moral category, to which one should align one’s intentions. Other than the other works by Lull here discussed, God’s goodness is interpreted as a personal category, or a guidance for our daily conduct. This interpretation is largely absent in Lull’s more metaphysical works, especially in the works where he recounts or imagines debates with other faiths, such as the *Disputatio Raimundi* and the *Llibre del gentil*. The *Cent noms de Déu* does not prove any dogma, but contemplates on their spiritual importance.

2.6. CONCLUSION

God’s goodness is His logic, according to which the universe is created. Goodness is often seen by Lull as the most important aspect of God’s attributes, since it encompasses and drives the meaning of most of His other attributes. It is the first attribute to be mentioned in the *Ars*.

Incarnation is described as the superlative of God’s goodness. It is the highest and best moment of creation, coming from the highest among the created matter, humanity, and the internal effect of God’s goodness, the Son. In the Incarnation, God’s goodness and the created goodness become one.

Goodness means the presence of God’s logic, evil means the absence of it. All goodness in the world is directed to God, whereas evil is simply emptiness, or the absence of divine logic. Goodness stands for creation, insofar as it is “according to God’s nature,” while evil is uncreated, and “not within God’s nature”. The celestial spheres are completely good, meaning they follow God’s logic and bask in His presence completely. However, the material world contains more evil or non-being, ending in Hell, where there is a complete absence of God.

Ramon Lull understands that other faiths can, likewise, have a good understanding of what the goodness of God means. The opinion of the Jewish scholar, who says that God necessarily has to be eternally good to create the world, works for a Christian audience as well, and is respected by Lull. The eternal goodness of God and His creation of the world acts like a binding factor, which holds the three monotheistic faiths together. Not one religion can believe that God is not good.

God’s goodness also proves the existence of God Himself. Created good cannot exist, if there is no eternal good which ultimately lies at the base of it. The logical fabric of the world needs to precede the world itself, which is the ultimate proof of God.

³⁰⁵ Lull, *Cent noms de Déu*, ORL, XIX, XX, p. 99. Translation: Sari, Hughes, “Hundred Names of God” (cf. footnote 10 above).

3. GREATNESS

3.1. DISPUTATIO RAIMUNDI

Raimundus begins his exposé by explaining to ‘Umar why the greatness of God must be co-essential to Him. According to Raimundus, God’s greatness is greater than every other greatness, since it pertains to God. If God’s greatness does not come inherently from His own essence, it has a source outside of Himself. This would mean that (a) God’s unity is destroyed, and (b) that God’s greatness is both earlier (because it pertains to God) and later (because it comes from a creature), which is impossible.³⁰⁶

Raimundus next defends his view that God is greatness by denying that God is great in a spatial, extended manner. God’s greatness is infinite and eternal, and not great in a finite, extensive way. This would imply that God has an end. God is a spiritual substance, and is therefore above space. Raimundus links the greatness of God as a spiritual substance with the correlatives. Every eternal greatness, he says, is even greater with the correlatives of magnifying, magnifiable, and magnifier. Without the internal act of greatness, God’s greatness would be less great.³⁰⁷

Raimundus also defends the Incarnation in light of God’s greatness. In the opinion of Raimundus, every great being loves its greatest possible effect, which is lovable by divine will and which God’s intellect understands. This greatest effect is the Incarnation.³⁰⁸ Raimundus also parries ‘Umar’s statement, that God cannot have incarnated into a human being, since His greatness would mean that Christ would have to be infinitely great. This is not a valid reasoning, according to Raimundus, since the Incarnation is more abstract than that. In the Incarnation, God becomes wholly flesh; and even though Christ as a human being is not everywhere, the Person of the Son, in as far as He became flesh, is man everywhere. This is why, in the terms of the sacrament, Christ can be present in an endless amount of places, because God incarnated as a man everywhere.³⁰⁹

3.2. ARS GENERALIS ULTIMA

In part 9, 1, 5, 1 of the *Ars generalis ultima*, God is combined with greatness. Ramon Llull begins by stating that God, in His greatness, needs an infinite magnified being without which He cannot have His infinite greatness, or His infinite act. This is the basis of the correlative theory, but explained in reverse. God has a need for an internal object, otherwise He cannot have an act by which to act upon said object, which would mean His greatness could no longer be infinite. Every attribute of God is convertible with God’s greatness, which means that their acts are infinitely magnified.

Ramon Llull explains that, since God knows Himself to be infinite and great in existence and action, He is disposed to creating a being which is infinitely great, if the created being only had the capacity to receive infinite greatness. Ramon Llull again uses the comparison of firewood, which would light all of heaven, if only given a sufficient amount of firewood.

³⁰⁶ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 9, p. 219.

³⁰⁷ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 9, pp. 219-220.

³⁰⁸ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 9, p. 220.

³⁰⁹ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 9, pp. 220-221.

However, since God cannot create eternally great created beings, He made the heavens, the angels, and the rational souls, which are “clothed in the habit of greatness”. Ramon Llull means that the celestial beings partake in greatness, but it is not eternally and essentially theirs. Llull concludes that the intellect discerns another creature, who is greater than all creatures. However, he refrains from concretizing this matter. It is obvious that he means to imply that Christ is the greatest created being, but since the *Ars* is meant to be a general logical exposé on the universe, and not a literal explanation of Christian theology, Llull does not mention His name.

“31. God is great, and He is his own infinite greatness whereby He has infinite magnified being without which He cannot have his infinite greatness or his infinite act. And since greatness is that by reason of which goodness and eternity are great, these dignities with their acts concur in producing infinite magnified being that is bonified, eternalized etc. so that each dignity has its infinite act in infinitely magnified being. 32. God knows that He is great and infinite in existence and action. He knows that He is well ordered and disposed to create great created being so much so that He would produce infinite created being if created being had the capacity to receive infinite greatness, just as fire, given a sufficient quantity of firewood, would magnify and expand its flames all the way up to the lunar sphere. Thus, God created great creatures like heaven, angels, rational souls and other creatures similarly clothed in the habit of greatness. Here, the human intellect recognizes one great created being who is greater than all creatures; I do not propose to explain or demonstrate this here because this is a general *Ars*, as we already said.”³¹⁰

3.3. CENT NOMS DE DÉU

In the *Cent noms de Déu*, Llull discusses God’s greatness as one of His hundred names. Ramon Llull begins the chapter by explaining that God is great in relation to His existence and operation. This operation could mean the internal act of magnifying the magnifiable, but also the act of creating great (but finite and temporal) beings. Ramon Llull also explains that God’s greatness is linked to His goodness, and that the act of “magnifying” is given to God’s “bonifying”.

“1. O God, Who art as great in Your magnifying
as You are infinite and eternal in Your existing!
You are great and perfect in Your existence and operation.

2. Greatness is great in bestowing
its magnifying upon bonifying
so that goodness may be great.”³¹¹

Ramon Llull underlines the inherent difference of God’s greatness from the concept of smallness. While infinite, divine greatness implies an abstract notion of infinite being and

³¹⁰ Lullus, *Ars generalis ultima*, CCCM, 75, ROL, XIV, 9, 1, 5, 2, p. 196. Translation: Abbott, Damberg, *Raymond Lull’s Ars Magna* (cf. footnote 147 above), pp. 121-122.

³¹¹ Llull, *Cent noms de Déu*, ORL, XIX, XXI, p. 99. Translation: Sari, Hughes, “Hundred Names of God” (cf. footnote 10 above).

no non-being (rather than literal spatial extension), the idea of smallness implies – at least partial – non-being which is never in being, and imperfection. Therefore, Llull argues, God’s greatness “lends concordance to the magnifier, the magnifiable and the magnifying,” without the “minifier, the minifiable and minifying.” Since God is eternal, great being, there can be no smallness (i.e. imperfection, non-being) within Him.

“3. Greatness is great on account of its lending concordance to
<the> magnifier, <the> magnificable and magnifying,
free from <the> minifier, <the> minifiable and minifying.”³¹²

Ramon Llull next argues that God’s greatness is in accord with His power, wisdom and will, and that it can therefore not be “wanting in any good”. This means that, due to the inherent convertibility of God’s greatness with His other attributes, there can only be goodness and perfection within His greatness. There can never be non-being or evil within God’s greatness, since this would deny the very nature of His divinity. Ramon Llull also argues that, because the attributes of power, wisdom and will are in accord with God’s greatness, they can never lack any sort of complete power. God’s divine wisdom, will and power are so great, that He can create and accomplish anything His intellect can know and His will can love, by His own accord. Due to their convertibility with God’s greatness, His power is all-powerful, His intellect omniscient, and His will ultimate. It is the mutual convertibility between God’s attributes and His greatness that makes His attributes divine. Llull also argues that God’s goodness cannot “lack originating”, i.e. the magnifiable, since this would mean that His correlatives cannot exist and that He would, therefore, be idle. This way, Llull proves that the correlatives of magnifying are primordial to create divine greatness, which has to be perfect and, therefore, forever in act.

“4. The great and greatness which enjoy equality
of power, wisdom and will
cannot be wanting in any good.

5. God is so great in power, wisdom and will
that He is capable of achieving everything He knows <all> by Himself,
so long as it please His will and His wisdom.

6. Were greatness to lack <the act of> originating (lit. “beginning”),
the power of greatness could not operate properly
and greatness would be meagre in terms of <its> magnifying.”³¹³

At last, Ramon Llull wishes to prove that, for human beings, greatness lies more in spiritual faculties – which can be eternal and therefore forever in being – and less so in material or temporal honours and possessions – which are finite. Greatness, Llull argues, is greater by wisdom and will than in things one can own, such as gold or political power. Moreover, one who revels in honours and wealth is small, just like a someone who is a sinner. In Llull’s argument, the real greatness which suits a human being is the greatness of virtue and being loved by God, while earthly greatnesses do not bring about any real

³¹² Llull, *Cent noms de Déu*, ORL, XIX, XX, p. 99. Translation: Sari, Hughes, “Hundred Names of God” (cf. footnote 10 above).

³¹³ Llull, *Cent noms de Déu*, ORL, XIX, XXI, p. 100. Translation: Sari, Hughes, “Hundred Names of God” (cf. footnote 10 above).

greatness due to their temporal, finite nature. One might argue that temporal greatness is a distraction and does not contribute to the greatness of the soul. Llull also combines greatness with the spiritual faculties, which are all interchangeable, such as remembering, willing and understanding. These mental faculties all contribute to non-temporal, spiritual greatness, when applied correctly as one (with understanding will, loving understanding, and love which remembers).

“7. Greatness is greater in <the> goodness
of wisdom and of will,
than <it is> in <that of> gold, empire or kingdom.

8. Whoever is loved by God is great
and whoever abides in sin is small,
as is he who receives an excess of honours.

9. Will is great in <its> understanding,
and understanding is great in <its> loving,
and love is great in <its> remembering.”³¹⁴

3.4. CONCLUSION

The greatness of God is explained by Ramon Llull as something spiritual which stands above measure and matter, instead of something material and extensive. While God cannot have a measure by which to be great, and while He cannot have an extension in space, God can be great when it comes to His infinity and eternity. Since God is infinitely great, He needs the correlatives of magnifying, magnifiable and magnified. Otherwise, His greatness would be idle and incomplete, or would be less great than if God did have the correlatives. While God is infinitely great, every other spiritual being which God created shares partially in His greatness. Angels, heaven and rational souls are “clothed in the habit of greatness,” meaning that they partake in God’s greatness, but not essentially.

Ramon Llull also links God’s greatness to the Incarnation, in both the *Disputatio Raimundi* and the *Ars generalis ultima*. In the *Disputatio Raimundi*, Raimundus immediately concretizes the fact that the Incarnation is the greatest possible form of material creation, and therefore a necessary effect of God’s greatness. In the *Ars generalis ultima*, Llull does not literally mention the Incarnation. He only says that one can discern one created being which is greater than any other, by which he means the Incarnation. However, Llull does not venture too far in explaining this theory, due to the general nature of the *Ars generalis ultima*. According to Llull, the Incarnation of God in Christ is the greatest possible effect that God’s greatness can have, since Christ is the greatest of all created beings. Again, this comes down to the spiritual greatness which exists in the Incarnation. Since Christ is infinitely great, this must mean that He is the necessary effect of God’s greatness, which is also infinite.

³¹⁴ Llull, *Cent noms de Déu*, ORL, XIX, XXI, p. 100. Translation: Sari, Hughes, “Hundred Names of God” (cf. footnote 10 above).

4. POWER

4.1. DISPUTATIO RAIMUNDI

According to the character Raimundus, the fact that God's divine power is convertible with His own essence is a logical consequence of His being an infinite entity. Every infinite entity, says Raimundus, is its own infinite power. An infinite entity can never exist without power, which means his power must 'co-eternate' with said entity. Moreover, since God's power is infinite, His power must have an infinite act, and also contain the correlatives "possificante" and "possificato". These correlatives, again, constitute God's Trinity.³¹⁵

In the previous part of the *Disputatio Raimundi*, 'Umar had said that God's power cannot be infinite, in the same way as fire of a candle cannot light all the air in the world. Raimundus disagrees since, according to him, fire does have the power to burn infinitively, provided it has enough wood to burn. If the created fire has the potency to burn infinitively, then God definitively has the potency to have infinite power.

Next, Raimundus looks back at one of 'Umar's arguments, who said that God cannot incarnate, since the Son would be of the same essence as the Father. According to Raimundus, 'Umar falsely limits the divine power in this way. Raimundus provides a metaphysical counter-argument, in which he states that the rational mind comprises three parts: the intelligent, intelligating, and the intelligible. When the intelligible thinks a certain thing, an external intelligible is created, or the external object which is intelligated by the intellect. This way, there are no two intelligents, but two intelligibles, one internal and one external. All this could also be said of the imaginative and sensual power. The two objects of rationalization explain the Incarnation, with Christ being seen as an external reflection or object of divine rationality.³¹⁶

God has a certain power in this world, Raimundus continues, because He is incarnated. And the Incarnation is possible, since a cause is essentially different from its effect. This is the answer to what 'Umar said earlier, in a parallel argument, namely that no single power can cause that a cause³¹⁷ is an effect, because cause and effect are so disparate, believing in the Incarnation is like saying that the visible power is audible power. Therefore, God (the ultimate cause) cannot become a man (which is an effect of said cause).³¹⁸ Raimundus will contradict, saying that ultimately, 'Umar would be right in his opinion, if he claimed that vision would want to be hearing with colour as an object. However, in the Incarnation, God, the cause, is in relation to His proper effect, Christ, like vision is in relation to its logical object, colour. Raimundus denies that the Incarnation effectuates cause; the Incarnation is the proper effect of God.³¹⁹

³¹⁵ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 10, p. 221.

³¹⁶ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 10, pp. 221-222.

³¹⁷ The term "cause" would signify God, being the ultimate cause of creation, and "effect" would mean a created substance, coming from God. In the Incarnation, according to 'Umar, God would be both God (cause) and creation (effect) which is impossible. According to Ramon Llull, the Incarnation in itself is the effect of God.

³¹⁸ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 10, p. 185.

³¹⁹ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 10, p. 222.

4.2. ARS GENERALIS ULTIMA

Ramon Llull includes power as an attribute of God many times in his *Ars*. He often describes power as a mediating principle, without which none of the attributes of God would be in act. The Incarnation would not be able to exist without God's infinite essential power. Llull links power to goodness in part 6 of his *Ars*, and later, in that same chapter, he explains why power is so important for all of God's attributes. This happens in part 6, chapter 3:

“Goodness is powerful. Is goodness powerful? We reply that it is, by the definitions of goodness and power, since power is a being on account of which goodness can exist and act; if goodness was not powerful, it could not be a reason for good to produce good. In addition, rule B affirms that goodness is powerful. Why is goodness powerful? By the first species of rule E we reply that it is powerful because it consists of its own co-essential bonificative, bonifiable and bonifying. Thus, goodness as an active and powerful being bonifies peregrine bonifiable things in its intrinsic bonifiable, and these peregrine bonifiable things do not belong to the genus or nature of goodness' own intrinsic bonifiable. By the second species, goodness is powerful so it can habituate other essences, and rule B shows this.”³²⁰

Goodness, the most primordial of God's attributes, is here described as “powerful” since it has the potency to create and to exist. Goodness and power are linked in the *Ars*, as are all the other attributes of God.

In the chapter on God's greatness, or part 9, section 1, chapter 2, Llull answers a question which is partly about God's power. God can create heaven and angels, all of which are “clothed in the habit of greatness”. Moreover, he continues, there is one eternal great thing which God can create, which is the greatest form of creation. Of course, Ramon Llull means the incarnate Christ. However, since he aims to make the *Ars* a “general” one, or non-attached to one particular faith, he never concretizes what he means. Part 9, section 1, chapter 2 goes as such:

“God knows that He is great and infinite in existence and action. He knows that He is well ordered and disposed to create great created being so much so that He would produce infinite created being if created being had the capacity to receive infinite greatness, just as fire, given a sufficient quantity of firewood, would magnify and expand its flames all the way up to the lunar sphere. Thus, God created great creatures like heaven, angels, rational souls and other creatures similarly clothed in the habit of greatness. Here, the human intellect recognizes one great created being who is greater than all creatures; I do not propose to explain or demonstrate this here because this is a general *Ars*, as we already said.”³²¹

The comparison of God's infinite power with the power of fire, which has the infinite potency to burn but only lacks material opportunity of having infinite firewood, can also

³²⁰ Lullus, *Ars generalis ultima*, CCCM, 75, ROL, XIV, 6, 3, p. 81. Translation: Abbott, Damberg, *Raymond Lull's Ars Magna* (cf. footnote 147 above), p. 45.

³²¹ Lullus, *Ars generalis ultima*, CCCM, 75, ROL, XIV, 9, 1, p. 196. Translation: Abbott, Damberg, *Raymond Lull's Ars Magna* (cf. footnote 147 above), p. 122.

be found in the *Disputatio Raimundi*, when the character Raimundus explains God's infinite power in the same way.³²²

Ramon Llull goes on to explain the nature of God's power. First, he explains that God's power, like His other attributes, is infinite and has an infinite act, by which Llull refers to the Trinity. Also, God's power as an extrinsic and intrinsic attribute is discussed in paragraph 36. Llull mentions that God does not produce external creation from His own nature or essence, but as an effect of His own essence.

“God is powerful, and He is His own power. Thus, God necessarily produces an infinite empowered being so that His power can be infinite with an infinite act. Just as divine goodness, greatness etc. can exist and act infinitely through power, so do all the other dignities with their acts concur in producing an empowered being that is bonified, magnified, etc. (...) God knows that He is powerful in existence and action; He knows that He is disposed and ordered for producing created power that is neither infinite nor eternal. Now God knows that His intrinsic power is both absolute and ordered, but that His extrinsic power is only ordered. For God does not produce creatures from His own nature, but He produces them as an effect, like a real man who paints a mural of a man who does not belong to his own nature. Thus, the human intellect knows what God intended when He made created powers; namely, that creatures could use these powers to understand, love, remember and praise God. Therefore, the human intellect knows that an infinite, intrinsically empowered being is the cause of all finite and extrinsically empowered beings.”³²³

Interestingly, Ramon Llull concludes with a statement which sounds almost mystical: God created humankind and the human intellect, so they could understand, love, remember and praise Him. This could be seen as a different way to look at God: as He created the world, as a testimony of His attributes, humankind stands in between heaven and earth, contemplating the divine source of all which is. Humankind's faculty of understanding and contemplating God gives them a special place within creation.

4.3. LLIBRE DE CONTEMPLACIÓ EN DÉU

The sixth distinction of the *Llibre de contemplació* is devoted to the divine power. Firstly, Ramon Llull shows that God's power is part of His essence. Therefore, he continues, God's power is also infinite.

“God, glorious, loving Lord, full of kindness, our beginning! If Your great power, Lord, is eternal, it is no wonder, since it befits it that it is eternal. Perfect Lord, full of all virtues! Your power is so high and noble, that it is within its nature that it would be without end: for since it is in its nature to be without beginning, it is also in its nature to be without end. O holy and glorious Lord! Be praised, since Your power is such a great thing, that it is a wonderful thing to imagine; because our

³²² Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 10, pp. 221-222.

³²³ Lullus, *Ars generalis ultima*, CCCM, 75, ROL, XIV, 9, 1, p. 197. Translation: Abbott, Dambergs, *Raymond Lull's Ars Magna* (cf. footnote 147 above), pp. 121-122.

intellect cannot think a beginning or end in it, on the contrary, it is totally impressed and captivated by it.”³²⁴

Ramon Llull is very clear: God’s power is infinite, as His essence is infinite. The intellect cannot think any limitations to God’s power, since God’s superb greatness goes beyond our imagination.

Next, in chapter 15, Ramon Llull explains that the divine power can force the course of nature in a different direction.

“So goodness and fortitude and power be in You, Lord; since You constrain the nature of the created beings in being; because, like a man who throws a stone to heaven, he makes it move upwards against the nature of the stone, which has the nature to fall down – like this it is the nature of the creature to turn to non-being; like a stone moves down by nature, in that way, if you were to relinquish the creatures, all things would revert to non-being.”³²⁵

God’s power in sustaining the fabric of nature is underlined in this paragraph. Without God’s power, holding reality together in a *creatio continua*, nature would soon turn to nothing. It is God’s infinite power that brings about the creation of the world, just like His will desires it. God’s power is here described as the ultimate force behind creation. This proves the premise of most of Llull’s theology: where there is being, God’s power is present, and where His power is not present, there is only non-being – almost like a binary formula. There is either affirmation, goodness or being, or negation, evil and non-being. The presence of God defines what is and what is not.

4.4. LLIBRE DEL GENTIL E DELS TRES SAVIS

Ramon Llull discusses a combination of power, love and wisdom to prove the Trinity in book III, which deals with Christianity.

“God, blessed may He be! is His own power, His own wisdom, and His own love. Now if, as we said above, it is fitting that use be made of the sun and fire, which are creatures, how much more fitting that use be made of the above-mentioned flowers, in order that God may make use of power, wisdom, and love in creatures. For if this were not the case, it would follow that the sun and fire would be more in accord with perfection of power than divine power, wisdom, love, which is impossible. By this impossibility is signified the fact that if the above-mentioned compartments, that is to say, the flowers, can be used with creatures, how much more fitting that they be used with, and derive benefit from, themselves. And if this were not the case, it would follow that God would be more in accord with activity outside Himself than activity within Himself, which is impossible. By this impossibility is signified the fact that God’s power must of necessity empower, His wisdom make wise, and His love love, and this in infinite goodness, greatness, eternity, power, wisdom, love, perfection; which necessity could not exist without distinction of personal properties, that is, properties distinct one from another and yet which together form a single divine essence, infinite in goodness, greatness, eternity,

³²⁴ Llull, *Llibre de Contemplació*, NEORL, XIV, I, 6, XIV, 1-3, p. 75. Translation by Margot Leblanc.

³²⁵ Llull, *Llibre de Contemplació*, NEORL, XIV, I, 6, XV, 2, p. 75. Translation by Margot Leblanc.

power, etc., and that that essence be three personal properties distinct by personal, essential, begetting generation, by personal, essential, begotten generation, and by personal, essential, proceeded procession, each of them containing all the flowers of the first tree, and being all together a single flower containing all the flowers of the trees.”³²⁶

In this extract, Lull uses power, wisdom and love to describe the correlative theory. Just like in the first part of the *Disputatio Raimundi*,³²⁷ God’s power is shown to have an infinite act, an infinite actor and an infinite effect. This applies to God’s goodness, greatness, eternity, power, wisdom, love, perfection, in other words, to all His attributes.

The link between power and one of the virtues, charity, is discussed by Lull in book III of the *Llibre del gentil e dels tres savis*, in article 6, on re-creation. The second combination of attributes deals with the combination power and charity, which I discussed in the previous chapter on goodness.

First of all, the Christian scholar tries to make the gentile understand that God has to have an infinite power. He does so by comparing the power of God with that of fire.

“The Christian said to the Gentile: ‘It is clear that God created creatures and their properties to exemplify His great power and charity. He therefore gave fire the property that it would, in burning wood, extend its size infinitely, as long as it were given an infinite amount of wood and infinite space in which to burn, in accordance with the place we are in. But since fire does not have infinite material, it does not burn an infinite amount. Thus if fire, which is a finite and limited creation, has this power and property, and since it does not have this power and property from itself, but rather as a gift from God, how much more power has God to place infinite good in a creature, if the creature could receive it! And if this were not the case, it would follow that God’s will and power were contraries, and that God had given greater power to fire than to Himself, which is impossible.’”³²⁸

This same idea, in which the power of God is proven to be unlimited by comparing it to the theoretically unlimited power of fire, also occurs in the *Disputatio Raimundi*³²⁹ and in the *Ars*,³³⁰ as mentioned above. It seems to have been a very important argument in Ramon Lull’s discussion of God’s power, one he frequently used in interreligious debate, since, again, the endlessness of God’s power has to be proven in order to prove the Incarnation. Since allegories were a very important part of Lull’s discourse, it should be taken into account that he will use and re-use some of these allegories throughout his work.

Ramon Lull continues by proving the Incarnation, calling it the ultimate act of creation by God. His power and charity reach their ultimate goal in the Incarnation, God’s highest created virtue. This creature should also be joined to God, and become one with His nature.

³²⁶ Lull, *Llibre del gentil e dels tres savis*, NEORL, II, III, 2, pp. 94-95. Translation: Bonner, SW (cf. footnote 138 above), pp. 197-198.

³²⁷ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 10, p. 221.

³²⁸ Lull, *Llibre del gentil e dels tres savis*, NEORL, II, III, 6, pp. 117-118. Translation: Bonner, SW (cf. footnote 138 above), p. 220.

³²⁹ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 10, pp. 221-222.

³³⁰ Lullus, *Ars generalis ultima*, CCCM, 75, ROL, XIV, 9, 1, p. 196.

“If God created a creature, made that creature be better than all others, and gave it greater power, wisdom, will than all other creatures, then the fact that God could make a creature infinite in power, wisdom, charity if the creature could receive it would be better exemplified than if God did not make such a creature. And since that by which God’s power and charity is best shown to place infinite good in a creature, if the creature can receive it, must exist, therefore it is only fitting that God should have made a creature nobler in virtue and virtues than all other creatures. And because of the fact that this creature can be better than all other creatures, if it is joined to, so as to become one with, God’s nature, it is therefore nearer to being infinite in virtue, if it could receive it, than it would be if it were not joined to or united with God’s power and charity. And since that by which God best demonstrates His power and charity must be granted, therefore, in this granting, which accords with being against its contrary, that is to say, negation, is manifested the re-creation we have been seeking.”³³¹

It is clear that God’s power is mainly the attribute which facilitates and proves Incarnation and creation, in the *Ars*, the *Disputatio Raimundi*, and the *Llibre del gentil e dels tres savis*. Like goodness, this attribute of God is a means to understand God’s creative nature.

4.5. CENT NOMS DE DÉU

Ramon Llull begins by explaining that God is His own power. God would no longer be glorious if His power were to be idle, or if His power did not have an internal act. The fact that God’s power is capable of eternal and infinite goodness, or of an infinite and eternal good effect, means that God’s power is eternal, or “without limit or quantity”. This means that the eternal and infinite potential of God implies that God is His own power, and that His power in itself is infinite and eternal. The convertibility of power and goodness is primordial for God’s power to create good. If God’s power did not convert with God’s correlatives of goodness, God’s power would not be able to create goodness (which is equated with being in Llull’s thought). This would render His power completely useless.

“1. O God, Who art power by reason of <being> powerful!
You would no longer be a glorious God
were power in You to be idle.

2. Power which is capable of goodness,
of infinity and of eternity,
is without limit or quantity.

3. Power which cannot derive its origins
from the principle of bonifying,
cannot suffice for goodness.”³³²

³³¹ Llull, *Llibre del gentil e dels tres savis*, *NEORL*, II, III, 6, p. 118. Translation: Bonner, *SW* (cf. footnote 138 above), pp. 220-221.

³³² Llull, *Cent noms de Déu*, *ORL*, XIX, XXII, p. 100. Translation: Sari, Hughes, “Hundred Names of God” (cf. footnote 10 above).

Ramon Llull explains that God's power, wisdom and will are bound together by being one entity. This entity is God, or the "deity," which has the correlatives of deifying. The fact that the deity has to exist, as the core of God's being which holds all the correlatives, means that if deifying did not reside in deity, the attributes of God (among which God's power) could not reside in God. Even though every attribute of God is convertible with God Himself, God as a deity also has to exist, otherwise God Himself as a whole would not exist to assume the correlatives.

"4. In God, power, wisdom and will
constitute a single deity
wherein the deified is made possible.

5. Since possifying resides in power,
were deifying not to reside in deity,
power could not be God."³³³

Ramon Llull next explains why the spiritual faculties of the soul are worth more than the sensible. Spiritual power is stronger than sensible power since it is in line with God's power, which is eternal and has no limits. Ramon Llull goes on to exalt the power of love, which is a spiritual matter of the will, above the merely sensible and intellectual faculties of sight and imagination. It is apparent that Ramon Llull's mention of love signifies real, spiritual love, and not the earthly, sensual love driven by sight and imagination. Ramon Llull links these statements to the true meaning of power. Real power, as it was meant to be coming from God, is aimed towards the spiritual capacities of the mind, and not towards worldly power and wealth. There is difference between true power, which is mental power, and worldly power, which is secondary.

"6. Spiritual power
prevails over sensible such,
because it is more capable than its natural counterpart.

7. The power of love is superior
to that of sight or of the imagination,
which is why man should cherish it more.

8. Power is superior when it fosters
good will and good memory
than it is in terms of gold and silver."³³⁴

Ramon Llull also explains the Incarnation by referring to God's power, but he does so in a different way from the *Disputatio Raimundi*. Llull underlines the aspect of charity in God's Incarnation. God became flesh, because He wanted us to understand and love Him to the best of our abilities. This means, that God incarnated so humanity would be better

³³³ Llull, *Cent noms de Déu*, ORL, XIX, XXII, p. 100. Translation: Sari, Hughes, "Hundred Names of God" (cf. footnote 10 above).

³³⁴ Llull, *Cent noms de Déu*, ORL, XIX, XXII, pp. 100-101. Translation: Sari, Hughes, "Hundred Names of God" (cf. footnote 10 above).

able to envision Him. Moreover, the sacrament of communion can only be possible with the Incarnation of Christ.

“9. God wished to give Himself, to the best of His ability,
to our understanding and loving,
for which reason He chose to become incarnate.

10. Who can assess
the power that God has sought to bestow
by means of the sacrament of the altar?”³³⁵

Ramon Llull explains the correlatives of power the same way as he does in the *Disputatio Raimundi*. In both works, Llull explains how God is His own infinite power, and how He needs to possess the correlatives.³³⁶ However, Llull devotes less of the passage in the *Disputatio Raimundi* to investigating the consequences of the fact that God’s attributes are convertible with one another. He does not explicitly link God’s power to His goodness, for example. Moreover, in the *Disputatio Raimundi*, the character of Raimundus never explains the devotional use of power, or the meaning of true spiritual power, and keeps his discussion merely metaphysical.

4.6. CONCLUSION

God’s power is His ability to shape and determine, by which the universe is created. The power of God has no limits, according to Ramon Llull, and there is no law within temporal logic that can stop Him.

Ramon Llull proves that the power of God is infinite, and belongs to His essence. If God were without power for just one moment, He could not shape and determine the universe any longer, and the world would quite simply cease to exist. God’s power must be infinitely part of Him, since He can never be powerless. Likewise, His goodness has to be forever part of His essence, since He cannot be evil.

While Ramon Llull acknowledges in many of his works that some doubt the absoluteness of God’s power, he keeps proving that God can accomplish anything He wants, and that He is not bound by logic or human expectation. The *Llibre de contemplació* explains that God’s power determines the natural laws. Nature and logic are all dependent on and obedient to God’s power – since reality *is* God’s power. Even if the Incarnation seems impossible, it is not impossible to God, according to Llull. Moreover, it is the Incarnation, and God’s entrance in the temporal world, that allows God’s power to act within material creation. Llull claims that the intellect does not have the capacity of imagining any limitations to God’s power because of the infinity of God’s power, which is, again, part of His essence.

The discourse concerning God’s power is almost the same in every work of Ramon Llull. Each time, the infinity of God’s power is proven, as is His ability to accomplish the Incarnation, which is possible due to the endlessness of God’s power. The comparison of

³³⁵ Llull, *Cent noms de Déu*, ORL, XIX, XXII, p. 101. Translation: Sari, Hughes, “Hundred Names of God” (cf. footnote 10 above).

³³⁶ Cf. Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 10, p. 221.

God's power with fire is also present in the *Disputatio Raimundi*, in the *Ars*, and in the *Llibre del gentil e dels tres savis*. Naturally, the power of God would be a great tool for debating a representative of another religion, since every religion believes that God is all-powerful. In Judaism, one of the names of God is 'almighty' or *Shaddai*,³³⁷ and in Islamic theology as well, God is addressed with the name 'almighty' or *al-Azīz*.³³⁸ The omnipotence of God could never be doubted, which means Ramon Llull's plan to refute the impossibility of the Incarnation by asserting God's unlimited power made sense in his dialogue with a Muslim.

5. WILL

5.1. DISPUTATIO RAIMUNDI

Every infinite entity is an infinite will, Raimundus begins. And the will has to have the divine correlatives, the willing one, the willed one and willing.³³⁹

Raimundus disagrees with 'Umar, who says that God could not have an infinite will, because He would infinitely love and hate the entire world. According to Raimundus, the correlatives only allow uniformity, singularity and infinity. So there is one willing one, and not hating one, one loved one and no hated one, one willing and no hating, etc.³⁴⁰ This means that God only has a positive will: His will drives goodness and being, and does not direct itself to evil and non-being.

Raimundus also disagrees with 'Umar, who says that God cannot want Himself to be a father. God is His eternal will, and therefore, His will cannot be limited in any way. Since God's will is endless and non-contained, He is able to will Himself to be the Father.³⁴¹

The will, according to Raimundus, also explains the Incarnation. Every infinite will, he says, that loves its greater effect, which is greater because of its infinity, is incarnated. God is infinite will, therefore, he is incarnated.³⁴²

Next, Raimundus counters 'Umar's statement, that God cannot will the Incarnation, because God would become human and a human person would become God. Since God is eternal will, He can will the Incarnation.³⁴³

Raimundus also denies the truth of 'Umar's statement, when he says that God, if He were incarnated, would want to incarnate as an angel and not as a human being. An angel is indeed a higher being, but humankind has a broader nature, since human beings are body and soul conjoined, and relate to both the spiritual and material, whereas an angel does not.

³³⁷ Máire Byrne, *The Names of God in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam: a Basis for Interfaith Dialogue*, London: Continuum, 2011, p. 29.

³³⁸ Byrne, *The Names of God in Judaism, Christianity and Islam* (cf. footnote 337 above), p. 97.

³³⁹ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 11, p. 224.

³⁴⁰ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 11, p. 224.

³⁴¹ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 11, p. 224.

³⁴² Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 11, pp. 224-225.

³⁴³ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 11, p. 225.

And that is why God wanted to become flesh, so He could consort with all creatures in nature.³⁴⁴

5.2. ARS GENERALIS ULTIMA

In the *Ars*, part 9, chapter 6, Lull discusses God in combination with His will. Mainly, he proves the Trinity by God's will. If God is infinite will, He must produce His most beloved effect throughout His entire essence of His will. This looks like Ramon Llull's description of the Incarnation (every infinite will that loves its greater effect, is incarnated), although this section only proves the the inner-Trinitarian generation of the Son.

“God is willing, and He is His own will. Therefore, He knows that with His infinite willing, He must necessarily bring forth an infinite desired or beloved being throughout the entire infinite essence of His will, and consequently He brings forth exactly what He knows and wants. And as all the other dignities are lovable, they concur with their acts in producing an infinite beloved so that every dignity can have an infinite act in the beloved that is bonified, magnified etc.”³⁴⁵

This part perfectly explains the theory of the Trinity, which will be a shaping theory in all of Ramon Llull's works. Even though the name ‘Christ’ or the term ‘Son’ does not enter the *Ars generalis*, the presence of the Trinity is everywhere throughout the book.

5.3. LLIBRE DE CONTEMPLACIÓ EN DÉU

In the *Llibre de contemplació*, Ramon Llull devotes his distinction 13 to explaining the divine will. The first subchapter is of great importance, since it explains the link between the will of God, and His goodness. Mainly, the first chapter explains that all good things are willed by the divine will. Whereas goodness constitutes and shapes creation, it is the will that makes God actively pursue this creation. God's will is a logical consequence of His divinity and perfection, which, again, is implied in this chapter.

In chapter 63, paragraph 4, Ramon Llull explains that God's will can only choose to enact the greatest good, which accords to God's nature. He cannot will any secondary or lesser good into existence.

“Wise Lord, knower of all things! Since You are supreme goodness, naturally, You would rather want the supreme goods, than inferior goods. Therefore, the goods which, ordinarily, are willed by the first intention, have to be more willed than those willed with the second intention, since they are better.

Since the goods, which we possess, Lord, are inferior, and the goods within You are superior, it would not be dignified that our good would be equally willed in Your will, as Your good.”³⁴⁶

³⁴⁴ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 11, p. 225.

³⁴⁵ Lullus, *Ars generalis ultima*, CCCM, 75, ROL, XIV, 9, 5, p. 198. Translation: Abbott, Dambergs, *Raymond Lull's Ars Magna* (cf. footnote 147 above), p. 123.

³⁴⁶ Llull, *Llibre de contemplació*, NEORL, XIV, II, 13, LXIII, 4-5, p. 271. Translation by Margot Leblanc.

Ramon Llull describes how the first (created or “ordered”) goodness, or the most desired goodness, lies within God Himself. God’s first intention is to create goodness within Himself, the divine goodness. This sheds a new light on the bond between will and goodness: it is the divine will that forever orders the divine goodness and divine correlatives, before creation from this divine goodness – also according to the will – even takes place.

The next chapter (chapter 64) deals with Ramon Llull’s belief that God cannot intentionally will sin and blame. According to Ramon Llull, God cannot will sin, since this is based on evil, which, in turn, is based on privation and nothingness. This can be compared with the *Disputatio Raimundi, mutatis mutandis*, when Raimundus says that God cannot hate either.³⁴⁷ The evil in this world, and the sins of humankind, cannot be willed by God, since evil has no connection to the divine.

“Oh glorious God, Father and Lord of all that exists! Praise and gratitude be to You, Who gratifies and illuminates the intellect of Your servants as much, that they talk of the evil of guilt in two ways.

The first way, Lord, is the evil of guilt, which is the sin that is in human sinners, and the second is the evil of guilt, which is in privation.

The first way, Lord, in which sin is engendered, is when a person loves herself or her neighbour more than You. The second way of sinning, would be if You were not the guardian of the just, or if You were to do something against justice and against reason, which is why this second mode is in privation, since it is eternally not in Your will, and the first way is in being, since it is not in privation from the human will.”³⁴⁸

Evil which is willed by God is impossible, Llull says, since evil, injustice and irrationality cannot be willed by God. Sin only lies within humanity, or within creatures. Therefore, the existence of any evil in God’s will is “in privation,” meaning it cannot exist.

Chapter 65 deals with God’s will to be man and God at the same time. Llull describes how God willed to be a creator and a creature simultaneously, but also mentions that His divine nature did not alter because of the Incarnation. This part could be compared to Raimundus’ answer to ‘Umar’s objection, when he says that God cannot will the Incarnation, because this would mean that humanity and divinity would be confounded in Christ. However, in the *Disputatio Raimundi*, Raimundus only points out that God’s will is limitless, and does not oppose the Incarnation.³⁴⁹

“You, Lord, want to be God and human at the same time, in such a way that Your divine nature does not change, neither does it change into a human nature, since it is perfect in goodness, and the human nature does not have such a perfection, and it

³⁴⁷ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 11, p. 224.

³⁴⁸ Llull, *Llibre de contemplació*, NEORL, XIV, I, 13, LXIV, 1-3, p. 275. Translation by Margot Leblanc.

³⁴⁹ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 11, p. 225.

is impossible for the human nature to change in the divine nature, since, due to its defectiveness, it cannot ascend to such a great nobility as the divine nobility.”³⁵⁰

In the same chapter, Ramon Llull expresses his wonder when he is confronted with adherents of other creeds, who doubt the Incarnation as being impossible.

“Since You, Lord God, wish to be God and human at the same time, and since You can be, as long as You wish this, I really marvel at people who doubt that You can be God and human at the same time, since they claim it to be impossible, what is possible to You, if only You wish it to be true.”³⁵¹

Ramon Llull stresses the ultimate power of the divine will, which has no limits to will anything, which is in God’s nature. Moreover, again in paragraph 13, Llull stresses the fact that the divine nature does not alter during the Incarnation.

“Loving God, full of mercy! Like unbelievers refrain from believing that You are God and human, since they do not know what can be by nature, and because they believe that the divine nature would change into another, the same way, they could doubt, in first glance, Your goodness and virtues.”³⁵²

According to Ramon Llull, in this paragraph, the nature of God cannot change during the Incarnation. Not understanding the Incarnation would lead to unbelief since, according to Llull, if one doubts the Incarnation, one might just as well doubt divine Goodness.

Harvey Hames also connects the will or love of God with a passage from chapter 9 of the *Llibre de contemplació*, which is devoted by Llull to the explanation on why the divine essence is only one substance. In the third section of this chapter, Llull argues that God is only one love, which is directed towards His own essence. Since God’s love is simple (or one-fold) and perfect, God has His own essence as the object of His love.³⁵³ Hames interprets this passage as containing the roots of two great Lullian concepts: first the idea of the “eternal activity of the Godhead”, and second, the correlative theory.³⁵⁴

5.4. LLIBRE DEL GENTIL E DELS TRES SAVIS

In the first book, which treats the common ground of all three religions and instructs the reader on the very nature of God, the sages take the flower ‘love-perfection’ from the tree.³⁵⁵

“Love, perfection are in accord with being; and being and perfection are in accord with one another, as are non-being and defect. Now, if non-being and defect are in accord with being and with perfection in man and in the things of this world, how

³⁵⁰ Llull, *Llibre de contemplació*, NEORL, XIV, II, 13, LXV, 3, p. 279. Translation by Margot Leblanc.

³⁵¹ Llull, *Llibre de contemplació*, NEORL, XIV, II, 13, LXV, 9, p. 280. Translation by Margot Leblanc.

³⁵² Llull, *Llibre de contemplació*, NEORL, XIV, II, 13, LXV, 13, p. 280. Translation by Margot Leblanc.

³⁵³ Llull, *Llibre de contemplació*, NEORL, XIV, II, 4, IX, 3, p. 55.

³⁵⁴ Hames, *The Art of Conversion*, p. 198.

³⁵⁵ The subject of “perfection” will be dealt with on its own, later in this thesis, and it will refer to other chapters of the *Llibre del gentil* dealing with perfection. However, one should take this particular case study into account in order to properly understand the next chapter on perfection.

incomparably more fitting it would be for being and perfection to be in accord in something that had no non-being or defect.”³⁵⁶

The existence of love and perfection, according to Llull, requires a being in whom there is no non-being or defect. If love and perfection can be said about humankind and creation, which are partially defective, it could be said even more rightly that love and perfection would be in accord with a being which has no defect or non-being, but only is in being and perfection. This, again, proves the existence of God:

“If there existed no being in which love and perfection would be in accord without nonbeing and defect, love would naturally love defect as much as perfection, since without defect it could not have being or fulfillment. But this is not true, and therefore it is shown that there exists a God, in whom love and being and perfection are in accord without nonbeing and defect.”³⁵⁷

The existence of God is proven, and He is described as the necessary perfect entity to Whom love and perfection are ultimately directed. Without the existence of the ultimate perfection, there would be no true nature or direction within perfection and love, as they would not have a sense of pure goodness and perfection to define their nature. Without the existence of love and perfection as divine attributes, one could say, created love and perfection would not be able to exist, as they would both be negated and absolute at the same time.

The Islamic scholar, in the fourth book, also mentions love in combination with power. He uses this combination to prove the use and the existence of the Qur’ān.

“Power and love are in accord in God, and since in the Koran there are so many blessings that God promises those who know His glory, therefore the Koran shows us God’s great love for His people. And since no other religion promises men so many blessings as does the Koran, it is therefore evident that the Koran is more pleasing to God than any other law. And if this were not the case, it would follow that one could love God more if He promised lesser blessings rather than greater ones, which is impossible and against the conditions of the trees.”³⁵⁸

The tone, which Llull attributes to the Islamic scholar, is less exalted. The character of the Islamic scholar simply declares that God shows His love the most in the Qur’ān, which promises the most rewards of all the sacred books. God’s love is most in accord with the religion which contains the most advantages, the Islamic scholar says. We can read Ramon Llull’s opinion on Islam between the lines. Islam, he tries to tell us, is a religion of quick rewards, and material benefits. These are sacred in Islam, contrary to the Christian sanctity of asceticism and self-denial. The Islamic scholar continues by stating that the Qur’ān has to have been given by God, since otherwise, it would simply be a lie. And since God loves

³⁵⁶ Llull, *Llibre del gentil e dels tres savis*, NEORL, II, I, 1, p. 19. Translation: Bonner, *SW* (cf. footnote 138 above), pp. 122-123.

³⁵⁷ Llull, *Llibre del gentil e dels tres savis*, NEORL, II, I, 1, p. 19. Translation: Bonner, *SW* (cf. footnote 138 above), p. 123.

³⁵⁸ Llull, *Llibre del gentil e dels tres savis*, NEORL, II, IV, 4, p. 167. Translation: Bonner, *SW* (cf. footnote 138 above), p. 265.

truth more than falsehood, and since, according to the Islamic scholar, the truths in the Qur'ān are irrefutable, it has to have a divine origin.

“If the Koran were not God-given, it would be contrary to the truth; and since truth has power over falsehood, and truth is pleasing to God and falsehood odious, and since the Koran cannot be refuted by the doctrines of the Christians nor by those of the Jews, it is therefore evidently God-given, in order to show the concordance existing between the power and will of God, which accord is based on the fact that the power can and the will wants what the Jews and Christians do not have the power to refute, even though they have the will to do so.”³⁵⁹

The Islamic scholar argues that the Qur'ān is, in fact, a major proof for the truth of Islam. The idea that the Qur'ān is a miracle (*i jāz al-Qur'ān*) and cannot be imitated or refuted is a widely held Islamic view. Ramon Llull would contradict this very statement, for example, by attempting to emulate the Qur'ānic 99 Beautiful Names of God in his *Cent noms de Déu* (1288), a poem in which he lists his own Christian version of the ‘names of God’.³⁶⁰ This passage from the *Llibre del gentil* might also shed more light on Ramon Llull’s opinion on arguments against Islam, which are solely derived from sacred texts. The character of the Islamic scholar knows that there are always counter-arguments, against every kind of objections against Qur'ānic passages. Indirectly, perhaps, Llull shows his Christian contemporaries that they should take on deeper philosophical debates, which could, according to him, eventually mean the difference.

5.5. CENT NOMS DE DÉU

In his discussion on the will, Ramon Llull first describes how the will is convertible with greatness, meaning that God has an eternally great will. More exactly, God has as much greatness in the correlatives of will as He has in the correlatives of greatness.

“1. O God, Who art will and love!
May You remember Your servant,
who, to the best of his abilities, strives for Your honour.

2. Within His will, God possesses as much greatness
pertaining to <the> lover, loving and <the> beloved
as He does to <the> magnifier, magnifying and <the> magnified.”³⁶¹

Moreover, Llull explains that the perfection of God’s will implies that His will is always positive. There is only love within God, and no hate, since this would imply a negative, non-superior form of will. This is reminiscent of the passage of will in the *Disputatio Raimundi*, where Raimundus explains that, even though God is infinite will, He does not

³⁵⁹ Llull, *Llibre del gentil e dels tres savis*, NEORL, II, IV, 4, p. 167. Translation: Bonner, SW (cf. footnote 138 above), p. 266.

³⁶⁰ José Bellver, “Mirroring the Islamic Tradition of the Names of God in Christianity: Ramon Llull’s Cent Noms de Déu as a Christian Qur’ān,” *Intellectual History of the Islamicate World* 2, no. 1–2 (2014): p. 294.

³⁶¹ Llull, *Cent noms de Déu*, ORL, XIX, XXIV, p. 102. Translation: Sari, Hughes, “Hundred Names of God” (cf. footnote 10 above).

love and hate the entire world at the same time. Rather, God only has love or will and no hate.³⁶²

“3. Since will is superior when it loves
than it is when it hates,
hatred cannot exist in God.”³⁶³

Ramon Llull continues by explaining the convertibility between greatness, love (or will) and truth. Since truth has the correlatives, which are beloved, greatness pertains to truth. The same can be said for every other correlative. The correlatives of God are beloved by Him, which means that they have to exist, and that they all bring the attributes to greatness.

“4. Greatness pertains to truth,
for therein resides a beloved
verifying, verifier and verified.”³⁶⁴

The working of God’s will in shaping God Himself, or in enacting God, is explained by referring to the working of God’s wisdom. The wisdom of God achieves perfection through knowing God’s attributes (goodness, greatness, eternity and power). In the same way, God’s will achieves perfection through willing or desiring God’s attributes. While God’s wisdom enacts within God by knowing Himself, God’s will enacts within God by desiring or loving Himself.

“5. Just as wisdom achieves its perfection through knowing
goodness, greatness, eternity and power,
<so too> does will achieve its perfection through desiring them.”³⁶⁵

Ramon Llull then explains that God desired to love humankind, so we can in turn love Him (or be “enamoured of Him”), which is why He incarnated. More precisely, the death of Christ on the cross was an act out of love, during which God sacrificed Himself for the sake of His love for humankind. Llull used the same kind of argument in the passage on God’s intellect. In this passage, Llull argues that God created humankind in order to be understood, and that He incarnated into a human being in order to be better understood by humankind, or to guide humankind into comprehending Him. The attribute of intellect and will seem to be very much alike in the *Cent noms de Déu*, especially when it comes to the nature of their act, and their role in creation.³⁶⁶

“6. So greatly has God desired to love mankind,
in order to make us enamoured of Him,
that He has chosen to give Himself for man’s sake.”³⁶⁷

³⁶² Cf. Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 11, p. 224.

³⁶³ Llull, *Cent noms de Déu*, ORL, XIX, XXIV, p. 102. Translation: Sari, Hughes, “Hundred Names of God” (cf. footnote 10 above).

³⁶⁴ Llull, *Cent noms de Déu*, ORL, XIX, XXIV, p. 102. Translation: Sari, Hughes, “Hundred Names of God” (cf. footnote 10 above).

³⁶⁵ Llull, *Cent noms de Déu*, ORL, XIX, XXIV, p. 102. Translation: Sari, Hughes, “Hundred Names of God” (cf. footnote 10 above).

³⁶⁶ Cf. Llull, *Cent noms de Déu*, ORL, XIX, XXIII, p. 102.

³⁶⁷ Llull, *Cent noms de Déu*, ORL, XIX, XXIV, p. 102. Translation: Sari, Hughes, “Hundred Names of God” (cf. footnote 10 above).

Ramon Llull finishes his exposé with contemplation on the human, earthly will, and how it should be in accord with divine will. According to Llull, there should be concordance between lover, loveable and loving in one's will, by which we would be able to protect ourselves against vices. This means that the object of our love should be in accord with appropriate loving, and with ourselves (and our conduct) as the source of our love. Spiritual, virtuous love, and the reliable memory, which drives friendship by positive remembrance, is worth more as a driving factor than any sensual goodness. As always, Llull puts spiritual wealth above material wealth. Virtuous, real love, cannot be deceived because it is pure and true. Likewise, real love which is without the intent of sinning – perhaps platonic, selfless or non-sexual love – is the greatest gift of all.

“7. Whoever, as regards <his> will, is able to achieve concordance between the nature of <the> lover, <the> loveable and loving, is <likewise> able to protect himself against every vice.

8. In terms of will, virtuous love and, in terms of friendship, a reliable memory are of greater worth than all sensate good.

9. He who is well able to use <his> will can be deceived by no thing, nor can he lack any good.

10. No one can give more than he who gives his love without the intention of sinning.”³⁶⁸

Other than the *Disputatio Raimundi*, or the other works by Llull here mentioned, the *Cent noms de Déu* puts much more emphasis on the redemption of the human will. Llull explains the purity of will as the purity of love without evil, corrupting intentions. By aligning our will with what is truly good and virtuous, we are exempt from sin and mistakes. The meaning of will for humankind is especially mentioned in the *Cent noms de Déu*.

5.6. CONCLUSION

God's will is His intrinsic motivation and goal, by reason of which the universe is created. God's will is eternal and singular, and part of His essence.

Llull's conception of God's will depends a great deal on his conception of goodness. The connection almost takes the shape of a deeper religious or spiritual question: if evil exists within this world, how can God 'will' this into existence? Does He not hate that which does not follow His logic and attributes? It is the same question which the gentile asks the Jewish scholar in the *Llibre del gentil e dels tres savis*, in the part on goodness. The answer, according to Ramon Llull, is quite simple. God has only one will, and no hatred, since God's unity would not allow any dualism in His will. God only relates to

³⁶⁸ Llull, *Cent noms de Déu*, *ORL*, XIX, XXIV, pp. 102-103. Translation: Sari, Hughes, “Hundred Names of God” (cf. footnote 10 above).

goodness, not to evil. Since only goodness is directed to God, and evil is the absence of Him, Lull states that God simply wills good, and does not will evil.

God's will is not primarily directed towards the creation of the universe, even though He is necessarily disposed to creation. The first action which is willed by God is His intrinsic act, the act of His correlatives. The Incarnation follows, which is the crowning piece of the material creation. Incarnation is the apex of God's love. It is the most loved material creation, coming from the most loved among the material beings, humanity, and the internal effect of God's love, the Son. God's love positions the Incarnation in the divine plan.

In the *Llibre del gentil e dels tres savis*, Ramon Lull discusses a prove of Islam, based on the irrefutability of the Qur'ān, which was common in Islamic theology. The Islamic scholar says that the power of God is proven in the power of the Qur'ān, since no Christian scholar ever managed to reject or refute the Qur'ān as a mendacious sacred text. This might be a subtle critique by Lull of his contemporaries, since they base their critique of Islam on a refutation of the things mentioned in the Qur'ān, which is a method which Lull believed was doomed to failure. Of course, Christian scholars such as Thomas Aquinas would at times not use any authoritative texts (such as the Qur'ān or the Bible) at all, only resorting to logic. This would be a far better technique, in Lull's opinion.

6. UNDERSTANDING

6.1. DISPUTATIO RAIMUNDI

Raimundus explains that God Himself is infinite understanding because He is the more definable entity. Since God is eternal and infinite, this means that He is infinitely definable. Therefore, He must have an infinite intellect by which to understand Himself, since understanding and understood are essentially the same being.³⁶⁹ Since God is eternally definable, only His own intellect is great enough to have Himself as an object. Raimundus further argues that God's understanding needs the correlatives of the understanding, the understander, and the understood. These three correlatives are equated to the Trinity.³⁷⁰

Next, Raimundus defends the Incarnation, which he explains with the argument that will and intellect are convertible within God. This means that God loves that which He understands. The Incarnation of Himself within the created universe is the most understandable entity for Him. That means it is also the most lovable.³⁷¹

As a reply to the argument of 'Umar, that God cannot incarnate because He cannot understand Himself to become man, Raimundus argues that God did understand that He became man, but He did not understand that He became God. During the Incarnation, God never became a man naturally, but rather willingly and by His own accord.³⁷²

³⁶⁹ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 12, pp. 222-223.

³⁷⁰ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 12, p. 223.

³⁷¹ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 12, p. 223.

³⁷² Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 12, pp. 223-224.

6.2. LLIBRE DE CONTEMPLACIÓ

Ramon Llull explains in chapter XIX of the *Llibre de contemplació* that God's intellect is endlessly great, due to the fact that God's intellect is great in eternity, which means that "eternity and the intellect are never separated but they will always be together."³⁷³ This passage is reminiscent, *mutatis mutandis*, of the convertibility of the intellect with infinity: in the *Disputatio Raimundi*, Raimundus explains that God is eternal intellect, by saying that He is in Himself infinite and eternal, and therefore requires an infinite and eternal intellect. However, Raimundus especially stresses the infinity of God.³⁷⁴

Llull also discusses how God knows Himself to be God – in other words, that God's intellect knows Himself to be God. Llull does not define God's intellect the way he does in the *Disputatio Raimundi*, when he explains the correlative theory, and when he explains that God is the primordial object of His own intellect. Llull merely implies that God's own self-realization is a source of great good and happiness for Him. If a king is merry because he understands that he is a king, and that he has complete power over his subjects, than God much more so. If God understands Himself to be God, this understanding is a source of great good, which only God can access.³⁷⁵

6.3. LLIBRE DEL GENTIL E DELS TRES SAVIS

In the *Llibre del gentil*, Llull discusses the combination of power, wisdom and love, which has been discussed in the chapter on power.³⁷⁶ In present chapter, which appears in book III and describes the Christian Trinity, the Christian scholar explains how God is His own wisdom (and His own power and love). According to the scholar, God's wisdom has to be part of God, and has to be active in itself, because otherwise the attributes would be greater in created being than in God Himself.³⁷⁷ This is reminiscent of the *Disputatio Raimundi*, where Raimundus explains that God's wisdom is part of His essence, and that it needs to have correlatives – after 'Umar stated that God's attributes only describe His act within creation.³⁷⁸ However, the arguments are slightly different. In the *Disputatio Raimundi*, Raimundus claims that God is His own wisdom, since He is the most definable entity – and is therefore the object of His own eternal intellect. In the *Llibre del gentil*, the Christian scholar claims that God is His own intellect, because creatures cannot take part in God's attributes by their own accord, or more than God Himself.

The Christian scholar also discusses God's judgement by referring to His greatness and His wisdom. He begins by stating that justice is in accord with greatness and wisdom. The greater the wisdom of the judge, the more justice is prone to judging with wisdom, instead of ignorance. According to the Christian scholar, the judge on the Judgement Day must be both God and man, because God's great justice and wisdom will be shown all the more if it befalls a man, who is God at the same time. Of course, the Christian scholar means Christ.

³⁷³ Llull, *Llibre de contemplació*, NEORL, XIV, I, 7, XIX, 4, p. 95.

³⁷⁴ Cf. Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 12, pp. 222-223.

³⁷⁵ Llull, *Llibre de contemplació*, NEORL, XIV, I, 7, XIX, 7-8, pp. 95-96.

³⁷⁶ Cf. chapter 4.4 of this thesis, pp. 86-103.

³⁷⁷ Llull, *Llibre del gentil e dels tres savis*, NEORL, II, III, 2, 2-4, pp. 94-95. Cf. Translation: Bonner, SW (cf. footnote 138 above), pp. 197-198.

³⁷⁸ Cf. Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 12, pp. 222-223.

Whatever provides the best evidence for the accordance of God's wisdom with His justice should exist, making the judgement of humankind by Christ necessary.³⁷⁹

The discussion of the divine intellect does not only serve as an argument to prove Christianity. In the *Llibre del gentil*, divine intellect in combination with pride is also shown to defend Islam by the Islamic scholar. The combination is meant to defend the prophethood of Muhammad. The Islamic scholar says that Muhammad received the revelation of the Qur'ān because he was uneducated and illiterate. Despite his lack of education, the Qur'ān is described as the most beautiful work, which no other living entity (men, angels or devils) could ever compose. The reason behind this miracle consists of the rejection of pride, on the one hand, and the gift of wisdom on the other. God wished to bestow the enlightenment of the Qur'ān upon someone who was less "proud and vainglorious" due to his lack of scholarly learning and wisdom, which makes people "customarily look down upon those who are less wise". This meant that God showed His humility and wisdom, by enlightening and exalting the humility and wisdom of Muhammad.

"The Saracen said to the Gentile: "Mohammed was an uneducated man who could not read or write, and God revealed to him the Koran, which is a book of great wisdom and the most beautiful composition there is or could be; for all the men in the world, or all the angels or devils, could not compose so beautiful a work as the Koran, which is our law. Now since those men whom wisdom has made proud and vainglorious customarily look down upon those who are less wise, therefore God wanted to enlighten Mohammed, who had such great wisdom that he was able to divulge the Koran, which is the word of God, without becoming proud, in order to destroy pride and vainglory by exemplifying the humility of God, who so wanted to exalt the wisdom and humility of Mohammed. And since Mohammed had greatness of wisdom and humility, in this greatness of wisdom and humility is signified the fact that Mohammed was a prophet."³⁸⁰

6.4. CENT NOMS DE DÉU

In the first part of the chapter on intellect, Llull explains why God is wholly understanding: God understands everything which exists, according to the manner of its existence. This means that the world is, in fact, a product of God's intellect.

"1. O God, Who art wisdom and knowledge!
I should like to love and cherish You
by means of what my will is capable of desiring.

2. God is wholly His pure understanding,
which is why He understands all that exists
according to the exact manner of its existence."³⁸¹

³⁷⁹ Llull, *Llibre del gentil e dels tres savis*, NEORL, II, III, 14, 2, p. 154. cf. Translation: Bonner, SW (cf. footnote 138 above), pp. 253-254.

³⁸⁰ Llull, *Llibre del gentil e dels tres savis*, NEORL, II, IV, 3, 3, p. 165. Translation: Bonner, SW (cf. footnote 138 above), pp. 263-264.

³⁸¹ Llull, *Cent noms de Déu*, ORL, XIX, XXIII, p. 101. Translation: Sari, Hughes, "Hundred Names of God" (cf. footnote 10 above).

Next, Llull explains that God's understanding is convertible with the other attributes, and their correlatives. God's understanding is dependent on His greatness and goodness, so He understands goodness, which is intelligible in a good and great manner. Moreover, God understands Himself, and what is understood is the Person of the Son. This means that God's understanding is boundless. The meaning of this passage is the same as the meaning in the *Disputatio Raimundi*: God understands Himself, because His understanding is infinite and eternal (boundless). This means it requires an infinite and eternal object, otherwise His understanding would be finite instead of infinite.³⁸² Ramon Llull also immediately makes a connection with the Trinity: the thing understood (the patient) is granted personhood (the Son).

“3. God understands in virtue of His greatness and goodness, which is why He understands bonificability, which consists in good and great intelligibility.

4. God understands that He is understood by Himself, and He understands that the <thing> understood is granted personhood, so that within Him His understanding may be boundless.”³⁸³

Ramon Llull next explains that understanding requires an internal patient or object, since there cannot exist “intention” in understanding without there being a difference between the understander (the agent of understanding) and the thing understood (or the patient). This derives from Llull's theory that within (divine) understanding, there have to be correlatives which are different from one another, while still being the same entity. Even though the object, agent and act of an attribute are mutually different, and not convertible, they are still the same entity.

“5. In understanding, there cannot exist intention unless a difference obtains between the understander and the <thing> understood, so that the purpose (lit. “end”) of understanding may perfectly be achieved.”³⁸⁴

According to Llull, if understanding had no internal patient or agent (what is “derived” from understanding), there would be no goodness in the understander or the thing understood. This means that, without the correlatives, for example, the correlative of patient, goodness would not consist in the correlatives, and would be ignorance – or idleness. The intellect without correlatives is workless, and cannot be called “intelligent”. The act of understanding must come into being by way of “difference,” meaning the difference between correlatives, which are bound together by concordance to be the same entity.

“6. Were nothing to be derived from understanding, goodness would not consist in the understander and the <thing> understood, but would reside, rather, in ignorance.

³⁸² Cf. Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 12, pp. 222-223.

³⁸³ Llull, *Cent noms de Dieu*, ORL, XIX, XXIII, p. 101. Translation: Sari, Hughes, “Hundred Names of God” (cf. footnote 10 above).

³⁸⁴ Llull, *Cent noms de Dieu*, ORL, XIX, XXIII, p. 101. Translation: Sari, Hughes, “Hundred Names of God” (cf. footnote 10 above).

7. Understanding must come into being by way of difference,
so that concordance may reside therein,
whereby it [viz. understanding] may be remote from contrariety.”³⁸⁵

Ramon Llull continues by stating that Christ (or the “man who has been deified”) is more intelligible than any other entity ever created. This is reminiscent of the *Disputatio Raimundi*, where Raimundus explains that the Incarnation is the highest intelligible creation.³⁸⁶ However, this especially signifies that God is more disposed to understand the Incarnation than any other entity that He created. Here, Llull explains the intelligibility of the Incarnation differently. According to him, God incarnated so He would be better understood by humankind. The Incarnation as the most intelligible being is, therefore, explained as a matter of divine charity towards humankind, rather than a necessary object of God’s own intellect.

“8. That man who has been deified
is possessed of far greater intelligibility
than all else that has been created.

9. In order that God might greatly be understood by man,
He, therefore, assumed human nature;
let us understand Him, then, more than anything else.

10. God’s intelligibility is as great
as is His intellectivity,
for together they possess equal greatness and goodness.”³⁸⁷

The explanation of the Incarnation that can be found in the *Cent noms de Déu* is quite different from the explanation in the *Disputatio Raimundi*. While the argument in the *Disputatio Raimundi* states that the Incarnation is the most understandable created entity for God, Ramon Llull says in the *Cent noms de Déu* that God created the Incarnation as a means to be better understood by human beings. The Incarnation is not explicitly explained as necessary for God’s intellect, but rather as an act of charity towards creation. The interpretation of God’s intellect is, as always, based on the spirituality of the believers in the *Cent noms de Déu*, and on God’s divinity in the *Disputatio Raimundi*.

6.5. ARS GENERALIS ULTIMA

Ramon Llull explains that God has to be His own intellect, and that by virtue of the infinity of His intellect, God understands that He produces a being which comes from His infinite understanding, and which in itself is also infinite. This produced being is as eternal as God’s wisdom, and comes from God’s entire essence. Ramon Llull uses the example of the fire: just as fire produces ignited being, God, too, produces infinitely understood being by the

³⁸⁵ Llull, *Cent noms de Déu*, ORL, XIX, XXIII, p. 101. Translation: Sari, Hughes, “Hundred Names of God” (cf. footnote 10 above).

³⁸⁶ Cf. Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 12, p. 223.

³⁸⁷ Llull, *Cent noms de Déu*, ORL, XIX, XXIII, p. 102. Translation: Sari, Hughes, “Hundred Names of God” (cf. footnote 10 above).

production of every attribute. This passage contains all the information given in the first part of the passage on the intellect in the *Disputatio Raimundi*, where Raimundus explains that God's intellect is eternal, and must therefore have itself as its object.³⁸⁸

Ramon Llull also attaches his view on creation to the intellect of God. According to him, God created the intellect of angels and human beings in order to be understood since He knows Himself, and He knows that it is worthy to create them for this purpose. However, in Llull's exposé, the "human intellect" (or rather, the reader) wonders why humankind is not directed towards God at all times. Ramon Llull blames the existence of sin, which leads sinners and evil angels astray.

"37. God is wise, He is his own intellect and his own wisdom. And by reason of this wisdom the wise One understands that He must necessarily produce a being that is understood in the infinity of his wisdom by infinite understanding throughout the entire infinite essence of his intellect; just as fire with its natural appetite must necessarily produce ignited being by igniting it throughout its entire essence. Thus, all the divine reasons concur in producing an infinitely understood being by an act of production in which every dignity naturally has its infinite act.

38. As God thus knows Himself, He knows that it is worthy and just that there be created intellect to know and honour his infinite intellect, and so He created intellect in angels and men. But the human intellect wonders, given that God created it for understanding the supreme intellect, why created intellect ignores it. Then, it realizes that sin is the cause that makes evil angels and sinners deviate from the purpose for which they exist."³⁸⁹

6.6. CONCLUSION

God's intellect explains the Trinity and the Incarnation, just like God's greatness. In almost every work, Llull explains how God's intellect thinks Himself. Since God's intellect is infinite and eternal, it must have an infinite and eternal object. This means that God must think Himself, since He alone is infinite and eternal. This makes the correlatives necessarily come into existence: God's act of understanding or thinking is the act, His understood is the object or patient, and His understander is the agent. God is infinite intellect, and He is also the most understandable entity due to His greatness. This makes Him and His intellect, and the object of His intellect, one.

The explanation of the Incarnation by the intellect is based on the view of the Incarnation as the highest possible created entity. Since the Incarnation is greater and higher than every other entity, this means that it is also the most understandable. This means that God is more inclined to understand the Incarnation, since this is the highest created entity that God can possibly think or understand. He is more inclined to create a higher or greater created being.

However, God does not simply understand Himself, and His understanding is not the only one. The human intellect, likewise, is created by God in order to be ordered towards

³⁸⁸ Cf. Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 12, pp. 222-223.

³⁸⁹ Lullus, *Ars generalis ultima*, CCCM, 75, ROL, XIV, 9, 1, 5, 5, p. 198. Translation: Abbott, Damberg, *Raymond Lull's Ars Magna* (cf. footnote 147 above), pp. 122-123.

His essence. In the *Ars generalis ultima*,³⁹⁰ Lullus describes how God created the created intellect, of human beings and angels, in order to be understood by His creation. In the *Cent noms de Dieu*,³⁹¹ God incarnated so that humankind would be more inclined to knowing and understanding Him. Even though the Incarnation is the effect of God's intellect, it also serves to guide the lower, human intellect.

7. VIRTUE

7.1. DISPUTATIO RAIMUNDI

Raimundus begins his exposé by stating that God is infinite virtue, since every infinite being which is not vice must be virtue. If God were not virtue, He would not be as removed from vice. Raimundus uses an example to clarify this argument:

“For if an infinite being were not virtue, it would itself have nothing by which it would be more removed from vice, and so it would be finite; as water would not be further removed from fire, which is hot, if it were not itself cold.”³⁹²

Raimundus parries ‘Umar’s argument, that God cannot be virtue, since virtue has an opposite, and God does not. According to Raimundus, vice cannot endure in the presence of infinite virtue, which means that God’s virtue does not allow for the existence of a direct opposite (which would be infinite vice).³⁹³

God’s infinite virtue must also have the divine correlatives in order to be eternal. In the light of the attribute of virtue, Raimundus says, God recognizes Himself as infinitely good, great, and so on (due to the convertibility of God’s virtue with His other correlatives). This means He justifies Himself by bringing forth an eternally good, great, powerful (etc.) Son. The Father and the Son together justify themselves by bringing forth the Holy Ghost. They are, therefore, infinitely moved away from injustice.³⁹⁴

Raimundus next states that God’s Fatherhood or Sonhood do not destroy His virtue, but rather, His virtue would be destroyed if God were not Father or Son. Raimundus also defends the Incarnation. According to Him, every virtuous entity which has to cause its highest created effect, has to incarnate. Due to the infinite power God has, He is capable of creating a creature with a higher form of virtue than created virtue, which His intellect knows and His will loves. Moreover, since God is infinite virtue, it would make sense that He adorned the finite creation with the Incarnation, the same way a king clothes a servant and honours him in this way.³⁹⁵

Likewise, according to Raimundus, God did not do injustice to Himself by becoming flesh, since it never occurred that God abdicated His divinity and assumed only humanity

³⁹⁰ Cf. Lullus, *Ars generalis ultima*, CCCM, 75, ROL, XIV, 9, 1, 5, 5, p. 198.

³⁹¹ Cf. Lullus, *Cent noms de Dieu*, ORL, XIX, XXIII, p. 102.

³⁹² Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 13, p. 225. Translation by Annemarie C. Mayer.

³⁹³ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 13, p. 225.

³⁹⁴ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 13, pp. 225-226.

³⁹⁵ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 13, p. 226.

during the Incarnation. Rather, God incarnated with His attributes, so that they might be loved by humanity.³⁹⁶

As a final defense of the Incarnation, Raimundus refutes ‘Umar’s claim that the Father and the Holy Ghost have been done an injustice, since they have not incarnated. According to Raimundus, if the Father had incarnated, He would have been the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost at the same time. Moreover, Raimundus believes that the Incarnation needed to happen, since it is the highest exaltation of the universe, higher than which none is possible. If this was not the case, the Son would not have been enough to extoll the universe. However, since the Son is eternal, this is impossible.³⁹⁷

7.2. ARS GENERALIS ULTIMA

Ramon Llull explains God’s virtue, and how God is His own virtue. Llull explains how virtue has its co-essential act. Moreover, Llull shows how God’s virtue is convertible with His intellect and His love. God loves that He produces the infinite beloved, and He also knows and loves the fact that He produces virtuous being. Since every attribute of God is convertible, every attribute of God is inherently virtuous. The fact that God’s virtue has divine correlatives is discussed in the *Disputatio Raimundi*³⁹⁸ and in the *Cent noms de Déu*, and the fact that God’s virtue is convertible with God’s other attributes is given special attention in the *Cent noms de Déu*.³⁹⁹ In the *Ars generalis ultima*, Llull also discusses these two topics, i.e. the correlatives of God’s virtue and the interchangeability of divine virtue with God’s other attributes.

“41. God is virtuous, and He is his own virtue along with its co-essential, natural acts. Just as God loves the fact that He must necessarily produce an infinite beloved, so does He also know and love the fact that He must necessarily produce an infinitely virtuous being. All the dignities with their acts concur in this, as all are virtuous with infinite virtue, and cannot possibly be otherwise than the way they are.”⁴⁰⁰

In the next passage, Ramon Llull explains that God knows that He is disposed to create natural virtues, which exist in the created world, and by which the infinite and eternal virtue of God can be known. These virtues are everything in nature that has the power to do good, that has a clear function, or that serves a good end (an example here might be the medical use of certain plants). The moral virtues are of a different category. They are paths to salvation and heaven, which humanity can follow.

“42. As God thus loves and knows himself intrinsically, He inclines himself toward loving and knowing that He is ordered and disposed to create natural virtues that are signs and figures of infinite, eternal etc. virtue; and through these created virtues, the infinite, eternal etc. virtue can be known, loved, remembered and praised. Further, He creates the moral virtues (that we will deal with later on, in the ninth

³⁹⁶ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 13, p. 226-227.

³⁹⁷ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 13, p. 227.

³⁹⁸ Cf. Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 13, pp. 225-226.

³⁹⁹ Cf. Llull, *Cent noms de Déu*, ORL, XIX, XXV, p. 103.

⁴⁰⁰ Lullus, *Ars generalis ultima*, CCCM, 75, ROL, XIV, 9, 1, 5, 7, p. 199. Translation: Abbott, Damberg, *Raymond Lull’s Ars Magna* (cf. footnote 147 above), p. 123.

subject) because they are paths to paradise where God can reward man with virtuous glory.”⁴⁰¹

Ramon Llull has now explained the existence of eternal, infinite virtue in God, and finite, moral virtue. However, he must also deal with the subject of sin. If there is a supreme origin of virtue and not of vice, why would humanity have a tendency for sin? Ramon Llull claims that we have our free will to blame. Since we have the free will to do either good or bad, we are more inclined to the call of our senses, which is the cause of our malice.

“43. While the intellect considers these things, it wonders why people in this life are not more morally virtuous than vicious, given that the virtues originate in supreme virtue, which is not the case for the vices? Then it recognizes that this is because men have the free will to do either good or evil, and they are more inclined to heed their sensitive powers and love them more than they love their power of reasoning.”⁴⁰²

Ramon Llull explains how God, who is “virtuous, spiritual and not sensual,” still allows humankind to sin against Him. God endowed humankind with a free will to sin, so His justice would have a subject in which to act. The free will is inclined to both good (which is being and comes from God) and evil (which is non-being and has not been created by God). However, since humankind is derived from nothingness, we are always driven to go back to nothingness. This does not need to be our biggest and final motivation, however, since we have the free will to choose for good. God’s justice will judge us by how we use our free will.

“44. The intellect then asks why God permits this to happen, given that He is virtuous, spiritual and not sensual. Then the intellect recognizes that this has to be so in order to provide God’s justice with subjects in which it can act. Now we must know that the free will is inclined toward two divergent directions: on the one hand, it does good with its created good part while on the other hand, it does evil and commits sins with the non-created evil part. The non-created part accidentally arises from non-created nothingness because man was made from nothing and consequently he is inclined to return to nothingness, which is contrary to being. Here we see that the free will partly convenes with being and partly with non-being or nothingness (which is the same), and that both inclinations are equal. 45. The intellect asks why God created man although God knew that man would sin. Now it realizes that God endowed man with free will, whereby man can refrain from sin and hate sin if he wants to. Indeed, if God did not create man, He would violate his own justice by not providing it with a subject in which to act.”⁴⁰³

Just like in the chapter of the *Ars* on intellect, Llull explains the existence of sin and unbelief. According to Llull, God remained unknown or unremembered by some angels

⁴⁰¹ Lullus, *Ars generalis ultima*, CCCM, 75, ROL, XIV, 9, 1, 5, 7, p. 199. Translation: Abbott, Dambergs, *Raymond Lull’s Ars Magna* (cf. footnote 147 above), p. 123.

⁴⁰² Lullus, *Ars generalis ultima*, CCCM, 75, ROL, XIV, 9, 1, 5, 7, p. 199. Translation: Abbott, Dambergs, *Raymond Lull’s Ars Magna* (cf. footnote 147 above), p. 123.

⁴⁰³ Lullus, *Ars generalis ultima*, CCCM, 75, ROL, XIV, 9, 1, 5, 7, pp. 199-200. Translation: Abbott, Dambergs, *Raymond Lull’s Ars Magna* (cf. footnote 147 above), pp. 123-124.

and human beings due to the existence of sin.⁴⁰⁴ In the chapter on virtue, Lull elaborates on how sin exists, and why God allows sin to exist while He is disposed to perfection.

7.3. CENT NOMS DE DÉU

Ramon Llull describes God's virtue as good in its operation (which means in the internal act of God's virtue) and, likewise, good in the "powering of power". Ramon Llull shows how virtue and power are convertible into one another, and that what God accomplishes with His power is also virtuous. The internal act of God's virtue, which is good, is what makes God's virtue infinite. Moreover, Llull explains that the correlatives (or here, the "bonified") are what makes God's attributes "virtuous".

"1. O God, who art perfect virtue!
You are the joy, the life and the salvation
of all those by whom You are loved.

2. Divine virtue is as worthy in its operation
as it is in its being able to possify,
in order that it may be infinite.

3. God enjoys as great a virtue in <His> goodness
as He does in <His> wisdom and <His> will,
for the reason that in <His> goodness He possesses the bonified."⁴⁰⁵

Ramon Llull then turns to the meaning of created, moral virtue for humankind. According to Llull, the operation of virtue enriches the mind and soul, in such a way that it is removed from want and sin. Naturally, the virtues are the opposite of the sins, and practicing every virtue rules out being touched by sin. Being remote from "want" means that a virtuous person is not tormented by troubling desires, since both the mind and soul are directed towards virtue.

Ramon Llull further elaborates on the convertibility of the divine attributes. According to him, goodness can possess virtue by reason of greatness, while greatness can be convertible with virtue by goodness and power, on account of wisdom. Every attribute of God can be converted with another, which again leads to the convertibility with yet another attribute. God's goodness is virtuous, because it is great (and not small), and since the greater good is to be equated with virtue. God's greatness is virtuous, due to the fact that God's greatness is good, and all powerful. This means that God's greatness is capable of doing good (or virtuous action), and it can discern the goodness due to the fact that it is convertible with wisdom.

Ramon Llull explains that God's virtue is good, and exists in such quantity, that it is accessible for everyone. This means that all can partake in God's virtue, and God will see greater honour in human beings who have more virtue, since they are more directed towards Him.

"4. Whoever in himself enjoys the operation of virtue

⁴⁰⁴ Cf. Lullus, *Ars generalis ultima*, CCCM, 75, ROL, XIV, 9, 1, 5, 5, p. 198.

⁴⁰⁵ Llull, *Cent noms de Déu*, ORL, XIX, XXV, p. 103. Translation: Sari, Hughes, "Hundred Names of God" (cf. footnote 10 above).

is remote from want and from sin,
and shall dwell forever in glory.

5. Goodness is able to possess virtue by reason of greatness,
and greatness, by reason of goodness and power,
is able to possess virtue on account of wisdom.

6. Virtue is so good and <exists> in such great quantity
that everyone can acquire it at will,
and whoever has more of it, is more greatly honoured by God.”⁴⁰⁶

Ramon Llull proceeds to ponder upon the devotional value of virtue, first by explaining its spiritual value, and then by addressing the need for virtue as the subject of prayer and as something greater to aim for. First, Llull argues that virtue is a spiritual wealth, since it cannot be acquired by any possession, but “by faithfulness and good will”. This is why everyone can acquire virtue. Next, Llull claims that virtue is worth more than gold or family, since only virtue can be a protection against any potential seduction or corruption (by the enemy or Satan) and torment that is caused by the corruption (punishment in the hereafter). Ramon Llull argues that it is more becoming to be clearly virtuous than to alter ones appearance and character by means of dress or ornaments. Human beings should ask God for virtue in order to procure their own salvation, so as not to incur the wrath of God, while a human being who does not care for salvation or punishment is deserving of God’s anger.

“7. Virtue is not earned by means of possessions,
but by faithfulness and good will,
for which reason all men can acquire it.

8. Virtue is worth more than gold or family,
for by means of virtue does one protect oneself
against the enemy (i.e. the devil) and against torment (i.e. hell).

9. By means of virtue can one adorn oneself better
than if one uses silk, colours <applied to the face> or braiding,
or a saddle, a shield or a <particular> hairstyle.

10. Whoever fails to ask God for virtue
has no fear of punishment nor does he love salvation,
and he incurs the ill will of God.”⁴⁰⁷

⁴⁰⁶ Llull, *Cent noms de Déu*, ORL, XIX, XXV, p. 103. Translation: Sari, Hughes, “Hundred Names of God” (cf. footnote 10 above).

⁴⁰⁷ Llull, *Cent noms de Déu*, ORL, XIX, XXV, p. 103. Translation: Sari, Hughes, “Hundred Names of God” (cf. footnote 10 above).

7.4. CONCLUSION

Ramon Llull's view of virtue is twofold: on the one hand, he discusses the virtue of God, which is infinite and eternal, and on the other hand, he discusses created virtue. The virtue of God is co-essential to Him, and contains the correlatives. God has the act of being virtuous, and He is disposed towards creating a virtuous object. He generates His own internal virtuous object, or the co-essential Person of the Son, and He creates an external virtuous object, or Christ. God must necessarily create the highest created virtue. God's virtue is the goodness, goal and use behind His actions, which is why it is especially convertible with goodness, wisdom and power.

Ramon Llull discusses created virtue as a more complicated matter. All created virtue was created in likeness of God. This includes natural virtue (of herbs, flowers, ...) and moral virtues (of human actions). Moral virtue especially has to be cultivated by humankind. However, there is still the question of free will. Llull explains that humankind is not necessarily driven to virtue, but rather by the impulses of their senses. Humankind has been bestowed with free will, which makes the choice for virtue all the more pious. However, since humankind stems from non-being due to their finite nature, they are still driven towards non-being and evil.

The matter of created spiritual virtue is discussed in the *Cent noms de Dieu*⁴⁰⁸ and the *Ars generalis ultima*,⁴⁰⁹ but not in the *Disputatio Raimundi*. This is due to the fact that the *Disputatio Raimundi* centres around the prove of the Christian theology, and not on the idealized religious life of the believer. Ramon Llull discusses the divine meaning of virtue, especially for the Trinity and the Incarnation, but he does not explain the meaning of virtue in the life of the perfect Christian, at least not in the part about the attributes of God.

8. TRUTH

8.1. DISPUTATIO RAIMUNDI

Raimundus begins his section on truth by stating that God is His own truth. God understands Himself with infinite understanding, and He loves Himself with infinite loving. If God did not become the highest truth in the process, He would not be able to understand and love Himself, because there would be no truth to understand or love.⁴¹⁰

The argument by 'Umar, that God is not truth because truth is a habitus, is refuted by Raimundus. According to him, 'Umar would be right if the divine truth was an accident. However, this is not the case since God's truth is infinite and self-existent, which means that it is also a substance and not an accident. Since God is infinite truth, He must also have existence and action. The action of verifying requires the correlatives of verifiable and verifier.⁴¹¹

⁴⁰⁸ Llull, *Cent noms de Dieu*, ORL, XIX, XXV, p. 103.

⁴⁰⁹ Cf. Lullus, *Ars generalis ultima*, CCCM, 75, ROL, XIV, 9, 1, 5, 7, pp. 199-200.

⁴¹⁰ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 14, p. 227.

⁴¹¹ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 14, pp. 227-228.

Raimundus has to defend the Incarnation against ‘Umar’s argument, that God cannot believe or understand that a son is born without a mother. Raimundus refers to the fact that God understood the birth of Adam, who was the first human being and therefore created without a mother, and Eve, who was taken from Adam’s side (or rib) and therefore also born without a mother. Therefore, since God can understand that beings are brought forth without a mother, it is possible that He understands that the Son as the second Person of the Trinity is also brought forth without a mother.⁴¹²

Infinite truth rejoices in (litt. applauds) having an infinite effect, by which it can be known and loved.⁴¹³ Raimundus uses the example of the fire once again: just like fire has the infinite power to burn, if only it had enough wood, God’s truth has the power to bring forth an infinite effect, through which it can be known and loved. This effect is the Incarnation, or the man Jesus Christ connected to the Son of God, which is the highest possible creation.⁴¹⁴

Raimundus then explains that God can incarnate, despite ‘Umar’s claim that God cannot be “locked in” the flesh. According to Raimundus, this never happens, since God is infinite. He wills Himself to be infinite, and He wills Himself to be born as a human being. Raimundus refutes ‘Umar’s argument that God cannot incarnate, because He cannot descend from heaven due to Him being immovable. According to Raimundus, this is true in the literal sense, but not in the allegorical sense. God does not have to move from heaven, since He can be everywhere.⁴¹⁵

The next argument is against the statement of ‘Umar, who claims that human generation cannot be the cause of the birth of God, since the weaker cannot cause the stronger. Raimundus claims that ‘Umar names things wrongly. In the Incarnation, the stronger cause is the cause of the weaker. The stronger cause is that divine truth should be understood and loved, and the weaker is the humanity of Christ.⁴¹⁶ Raimundus gives an example of how the Incarnation works logically:

“Let us assume that there never has been, nor is, nor will be but one human being, whose soul would be earlier than the body, because it could meet God through understanding, loving, and honouring; but the body would not, because God is neither imaginable nor tangible.

Likewise, that human being’s body would be earlier, but heaven and all elements and material things would be later, because they cannot meet God.

⁴¹² Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 14, p. 228.

⁴¹³ This is the argument that can be found in the *Cent noms de Dieu*, in the chapters on intellect, will and glory, for example: cf. Llull, *Cent noms de Dieu*, ORL, XIX, XXIII, p. 102; Llull, *Cent noms de Dieu*, ORL, XIX, XXIV, p. 102, and Llull, *Cent noms de Dieu*, ORL, XIX, XXVI, p. 105.

⁴¹⁴ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 14, pp. 228-229.

⁴¹⁵ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 14, p. 229.

⁴¹⁶ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 14, p. 229.

And the earlier being of that body would be because of the connection it would have with the soul, by which it would meet God, while it is not connected with the other bodies.”⁴¹⁷

Raimundus finally refutes ‘Umar’s statement that God did not make Himself contingent and new by taking on flesh. It is true, Raimundus says, that God became a human being even though He never was before, but He remained infinite and eternal in and of Himself. His renewed eternity remained. Raimundus states the example of a man who buys a hat, and is renewed when it comes to the hat, but not when it comes to his entire being.⁴¹⁸

8.2. ARS GENERALIS ULTIMA

In the *Ars generalis ultima*, part 9, section 1, chapter 5, article 8, Ramon Llull explains that God is His own truth. He must therefore produce an object of His truth, being the correlative of the patient, through His entire being. This object is co-essential with God Himself. The reason why God produces this object, according to Llull, is so that His infinite verifying can “‘enjoy’ itself from eternity and in eternity,” meaning that God can rejoice in His own justice. Through God’s verified being, the other eternal attributes can enjoy their infinite and eternal acts – since the attributes of God are convertible.

“46. God is true, and He is his own truth; and thus He truly loves and knows the fact that He must necessarily produce an infinite verified being through his entire essence. He produces this being through his essence so that his infinite verifying can sufficiently enjoy itself from eternity and in eternity, and so that the other dignities can enjoy infinite and eternal acts through this verified being.”⁴¹⁹

God loves and knows that He must produce the patient-correlative of His truth. Therefore, God also loves that He can create both natural truth and moral truth. The difference between both is the same as we can find in the difference between natural and moral virtue: natural truth is the truth behind creation, being natural science, and moral truth is the truth behind the human conscience. The existence of both truths is a reflection of God, which makes it possible to understand, love, remember and praise God. Ramon Llull also explains that lying or mendacity comes from nothingness (or evil, or non-being), which we are drawn to since we were created from nothingness, or because we were nothing before our beginning.

“47. As God thus loves and knows that He must necessarily produce an infinite true being, so does He also love and know that He can truly create natural created truth along with moral created truth so that the infinite verified being can be understood, loved, remembered and praised by it. Now the intellect wonders and asks where mendacity comes from. Then it realizes that it arises from the nothingness from

⁴¹⁷ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 14, p. 229. Translation by Annemarie C. Mayer.

⁴¹⁸ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 14, p. 229.

⁴¹⁹ Lullus, *Ars generalis ultima*, CCCM, 75, ROL, XIV, 9, 1, 5, 8, p. 200. Translation: Abbott, Damberg, *Raymond Lull’s Ars Magna* (cf. footnote 147 above), p. 124.

which man was created, like a falling stone drawn toward the earth's center by its weight."⁴²⁰

The question on the origin of mendacity is parallel with the question in the chapter on intellect (why God is not known by every being), and virtue (why some people and evil angels choose sin instead of virtue). The answer is almost the same as in the previous passages of the *Ars generalis ultima*: mendacity comes from nothingness, the uncreated, and evil, which does not fall under the creation of God.

8.3. LLIBRE DE CONTEMPLACIÓ

Ramon Llull explains in chapter 8 of the *Llibre de contemplació* that God is eternal truth. He never changes into non-truth. God's truth does not alter, and there is no conjunction between God's truth and the opposite of truth.⁴²¹ Ramon Llull continues by saying that God's truth is in greater truth than any other, because divine truth is forever in actuality and never in potentiality. Ramon Llull compares divine truth with created truth, or with the truth of humanity, which is finite and therefore sometimes in actuality, sometimes in potentiality. God's truth is forever in actuality, and cannot be in privation.⁴²²

Ramon Llull honours God's truth, since it is infinite, and therefore never in any kind of privation. The truth of the human or created beings was once in privation, before it was in being. However, the truth of God is not preceded by non-being, (since He is without beginning).⁴²³ Since human beings were once in non-being, truth and the opposite of truth are joined together. This means that we are in truth at one time, and then later in falsehood.⁴²⁴

Next, Ramon Llull complains that God's truth remains apparently invisible and hidden to us, due to the fact that the five senses of human beings are not enough to discern it. However, this does not mean that we live in falsehood, or that the truth is unattainable to us. This is due to the fact that humanity not only has physical senses, but also spiritual senses, with which humanity can know the truth.⁴²⁵

8.4. CENT NOMS DE DÉU

Ramon Llull states that God's truth reveals the truth of all of God's correlatives. Since God's truth is convertible with every other attribute, it makes sense that every attribute would be truthful. God's divine truth is accessible for human beings since, as we see in the *Ars generalis ultima*, God has given us paths to understand His power.

“1. O God, Who reveals the truth of Your power
as openly as You do that of Your love and wisdom,
reveal my <own> will to be true in <its> love!

⁴²⁰ Lullus, *Ars generalis ultima*, CCCM, 75, ROL, XIV, 9, 1, 5, 8, p. 200. Translation: Abbott, Dambergers, *Raymond Lull's Ars Magna* (cf. footnote 147 above), p. 124.

⁴²¹ Llull, *Llibre de contemplació*, NEORL, XIV, I, 8, 7-8, pp. 111-112.

⁴²² Llull, *Llibre de contemplació*, NEORL, XIV, I, 8, 10, p. 112.

⁴²³ Llull, *Llibre de contemplació*, NEORL, XIV, I, 8, 11, p. 112.

⁴²⁴ Llull, *Llibre de contemplació*, NEORL, XIV, I, 8, 12, p. 112.

⁴²⁵ Llull, *Llibre de contemplació*, NEORL, XIV, I, 8, 13, p. 112.

2. God loves to reveal the truth
of His infinity and eternity
as much as He does that of His wisdom and love.”⁴²⁶

Ramon Llull continues by saying that truth is a driving factor for human beings, since it extolls their mind and soul. When guided by truth, humankind becomes “courteous,” “trustworthy,” “free and well-educated,” and “courageous”. In other words: the pursuit of and belief in truth is a civilizing, edifying, liberating and motivating factor for any human being, since real truth leads directly to the divine truth of God. According to Llull, truth must lead a human being to loving God. If the truth of God is not discerned or loved by the believer, he is as sinful as if he did not love God.

“3. Truth renders a man courteous,
trustworthy, free and well educated,
and makes him courageous more than does anything else.

4. Whoever fails to love God by reason of truth
is as wrong and as sinful
as if he harbours ill will towards Him.”⁴²⁷

When Ramon Llull says that God is inclined to revealed truth, he most probably means the revealed truth of Christianity. According to Llull, God loves His truth, which means He is inclined towards His “revealed truth,” being the man Jesus Christ (as the bringer of the truth of God to humankind), the same way as He is inclined towards His “beloved,” or His internal object. This means that God loves the Incarnation as much as the second Person of the Trinity, or His internal object.

“5. God so greatly loves His truth
that He is as inclined towards the revealed truth
as He is, on account of love, towards the beloved.”⁴²⁸

Ramon Llull discusses the importance of truth in human conduct. According to him, a morally upright human being should speak the truth at all times and not hide it, since no good can come from not uttering the truth. That, in Llull’s opinion, is simply the first step in telling a lie. Moreover, truth is also very important in matters of love, since this is a higher matter, pertaining to the soul. Ramon Llull compares the honesty of love with the dishonest polish of rhetoric, in which a speaker embellishes his speech to say things more eloquently (perhaps even in the case of preachers embellishing their sermons), and with merchants when they praise their own merchandize.

“6. Whoever knows the truth yet does not wish to utter it
is on the very verge of telling a lie,
since no good can come of it.

⁴²⁶ Llull, *Cent noms de Déu*, *ORL*, XIX, XXVI, p. 104. Translation: Sari, Hughes, “Hundred Names of God” (cf. footnote 10 above).

⁴²⁷ Llull, *Cent noms de Déu*, *ORL*, XIX, XXVI, p. 104. Translation: Sari, Hughes, “Hundred Names of God” (cf. footnote 10 above).

⁴²⁸ Llull, *Cent noms de Déu*, *ORL*, XIX, XXVI, p. 104. Translation: Sari, Hughes, “Hundred Names of God” (cf. footnote 10 above).

7. It is better to be truthful when loving
 than <to be so> when embellishing the words of a sermon,
 or when buying and selling.”⁴²⁹

Ramon Llull finishes his exposé by reflecting on the higher value of truth. According to Llull, the spiritual goodness of truth is a great wealth, while a liar is more akin to a beggar. This is in line with Ramon Llull’s view that spiritual goodness and depth makes for true wealth, while material possessions and overindulgence are signs of poverty, since they lead to desire that is never truly satisfied. A person without spiritual virtues is inherently poor, no matter how many possessions they acquire throughout their life. According to Llull, one can find the truth in a generous man, but not in a miser. A generous man will be more inclined to give a person what they deserve or what they require, even if it does not suit him directly, or even if it might be in his disadvantage, while a miser might choose his own wellbeing, and take an easier path by not telling the truth at all.

“8. Man is rich in goodness and in spirit
 when he speaks the truth,
 but a beggar when he lies.

9. One can find the truth
 in a generous man, but not in a miser,
 because <the former> delights in giving.

10. To die in the truth is better
 than to live amid lies
 or to feel any pleasure.”⁴³⁰

The discussion of truth in the *Cent noms de Déu* is very different from the same topic in the *Disputatio Raimundi*. The *Cent noms de Déu* mainly treats the meaning of truth for human beings, and truthfulness as a spiritual power. God is described as the being that reveals the truth, but there is no extensive contemplation on truth as a divine attribute. The correlatives of truth (verifying, verifiable, verifier) are not discussed. However, the revealed truth of God (or Christianity) is seen as an object of God’s truth. The focus of the chapter of truth in the *Cent noms de Déu* is on religious truth, and not in the first place on truth as a divine attribute, or as a part of God.

8.5. CONCLUSION

When Ramon Llull discusses truth, he can mean a number of things. First, truth can signify the truth which is God, meaning that God knows Himself as truth, that He enacts His own truth on His internal, verified being. Second, the truth of God can mean the truth of the Incarnation, which is the highest possible truth. Third, truth can mean the created truth or

⁴²⁹ Llull, *Cent noms de Déu*, *ORL*, XIX, XXVI, p. 104. Translation: Sari, Hughes, “Hundred Names of God” (cf. footnote 10 above).

⁴³⁰ Llull, *Cent noms de Déu*, *ORL*, XIX, XXVI, p. 104. Translation: Sari, Hughes, “Hundred Names of God” (cf. footnote 10 above).

the revealed truth, of either science and nature, or the teachings of Christianity. Every one of these truths comes from God, and leads humanity to Him.

In the *Disputatio Raimundi*, Raimundus discusses the truth of the Incarnation at length against the attacks by ‘Umar. He argues why the Incarnation must be true, and how it is not illogical. The focus is here on the defense of the Incarnation, and how it is not subverted by logic and philosophy. The *Disputatio Raimundi* does not mention human truth or created truth, except in the case of the Incarnation. The lack of devotional or moralistic background makes the debate concerning truthfulness unnecessary, since only the Trinity and the Incarnation have to be explained.

In the *Ars generalis ultima*, Llull explains both divine and human truth. First, he discusses how divine truth brings forth the correlatives, and how it is disposed towards creating an eternal effect. The *Ars generalis ultima* shortly explains the source of mendacity and the apparent lack of human truthfulness. Llull writes that humanity is pulled towards the nothingness from whence it first came into being.⁴³¹ The same argument is also made in the *Llibre de contemplació*, where Llull explains that the truth of humanity is imperfect, since it is mixed with nothingness. It is partially in being, partially in non-being, and it is therefore imperfect. While God’s truth is forever in act, human truth is partially in potentiality.⁴³² In the *Cent noms de Déu*, Llull discusses both revealed truth (of Christianity) and human truthfulness at length, and he admonishes his reader to choose truthfulness over mendacity. Llull discusses the value of truth, which comes from God and is being, over anything the material world has to offer.⁴³³

9. GLORY

9.1. DISPUTATIO RAIMUNDI

According to Raimundus, God needs to be infinite glory. If He were not, He would not understand His infinity to be perfect. This would diminish God’s infinity and His unity. His infinity would not be able to be glory, or there would be another entity bordering on it.⁴³⁴

Raimundus states that the glory of God is different from the glory of creatures. In God, glory is earlier because it is infinite and eternal, and since His glory is glory by itself. The fact that God is infinite glory, and that His glory is self-existing means that He also needs to have the infinite correlatives. God has the infinite glorifier, the glorified and glorifying. The correlatives are internally different, otherwise they would not be three, and they would not be infinite.⁴³⁵

Raimundus claims that God has to be His own glory. Every infinite being, he says, which has infinite and glorious correlatives, has to be more similar to itself. This means that it

⁴³¹ Cf. Lullus, *Ars generalis ultima*, CCCM, 75, ROL, XIV, 9, 1, 5, 8, p. 200.

⁴³² Cf. Llull, *Llibre de contemplació*, NEORL, XIV, I, 8, 10, p. 112.

⁴³³ Cf. Llull, *Cent noms de Déu*, ORL, XIX, XXVI, p. 104.

⁴³⁴ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 15, pp. 229-230.

⁴³⁵ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 15, pp. 230-231.

needs to be more similar to an infinite being with the correlatives, than to another being which is not infinite.⁴³⁶

Raimundus lastly explains the Incarnation, and refutes ‘Umar’s attack that the Incarnation would make God Himself understand shame and rebuke on Himself, since He would have a body. According to Raimundus, God cannot essentially be the subject of shame, even when incarnated in the flesh. The tribulations of the physical body would not immediately corrupt the divine essence, since it is spiritual, like a corruption of the body does not affect the soul.⁴³⁷

9.2. ARS GENERALIS ULTIMA

According to Ramon Llull, God is His own glory. This means He must produce an infinite glorified being, or the object-correlative of His own glory. This glorified being is infinite, which means that it can only be produced by God’s essence, which is likewise infinite. Every other dignity concurs in this infinite glorified being with their acts, which means that the correlatives of other attributes are convertible with the correlatives of God’s glory. This makes every other attribute of God have glorious acts, or glorious correlatives.

“48. God is glorious, He is his own glory and thus He knows and loves to know that He must necessarily produce an infinite glorified being produced from infinite glory. Now it cannot be produced from any other essence, for all the other essences are finite and new. Nor can it be produced from nothingness, because that would make it finite and new, which is impossible. In addition, all the other dignities with their acts concur in this infinite glorified being, so that they can have their glorious acts in it.”⁴³⁸

God also knows that He must produce an external glorified being, placed in eternity, so as to make it possible that He is praised, understood, loved and remembered. With this external object Llull means the Incarnation, which makes it possible for human beings to love and understand God. The reader might ask why God did not dispose everyone to understand and remember Him and to receive glory from Him. This might refer to a lack of spiritual discipline among Christians, but also to the existence of other faiths outside of Christianity. Ramon Llull explains that the love for God is all the greater because of our free will, and because we have the opportunity to sin.

“49. While God knows and loves to know that He must necessarily produce an intrinsic infinite glorified being, He also knows and loves to know that it is glorious to create extrinsic glorified being placed in eternity so that the supreme and infinite glorified being is understood, loved, remembered and praised by it while the infinite glorified being bestows glory upon it. Here, the intellect wonders and asks why God did not dispose all men to understand and remember him and receive glory from him? Now it remembers the chapter on justice that deals with free will: if men were unable to sin, then they would not be able to love very much. Great is the love of

⁴³⁶ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 15, p. 231.

⁴³⁷ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 15, p. 231.

⁴³⁸ Lullus, *Ars generalis ultima*, CCCM, 75, ROL, XIV, 9, 1, 5, 9, p. 200. Translation: Abbott, Dambergs, *Raymond Lull’s Ars Magna* (cf. footnote 147 above), p. 124.

one who can refrain from loving and who can choose to love or not to love. Moreover, if there was no punishment, glory would not be as well known because an opposite is known through its counterpart.”⁴³⁹

The explanation of why not every human being shares in God’s glory is parallel with the answer of the question why God allows sin to exist, in the chapter on virtue.⁴⁴⁰ Not every human being is virtuous and shares in God’s glory, due to the pull of their free will. If humanity did not have the power or the possibility to sin and to not glorify God, His mercy and His glory would be less powerful, and would be less known.

9.3. CENT NOMS DE DÉU

First, Ramon Llull discusses the convertibility between the attributes of God, or more concretely, between the divine attributes of glory, greatness and power. It is due to power that God is capable of glorifying greatly, while His will loves greatly. In Llull’s thought, especially in the *Cent noms de Déu*, there seems to be some systematic similarity between the attributes of power and the act of glorifying, since it is God’s power which enables God to glorify greatly.

“1. O glory, who art greatness and power!
Your power enables You to glorify as greatly
as Your will does to love greatly.”⁴⁴¹

Ramon Llull continues his explanation on glory by underlining the importance of the correlatives. According to Ramon Llull, God’s glory exists in the glorifying, the glorifiable, and the glorifier, which are loved by God’s love. God’s love in the glorifying is present in the Holy Spirit, who is to be equated with the act of the correlatives, and who is spirated by the love of the Father and the Son – while the Son is generated by the love of the Father. Ramon Llull stresses the importance of the act of glorifying between “the one and the other,” meaning the agent and patient. If this internal relation did not exist, God’s glory would be incomplete (since it would be idle, to use the typical wording from the *Disputatio Raimundi*).

“2. God is glory in <His> glorifying
<of> the glorifiable, and in <His> love
<of> the glorifying present in the Holy Spirit.

3. If, within glory, there did not exist glorifying
between the one and the other on account of love,
glory <itself> could not be complete.”⁴⁴²

⁴³⁹ Lullus, *Ars generalis ultima*, CCCM, 75, ROL, XIV, 9, 1, 5, 9, pp. 200-201. Translation: Abbott, Damberg, *Raymond Lull’s Ars Magna* (cf. footnote 147 above), p. 124.

⁴⁴⁰ Cf. Lullus, *Ars generalis ultima*, CCCM, 75, ROL, XIV, 9, 1, 5, 7, p. 199.

⁴⁴¹ Llull, *Cent noms de Déu*, ORL, XIX, XXVII, p. 104. Translation: Sari, Hughes, “Hundred Names of God” (cf. footnote 10 above).

⁴⁴² Llull, *Cent noms de Déu*, ORL, XIX, XXVI, p. 105. Translation: Sari, Hughes, “Hundred Names of God” (cf. footnote 10 above).

Ramon Llull continues by saying that God needs to bestow His whole Self (by generating the correlatives), or He would not enjoy glory in “generously giving, equalling, lending concordance or in originating”. These four terms describe the act of God’s creation of the correlatives: God generously gives from His own essence to generate the Son and spirate the Holy Ghost; the equalling stands for the equality (but not sameness) between the correlatives; the lending of concordance means that every correlative is in concordance with the others; and originating means that every correlative originates in God’s essence.

Next, Ramon Llull explains that the goodness of God is convertible with His glory, meaning that God’s goodness is glorious in bonifying, while it also enjoys greatness in magnifying, and eternity in eternifying. God’s goodness is glorious, great and eternal. At the same time, God’s glory is good in magnifying, and His glory is great while it is good. This is why glory “resides in its own operation,” meaning that God’s glory is good and great since it has its own internal act of glorifying.

“4. Were God unable to bestow His whole self,
He would not enjoy glory in generously giving,
<nor> in equalling, lending concordance or in originating.

5. Goodness enjoys glory in bonifying,
greatness in magnifying
and eternity in eternifying.

6. Glory enjoys goodness in magnifying
and glory enjoys greatness in bonifying,
which is why glory resides in its <own> operation.”⁴⁴³

Ramon Llull explains that God’s glory is accessible as a subject of devotion for humankind. According to Llull, the Incarnation plays a pivotal role in the human understanding of God, since through the Incarnation, God awards the connection of the senses to God glorified. This means that God makes Himself more known to us, by manifesting Himself in the physical world, which makes us more capable of envisioning Him. This passage can be compared to the passage in the *Ars generalis ultima*, where Ramon Llull argues that God incarnated in order to make Himself more known and sensible to humankind.⁴⁴⁴ Moreover, whoever is directed towards glory as a part of God’s essence, has glory in God Himself, towards which God directs him. However, the glory human beings direct themselves to must be God’s glory. By betraying God’s glory, and by going on the path of sin, human beings can head to hell. Faithfulness in belief is more directed towards glory than any kind of sinful disposition.

“7. In order that <the act of> sensing might be awarded
to man with respect to God glorified,
<He> chose to become incarnate as man.

8. Whoever consists in glory, pertains to the glorious

⁴⁴³ Llull, *Cent noms de Déu*, ORL, XIX, XXVI, p. 105. Translation: Sari, Hughes, “Hundred Names of God” (cf. footnote 10 above).

⁴⁴⁴ Lullus, *Ars generalis ultima*, CCCM, 75, ROL, XIV, 9, 1, 5, 9, pp. 200-201.

and is glorifying, lacks not
glory, towards which glory God brings us.

9. Long have I felt sadness,
for so many men proceed towards torment (i.e. hell)
who were afforded their origin for the sake of attaining glory.

10. Faithfulness befits glory better
than do a sinful conscience
and sensory pleasures.⁴⁴⁵

9.4. CONCLUSION

God's glory is only explained as an attribute that describes God's essence, and not His outward act towards creation. This fact is never stated literally, but it is quite apparent from the comparison of the *Disputatio Raimundi*, the *Cent noms de Dieu* and the *Ars generalis ultima*. Unlike goodness, according to which the world is ordered, and justice, which is an act of God within the world, glory is mainly a descriptor of God Himself. Created glory is hardly mentioned. God's glory is a motivator for creating the internal correlatives, since these are necessary to perfecting God's glory. The ultimate glory is the glory God bestows Himself, by glorifying Himself eternally.

God's glory can be known to humankind as an object of devotion. It explains the Incarnation of God in Christ. Through the Incarnation, by which God creates an external, material glorious being, humanity can understand divine glory and contemplate it. However, not every human being accepts the glory of God or the glory of the Incarnation. The sin in the created world, and the fact that God's glory leaves room for error and vituperation, can be explained by the free will of human beings. The existence of the possibility of error and sin leads to either the free choice for goodness, or the punishment for wickedness. Either way, the glory of God will be known by it all the more.

10. PERFECTION

10.1. DISPUTATIO RAIMUNDI

Raimundus begins his exposé on perfection by stating that every infinite entity is perfection. God is an infinite entity, and therefore, He is perfection. Moreover, a perfect entity needs to have an action, since it cannot only have existence. This is why He is perfect in existence and action.⁴⁴⁶

Raimundus disagrees with 'Umar, who says that God cannot be perfection, since perfection has a cause. According to Raimundus, this only counts for the secondary perfection, which comes after God, but not for primary perfection, which is God.⁴⁴⁷

⁴⁴⁵ Lull, *Cent noms de Dieu*, *ORL*, XIX, XXVI, p. 105. Translation: Sari, Hughes, "Hundred Names of God" (cf. footnote 10 above).

⁴⁴⁶ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, *CCCM*, 114, *ROL*, XXII, II, 1, 16, p. 231.

⁴⁴⁷ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, *CCCM*, 114, *ROL*, XXII, II, 1, 16, p. 232.

God is God by His perfect existence, and He is God by His perfect action. In this way, Raimundus says, God's existence and action are interchangeable. However, God does not "act" or "make" Himself, since no single creature does so. God brings forth God, by His perfect action. The forth bringing God is the Father, the brought forth God is the Son, and the bringing forth is the Holy Ghost.⁴⁴⁸

Raimundus disagrees with 'Umar, who says that perfection or perfecting does not belong to God's essence because it is always in *fieri* (in the process of being accomplished) or in *factum esse* (accomplished). According to Raimundus, this makes sense when it comes to the created world. But in God, there is neither time nor succession, neither place nor movement, so there is no process in Him.⁴⁴⁹

Next, Raimundus defends the Incarnation by referring to God's perfection. God, he says, is more inclined to produce a perfect being than an imperfect being. This is how the Incarnation can be proven: God is more inclined towards producing the highest created being, the most perfect in intellect, will, and so on. This can only be the sum of creation, Jesus Christ.⁴⁵⁰

Raimundus also disagrees with 'Umar, who says that God cannot bind Himself to the physical during the Incarnation, since He is perfect and humanity is imperfect. This, Raimundus says, would only count if there was sin involved. Since Christ is free from sin, the Incarnation is possible. Raimundus compares this with the soul of human beings when they enter paradise: the sins, connected to their bodies, are of no importance there.⁴⁵¹

10.2. ARS GENERALIS ULTIMA

Ramon Llull's *Ars generalis* does not contain a clear reference to perfection as an attribute of God. However, God's perfection, which is implied in all His attributes, is naturally assumed throughout the *Ars*. Llull's universe can be divided according to the degree of perfection of its parts. For example, in part 10, chapter 14, article 98 (on prayer):

"There are three places, one of which is perfect and flawless in every way, namely paradise, where eternal and infinite glory dwells. Another place is very defective, namely hell where every imperfection is found. The third place has both perfect and imperfect parts, this is the condition of this world. Therefore, the preacher shall refer to these three places, and clarify what they are, what they contain and what they are used for."⁴⁵²

Ramon Llull sees perfection as something which constitutes reality, more or less. The entire universe – with Hell as the only exception – contains perfection, to a higher or lesser degree. The celestial realm, which is the dwelling place of the divine, contains the greatest perfection. The material world is both perfect and imperfect, good and evil. Hell, to

⁴⁴⁸ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 16, p. 232.

⁴⁴⁹ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 16, p. 232.

⁴⁵⁰ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 16, pp. 232-233.

⁴⁵¹ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 16, p. 233.

⁴⁵² Lullus, *Ars generalis ultima*, CCCM, 75, ROL, XIV, 10, 14, p. 387. Translation: Abbott, Dambergs, *Raymond Lull's Ars Magna* (cf. footnote 147 above), p. 247.

conclude, does not share in any kind of perfection at all. This roughly corresponds with the “ladder of being,” in which celestial beings stand above humanity and earthly beings.

In Question TFGH, which is one of the model questions in part 11, made according to the principles or letters, Lull answers a few imaginary questions about perfection. One of these questions is of great importance (part 11, section 1, chapter 5):

“Question - when did the end that is in major perfection exist? Answer - it existed before the end that is in major privation.”⁴⁵³

God, or the end which is in major perfection, is seen as what comes before imperfection, especially that which is in major privation or evil. The nature of God’s goodness and perfection is primordial, and comes before imperfection, or any kind of evil.

Ramon Lull also sees God as a “perfect principle,” being the creator of all, or the first perfection, which lies at the basis of all created perfection. Especially in part 9, section 1, chapter 5, article 13:

“God commences, and He is His own commencement. In His goodness, God commences but is not commenced, He is the bonifier before whom nothing else existed. He is both commenced and commencer in the bonified being that proceeds from the bonifier, and He is commenced but does not commence in His co-essential bonifying that does not commence anything in the nature of His goodness, but is only commenced by the commencer and the commenced, just as loving is commenced by the lover and the beloved. 60. Now God sees Himself as a perfect principle and He proceeds to create the world from nothingness so that individuals generate other individuals, one man begets another man, one plant produces another plant similar to itself, which they do by means of substantial and natural initiating. He also creates another principle, as in the knower who causes objective knowledge while the knower together with this knowledge accidentally cause the act of knowing whereby the intellect can acquire science. We can say the same about the will clothed in the habit of love.”⁴⁵⁴

The link between God’s primordial nature, and the description of God as “the perfect principle,” draws a connection with creation. God’s principality and perfect nature gives rise to secondary beings that, indirectly and in a less perfect way, share in His attributes.

10.3. LLIBRE DE CONTEMPLACIÓ EN DÉU

Part 22 of the *Llibre de contemplació* is devoted to God’s perfection. Of this part, chapter 100 explains why God is perfect in His essence. First, Lull begins by explaining why God’s perfection has to be integrally part of His essence.

“Ah, glorious God, perfect in all perfections! To Your holy perfection, Lord, be glory, and honour at all times, which is demonstrated and manifested in Your

⁴⁵³ Lullus, *Ars generalis ultima*, CCCM, 75, ROL, XIV, 11, 11, p. 412. Translation: Abbott, Damberg, *Raymond Lull’s Ars Magna* (cf. footnote 147 above), p. 265.

⁴⁵⁴ Lullus, *Ars generalis ultima*, CCCM, 75, ROL, XIV, 9, 1, p. 202. Translation: Abbott, Damberg, *Raymond Lull’s Ars Magna* (cf. footnote 147 above), p. 126.

eternity, because *esse*, that is without beginning and without end, means it has perfection in itself, since the privation of it means defect.”⁴⁵⁵

Since God is eternal being, Llull says, He must have eternal perfection, since the absence of perfection would be defect or non-being. This, again, draws the line between goodness, perfection and being, and defect, evil and non-being. It also explains the link between perfection and eternity: if God is eternal, He can only forever be in being (or perfection), never in non-being.

Ramon Llull continues by proving the Trinity:

“Since You, Lord God, are alone, and without equal or associate, and nothing, that is in being, has virtues and attributes like Yours, it is demonstrated and manifested, that You have all perfection, and that there is no defect in You.

Your perfection, Lord God, be honoured and praised, which is demonstrated in You by Your sacred Trinity: because by the Person of the Father, we understand that Your power is perfect, and by the Person of the Son, we understand that Your wisdom is perfect, and by the Person of the Holy Ghost, we understand that Your kind love is full of all perfection.”⁴⁵⁶

This part deals with God’s singularity, and also His Trinity. First of all, the description of God as having no “equal or associate” has a Qur’ānic undertone. In the Qur’ān, Surah 30, verse 40,⁴⁵⁷ to name one instance, associating (Arabic: *šariyk*) any other entity with God, or having any other entity share in His eternity or perfection, is described as being the same as idolatry. Llull sees the Trinity as a totally different kind of reflection on God, by associating each Person with a divine attribute: the Person of the Father is God’s power, the Person of the Son is wisdom, and the Person of the Holy Ghost is God’s love. This is not the correlative theory, but it still reflects Ramon Llull’s general view of the Trinity. To Ramon Llull, the divine persons are no association of other entities with God, but rather aspects of His one perfect nature. This part might be one of the most literal defenses of Christianity *vis à vis* Islam in this chapter.

Chapter 101 is titled “That God is good in all His works”. Here, Ramon Llull especially explains Christ’s perfection, and the Incarnation.

First, Ramon Llull says that, since everything Christ does is perfect in His divinity, it also follows, that all Christ’s actions, in His humanity, are perfect.

“Lord Jesus Christ! Glory and praise be given to You forever, and praised be all Your works, which You did in this world! Because whatever You did, in so far as

⁴⁵⁵ Llull, *Llibre de contemplació*, NEORL, XIV, II, 22, C, 1, p. 414. Translation by Margot Leblanc.

⁴⁵⁶ Lullus, *Llibre de contemplació*, NEORL, XIV, II, 21, C, 2, p. 414. Translation by Margot Leblanc.

⁴⁵⁷ Q. 30:40: “Allah is He Who created you and then sustained you, then causeth you to die, then giveth life to you again. Is there any of your (so-called) partners (of Allah) that doeth aught of that? Praised and Exalted be He above what they associate (with Him)!” Translation by Marmaduke M. Pickthall, 2001, accessible through Perseus.edu: <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A2002.02.0002%3Asura%3D30>.

You are God, is perfect and complete, and whatever Your humanity did, is perfect and complete and without defect.”⁴⁵⁸

Christ’s divinity and His humanity are separated from each other, but still, Christ as a human being has no defect at all. Exactly like in the *Disputatio Raimundi*, Ramon Llull wishes to defend the Incarnation. Even though, in the eyes of ‘Umar, God’s Incarnation would mean that God’s divine essence is tarnished with human imperfection, Ramon Llull finds a way to dismiss this objection. Mainly, he explains that Christ in His humanity is perfect, without sins, which is why Christ is never truly vilified.⁴⁵⁹

10.4. LLIBRE DEL GENTIL E DELS TRES SAVIS

The bond between power and perfection is discussed by the Islamic scholar in article 6 of book IV. This part, however, goes very much against Ramon Llull’s deepest beliefs. The Islamic scholar uses power and perfection to prove that God will allow the soul to die, not only the souls of humankind, but even of angels. Death will take place in full, after the Seraphim blows his trumpet at the End of Times. The premise would not really be true according to Ramon Llull, which might explain why his gentile ends this chapter by voicing his profound disagreement.

“The Saracen said to the Gentile: ‘We believe that everything dies, except God; that is to say, men, angels, devils, and all living things. And this death will take place when the Angel Seraphim sounds the trumpet and then himself dies. And nothing that has life will remain alive, with the sole exception of God. Now to prove this article, the above-mentioned flower is suitable; for if all living things die, then power, perfection will be better signified in God, for greater power and perfection exist in a thing that is not mortal than in one that is mortal, since mortality signifies imperfection, and immortality perfection. And because that by which God’s power and perfection accord with greater nobility should be granted, according to the conditions of the tree, it is therefore shown that everything must and will die, with the sole exception of God.’”⁴⁶⁰

According to the Islamic scholar, God will allow humanity to temporarily die, since divine perfection and power contrast to created perfection and power, and immortality befalls God alone. The gentile does not agree with this idea:

“(…) Now if all things die, it is true that God’s power and perfection will seem greater in terms of the use made of His perfect, immortal power. But since even angels and the souls of saints who deserve life rather than death would die, God’s perfection would be against justice and against goodness, since death brings suffering and harm, which suffering and harm should not exist without guilt. Now

⁴⁵⁸ Llull, *Llibre de Contemplació*, NEORL, XIV, II, 22, CI, 1, p. 419. Translation by Margot Leblanc.

⁴⁵⁹ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 16, p. 233.

⁴⁶⁰ Llull, *Llibre del gentil e dels tres savis*, NEORL, II, IV, 6, p. 173. Translation: Bonner, SW (cf. footnote 138 above), pp. 270-271.

since it is impossible for divine perfection to be against God's justice, goodness, it is therefore shown that what you say is not true."⁴⁶¹

It almost seems as if the gentile is plunged into his religious crisis again when, earlier, his mind tilted towards religion due to fear of death. If God allows ultimate death to exist, how does this correspond to His innate desire for good and perfection? Why would God allow the death of souls to exist, if death only brings about suffering and evil, coming from sin?

The Islamic scholar explains the logic behind his belief:

"The Saracen replied: 'What you say would be true if God did not revive angels and souls again. But since they will all be alive again, and God will give them everlasting life, therefore God will be doing them no wrong in having them die, but rather He would be wronging Himself if in creatures He did not make use of His virtues so that they were seen in their greatest nobility and perfection.'"⁴⁶²

God does allow His creation to die during the End of Times, but not for long. He gives His creatures eternal life again, eventually. The gentile is still unsatisfied, however, since he cannot understand that an angel, who is an immaterial being, could ever die.

"Question. The Gentile said, 'Death is the separation of body and soul. Now if angels have no body, how can they die?'

Solution. The Saracen replied, 'Angels will die by becoming nothing, and this is what we mean when we say they will die.'

The Gentile replied, 'By making them become nothing, God would be contrary to that which accords with being, since the good angels, by the fact of serving God deserve to have being; and if they are naught, God's virtues accord with non-being against being, and that is impossible.'"⁴⁶³

This reply of the gentile is the end of the chapter on the combination of power and perfection. According to him, God could not allow perfect beings, such as angels, to die, since certain beings inherently deserve to live. Since angels are completely good, God would choose non-being of good against being, if He allowed angels to die. Ascribing death to ethereal beings, such as angels, seems illogical to the gentile.

The Islamic scholar then tries to say more on death and God's perfection by combining it with justice. He mainly attempts to prove that saints and angels are not the victims of injustice when they die, as the gentile implied in the previous article.

"The Saracen said to the Gentile: 'Just as silver or gold is purified in fire, so the saints shall receive purification in death, for every vice and imperfection will be annihilated in death; and this death will be one of justice, in which justice their

⁴⁶¹ Lull, *Llibre del gentil e dels tres savis*, NEORL, II., IV, 6, p. 174. Translation: Bonner, SW (cf. footnote 138 above), p. 271.

⁴⁶² Lull, *Llibre del gentil e dels tres savis*, NEORL, II., IV, 6, p. 174. Translation: Bonner, SW (cf. footnote 138 above), p. 271.

⁴⁶³ Lull, *Llibre del gentil e dels tres savis*, NEORL, II., IV, 6, p. 174. Translation: Bonner, SW (cf. footnote 138 above), pp. 271-272.

perfection will be purified. Thus, in order to demonstrate that God's perfection accords with justice and with the purification of angels and saints, God will want all things to die. It is evident that nothing is perfect or immortal, with the sole exception of God. Now if that which is immortal never meted out death to that which is mortal, it would not mete out justice as a sign of its perfection and immortality, nor would mortality be made actual, and this would be an offense to its perfection and immortality, and this is impossible; by which impossibility it is made evident that everything that exists, except God, must necessarily die."⁴⁶⁴

The Islamic scholar describes death of all beings, including saints and angels, as a form of divine justice, since death purifies the deceased. Death forms a natural path towards perfection, according to the Islamic scholar, not a pathway to imperfection and suffering. The main question here is the meaning and significance of death. But more than that: God does not only allow humanity to die to display His virtues, it is in fact an act of mercy. However, death of saints, and even of angels, seems quite counter-intuitive to the gentile, and probably also to Llull, which means it would barely have been accepted as true by Llull or his readers.

10.5. CENT NOMS DE DÉU

According to Ramon Llull, God is perfection. This means that He is the end of the perfection of all that exists, and will exist. Every created being is directed towards God's perfection, and in its growth and movement, all orders itself towards God (being the "end" of all that ever existed). This happens by virtue of concordance, since what is created is like God, and concurs with His essence.

"1. God is the end, that is to say, the perfection of all that has existed from the beginning until the end by virtue of concordance."⁴⁶⁵

God's perfection or "end" cannot exist in perfection without the correlatives of perfecter and the perfected, and the union between them which makes them "indestructible," since they are both God. Moreover, the end or perfection is necessarily good. This means that God's perfection cannot consist in goodness without it being convertible with the correlatives of goodness, such as the bonifier, which pertains to its very essence.

"2. The end cannot consist in perfection in the absence of the perfecter, the perfected and the union wherein they cannot be destroyed.

3. The end could not have consisted in goodness were the bonifier, which pertained to its <very> essence, not to have obtained therein."⁴⁶⁶

⁴⁶⁴ Llull, *Llibre del gentil e dels tres savis*, NEORL, II, IV, 6, pp. 174-175. Translation: Bonner, SW (cf. footnote 138 above), p. 272.

⁴⁶⁵ Llull, *Cent noms de Déu*, ORL, XIX, C, p. 169. Translation: Sari, Hughes, "Hundred Names of God" (cf. footnote 10 above).

⁴⁶⁶ Llull, *Cent noms de Déu*, ORL, XIX, C, p. 169. Translation: Sari, Hughes, "Hundred Names of God" (cf. footnote 10 above).

Ramon Llull states that God provided the entire world with an end, which means He ordered creation towards His perfection. The connection between God's perfection and the created world was established through the Incarnation. Llull says that when a human being fails to receive from the end that which has the greatest perfection, he does not understand choice. Arguably, he speaks about anyone who fails to receive the belief or understanding of the Incarnation. The lack of spiritual understanding of God's Incarnation, and the lack of understanding of His perfection, make it impossible to choose their life's conduct in a fully lucid state of mind. Choice might refer to moral choices or to choosing virtue, which would be difficult without understanding the redemption that the Incarnation brings. It might also signify the choice of the right spirituality or religion. When Llull says that anyone can obtain what they wish from the end by means of the middle, he most likely means that humanity can use their finite goodness to strive for infinite goodness, or that they can use the means of creation (the middle) to access a part of God's perfection (the end).

“4. God has provided the entire world with an end,
since He has caused it to partake in Him
insofar as He became incarnate in man.

5. He who fails to receive from the end
that wherein lies the greatest perfection,
knows not in what choice consists.

6. Whoever wishes to choose from the end
that which he desires most,
can obtain it by means of the middle.”⁴⁶⁷

Ramon Llull finishes his exposé by referring to the connection between God's perfection, goodness and sin. According to Llull, God's end possesses such a great abundance of goodness and perfection (or being) that it leaves no room for evil or sin (or non-being). Ramon Llull explains that the greatest, ultimate perfection, consists in the internal act of God's deity, and the virtuous love of His will. This point of view is also present in the *Disputatio Raimundi*, as a basic manner in which God's correlatives are explained. The greatest and most primordial perfection is God's own correlatives, not anything created. Finally, Ramon Llull makes the connection with God's perfection and Christian detachment. If only God is perfection, every material possession is imperfect. God's perfection has more value than the material. Llull argues therefore that a good Christian puts God above relatives or wealth. The striving for God's perfection makes Christians walk the path towards perfection, since God's perfection will allow Christians to make good choices.

“7. The end possesses such a great abundance
of goodness and perfection
that there is no room therein for evil or sin.

⁴⁶⁷ Llull, *Cent noms de Dieu*, ORL, XIX, C, p. 169. Translation: Sari, Hughes, “Hundred Names of God” (cf. footnote 10 above).

8. The greatest end that can be conceived
consists in deification within deity
and virtuous (lit. “good”) love within will.

9. He who loves <his> greatest end
in God, rather than in money or in relatives,
proceeds towards <that> end along a straight path.

10. Alas, I see so many men who deviate
from their end, since they refuse to honour
God, Who entreats one to love!”⁴⁶⁸

Throughout this passage, the words “end” and “perfection” can be used interchangeably (here Llull uses the words *fi* and *compliment*). This shows the greater meaning of God’s perfection: every being in the world is ordered towards God’s perfection, which is the greater end of every attribute according to which the world was created. The Incarnation of God in the created world is a catalyst in God’s perfection: it is the highest, most perfect part of creation, which forms a bridge between divine perfection and the world.

10.6. CONCLUSION

Perfection is the degree of absoluteness of God’s attributes, according to which the universe is ordered. Every attribute of God is superlative within God Himself, and the ultimate source of the corresponding lesser attributes within creation. Perfection is what orders the “ladder of being”: the highest beings (heaven and angels) share more in God’s perfection, and lower on the ladder are the less perfect beings.

The perfection of God poses a challenge when trying to convince other faiths of the Incarnation. Llull discusses this especially in the *Disputatio Raimundi* and the *Llibre de contemplació*. One might wonder whether the human form would be a sufficiently perfect form for the person of the Son in which to be incarnated, or whether an etheric entity such as an angel would be more suitable. Ramon Llull dismisses this objection. The man Jesus Christ has no sin and, therefore, the Incarnation is not a pathway to God’s essence being vilified or mixed with humanity. However, the Incarnation is necessary for God to bind Himself to the temporal and the material. Moreover, if Christ is perfect in His divinity, it must follow that He is perfect in His humanity.

Ramon Llull devotes much energy to explaining how three persons can share in God’s perfection, without harming His unity and without being accused of “association”. He explains the need for a perfect being to be a Trinity, to have different aspects in its essence. However, this does not change the unity of God. God is still one, the conceptual differences that exist within His perfection do not damage His unity in any way.

⁴⁶⁸ Llull, *Cent noms de Déu*, ORL, XIX, C, p. 169. Translation: Sari, Hughes, “Hundred Names of God” (cf. footnote 10 above).

11. JUSTICE

11.1. DISPUTATIO RAIMUNDI

Raimundus first states that justice is not a habitus in an infinite being. If justice were a habitus, the being would be finite instead of infinite, since that being could not act without the instrument of justice. If justice were a habitus, it would be finite, and the being it is the habitus of would also have to be finite.⁴⁶⁹

God is just, and He is His own justice. Raimundus explains this by stating that if God's justice were not convertible with Him, it would not be infinite. If God's justice were not infinite, there would not be enough for God, who is infinitely just, to love and understand. 'Umar argues against this, by saying that God cannot be infinite justice, since He cannot judge His own actions. According to Raimundus, however, God does not judge His own actions, since He cannot act unjustly. However, God's justice does have an internal act.⁴⁷⁰

Raimundus explains the Trinity by referring to this theory. According to him, justice consists in giving everyone their due. Therefore, God needs to give the divine unity what is its due. Since the divine unity is infinite, it needs to have the internal act, agent and patient. If there were no correlatives in God's unity, and if God's justice did not give God's unity what it is due, it would be idle and finite, and God's justice would alter into injustice.⁴⁷¹

Raimundus uses these arguments against 'Umar, who says that the generation of the Son is impossible, since God's justice would be finite and new. Raimundus has proven that God's justice is infinite, so 'Umar's argument is invalid regarding the production of the Son.⁴⁷²

The argument of 'Umar, that the Father either needs the Son or not, is refuted by Raimundus. According to him, God needs the Person of the Son naturally and eternally. Since the correlatives are what God is due, without them, God would be idle, finite, and empty, and God's justice would be broken.⁴⁷³

Raimundus also explains the Incarnation by his previous arguments. According to him, God must understand the highest created end, higher than which it cannot understand. If God did not understand this highest created end, He would be unjustly in the habitus of ignorance. The same can be said of will, goodness, and greatness. In this way, every attribute of God must be part of this highest end of creation, which is their due.⁴⁷⁴

Raimundus parries 'Umar's statement that God's Incarnation was unjust because He did not incarnate in an angel, by referring to the section on will. The idea that it is unjust of God to incarnate into only one human being is solved in the section on singularity.⁴⁷⁵

⁴⁶⁹ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 17, pp. 233-234.

⁴⁷⁰ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 17, p. 234.

⁴⁷¹ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 17, pp. 234-235.

⁴⁷² Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 17, p. 235.

⁴⁷³ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 17, p. 235.

⁴⁷⁴ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 17, p. 235.

⁴⁷⁵ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 17, p. 236.

11.2. LLIBRE DEL GENTIL E DELS TRES SAVIS

Ramon Llull discusses the combination of justice and pride in the Christian part of his *Llibre del gentil*, to explain the virgin birth. The Christian scholar discusses how Adam and Eve gave rise to guilt and sin through pride. The reverse of these, justice and humility, are born by the flowers of the tree. It was necessary that justice and humility were in accord with a creature, which was “finer than any other,” for justice and humility to exist in humanity to a greater degree than sin and guilt which came from injustice and pride. If this were not the case, the conditions of the flowers would be undone, and the flower of perfection and justice would be in contrariety, which would mean that perfection and pride would be in concordance.⁴⁷⁶ The gentile next asks about the family of the woman who gave birth to Christ, and of which king she was the daughter. The Christian scholar does not fully deny the exalted heritage of Mary, but he does not call her noble either, rather the contrary.

“It is true that our Lady was of the house of David, who was the noblest and most honored king the Jews ever had; yet the father of our Lady Saint Mary was not a king, nor was her mother a queen; they were instead humble folk. And our Lady was a woman poor in earthly possessions, but in virtues she was richer and nobler than any other creature, with the exception of her Son. In fact, this woman was so poor that when she gave birth to the savior of the world, she had no house in which to do so, and she gave birth in a stable, which is a lowly house for animals. All this was to show the great humility of the Son of God, who is more contrary to pride than any other creature. For if the Son of God had wanted to be born of a queen, ruler of all the kingdoms in the world, He could easily have done so; but it would not have signified so great a concordance of humility, justice against injustice, pride.”⁴⁷⁷

Mary’s humility and poverty is meant to teach believers humility and justice, against injustice and pride. It is true that God could have incarnated into a noble or wealthy household, but this would have been against God’s humility and His justice. However, even though the Christian scholar does not call Mary wealthy or noble, he does ascribe some noble lineage to her, saying that she was of the house of David. This, on the one hand, exalts Mary and, on the other hand, it stresses her humility even more.

God’s justice also plays a very important role on Judgement Day, according to the Christian scholar. He attempts to explain Judgement Day by referring to both greatness and justice, and to charity and justice. In the first combination, of greatness and justice, the Christian scholar explains that God’s justice is great. The more a human being does greater good, or greater sin, the greater is the effect on him or her of God’s judgement. Wherever justice can judge more, its greatness is shown the most. If this were not the case, the effect of devoting oneself to God would be quite meager. Ramon Llull next stresses the accord between justice and mercy, and the accord between mercy and greatness, which is as close as the accord between justice and greatness. This means that, as human beings sin and feel contrition, they access God’s mercy by His forgiveness, which renders us capable of understanding His mercy. The Christian scholar continues his argumentation, by referring

⁴⁷⁶ Llull, *Llibre del gentil e dels tres savis*, NEORL, II, III, 9, 6, p. 137.

⁴⁷⁷ Llull, *Llibre del gentil e dels tres savis*, NEORL, II, III, 9, 6, p. 138. Translation: Bonner, SW (cf. footnote 138 above), pp. 238-239.

to the fact that among Muslims and Jews, there are less men who choose to lead detached lives as monks, martyrs and almsgivers. According to the Christian scholar, this means that God is more inclined to give back to Christianity, since Christians are so ready to do so much for His love. Lastly, the Christian scholar refers to the Incarnation of Christ as a source of justice among Christians. Since, in Christian theology, God incarnated in Christ, and suffered poverty and death for humankind, sins are considered worse in Christianity. A Christian who is fully aware of the sacrifice of Christ and still sins, is a greater infidel, than a person who does not understand the Incarnation.⁴⁷⁸

In the combination of charity and justice, the Christian scholar explains that charity and justice have to be in accord during Judgement Day, so as to make justice contrary to hatred and injustice. During Judgement Day, Christ will display His charity for human beings by showing His cross and wounds. In this way, He will show how He sacrificed Himself to save humanity. Since justice and charity are bound together, greater justice will be shown by greater charity. If Christ did not come to judge sinners, and if He did not show charity in doing so, the flowers of the first tree would be in discord with charity and justice, which is not possible.⁴⁷⁹

Apart from Christianity, Lull also discusses Islam according to the attribute of justice. In the third book of the *Llibre del gentil*, the Islamic scholar discusses the combination of charity and justice to discuss the legacy of Islam, and he attempts to prove why the prophethood of Muhammad is undeniable. The Islamic scholar claims that Muhammad's prophethood can be proven through the popularity and fast growth of Islam. According to him, since Muhammad is honoured around the world, this must mean that in him, justice is in accord with God's charity. If it were not, this would mean that the honour would be against charity, in dishonour and injustice. However, the gentile is not convinced. He claims that this is also an argument for Christianity: since Christ was generally revered as the Son of God, He must therefore also have received this honour rightly, since God does not allow "those who died in falsehood to be honoured in the world". This would subvert any truth claim from Islam.

"It is only fitting that one should revere and honor a man who has charity and justice. Now since Mohammed is honored in this world by so many people, it is only right that in him justice accord with God's charity; for if it did not, God would not allow him to be as honored as he is; and if He did, it would follow that injustice and honor would accord with charity against charity, dishonor and justice, and this is impossible; by which impossibility it is shown—by the honor with which God has so greatly honored Mohammed—that Mohammed is Prophet.' The Gentile replied to the Saracen: 'According to what you say, it follows that Jesus Christ, who is so honored in this world, is God, and that His apostles and other martyrs, who are so honored in this world, died on the true path. For if God did not allow those who died in falsehood to be honored in this world, then what was said of Christ must be

⁴⁷⁸ Lull, *Llibre del gentil e dels tres savis*, NEORL, II, III, 14, 3, pp. 155-156. Cf. Translation: Bonner, SW (cf. footnote 138 above), pp. 254-255.

⁴⁷⁹ Lull, *Llibre del gentil e dels tres savis*, NEORL, II, III, 14, 5, pp. 156-157. Cf. Translation: Bonner, SW (cf. footnote 138 above), pp. 255-256.

true; and if it were, then your religion would not be true, nor would Mohammed be worthy of being honored or of being a prophet.”⁴⁸⁰

A second proof for Islam is made by the Islamic scholar in the part on power and justice. The chapter treats the truth of the Qur’ān. The central point of argumentation for the validity of the Qur’ān is the Islamic rule of Jerusalem. According to the Islamic scholar, Jerusalem is a sacred city for Jews and Christians alike. However, the city is under Islamic rule, and the Qur’ān is revered and taught publicly. Moreover, the Islamic scholar says that even in their “most honoured and sought-after place,” Jews and Christians are not rulers. Therefore, the Qur’ān has to be the dominant scripture, and has to be the word of God. Otherwise, the power and justice of God would be contrary to the justice of the Christians and Jews. This is, according to the Islamic scholar, quite impossible.

“You should know, Gentile, that for both Christians and Jews the most honored and sought-after place in the world is a city called Jerusalem. In the beginning of the world, it was the principal city of the prophets. In that city Jesus Christ was crucified and killed, and there is His tomb, according to what the Christians believe. And this city the Saracens hold, have, and possess in spite of the Christians and Jews. And in that city the Koran is taught publicly, and no book or doctrine is so honored there as is the Koran. Now all of this bears witness to the power and justice of God, for since neither Christians nor Jews believe in the Koran, God punishes them in the most honored and sought-after place they have. It is therefore clear that the Koran is the word of God; for if it were not, it would follow that the power of God and justice would be contrary to the justice of the Christians and Jews, and this is impossible; by which impossibility it is made manifest that the Koran was transmitted and sustained by the power of God.”⁴⁸¹

11.3. CENT NOMS DE DÉU

In his discussion on the justice of God, Ramon Llull first mentions God’s judgement in connection to humanity. According to Llull, God possesses true judgement, which means one should be “pensive and fearful” of one’s own sins. Since God’s judgement is true, He will judge the sins of human beings with perfect judgement.

“1. O God, Who possesses true judgment!
When I remember my sins
I am pensive and fearful.”⁴⁸²

Ramon Llull next explains the convertibility of God’s justice with His other attributes. According to Llull, God is just towards His will and wisdom. These attributes possess as much power as they wish to have. In other words, the convertibility of the attributes, and the infinite power of those attributes, is a form of justice that God bestows upon Himself. Moreover, the internal acts of the attributes, and the internal patient, are likewise a form of

⁴⁸⁰ Llull, *Llibre del gentil e dels tres savis*, NEORL, III, IV, 3, 4, pp. 165-166. Translation: Bonner, SW (cf. footnote 138 above), p. 264.

⁴⁸¹ Llull, *Llibre del gentil e dels tres savis*, NEORL, IV, 4, 2, pp. 167-168. Translation: Bonner, SW (cf. footnote 138 above), p. 266.

⁴⁸² Llull, *Cent noms de Déu*, ORL, XIX, XXVIII, p. 105. Translation: Sari, Hughes, “Hundred Names of God” (cf. footnote 10 above).

justice that God bestows upon Himself. God gives bonifying and bonified to His own goodness, and loving to His will. The absence of God's correlatives or attributes is impossible, since without them, God would be idle. This would mean that He is not just towards His power. Ramon Llull's conclusion is that the nature of the attributes, the convertibility between them, and the correlatives are a display of God's justice within Himself.

“2. By means of His power, God is just towards His will and wisdom.
which possess as much thereof (i.e. power) as they wish to have.

3. God bestows as much bonifying and bonified upon goodness, as He does loving upon will.

4. Were God idle within Himself, He would not be just towards <the> glorious nor powerful (i.e. mighty) towards <His> power.”⁴⁸³

Ramon Llull continues by saying that God's judgement and His forgiveness are one and the same. God is just in His judgement, and just in His forgiveness, as both elements come from His own perfect justice. Judgement and justice are not the same, it is God's justice that defines how He will display either judgement or forgiveness. Both elements are part of God's justice towards humankind. This means that there are two ways in which God's justice can be shown, while there is still only one justice.

“5. God is just in <His> judgement, just in <His> forgiveness and just in rendering them both equal.”⁴⁸⁴

Ramon Llull explains the Incarnation by referring to God's justice. According to Llull, God would have to become a human being, in order to do justice to His great generosity towards creation. This means that God's generous and merciful disposition towards His creation must be shown by His ultimate gift to humankind. God's generosity and love for His creation must be respected and treated justly, by giving it its due, which is the Incarnation of God in Christ.

“6. Were God not to have become incarnate in man, He would not have exercised justice towards <His> great generosity as Creator in respect of created being.”⁴⁸⁵

⁴⁸³ Llull, *Cent noms de Déu*, ORL, XIX, XXVIII, pp. 105-106. Translation: Sari, Hughes, “Hundred Names of God” (cf. footnote 10 above).

⁴⁸⁴ Llull, *Cent noms de Déu*, ORL, XIX, XXVIII, p. 106. Translation: Sari, Hughes, “Hundred Names of God” (cf. footnote 10 above).

⁴⁸⁵ Llull, *Cent noms de Déu*, ORL, XIX, XXVIII, p. 106. Translation: Sari, Hughes, “Hundred Names of God” (cf. footnote 10 above).

Ramon Llull next argues about the link between justice and the human spirit. Justice, he says, brings humility, mercy and compassion. This again causes human beings to be “enamoured”. In this case, the love that is brought into connection with humility, mercy and compassion should be seen as a higher form of love, coming from spiritual purity.

Ramon Llull states that a person who judges himself is close to forgiveness and on the path of salvation. This means that, by judging our own actions and by contemplating on our own sins, we can open our hearts for redemption and find the right path. The justice of God can be in our reach, and can guide us to righteousness.

Next, Llull compares the spiritual faculties, driven by justice, with earthly possessions. Just memory, love and thought are worth more than any golden possession that a person might possibly have, or any kind of temporal honour. Ramon Llull ends his chapter on justice by saying that he entrusts himself to justice, which can either mean as a guide for his conduct, or as divine justice that will judge his actions throughout his life. Finally, Llull says that mercy and goodwill have achieved a bond with justice and compassion, which could mean that perfect justice is compassionate and understanding in the end.

“7. Justice brings humility,
mercy and compassion
and causes man to become enamoured.

8. He who wishes to judge himself
lies very close to forgiveness
and is on the path to salvation.

9. A just memory,
just love and just thoughts,
are worth more to man than gold or honours.

10. I surrender and entrust myself to justice,
that it do with me as it will,
and I beg its mercy.

11. Mercy and goodwill
have achieved great fellowship
with justice and compassion.”⁴⁸⁶

11.4. CONCLUSION

In Ramon Llull’s writings, there seem to be three main kinds of justice: first, the justice that God has towards Himself; second, the justice that God has towards creation; third, the justice human beings exercise towards themselves, through contrition, remorse and guilt.

God’s justice towards Himself does not mean that He judges His own actions. Rather, it means that He gives to His own essence what is its due. In the *Disputatio Raimundi*, this is

⁴⁸⁶ Llull, *Cent noms de Déu*, ORL, XIX, XXVIII, p. 106. Translation: Sari, Hughes, “Hundred Names of God” (cf. footnote 10 above).

mainly His internal act, and the correlatives. God owes the internal correlatives to His unity and divine essence. If God did not bring forth the internal correlatives, He would damage His unity, and He would render Himself idle and imperfect.⁴⁸⁷ God's Incarnation is, likewise, the righteous effect of God's divinity. The *Disputatio Raimundi* does not mention any other motive for God to incarnate than the justice He owes Himself. Raimundus mainly discusses why God's Incarnation is not unjust, and why it is necessary.⁴⁸⁸ The *Cent noms de Déu* only explains God's correlatives by referring to the justice God bestows on Himself.⁴⁸⁹

When it comes to the Incarnation in the *Cent noms de Déu*, it is explained as the justice God bestows upon creation. God incarnated due to the generosity He feels towards creation.⁴⁹⁰ In the *Llibre del gentil*, the focus is also on Christ's virgin birth, which renders Him free from any kind of original sin, and makes Him capable of delivering humankind from its own sin, and saving them.⁴⁹¹ Christ's judgement during the End of Times is, likewise, a display of divine justice towards humankind.⁴⁹² God's justice towards creation is prone to forgiveness, since forgiveness is a primordial aspect of divine justice.

The justice that human beings feel towards themselves is only explained in the *Cent noms de Déu*, as contrition and remorse. As a person judges herself, she is closer to forgiveness than a person who does not. A righteous remorse brings us closer to the justice of God, and renders our soul more capable of receiving forgiveness from God. The justice of humanity is directed against one's own actions, and prepares the soul for God's justice, which it comprehends.⁴⁹³

12. MERCY

12.1. DISPUTATIO RAIMUNDI

Raimundus begins his discussion of mercy by stating that God Himself is mercy. Every infinite being that forgives sin is mercy, and God is an infinite being that forgives sin, so He is mercy. Raimundus says that forgiving infinite sins is not possible without the act of forgiving, which, in itself, is an act of mercy.⁴⁹⁴

Raimundus refutes 'Umar's statement that God cannot be mercy, since He cannot and does not need to forgive His own sins. According to Raimundus, God's forgiveness has an act, but it does not forgive Himself, just like fire does not burn itself but only the firewood. According to Raimundus, God's mercy only forgives the sinners. Even though God's mercy is infinite, it seems that Raimundus ascribes to Him no infinite object which it can forgive.⁴⁹⁵

⁴⁸⁷ Cf. Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 17, pp. 234-235.

⁴⁸⁸ Cf. Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 17, p. 235.

⁴⁸⁹ Cf. Llull, *Cent noms de Déu*, ORL, XIX, XXVIII, pp. 105-106.

⁴⁹⁰ Cf. Llull, *Cent noms de Déu*, ORL, XIX, XXVIII, p. 106.

⁴⁹¹ Cf. Llull, *Llibre del gentil e dels tres savis*, NEORL, II, III, 9, 6, pp. 137-138.

⁴⁹² Cf. Llull, *Llibre del gentil e dels tres savis*, NEORL, II, III, 14, 3, pp. 155-156.

⁴⁹³ Cf. Llull, *Cent noms de Déu*, ORL, XIX, XXVIII, p. 106.

⁴⁹⁴ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 18, p. 236.

⁴⁹⁵ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 18, p. 236.

Umar stated earlier, that God would forgive every sin without retribution or contrition if He were infinite mercy, just like fire, if it were infinite, would burn all the water from the world. Raimundus denies this, by stating that this is impossible due to the convertibility of God's mercy and His justice. God's justice and His mercy are convertible, while fire and water are not. This means that God's justice guides His mercy.⁴⁹⁶

If there were an infinite subject, Raimundus says, God would infinitively forgive it. The fact that God has a potential extrinsic infinite act, if this were ever to exist, is signified due to His intrinsic infinite act. God forever has the act of infinitizing and the correlatives of infinitizer and infinitized. These can be compared with the Trinity of God.⁴⁹⁷

Raimundus denies 'Umar's statement that the Trinity would mean that one divine Person would have mercy earlier and the other later. According to Raimundus, all Persons are equal, and do not have a different kind of mercy. Raimundus also proves the Incarnation: every possible thing, which asks God to forgive more sins, by which divine goodness is bonified and divine greatness is magnified, has to come into existence. According to Raimundus, this being is the Incarnation, so the Incarnation necessarily exists.⁴⁹⁸

The Incarnation is a very important element in prayer since, within the Incarnation, Christ and God are interchangeable, and so are Christ and man, God and man, and Christ and mercy. Since in the Incarnation God became man, this means that, when one prays to the incarnate Christ, one also prays to God. This means that our prayers for mercy are on the highest possible level. The divine will and understanding cannot love or understand anything greater, since they are both convertible with one another.⁴⁹⁹

Umar stated earlier that the necessity of the Incarnation for the redemption of humankind implies a defect in God's mercy. Raimundus does not deny that God has the power to forgive original sin without the Incarnation, but humanity and the nature of original sin need it. God's mercy is capable of infinite forgiving without the Incarnation, just like God is capable of creating an infinite body. However, nobody is capable of receiving infinity, just like no sinner can receive infinite forgiveness without the Incarnation functioning as a mediator. Like humanity was cursed by the actions of Adam, being one man, redemption must come from one man, being Christ, who suffered to achieve the redemption.⁵⁰⁰

12.2. LLIBRE DE CONTEMPLACIÓ

Ramon Lull explains the nature of God's mercy in distinction XX, chapter 93. First, he argues that God's goodness and His mercy are convertible. This means, in short, that God's mercy allows all created goodness to take part in God's goodness. Likewise, God's goodness means that God has a perfect mercy.⁵⁰¹ God's mercy and His goodness are convertible, which means that, if God was not mercy, His goodness would be finite and

⁴⁹⁶ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 18, pp. 236-237.

⁴⁹⁷ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 18, p. 237.

⁴⁹⁸ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 18, p. 237.

⁴⁹⁹ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 18, pp. 237-138.

⁵⁰⁰ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 18, p. 238.

⁵⁰¹ Lull, *Llibre de contemplació*, NEORL, XIV, I, 93, 3, p. 387.

bordered, since there would not be infinite mercy. As God's mercy is infinite, so is His goodness.⁵⁰²

Ramon Llull also links the convertibility between the attributes goodness and mercy with the fate of the deceased in heaven. According to Llull, since God's goodness is infinite, it is only logical that His mercy is also infinite. This means that the glory of the deceased in Paradise, who have received God's mercy, will be as infinite as that mercy.⁵⁰³

God's mercy has to be infinite and perfect, according to Llull. If every attribute of God was not perfect, this would mean that God is not worthy of being divine. Since every attribute of God needs to be eternal, so also God's mercy. This is why God's mercy must be essentially part of God, and not accidentally. If God's mercy were accidental, it would be not unlike the created version of finite mercy. God's mercy would not be perfect due to the perfection that belongs to God.⁵⁰⁴

12.3. CENT NOMS DE DÉU

Ramon Llull explains mercy by referring to the act of being merciful. According to him, God has mercy upon sinners, so that He can love His creation all the more, and so that the created world may better know Him. Mercy for humankind is carried by God's love, and by His desire to be known to His creation. The convertibility between God's mercy and the other attributes is also discussed. Ramon Llull sees a connection between mercy, goodness and greatness, but also between mercy and justice. Justice contains God's forgiveness, while God's mercy is God's desire and proneness to forgive, and His proclivity to show His good will to humankind. God's mercy, His greatness and His goodness are also convertible. This is why justice allows God's forgiveness (which is a part of justice) to act and to bind itself with mercy. God's justice is bound with His mercy, because God has the desire to forgive. Ramon Llull compares mercy to the mother of sinners, while justice is a father figure. Mercy loves the human sinner, in as far as they love God. It is the sinner's love for God that makes him capable of receiving forgiveness. Mercy can be seen as the mediator between the sinner and God's justice.

- “1. God has mercy upon sinners
in order that He may bear great love towards His creation
and that man may know Him to be a great bestower.
2. God forgives with greatness of goodness,
for which reason justice allows forgiveness <to perform its acts>
and enters into partnership with mercy.
3. God entertains such a great desire (lit. “will”) to forgive
that He causes justice to love mercy,
for by virtue of mercy can He save sinners.
4. Mercy is mother to <all> sinners

⁵⁰² Llull, *Llibre de contemplació*, NEORL, XIV, I, 93, 4, p. 387.

⁵⁰³ Llull, *Llibre de contemplació*, NEORL, XIV, I, 93, 5, p. 387.

⁵⁰⁴ Llull, *Llibre de contemplació*, NEORL, XIV, I, 93, 11-12, p. 388.

and this mother loves her children on account of the love they bear towards God the Father, Who shows forgiveness.”⁵⁰⁵

Ramon Llull next calls upon the sinners to always put their hope in God’s justice. According to Llull, mercy is a very worthy thing to remember, as it brings hope for the sinner when they wish to be forgiven. Moreover, it would be blasphemous not to trust in God’s mercy, since He is infinite love. This means that He is capable of forgiving humanity to a higher degree than human beings are capable of sinning. To trust that God’s mercy can befall you means you understand the infinity and perfection of His mercy. Again, Llull compares mercy to a female figure who “readily forgives”. This means one should love her freedom, in order to be remembered and loved by her. The freedom of mercy means that mercy bestows her forgiveness on everyone she deems worthy, even when we feel that we might not deserve redemption.

“5. Mercy is a very worthy thing to remember
by means of greatness of understanding and loving,
for it brings hope against sin.

6. Whoever fails to entertain any hope in God’s mercy
blasphemes against Him and His great love,
for God is more capable of loving than is man of sinning.

7. Mercy is a lady who readily forgives,
for which reason man should love her freedom
so that he may be remembered and loved by her (i.e. mercy)”⁵⁰⁶

The abundance of God’s mercy means that human beings, as the receivers of His mercy, must always strive to do good, to be “faithful, humble and true,” and to not fail in carrying out the good deeds that they could do. When failing to do so, this would mean that one is not “enamoured” of forgiving (since they do not value forgiveness), and this would mean that God gives more forgiveness than one is able to conceive. Ramon Llull ends his passage on forgiveness by shouting out his regret for his own sinful nature. Since Llull calls himself a sinner, he says he should love God greatly, since God is eternal forgiveness.

“8. Let he who wishes to obtain God’s mercy
be faithful, humble and true (i.e. truthful),
and let him perform as much good as he can.

9. It seems to me that someone who fails to carry out all the good that he might do
is not greatly enamoured of forgiving,
upon which person God bestows more than man is able to conceive.

10. Alas! When I consider <the fact> that I am a great sinner,

⁵⁰⁵ Llull, *Cent noms de Déu*, *ORL*, XIX, LIX, pp. 132-133. Translation: Sari, Hughes, “Hundred Names of God” (cf. footnote 10 above).

⁵⁰⁶ Llull, *Cent noms de Déu*, *ORL*, XIX, LIX, p. 133. Translation: Sari, Hughes, “Hundred Names of God” (cf. footnote 10 above).

then does it occur to me that I should entertain great love for God, Who shows such great forgiveness.”⁵⁰⁷

12.4. CONCLUSION

Ramon Llull’s view of mercy centres around God’s proneness to forgive the sins of humankind. The internal object of God’s mercy is barely mentioned, since His mercy can only ever be active upon the imperfect and the sinful and not upon Himself. Within God, there is no sin, evil or shame, which means that He does not forgive His own sins. Llull explains the correlatives in combination of mercy by referring to the fact that God’s goodness is convertible with His mercy, and therefore, also the correlatives of goodness. Another explanation is that God’s mercy has the potential to have an infinite object, but that the imperfect and finite nature of the natural object of God’s mercy cannot receive infinite mercy. By any means, the attribute of mercy seems to have a different constitution from the other attributes.

God’s mercy can be seen as the guide for God’s justice. God is inclined to judge, but especially in a benign manner (since God is infinitely good). The proneness for God’s justice to forgive can be explained by His mercy, which is the catalyst or the mediator between God’s justice, and His forgiveness. Llull does not mention the place of humanity in acquiring God’s mercy or forgiveness, but he does mention in his other works how hope in God’s mercy is an important reason to acquire mercy. By contrition, which is the act of human beings of judging themselves, they can move closer to God’s justice. By hope for God’s mercy, and by trusting the greatness and perfection of His mercy, humankind can acquire forgiveness.

13. CONCLUSION

By referring to the divine attributes, Raimundus seeks to prove his own faith by a few necessary steps: first, God is a Trinity; second, God created the world; third, God is incarnated. These three concepts are closely interlinked: the Son, Who is part of the Trinity, will incarnate, which in turn sanctifies and crowns creation.

The use of God’s attributes is meant to appeal to a large and diverse number of faithful, whose religions hold on to the existence of divine attributes. However, the design of an inclusive philosophical base to view God, does not merely serve the rationality behind every religion. Llull’s logical construction inevitably leads to Christianity, which is, according to Llull, the only logical answer to any question concerning God’s nature. The way in which the truth of Christianity is “veiled or unveiled” depends on the nature of the work in which Ramon Llull discusses God. In the *Disputatio Raimundi*, the main tenets and dogmas of Christianity are all listed and proven, and Islam is clearly under attack. The *Ars* only hints at Christian dogmas such as the Incarnation, and does not clarify what it means – clearly holding on to the precept of being a general philosophical *exposé*. The *Llibre del gentil e dels tres savis* discusses religious dogma of all three monotheistic

⁵⁰⁷ Llull, *Cent noms de Déu*, ORL, XIX, LIX, p. 133. Translation: Sari, Hughes, “Hundred Names of God” (cf. footnote 10 above).

religions literally, but does not entirely clarify which religion is the truest – even though Islam receives a number of blows, certainly when the Islamic vision of Paradise is discussed. In the *Llibre de contemplació*, Ramon Llull is more affirming of Christian dogma, but less dismissive towards Islamic views. However, eventually, all comes down to the same three core principles, mentioned above. In the *Cent noms de Déu*, Llull emulates an Islamic concept, that of the 99 beautiful names of God, without necessarily diving into Islamic theology, and while keeping a strictly Christian point of view.

Ramon Llull understood very well that the attributes of God could also be used in Islam, to prove the validity of Islamic theology and Islamic writings. Llull showed this in the *Llibre del gentil*, through the Islamic scholar and in the *Disputatio Raimundi* through ‘Umar’s explanation. It would be Llull’s task to map out what he would consider to be the ideal use of the divine attributes, in order to once and for all prove Christianity. The way in which the Islamic viewpoints are portrayed in the *Llibre del gentil* and in the *Disputatio Raimundi*, seems at times preconceived, as Ramon Llull seems to suggest a specific view on Islamic theology. Furthermore, Ramon Llull uses arguments from his repertoire many times throughout his œuvre. The comparison of God’s power and the power of fire (*Ars generalis ultima*, part 9, section 1, chapter 2; *Disputatio Raimundi*, pars: 2, 1, linea: 968) goes a long way to prove that God’s power is infinite, to name one instance. This might simply imply that Ramon Llull uses these kinds of arguments because they are his latest findings: he began to write the *Ars generalis ultima* only a few years prior to his venture into North-Africa and completed it only one year afterwards. This version of the *Ars* probably contained his latest thoughts and rationalizations. However, the influence of the *Ars* on the recording of the historical debate between Llull and ‘Umar should not be underestimated. ‘Umar seems, at times, to merely contradict the main theology of the *Ars* and the *Llibre de contemplació* – although the *Disputatio Raimundi* does not follow the *Ars* blindly, as a few more attributes are added. For example, ‘Umar begins his arguments against Christianity by discussing goodness⁵⁰⁸, which is also the first of God’s attributes to be discussed in the *Ars*. Ramon Llull proceeds to deal with ‘Umar’s viewpoints accordingly, according to his *Ars*. Any other arguments by ‘Umar, for example against Christian traditions, laws, and warfare have not been recorded. One could wonder whether ‘Umar was, in fact, in some way an intellectual construction just like the character of Raimundus, or a partially fictional nemesis, meant to prove the methods of debate, layed out by Llull.

The divine attributes are variable, meaning that the lists of attributes which can be mentioned in Ramon Llull’s works are not set in stone. Depending on the audience, more attributes can be added, or some can be left out. In the *Disputatio Raimundi*, Ramon Llull mentions substance and nature as added attributes, because ‘Umar’s rationalization is driven by his denial of these principles in God. Sometimes, it is difficult to define how Llull categorizes the attributes of God, for example, in the *Llibre de contemplació*, he divides his list of divine attributes between *attributa quoad Deum*, such as will, and *attributa quoad nos*, such as justice. The *Llibre del gentil e dels tres savis*, the *Disputatio Raimundi*, and the *Ars generalis ultima* make no such division. In the *Cent noms de Déu*, which is mainly a tool for contemplation, Llull lists every possible attribute, name or characteristic of God, since they are all equally worthy of praise. There seems to be no division between the

⁵⁰⁸ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, I, 1, 1, pp. 183-184.

different categories. Broadly speaking, the concept of what Llull sees as a “divine attribute” is in a constant state of flux, perhaps more so since God Himself cannot easily be defined *in se*, especially in Lullian theology. It is the abstractness of God, and His all-encompassing perfection, that allows for some intellectual and spiritual freedom in defining Him. But however freely, Llull’s spirituality will always be driven by the three core tenets: Trinity, Incarnation, and creation.

Another remarkable variation might be the shifting tone of Ramon Llull. The friendship of the scholars in the *Llibre del gentil* and the contained hostility between ‘Umar and Raimundus in the *Disputatio Raimundi* could not be more different. In the case of the *Llibre del gentil*, the three scholars behave in an irenic way, never interrupting or disagreeing with each other. Only the gentile, functioning as a neutral judge, voices his occasional doubts, when he cannot understand the Trinity, the Islamic notion of death, and so on. There is great equality between the scholars: in the first book we do not even know which one is speaking. The scholars do not argue against one another either, and they do not purposely seek to disagree with each other’s views. They only voice their own beliefs, without attacking each other’s religion. More than that, there is no disagreement on who speaks first, and who has the final word. The scholars discuss their religion chronologically, first the Jewish scholar speaks, the Christian speaks next, and then the Islamic scholar. When the gentile wishes to make his choice known, they simply refuse to listen, since it would ruin their free inquiry for truth. The main goal of the debate is not to convert one another, or even to convert the gentile. They simply want to know the ultimate truth behind the universe, no matter what the result will be. The same cannot be said of Raimundus’ conversation with ‘Umar at all. First of all, the situation is not one of peace and equality. Raimundus has been incarcerated, but ‘Umar is free and prosperous, and a successful man in his country. There is no one to control or judge over the debate, the matter is between Raimundus and ‘Umar alone. Apart from that, both parties seek to discredit one another. The shape of the entire debate is modelled to be a direct offense against Islam: first ‘Umar voices his arguments against Christianity, but next, Raimundus can contradict these arguments, without being contradicted in return. Between Llull’s conceiving the *Llibre del gentil* and the *Disputatio Raimundi*, something happened. One might argue that, in his later years, Llull became more embittered, or that the situation simply required a more direct approach of conversion. After all, the *Llibre del gentil* is entirely fictional, but Llull’s mission to Béjaya took place in reality, and posed a real threat to Llull’s wellbeing. In this case, the goal was not to have a friendly debate, but to convert for the sake of mere survival, and the *Disputatio Raimundi* mapped out this confrontation with actual mission, be it in a more brushed-up, streamlined way.

The discussion of the attributes of God in the *Disputatio Raimundi* is just based on the first part of this work, which elaborates on the theological difference between Ash’aria Islam and Christianity. However, the subjects here mentioned will be of great importance in the second part of Ramon Llull’s work, dealing with structural differences between Islam and Christianity, such as religious traditions or moral laws. On the whole, the arguments of both ‘Umar and Raimundus, and the second chapter of the second part of the work, which states the structural differences, could function as a manual on the position of Ramon Llull vis à vis Islam. The matter of the attributes of God constituted the world, and therefore, also the view of the other.

PART II: LLULL AND THE ISLAMIC INTELLECTUAL WORLD

CHAPTER 5: RAMON LLULL AND ISLAM

1. INTRODUCTION

In the *Disputatio Raimundi*, Ramon Llull refers to his auto-insertion character as a “christianus Arabicus”.⁵⁰⁹ This is a nod to his ultimate ambition, to be a Christian who can verse his opinion in Arabic, and according to Arab thought. Both the character of Raimundus and the character of ‘Umar are meant to converse in depth with Islamic thinking; Raimundus interprets Islamic philosophy in a Trinitarian, Christian way, while ‘Umar is supposed to contradict Llull from an Islamic perspective. However, the discussion between ‘Umar and Raimundus, which was held in Arabic, turns out to be a misrepresentation, at least according to Hans Daiber. In the *Disputatio Raimundi*, Llull writes that ‘Umar believes that God is only good in as far as he created the world. This goes against the fact that both Raimundus and ‘Umar in reality believed that God is perfect in and by Himself. Llull wanted to secure the idea that, in Christianity, God’s goodness is a stable and eternal fact. Islamic theology, on the other hand, was supposed to propagate that God’s goodness is only dependent of whether God created the world.⁵¹⁰ This, however, is a very tendentious interpretation of Islamic beliefs concerning the unity and one-ness of God (*tawhīd*) and the divine attributes.

Ramon Llull’s *Disputatio Raimundi* should evidently be read against the background of Islamic thought, in particular concerning metaphysics. Ramon Llull drew from the views concerning the attributes of God, stemming from the Aš’arites, Ibn Sīnā, al-Ġazālī, and Ibn Rušd. Each of these theologians reflected on the attributes of God, and held different metaphysical views. They also reacted against each other: al-Ġazālī wrote a treatise against the rigid metaphysical doctrines concerning the one-ness of God, as apparent in the thought of Ibn Sīnā, and Ibn Rušd again reacted against the Aš’arites and the thoughts of al-Ġazālī.

In this chapter, I will compare the arguments of both ‘Umar and Raimundus from the *Disputatio Raimundi* with the thought of four Islamic thinkers, being Ibn Sīnā, Ibn Rušd, al-Ġazālī and al-Ġuwaynī. Each of these authors offers an interesting perspective on Ramon Llull’s thought. The similarities between the *Disputatio Raimundi* and the works of Ibn Sīnā have been shown in Hans Daiber’s “Raimundus Lullus in der Auseinandersetzung mit dem Islam”,⁵¹¹ which will be a very important source in this chapter. The connection

⁵⁰⁹ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, prol., p. 172.

⁵¹⁰ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, I, 2, 1, p. 183; cf. Hans Daiber, “Raimundus Lullus in der Auseinandersetzung mit dem Islam” (cf. footnote 2 above), pp. 136-137.

⁵¹¹ Hans Daiber, “Raimundus Lullus in der Auseinandersetzung mit dem Islam: Eine philosophiegeschichtliche Analyse des *Liber disputationis Raimundi christiani et Homeri saraceni*,” in *Juden, Christen und Muslime: Religionsdialoge im Mittelalter*, ed. by Matthias Lutz-Bachmann, Alexander Fidora (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2004), 136-172.

between Llull's thought and Ibn Rušd is apparent from the critique of Ramon Llull against both Western Averroism and the works of Ibn Rušd, which will be discussed in section 1.3. of this chapter.⁵¹² The connection between Llull and al-Ġuwaynī has been proposed by Dominique Urvoy,⁵¹³ and that between Llull and al-Ġazālī, especially in Llull's *Logica Algazelis*, has been studied thoroughly by Charles Lohr.⁵¹⁴

While in the previous chapter, I have followed the order of the attributes as they appear in the *Disputatio Raimundi*, I will now each time first discuss the attributes of God as discussed by 'Umar in book I, immediately followed by the answer as written by Raimundus in book II. I opt for this method, in order to provide a clearer outlook on the argumentation of the *Disputatio Raimundi*.

1.1. FOUR RELEVANT AUTHORS: IBN SĪNĀ, AL-ĠAZĀLĪ, IBN RUŠD AND AL-ĠUWAYNĪ

Ramon Llull's borrowing of the Arab theologians depended greatly on their views concerning the attributes of God. Many arguments, reflected by the voice of both 'Umar and Raimundus, seem to be representations of theological debates which were present in Islamic culture. Llull also based quite a few arguments in his *Ars* on the debate between Ibn Sīnā, al-Ġazālī, and Ibn Rušd. Ibn Sīnā started a dialogue about the attributes of God, and the effects of God's unity. Especially the one-ness of God was primordial in shaping his theology. According to Ibn Sīnā, God could not possibly have co-essential attributes, since this would mean the destruction of His unity. This argument was also commonly used against the Christian Trinity. This may come as no surprise: according to Harry Austryn Wolfson, the belief in the attributes in Islam has a trinitarian background, in the way that the Islamic term *ma'nā*, which means attribute, seems to go back to the Christian term *pragma*, which refers to the trinitarian Persons.⁵¹⁵

According to Wolfson, Ibn Sīnā's outlook on the unity of God was, first and foremost, that there are no multiple gods existing at the same time. However, it also meant that there is no composition in the intrinsic nature of God, for example, the composition of genus and differentia. According to Wolfson, even though Ibn Sīnā believed that genera, species and differentiae are unsubstantial and that they are neither real beings nor real names, he believed that they have in them enough reality to make them incompatible with God's unity, for example, through the existence of the attributes of God.⁵¹⁶ This means that God's attributes cannot be within His essence, without causing composition and multiplicity. In the *Disputatio Raimundi*, 'Umar claims in the section on unity⁵¹⁷ that there can be no composition in God and that there cannot be a difference – which, according to 'Umar,

⁵¹² See section 1.3 of this chapter, p. 150.

⁵¹³ Urvoy, "Dans quelle mesure la pensée de Raymond Lulle a-t-elle été marquée par son rapport à l'islam?" (cf. footnote 143 above), pp. 41-42

⁵¹⁴ Charles Lohr, *Raimundus Lullus' Compendium Logicae Algazelis, Quellen, Lehre und Stellung in der Geschichte der Logik*, PhD thesis (Freiburg I Br.: Freiburg University, 1967).

⁵¹⁵ Harry A. Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalam* (Cambridge, MA; London: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 112-117.

⁵¹⁶ Harry A. Wolfson et al., *Studies in the History of Philosophy and Religion* (Cambridge, MA; London: Harvard University Press, 1973), p. 143.

⁵¹⁷ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, I, 1, 2, pp. 177-179.

makes the existence of a Triune God impossible.⁵¹⁸ This echoes the theology of Ibn Sīnā concerning God's unity.

Al-Ġazālī took over the twofold interpretation of the unity of God, which can be found in the works of Ibn Sīnā, while criticizing mainstream Islamic philosophy. Ibn Sīnā's argument that the unity of God means that there cannot exist two gods, was mentioned as an argument by al-Ġazālī. According to him, philosophers are unable to prove the one-ness of God, and why there can be only one necessary entity. Apart from that, Ibn Sīnā argued against every kind of internal plurality within the divine, and defended the absolute unity of God. This meant, that God cannot be divided into quantitative parts; that God cannot be divided into form and matter; that there is neither plurality of essence and attributes; nor plurality of genus and differentia; nor plurality of essence and existence.⁵¹⁹ It is especially the debate concerning the second kind of unity, or the internal unity of God, that forms the background of the *Disputatio Raimundi*.

Ibn Sīnā denied the existence of "predicables" within God. He discerned five kinds: genus, species, differentia, property (or that which 'belongs' to God) and accident. The only way Ibn Sīnā could attach a predicable to God which was when discussing them as His property, because when a property is predicated of a being, it only belongs to that particular entity.⁵²⁰ When Ibn Sīnā explained that God's predicables have to be properties, he did so because he denied that any predicable could describe His essence (like divine attributes, which often focus on the very essence of God, while properties focus on the predicables which belong to God). According to Ibn Sīnā, they describe the existence of God. The properties of God describe the actions coming from Him, or His difference from the created and temporal beings. This means, according to Wolfson, that "even when predicates are adjectival or positive in form, they are to be interpreted as actions or as negations in meaning."⁵²¹

Al-Ġazālī criticized the opinion of the "philosophers," who adhered to a rigid interpretation of metaphysics and ascribed a very strict one-ness and unity to God, which was implied by His being a necessary entity. He especially fulminated against Ibn Sīnā and other likeminded philosophers, such as al-Fārābī. According to al-Ġazālī, God was indeed a necessary entity, but this was mainly by virtue of Him being the "uncaused". In the mind of al-Ġazālī, God was necessary as the end of the cosmic chain of causation. This interpretation of the necessary entity did not immediately rule out the divine attributes, since the strict rules concerning the one-ness of God were not the main descriptors behind God's being a necessary entity. If God was to be described as necessary of existence, eternal and uncaused, His attributes could likewise be eternal and uncaused. Al-Ġazālī used the same method of thought to argue that God, as the necessary cause, can still have a differentiation of genus and differentia, and essence and existence. He also argued that the view of God as mere existence is insufficient to prove His unity and His incorporeality. Al-

⁵¹⁸ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, I, 1, 2, p. 178.

⁵¹⁹ Wolfson et al., *Studies in the History of Philosophy and Religion* (cf. footnote 516 above), p. 144.

⁵²⁰ Wolfson et al., *Studies in the History of Philosophy and Religion* (cf. footnote 516 above), p. 149.

⁵²¹ Wolfson et al., *Studies in the History of Philosophy and Religion* (cf. footnote 516 above), p. 151; cf. also Mayer, "The Contribution of Islamic Doctrines to the Thought of Ramon Llull" (cf. footnote 14 above), pp. 102-105.

Ġazālī disagreed with the more radical views of God’s unity, in which there is no place for God’s attributes, and which were not purely based on God as the first cause.⁵²²

Al-Ġuwaynī, who is mainly known for his work, *Guide to Conclusive Proof of the Principles of Belief*, and who was the teacher of al-Ġazālī, criticized contemporary metaphysics as much as his pupil. Moreover, al-Ġuwaynī was quite clear on the ideal differences in approach between theology and philosophy. Theology, according to al-Ġuwaynī, was meant to be based on the authority of revelation and tradition and should have God as its subject. Philosophy should be based on reason alone. Theology may use philosophical views, but the use of reason does not justify itself without being grounded in authority. Only if authority is insufficient, it should be proven rationally, or at least confirmed by intuition. Speculation about topics such as the divine is not done, according to al-Ġuwaynī. This argument is shared with most Islamic theologians. Certainty and proof are, therefore, the core tenets in al-Ġuwaynī’s *Guide to Conclusive Proof of the Principles of Belief*.⁵²³

Al-Ġuwaynī discussed the Islamic dogma concerning God in full. This included the treatment of three main subcategories of theology. The first category deals with the subject of what must be said of God, His necessary attributes. These attributes are, again, divided into two subcategories: the attributes that God has in and of Himself (such as eternity, subsistence, etc.), and the attributes that describe His effect within the created universe. An example of the latter is God’s will, hearing, and speaking. This order and subdivision of God’s attributes into one category which pertains to God’s essence and one which pertains to God’s act within creation is followed in the part of the *Disputatio Raimundi* that reflects ‘Umar’s statements.⁵²⁴ Also Dominique Urvoy mentions the similarities between the attributes discussed by al-Ġuwaynī and Ramon Llull’s *Cent noms de Dieu*.⁵²⁵

Ibn Rušd reacted against the Aš’arites, and against al-Ġazālī. His attacks against the thought of al-Ġazālī were mainly outed as attacks against the views of the Aš’arites. In Ibn Rušd’s *Manāhij*,⁵²⁶ he focused on the main philosophical thoughts concerning the attributes of God. First, he discussed the view of the Aš’arites. According to this philosophical current, the attributes of God were “real,” and “superadded” to the essence. They “subsist” in God’s essence. The critique against this theory by Ibn Rušd was that this view on the attributes of God implies two main theological problems. First, by saying that the essence and the attributes are independent of each other, this implies the existence of multiple divine entities, rather like the Christian Trinity. Second, if the Aš’arites, like al-Ġazālī, claim that the essence subsists in itself and that the attributes, in turn, subsist in the essence, this means

⁵²² Wolfson et al., *Studies in the History of Philosophy and Religion* (cf. footnote 516 above), pp. 158-160; cf. al-Ġazālī, *Tahāfut al-falāsifa: texte arabe*, ed. by Maurice Bouyges (Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1927), pp. 72-74 (cited by Wolfson); cf. also Mayer, “The Contribution of Islamic Doctrines to the Thought of Ramon Llull” (cf. footnote 14 above), pp. 105-111.

⁵²³ Al-Ġuwaynī, *A Guide to Conclusive Proof of the Principles of Belief*, trans. by Paul E. Walker (Reading: Garnet Center for Muslim Contribution to Civilization, 2000), p. xxxii.

⁵²⁴ Al-Ġuwaynī, *A Guide to Conclusive Proof of the Principles of Belief* (cf. footnote 523 above), pp. xxii-xxiv.

⁵²⁵ Dominique Urvoy, “Dans quelle mesure la pensée de Raymond Lulle a-t-elle été marquée par son rapport à l’islam?” (cf. footnote 143 above), pp. 41-42

⁵²⁶ Translated by Marcus J. Müller as *Philosophie und Theologie von Averroes* (Weinheim: VCH, 1991) (cited by Wolfson).

that they hold that the essence of God is a subject, and that the attributes are accidents. This would imply that God is a finite entity (or a body) which can receive accidents.⁵²⁷

The Mu'tazilites believed in an opposite dogma, which consists of three main theses: first, "the attributes are the essence," second, "the attributes are the very self" (meaning that the attributes of God describe God's very essence, and not something else that can be said of Him), and third, "the essence and the attributes are one and the same thing."⁵²⁸ This theory is reminiscent of the theory of "modes," a term which Abū Hāšim (†713) used to describe the attributes which are identical to the essence, without being superadded to it.⁵²⁹ The critique against the Mu'tazilites by Ibn Rušd was mainly based on two theories, which Wolfson calls a "stock argument".⁵³⁰ The first theory states that the theory of modes is a contradiction, since the theologians who believe in modes say they can be described neither by existence nor by nonexistence. This would be a completely absurd thing to say, in the mind of Averroes. Second, if one believes that the modes are between existence and non-existence, one believes in something which is impossible. A middle ground between existence and non-existence is not possible.⁵³¹

While Ibn Rušd rejected the Aš'arites and al-Ġazālī on the one hand, and the Mu'tazilites on the other, he mainly sided with the views of Ibn Sīnā. He agreed with him that God's unity implies that God cannot be plural in the sense of (1) quantitative parts, (2) matter and form, (3) essence and attributes, (4) genus and differentia, and (5) essence and existence. These matters had been enumerated in the work by al-Ġazālī in his discussion on Ibn Sīnā. Ibn Rušd also agreed with Ibn Sīnā that the attributes of God must be seen as either a relation, or a negation, or both, and not as real entities which are superadded or rooted in the essence of God. On the other hand, Ibn Rušd disagreed with Ibn Sīnā's proof of the simplicity of God by necessity, with the fact that Ibn Sīnā names God's intellect as His predicate, and with the relation of essence and existence.⁵³²

1.2. RAMON LLULL'S CONCEPT OF "CHRISTIANUS ARABICUS"

In order to explain Christian doctrines in such a way that they would be understandable – or even acceptable – for a Muslim audience, Llull wished to explain Christian concepts according to Islamic theological language. In order to fully understand and assimilate Islamic metaphysics, Llull decided to learn Arabic. Ramon Llull occasionally mentioned relevant Arabic terms in their original language in his works, as he does in the *Disputatio Raimundi*. He also referred to the "*modus loquendi Arabicus*," when describing his own idiosyncratic use of Latin verb forms to describe the Persons of the Trinity. For the

⁵²⁷ Wolfson et al., *Studies in the History of Philosophy and Religion* (cf. footnote 516 above), p. 164; cf. Ibn Rušd, *Kashf 'an manāhij al-adillah fī 'aqā'id al-millah*, trans. by Marcus J. Müller (München: G. Franz, 1859), p. 56 (cited by Wolfson).

⁵²⁸ Wolfson et al., *Studies in the History of Philosophy and Religion* (cf. footnote 516 above), p. 162

⁵²⁹ Wolfson et al., *Studies in the History of Philosophy and Religion* (cf. footnote 516 above), p. 163.

⁵³⁰ Wolfson et al., *Studies in the History of Philosophy and Religion* (cf. footnote 516 above), p. 164

⁵³¹ Wolfson et al., *Studies in the History of Philosophy and Religion* (cf. footnote 516 above), p. 164; Cf. Ibn Rušd, *Kashf 'an manāhij al-adillah fī 'aqā'id al-millah*, trans. by Marcus J. Müller (München: G. Franz, 1859), p. 56 (cited by Wolfson).

⁵³² Wolfson et al., *Studies in the History of Philosophy and Religion* (cf. footnote 516 above), p. 165.

Disputatio Raimundi in particular, Llull had also formulated his main arguments in Arabic before his departure.⁵³³

In the period between 1305 and 1307 (approximately during his stay in Bijāya and the year before, when he began writing the *Ars generalis ultima*), Llull began to describe himself as a “*christianus Arabicus*”. According to Dominique Urvoy, this phrase had a double meaning: it meant Llull’s contact with Arabic sources without needing a translation, and his assimilation of Islamic philosophy and theology, in order to facilitate his preaching.⁵³⁴ In the context of the *Disputatio Raimundi*, the phrase “*christianus Arabicus*” means as much as “Christian, educated in Arabic and Arab philosophy”. Ramon Llull clearly detached Arab philosophy from a strictly Islamic interpretation, and did not see the terms “Arabic” and “Islamic” as inherently connected. He clearly made a distinction throughout his œuvre between the words “*Arabicus*” and “*Saracenus*”. In order to be called a “*christianus Arabicus*” (and not just a “*religiosus christianus bene in Arabico litteratus*”)⁵³⁵ it was not enough to be well versed in Muslim thinking or even in Arab philosophy. One’s intellectual endeavours and one’s rational opinions, enriched by Arab philosophy, had to lead to a specific goal, being the undeniable proof of Christianity and not just the explanation of Christian dogma.⁵³⁶

In the context of the *Disputatio Raimundi*, especially concerning the treatment of Arab philosophy throughout the work, Llull believed in his mission to prove – and not just explain – Christian doctrines by Arab philosophical standards. Llull did not seem to believe that the Arab views concerning philosophy and metaphysics – as apparent in the works by Ibn Rušd, Ibn Sīnā, etc. – could only be used in an Islamic context, or to prove Islamic dogma about the divine. On the contrary, Llull wished to convey that Arab philosophy could very well, if not better, prove Christian dogma. Throughout the *Disputatio Raimundi*, Llull wished to take over the point of view of Islamic writers, and reinterpret their opinions in order to fully explain Christian dogma. By donning the garment of Arab thought, Llull believed, Christianity would be made accessible – and unavoidable – for a learned Muslim audience.

1.3. LLULL’S CONTACT WITH ISLAMIC THOUGHT

The start of Ramon Llull’s religious calling was a full nine years of autodidactic study, which probably shaped his own particular way of thinking about Islamic thought and conversion. Staying in his native island of Majorca, Llull learned Arabic from a Muslim slave he had bought for this purpose, and he studied “grammar” and other useful skills in private. He probably learned Classical Arabic as opposed to merely colloquial Arabic, since most of the main philosophical texts were written in the former language. Moreover, in Bellver’s opinion, Llull’s in depth knowledge of Arabic grammatical concepts proved that his knowledge of Arabic was the result of immersive academic study under an educated

⁵³³ Charles H. Lohr, “*Christianus arabicus, cuius nomen Raimundus Lullus,*” *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 31, no. 1-2 (1984): pp. 59-60. Lohr cites the *Compendium artis demonstrativae* (*MOG* III, 1722), p. 452, where Llull mentions the term.

⁵³⁴ Dominique Urvoy, “L’idée de ‘*christianus Arabicus,*’” (cf. footnote 4 above), pp. 497-499.

⁵³⁵ Raimundus Lullus, *Liber de acquisitione Terrae Sanctae*, ed. by Fernando Domínguez Reboiras (Turnhout: Brepols, 2017), *ROL*, XXXVIII, CCCM, 266, 3, 1, p. 225.

⁵³⁶ Dominique Urvoy, “L’idée de ‘*christianus Arabicus,*’” (cf. footnote 4 above), pp. 499-501.

teacher, being the Muslim slave. The correlative theory, which was apparently largely based on Arabic verbal paradigms, particularly the three inflections *‘āqil* (intelligent), *ma‘qūl* (intellected) and *‘aql* (intellect), and which was also used in a philosophical way by Arab thinkers such as Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī (who used it especially to explain the Trinity), and Ibn Sīnā, betrays Lull’s academic prowess in Classical Arabic grammatical concepts and teachings, meaning that his contact with Arabic (and possibly also Islamic theology) was highly academic and came from the tutelage of a scholarly teacher.⁵³⁷ However, it should be mentioned that the correlative theory was only concretized in Lull’s œuvre at the end of the thirteenth century – even though it was hinted at in his earlier works, for example, in the *Llibre del gentil*. By any means, Lull did not study in the existing Majorcan *studium Arabicum*, according to Bellver, since he would probably mention his membership of the institution instead of insisting on the tutoring of his Muslim slave.⁵³⁸ Moreover, even though it had been Lull’s intention from the beginning to study in Paris, Ramon de Penyafort had dissuaded him from venturing there with that intention, which means that Lull did not have a university education either.⁵³⁹ In order to understand Islamic thought, Lull sought to enter into contact with the Islamic populace of Majorca. According to Dominique Urvoy, this proved to be quite difficult, since the greater part of the Islamic population of Majorca had been enslaved or relocated. Many Islamic intellectuals, who might have enhanced Lull’s understanding of Islamic theology, had had the means to flee before Majorca had fallen into the hands of the Christians. Urvoy disagrees with Bellver and does not believe that the slave, whom Lull had bought with the intention of employing him as an Arabic teacher, belonged to the intellectual elite.⁵⁴⁰ Even though the identity of the slave can never completely be concretized, it seems likely that he possessed some knowledge of Islamic thought, enough at least to teach some basic philosophical and theological jargon to his master-pupil.

Lull did have the chance to meet Islamic intellectuals many times in his life during his travels throughout Europe. His voyage to Montpellier (the first one from 1274-1275) proved especially fruitful. It is there, in the library of the faculty of medicine, that Lull was able to read many Islamic tracts. Lull especially read Ibn Sīnā in connection to medical science.⁵⁴¹ Lull also worked on his *Logica Algazelis*. This work is, according to Charles Lohr, based largely on original works by al-Ġazālī, mainly on the *Tahāfut al-falāsifa* (or the *Incoherence of the Philosophers*),⁵⁴² a work in which al-Ġazālī summarized and criticized Islamic philosophy, especially represented by Ibn Sīnā. Lohr argues that Lull’s

⁵³⁷ José Bellver, “The Profile and Possible Origin of Ramon Lull’s Muslim Slave,” *Studia Lulliana* 62 (2022): p. 97.

⁵³⁸ José Bellver, “The Profile and Possible Origin of Ramon Lull’s Muslim Slave” (cf. footnote 537), p. 100.

⁵³⁹ Fidora, Rubio, *Raimundus Lullus*, CCCM, 214, *ROL*, Supplementum Lullianum II, p. 43-44.

⁵⁴⁰ Dominique Urvoy, *Penser l’Islam* (cf. footnote 3 above), pp. 151-152.

⁵⁴¹ Ramon Lull mentioned Ibn Sīnā many times as his main source in the *Liber principiorum medicinae*, which he wrote between 1274-1283, starting in the year he stayed in Montpellier. Cf. Raimundus Lullus, *Liber principiorum medicinae*, ed. by Maria A. Sánchez Manzano (Turnhout: Brepols, 2006), CCCM, 185, *ROL*, XXXI, 413-564. This is, however, the only time Lull seemed to mention Ibn Sīnā by name in his works. For an extensive overview of the influence of Ibn Sīnā in the medieval Western world in general: cf. Marie-Thérèse d’Alverny, *Avicenne en Occident* (Paris: Vrin, 1993).

⁵⁴² Al-Ġazālī, *The Incoherence of the Philosophers*, trans. by Michael E. Marmura (Provo: Brigham Young University Press, 1997).

discussion in Latin is more directly loyal to the original Arabic.⁵⁴³ Moreover, Llull's treatment of Averroism in the *Disputatio Raimundi* was often based on the primary works by Ibn Rušd, and only secondarily on the Christian interpretation of them. According to Dominique Urvoy, however, despite the proximity of the Dominican language school in Montpellier, Llull's knowledge of Arabic was more mediocre and more practical than the knowledge of his contemporaries, such as Ramon Martí. In the case of the *Logica Algazelis*, Llull was aware of the original text of the *Maqāsid* by al-Ġazālī, as mentioned by Charles Lohr, but must also have known and used the translation of the work by Gundissalinus.⁵⁴⁴

During his journeys to Paris, Llull came into contact with the growing popularity of Averroism. It seems that Llull's knowledge on the writings of Ibn Rušd came from his own reading of the primary works, in Arabic or in translation.⁵⁴⁵ Ramon Llull often mentioned Ibn Rušd's works as sources he had read, especially when voicing his disagreement with the author. However, Llull was also aware of the current opinions of Parisian Averroism, separately from the original works of Ibn Rušd. Llull's final stay in Paris, from 1309 to ca. 1311, was the period when he appeared to immerse himself completely in the works by Ibn Rušd. Llull had read multiple works by him, of which he gave the Latin titles: he mentioned *Caeli et mundi* and *Metaphysica XII* in his own *De ente quod est simpliciter per se et propter se existens et agens* (written in Paris, ca. 1309-1311).⁵⁴⁶ He also mentioned the *Physica XIII* in his *De erroribus Averrois et Aristotelis* (Paris, 1311).⁵⁴⁷ In these works, he discusses certain topics which are also relevant for the *Disputatio Raimundi*. For example, Llull discusses Ibn Rušd's metaphysical approach to the denial of the Trinity in the *De ente*. This particular argument is based on Ibn Rušd's idea that God cannot have any kind of composition.⁵⁴⁸ However, during his stay, Llull never composed a systematic overview or compendium of Ibn Rušd's entire oeuvre, or his theological thought, as he did with al-Ġazālī. Rather, Llull wished to collect those topics within the works of Ibn Rušd he deemed heretical or against Christian doctrine. Aside from Llull's direct knowledge of Ibn Rušd's theological tracts, Llull also reacted directly against the Averroist tendency within the Parisian university. Llull made a clear difference between the *Saracenus* and the *Averroista christianus*. Llull's *Disputatio Raimundi et Averroistae* (1310)⁵⁴⁹ was an example of Llull's direct condemnation of Averroism as a philosophical tendency. In the *Declaratio Raimundi* (Paris, 1298),⁵⁵⁰ Ramon Llull directly discussed and reinforced the list of statements distilled from Averroism which were condemned in 1277. Ramon Llull provided a discussion of the statements, which he literally transcribed. Each time, his auto-insertion

⁵⁴³ Charles Lohr, *Raimundus Lullus' Compendium Logicae Algazelis: Quellen, Lehre und Stellung in der Geschichte der Logik*, PhD thesis (Freiburg I Br.: Freiburg University 1967), pp. 18-20.

⁵⁴⁴ Urvoy, *Penser l'islam* (cf. footnote 3 above), p. 155.

⁵⁴⁵ For an overview of Llull's final stay in Paris: cf. Fidora, Rubio, *Raimundus Lullus*, *CCCM*, 214, *ROL*, Supplementum Lullianum II, 85-108. For an overview of Llull's works written during his final stay in Paris: cf. pp. 207-219 of the same work.

⁵⁴⁶ Raimundus Lullus, *De ente quod simpliciter est per se et propter se*, ed. by Hermogenes Harada (Turnhout: Brepols, 1980), *CCCM*, 34, *ROL*, VIII, IV, p. 208.

⁵⁴⁷ Cf. Raimundus Lullus, *De erroribus Averrois et Aristotelis*, ed. by Hermogenes Harada (Turnhout: Brepols, 1980), *CCCM*, 34, *ROL*, VIII, p. 255.

⁵⁴⁸ Cf. Lullus, *De ente quod simpliciter est per se et propter se*, *CCCM*, 34, *ROL*, VIII, p. 204.

⁵⁴⁹ Raimundus Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi et Averroista*, ed. by Hermogenes Harada (Turnhout: Brepols, 1975), *CCCM*, 32, *ROL*, VII, xii-358.

⁵⁵⁰ Raimundus Lullus, *Declaratio Raimundi*, ed. by Michaela Pereira and Theodor Pindl-Büchel (Turnhout: Brepols, 1989), *CCCM*, 79, *ROL*, XVII, 219-402.

character Raimundus defended the condemnation of an Averroist statement, against his antagonist Socrates, who defended the statement against its condemnation. Llull reacted directly to the Condemnations, and not to the works of Ibn Rušd.⁵⁵¹

Even though Llull knew Arabic, he never quoted any Arabic source literally. Beyond this, Llull borrowed philosophical and theological thought systems from the Islamic world, and likewise philosophical techniques which could be employed in the various versions of the *Ars* and in the debate with Islamic philosophers.⁵⁵² Still, Ramon Llull's works often had a first version in Arabic. Notably, the *Llibre del gentil*, the *Logica del Gatzell* and the *Libre de contemplació* were presumably all written in Arabic before being translated to Catalan and Latin, even though these Arabic originals are unknown. Likewise, Llull mentioned at the end of the *Disputatio Raimundi* that he sent an Arabic draft of his discussion with 'Umar to the "bishop of Bugia". It is only after his shipwreck and his arrival in Pisa, that he translated the work into Latin.⁵⁵³

1.4. THE ARS AND LLULL'S OUTLOOK ON ISLAM

Ramon Llull's outlook on the Islamic arguments, which were typically attached to the concept of the attributes of God, can be summarized in a few steps. First, in Islamic theology, the attributes of God are not part of His essence, since God's essence cannot be divided, and since there can only be unity in God, without plurality. This particular belief in the one-ness of God, which does not allow for multitude and division, is the same theological standard which keeps Muslims from accepting the Trinity, at least in the mind of Ramon Llull. There is yet another reason why Muslims cannot accept the Trinity, in Llull's mind. According to him, Muslims believe that the attributes of God cannot be co-essential, but can only be ascribed to God in as far as He enacts these attributes in the created world. If God's attributes were part of His essence, this would mean that their effect would be infinite, and that it would negate the existence of the opposite in creation. For example, if God's goodness were part of His essence, this would mean that its effect would be infinite, and that there could not be any kind of evil left in the world. This would be impossible. Therefore, Llull argues that Muslims do not believe in the idea that God can have an eternal, perfect effect. While they view this possible eternal, perfect effect as the perfect enactment of God's attributes in creation, which is impossible, Llull sees this eternal, perfect effect as the internal generation of the Son. Llull shows his opinion on Islam in the *Ars generalis ultima*:

“We inquired into the divine dignities and found that in God they are co-essential and substantial from eternity and in eternity. The final purpose of their existence is within themselves and not outside, for otherwise they and God would exist by accident, which is impossible. Now this argues against certain Saracens who believe that they have an elevated and subtle knowledge of God when they say that God is One and as such has no dignities in himself, but only has them for acting in creatures. In other words, He is good in order to create good creatures and great in

⁵⁵¹ Cf. also Constantin Teleanu, “Averroes et Averroista christianus: deux adversaires de Raymond Lulle à l'Université de Paris,” in *En torno a Ramon Llull: Presencia y transmisión de su obra*, ed. by Francisco José Díaz Marcilla and José Higuera Rubio, *Textos e estudos de Filosofia Medieval* 11 (Vila Nova de Famalicão: Edições Húmus, 2017), 75-83.

⁵⁵² Urvoy, *Penser l'Islam* (cf. footnote 3 above), p. 156.

⁵⁵³ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, *CCCM*, 114, *ROL*, XXII, III, p. 261.

order to create great creatures eternal so that creatures can be durable etc. Their statements involve an obvious contradiction, because if things were as they say, then if God was infinite due to his dignities, He would create infinite and eternal creatures, which He does not do, for as they themselves say, the world is new and limited in size. They imply a further contradiction when they call God the prime cause, because He would not be the prime cause if his reasons were only meant for the world, and thus God would exist with his dignities for the sole purpose of enabling the world to exist, which is a totally absurd thing to say.”⁵⁵⁴

In order to prove the Trinity with his own philosophy, Lull needs to prove that God indeed has co-essential attributes, and that these co-essential attributes can have an eternal, perfect effect, being God Himself (or the Person of the Son). This will make room to prove the Trinity by referring to the correlative theory.

Throughout the *Disputatio Raimundi*, the character ‘Umar has divided the attributes of God into two categories, being the essential attributes and the non-essential attributes. Even though Lull argues in the *Ars generalis ultima* that Muslims do not believe in essential attributes, there is still a separate category in the *Disputatio Raimundi* for attributes which can, in some way, be attributed to God’s essence. These attributes are necessary entity, unity, singularity, infinity, eternity, simplicity and life. The reason why these attributes may be deemed necessary is perhaps due to their contribution to the Islamic way of contemplating the necessity and one-ness of God. Unity, singularity and simplicity all contribute to the one-ness of God, and explain why there cannot be any kind of division or multitude within God. Infinity, eternity and life all contribute to the boundlessness of God and to His necessity, since there has to be an infinite, eternal being which is forever present, and since these attributes explain why there cannot be another divine entity and, more specifically, a Trinity (since two infinite beings cannot exist next to one another, and since an eternal being cannot be created). All of these attributes are, therefore, inherent qualities of the divine, which belong to Him like the “defined and the definable”.⁵⁵⁵ The fact that the co-essential nature of these attributes does not contradict the statement which Ramon Lull made in his *Ars generalis ultima* is due to the contribution of these attributes to the metaphysical nature of the essence of God, and since these attributes define the reason why God cannot have an internal division or number. The other eleven attributes, beginning with goodness and ending with mercy, define the act of God within creation (as Lull mentioned in his *Ars generalis ultima*), but cannot be ascribed to God. If they were, their effect would be infinite and eternal, due to God’s co-essential eternity and infinity, and they would cause an eternal effect, which is not possible in the created world.

In order to prove the Trinity to ‘Umar, who reflects the Islamic point of view which is present in the *Ars*, Raimundus will have to resort to the following arguments: (i.) that God’s attributes are all part of His essence, since He can never be without them; (ii.) that the primary effect of God’s attributes is not enacted by God upon creation, but within Himself; (iii.) that the Trinity does not imply the existence of multitude or division in God, since (iii.a.) the Persons are all of the same essence, and (iii.b.) since God is not a finite, material

⁵⁵⁴ Lullus, *Ars generalis ultima*, CCCM, 75, ROL, XIV, 9, 1, p. 191. Translation: Abbott, Dambergers, *Raymond Lull’s Ars Magna* (cf. footnote 147 above), p. 118.

⁵⁵⁵ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, I, 1, pp. 174-175.

entity and neither are the Persons, so they cannot “border” or “limit” one another. Raimundus will use the correlative theory in order to prove these arguments.

1.5. ON NATURE AND SUBSTANCE

In the *Disputatio Raimundi*, Llull describes certain attributes which do not have a wide occurrence in his œuvre. The reason behind the rarity of the list of attributes which can be found in the *Disputatio Raimundi* is the motivation behind the work, which is more or less unique. The reason why the *Disputatio Raimundi* mentions attributes such as ‘necessary entity’ and ‘singularity’ is mainly because they were logical concepts which Llull had to explain (or re-interpret) in order to make Christian theology more understandable for Muslims. The metaphysical logical concepts on which the arguments of the *Ars* are based are discussed by Llull as divine attributes, in order to re-establish their meaning and use them as logical parameters later on. Two attributes of God which Llull discusses in his *Disputatio Raimundi* and which can be found nowhere else in his larger œuvre are ‘nature’ and ‘substance’. These metaphysical concepts are uniquely discussed as divine attributes by Llull in the *Disputatio Raimundi*. In the rest of Llull’s œuvre, and in most works of Islamic philosophy which are relevant for this thesis, these concepts are seldomly discussed, or at least never discussed in the form of divine attributes. In the section which discusses the nature of God, Raimundus attempts to prove that God has a divine nature, which He can think and love. In the section on the substance of God, Raimundus proves that God is a substance, which can receive the divine attributes.

In the section dealing with God’s nature, Raimundus argues that God has a nature, since if He did not, this would mean that He were idle, which is a finite property. This is not possible. Therefore, God must have a nature. Much of the evidence that God must have a nature comes from Llull’s interpretation that God must be a Trinity, and that He must generate the Son eternally. Raimundus argues that he has already proven earlier that God has a Trinity. Therefore, it is also proven that God has a nature, since if He did not, this would mean that He could not naturally be a Father, and the Son would not be generated. Raimundus also proves that God’s nature is co-essential to Him and convertible with Him, since God’s nature has to be eternal in order to eternally and naturally generate the Son. Moreover, if God’s nature was not convertible with His eternity, it would mean that there were two infinities. Raimundus next argues that God’s nature is convertible with God’s essence, and must therefore have the correlatives of naturating, naturable and naturator. These three elements constitute the Trinity (which is proven once more). Raimundus next argues against the idea of ‘Umar, that God cannot have a nature, since a nature implies a beginning and an endpoint. This is only true for created, temporal nature, Raimundus says, and not for divine nature. He also explains that the divine nature implies the Trinity, since every divine nature is more inclined to creating its highest created end. Therefore, they must become a Trinity.⁵⁵⁶

In the section on substance, Raimundus argues against ‘Umar’s opinion, that God cannot be a substance, because a substance would imply form and matter. According to Raimundus, this only applies to created but not to divine substance. Raimundus next proves the Trinity in connection to the divine substance by referring to the correlative theory. Every

⁵⁵⁶ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 7a., pp. 214-215.

substance is farther removed from accidents with the correlatives of substancing, substancible, and substancier. Raimundus proceeds to explain the Incarnation in connection to the divine substance. When God created the world, he argues, He was more inclined to creating one supreme created substance, which constitutes of the connection and unity of the divine substance and the created substance. Therefore, God was inclined to create the incarnation. Raimundus refutes ‘Umar’s statement, that God’s goodness would be wronged if He was connected to a substance consisting of form and matter. Raimundus argues that this does not happen, since the Incarnation is the highest created substance. It is likewise apparent that, in the case of human beings, the rational soul is not wronged when connected to the perishable flesh, since it is part of a good and great end, humankind.⁵⁵⁷

It becomes apparent that Llull wished to explain a few things in the sections on nature and substance, namely (i.) that God has a nature and a substance – not in the temporal way, but in the divine way, (ii.) that God can think Himself, since He has a nature, (iii.) that God can have attributes, since He is a substance, (iv.) that God’s attributes are not accidents, (v.) that God’s nature and substance allow for the Trinity and the Incarnation. These elements constitute the base of Raimundus’ own logical conceptualization of the divine, and will consolidate his arguments in the rest of the *Disputatio Raimundi*. Without establishing the meaning of nature and substance in a divine context, there could be no solid argumentation for the co-essentiality of the divine attributes, or for the correlative theory. Therefore, one could argue that the attributes of nature and substance, although rarely discussed in other works by Ramon Llull, are the key for the *Disputatio Raimundi*.

2. THE ESSENTIAL ATTRIBUTES IN THE *DISPUTATIO RAIMUNDI*

2.1. INTRODUCTION

In ‘Umar’s part of the *Disputatio Raimundi*, he clearly distinguishes essential and non-essential attributes. He calls the essential attributes ‘conditions’, without which He cannot exist. The conditions are essential to God, and they are also convertible with him, like “definition and defined”. The conditions are necessary entity, unity, singularity, infinity, eternity, simplicity and life. Most of them describe God’s one-ness and His primordial nature. God’s infinity and His eternity, for example, make it impossible that there would be more than one God, or that there would be internal differentiation within Him, while also explaining that God is uncaused. Since an uncaused being cannot be finite within time and space, God’s boundlessness is an important aspect of His essence. Unity, singularity and simplicity mean that God is one, that He cannot be divided into multiple parts, that He cannot have accidents and that there cannot be multiple necessary entities. Unity means that God is intrinsically one and one-fold, singularity means that God is singularly divine and that He does not have an equal, and simplicity means that God has no composition. Life, the final essential ‘condition’, describes God’s eternal life and immortality, since He can never be dead or cease to exist.

The character Raimundus denies the existence of ‘conditions’ within God. Rather, he believes that every condition or quality should be called ‘attribute’, and that there is no

⁵⁵⁷ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 7b, pp. 135-136.

difference between them. Throughout his *œuvre*, Llull does not use the word ‘condition’ to signify ‘divine attribute’. It must be noted, however, that Llull never states that certain attributes are essential to God and others are not, even though he does make the difference between the attributes ‘quoad nos’ and the attributes ‘quoad Deum’ in the *Llibre de contemplació*, meaning that he could differentiate between attributes belonging to God alone and the attributes describing His connection to creation. Therefore, Raimundus agrees with the essential nature of the conditions, even though he still needs to explain the Trinity and the Incarnation based on them.

2.2. NECESSARY ENTITY

‘Umar begins his exposé by referring to God as a “necessary entity,” an idea which stems from Aristotle, who described the necessary entity as the primal cause which, alone in the universe, is not created, has no beginning and no end.⁵⁵⁸ According to ‘Umar, God’s being a necessary entity is “self-evident”. Every created being, whose origin stems from God’s creation, is contingent. In his answer to ‘Umar, Raimundus uses the term *hujuden muclach* to denote the necessary entity. However, Raimundus discerns two types of necessary entities. The first kind is an entity which is necessary by nature, the only uncreated being, or God. This is, according to Raimundus, the same as the Islamic *hujuden muclach*. The second kind, which has no footing in Islamic theological terminology, is the created necessary entity. This entity can be either natural or artificial. This created necessary being is, in Llull’s theology, the incarnate Logos.⁵⁵⁹ The term *hujuden muclach* is connected by Daiber to the term *wājib al-wujūd muṭlaq* to passages in the *Maqāṣid*⁵⁶⁰ by al-Ġazālī, in the metaphysical part of the *Kitāb as-ṣifāh* or the *al-Ilāhiyyāt*⁵⁶¹ and in the *Kitāb an-naġāt*⁵⁶² by Ibn Sīnā.⁵⁶³ Simone Sari stresses the connection of the term with *wujūd muṭlaq*, used in the works by Ibn Sīnā and al-Rāzī, which also means necessary entity.⁵⁶⁴ The term ‘necessary entity’ seems to stem from Avicenna’s interpretation of Aristotle. Most notably, in the *Kitāb as-ṣifāh*, Ibn Sīnā uses the notion of God as necessary entity as a means to deny any Trinitarian thought, division or association within God’s essence.⁵⁶⁵ The theory that

⁵⁵⁸ Hans Daiber, “Raimundus Lullus in der Auseinandersetzung mit dem Islam” (cf. footnote 2 above), p. 139.

⁵⁵⁹ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 1, p. 196.

⁵⁶⁰ Al-Ġazālī, *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa*, ed. by Sulaiman Dunyā (Cairo: Dār al-Ma‘ārif, 1961), p. 210.

⁵⁶¹ Ibn Sīnā, *Kitāb as-ṣifāh: al-Ilāhiyyāt*, vol. II, ed. By Yusuf M. Mūsā, Sulaiman Dunyā, and Said Zāyid (Cairo: Al-Hay’ a al-‘amma li-ṣu’ūn al-maṭābi‘ al-amīriyya, 1960), p. 346.

⁵⁶² Ibn Sīnā, *Kitāb an-naġāt*, ed. by Mohammed T. Dānišpačūh (Teheran: Dānišga, 1986), p. 546.

⁵⁶³ Hans Daiber, “Raimundus Lullus in der Auseinandersetzung mit dem Islam” (cf. footnote 2 above), p. 141.

⁵⁶⁴ Simone Sari, ““Saracenus non considerat nomen Dei ita altum, sicut christianus”” (cf. footnote 11 above).

⁵⁶⁵ Avicenna, *Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina*, ed. by Simone Van Riet, 2 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 1977-1980), vol. II, tract. VIII cap. IV, p. 397: “Postquam autem nihil praeter ipsum est necesse esse, tunc ipsum est principium debendi esse omne quod est quod facit debere ipsum esse debito primario uel mediante alio. Sed postquam esse omnis quod est praeter eum est ab eius esse tunc ipsum est primum. Non intelligitur autem per primum intentio quae addatur ad debitum sui esse ita ut per hoc multiplicetur debitum sui esse sed intelligitur per hoc respectus relationis suae ad id quod est extra se. Scias autem quod cum nos dixerimus et probauerimus quod necesse esse nullo modo multiplicatur et quod essentia eius est pure una purissima uera non intelligimus per hoc quod ab ipso remoueantur omnia quae sunt et quod non habeat relationes ad ea quae sunt.”

every created being is contingent, and therefore ‘unnecessary’ is used by ‘Umar against the Trinity:

“It is proved that God is a necessary being. Yet no non-necessary being can be interchanged with a necessary being.

Yet the Christians say that the Son of God is God and the Holy Spirit is God and that they can be mutually interchanged with the Father due to the essence. And since the Son is necessitated by the Father, because He is begotten by Him, He already is not necessitated by Himself, but by the Father.

And so it can be said of the Holy Spirit who proceeds from both. Nor is the Father a necessary being by Himself; for He cannot exist without the Son and the Holy Spirit; for they are related to one another.

Hence it is evident that in God a trinity is impossible; otherwise, however, there would be a contradiction implied, namely that God were a necessary and a non-necessary being, which is impossible.”⁵⁶⁶

Since the Person of the Son and the Holy Ghost originate from God (the Father), the two Persons are logically speaking also contingent beings. This would mean that the Son and the Holy Ghost are also created beings, and cannot be necessary entities. Personhood is, therefore, not to be associated with the divine. ‘Umar’s argument is based on the idea that beings that are created have a beginning, and that beings with a beginning are necessarily contingent and therefore not necessary. However, this does not agree with the way in which Christians would normally understand the generation of the Persons within God, which cannot be called ‘creation’ in the same way as the term might be applied to God’s creation of the universe. Raimundus’ explanation is based on the idea that God’s generation of the Persons is in and of itself necessary, and that each of the divine Persons is also necessary.

Raimundus disagrees with ‘Umar’s interpretation of both necessary entity and the nature of the generation of the Persons, as mentioned above. He proposes the correlative theory in connection with personhood. God is a necessary being, since He is the uncreated cause of creation. The divine Persons are necessary beings, since they are ‘necessitated’ from God’s inner being, as the primordial act of God. Since there is no ‘first’ or ‘last’ in God’s essence, the emanation of the divine Persons is eternal, like God Himself. The divine Persons are also one with God’s essence, since the attributes and correlatives are one within God.⁵⁶⁷ By explaining the Trinity like this, Raimundus denies the accusation of polytheism, which was often attributed to Christians by Islamic thinkers.

2.3. UNITY

‘Umar next discusses God’s unity. Daiber remarks that Ibn Sīnā discusses the same topic in his *Kitāb as-ṣifāh*, directly after discussing God as the necessary entity. He also connects the passage on unity in the *Disputatio Raimundi* with a passage al- Al-Ġazālī’s *Maqāsid*

⁵⁶⁶ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, I, 1, 1, p. 176. Translation by Annemarie C. Mayer.

⁵⁶⁷ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, I, 1, 1, p. 176.

al-falāsifa.⁵⁶⁸ The character ‘Umar seems to follow Ibn Sīnā rather than Lull’s *Ars*. According to ‘Umar, God’s unity is absolute, and does not allow any kind of plurality or division, which is his main problem with the Trinity. The unity of an eternal and infinite necessary being stands in contrast to the plurality of contingent beings. According to ‘Umar, it is impossible that there is plurality, division or number within God, since it would imply polytheism. One god would be separated from the other, which destroys his infinity and boundlessness.

“The Saracen said: Every being that exists as one through infinite and eternal unity, is separate and devoid of all plurality.

Yet God is a being existing as one through infinite and eternal unity; therefore God is separate and devoid of all plurality.

The major premise I explain like this: A being, that exists infinitely and eternally as one, is the opposite of plurality, and vice versa; like one man is not many men, and vice versa.

The minor premise I prove like this: If God were not infinitely and eternally one being, it would follow that there are many gods, and one god would limit the other, which is impossible.”⁵⁶⁹

There are several interpretations for ‘Umar’s position: in his *Kitāb as-ṣifāh*, Ibn Sīnā describes the connection of God’s unity with His being a necessary entity at length.⁵⁷⁰ According to Ibn Sīnā, the unity of the necessary being, which is immaterial and self-existent, is in contrast to the plurality of the caused, not self-existent and the material. Anything that is immaterial has to have but one essence. The character ‘Umar connects this train of thought to divine personhood, by saying that the uncaused cannot contain any plurality of Persons, which he equates with the existence of multiple essences in God. This connection was not immediately made by Ibn Sīnā, however. Al-Ġazālī also discusses the

⁵⁶⁸ Hans Daiber, “Raimundus Lullus in der Auseinandersetzung mit dem Islam” (cf. footnote 2 above), p. 142.

⁵⁶⁹ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, I, 1, 2, p. 177. Translation: Lullus, *Disputatio*, trans. by A. C. Mayer (not yet published).

⁵⁷⁰ Avicenna, *Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina* (cf. footnote 565 above) vol. II, tract. VIII cap. V, p. 405: “Capitulum in quo quasi affirmatur et repetitur quod praeteriit ad ostendendam unitatem de necesse esse et omnes proprietates eius negatiuas secundum uiam concludendi. Opus est ut repetamus uerbum de hoc quod certitudo primi est ipsi tantum et nulli alii. Unus enim in quantum est necesse esse est id per quod est ipse et eius essentia et haec intentio est attributa illi uel propter essentiam illius intentionis uel propter aliam causam ueluti si id quod est necesse esse sit aliquid uerbi gratia hic homo tunc necesse est ut uel ille sit hoc propter humanitatem et quia est homo uel non sit. Si autem propter hoc quod est homo esset hic homo tunc humanitas iudicaret esse hunc tantum, Sed si humanitas est alii praeter hunc tunc non iudicat humanitas esse hunc. Hic autem non est factus hic nisi propter aliam causam praeter humanitatem. Similiter est dispositio certitudinis de necesse esse. Si enim ipsa per seipsam fuerit hoc signatum tunc impossibile est ut illa certitudo sit alii nisi illi alioquin ipsa certitudo non esset hoc. Si uero certitudo huius intentionis fuerit huic signato non ex seipso sed ex alio a se nec ipsum est ipsum nisi quia ipsum est haec intentio tunc proprium esse eius erit acquisitum ab alio a se et sic non erit necesse esse, quod est impossibile. Igitur certitudo de necesse esse est uni tantum quod est necesse esse. Quomodo enim quidditas exspoliata a materia erit duabus essentiis.” Cf. Hans Daiber, “Raimundus Lullus in der Auseinandersetzung mit dem Islam” (cf. footnote 2 above), p. 142.

unity of God in his *Maqāsid al-falāsifa*.⁵⁷¹ According to him, it is impossible to attribute anything to the necessary entity, which is a “superaddition” to His essence (or which does not immediately describe His essence), since this would be a superaddition which violates God’s unity, and makes Him compound. Al-Ġazālī stresses that by no means could God exist of “parts”. This is in immediate accord with the statements made by Ibn Sīnā. However, the similarities between Lull and Ibn Rušd seem more relevant to the passage in the *Disputatio Raimundi*. Ibn Rušd contemplates the unity of God in his commentary on Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* book XII, and explains why the Trinity is impossible. According to Ibn Rušd, the Trinity would signify composition, covered with unity. He argues that, while Christians explain the Trinity by stating that there are three Persons belonging to one God, this only means that God as a substance is compound, while the unity is a quality that is superimposed on Him, as a way to “cover” or hide the composition which Christians attribute to God. It does not diminish the actual, underlying multiplicity of God in any way, shape or form.

“It is in this respect that the Christians were mistaken when they adopted the doctrine of the Trinity in the substance; it does not save them from it to say that it (i.e. the substance) is three and God one because if the substance is multiple, the compound is one in the sense of unity superimposed on the compound.”⁵⁷²

‘Umar states that God is devoid of any plurality, and cannot be triune since this would not allow Him to be infinite. God’s infinity cannot be divided into separate infinite entities, there can only be one infinite entity. The answer of Raimundus is based on the co-essential nature of the divine Persons: according to him, God’s unity still allows for the existence of different Persons, since they are all of the same essence. Raimundus’ opinion can be compared with the interpretation of Ibn Rušd, who said that the Trinity means the superaddition of unity above a compound substance. In Raimundus’ interpretation, the three Persons are all essentially the same being and the same substance, and due to the intrinsic co-essentiality of the Persons (or the correlatives), there is not actual compoundedness in God. The Persons are, therefore, not three different beings that are all God.

“And when you say, that every being, which exists as one by means of infinite and eternal unity, is separate from and void of all plurality, you do say something true about the unity, which by essence is distinct from other unities; like one human being is not many people, because they differ by essence.

⁵⁷¹Al-Ġazālī, *Algazel’s Metaphysics: A Medieval Translation*, ed. by Joseph T. Muckle (Toronto: St. Michael’s College, 1933), p. 55: “Octavum est quod nichil potest designari in necesse esse quod sit superadditum essencie illius. Si enim posuerimus eius esse cum illa designacione, sic ut destruat eum esse, si ponatur illa non esse, tunc esse eius penderet ex illo, et fieret compositum ex partibus ita ut non sequatur essencia eius esse, nisi propter coniunctionem illarum ; omne vero compositum ex aliquibus causatum est, sicut predictum est. Si autem non sequatur illud non esse quamvis ponatur illa designacio non esse, tunc illa designacio accidentalis est illi sicut sciencia homini, verbi gracia, quod est falsum ; omne vero accidentale causatum est, sicut predictum est ; et eius causa si fuerit ipsum necesse esse, tunc ipsum simul erit agens, et recipiens.” Cf. Hans Daiber, “Raimundus Lullus in der Auseinandersetzung mit dem Islam” (cf. footnote 2 above), p. 142.

⁵⁷² Translation: Ibn Rušd, *Ibn Rušd’s Metaphysics: a Translation with Introduction of Ibn Rušd’s Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Book Lām*, trans. by Charles Genequand (Leiden: Brill, 1986), pp. 159-160.

However, what you say about divine unity is not true. For, even though it has three correlatives, it is not for the sake of this that they are many different ones by essence, because the correlatives themselves are one and the same by the essence of the unity.

For the Unifier, who is the Father, by the whole of Himself and the whole of the divinity brings forth the Son, and mutually by the whole of Themselves They breath forth the Holy Spirit.”⁵⁷³

According to Raimundus, God’s unity includes the divine correlatives, *unificare*, *unificans* and *unificabilis*. He repeats the necessity of the correlatives in God’s essence. Moreover, Raimundus claims that the correlatives of unity are part of the essence of unity as an attribute, and are therefore essentially the same being. The same logic applies to every attribute of God. This means, therefore, that there is no plurality in the Trinity, since the three Persons are essentially the same being.

2.4. SINGULARITY

The attribute singularity cannot be found in the works of Ibn Sīnā. According to Hans Daiber, the discussion of the attribute is nevertheless reminiscent of Ibn Sīnā’s thought, especially on the necessary entity and unity.⁵⁷⁴ Lullus includes this attribute, probably to discuss the difference in views regarding monotheism between Christianity and Islam. ‘Umar discusses the Islamic view on singularity, stemming from the logic behind the necessary entity. ‘Umar claims, on the authority of Aristotle, that God is unique in His infinity and eternity, which keeps Him from binding Himself with any other entity. God’s singularity is a logical consequence of His being an eternal and necessary being, just like His unity.

“Every infinite, eternal singularity presupposes that there is only one single infinite and eternal being. Yet such is God; therefore, in God there is no trinity nor plurality. The major premise is self-evident. Yet the minor premise I prove like this: the Philosopher posits one single first cause; and this is precisely what all religious laws affirm. For they say thus, that it is also much better that there should be one single God, just like there is one single world, and one sun, and one fire, and one whiteness, and the like. Therefore, it is concluded that in God there is no trinity.”⁵⁷⁵

‘Umar’s attack on the Trinity is countered by Raimundus, who refers to the correlative theory in order to defend the Trinity. Raimundus believes that God’s plurality is reinforced by the Trinity, since God’s infinity is not perfect and complete without the correlatives *infinitare*, *infinitans* and *infinitabilis*. Raimundus does not deny singularity as an attribute of God’s essence, but he does claim that the correlatives are a necessary part of God’s singularity, since it has to be a part of the necessary entity, since God’s attributes are not just defined by existence, but also by His act.⁵⁷⁶ ‘Umar also disagrees with Raimundus on

⁵⁷³ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 2, p. 199. Translation by Annemarie C. Mayer.

⁵⁷⁴ Hans Daiber, “Raimundus Lullus in der Auseinandersetzung mit dem Islam” (cf. footnote 2 above), p. 143

⁵⁷⁵ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, I, 1, 3, p. 179. Translation by Annemarie C. Mayer.

⁵⁷⁶ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 3, p. 202.

the meaning of singularity for the existence of the Incarnation. ‘Umar claims that the created cannot be bound to the divine like hot and cold or good and evil cannot be conjoined.⁵⁷⁷ God cannot incarnate due to His singularity, since He is infinite. A human being is contingent and finite, which means that God would have to incarnate in an ever larger number of singular created human beings in order to incarnate His entire infinity.⁵⁷⁸ Raimundus parries this theory, saying that God could only incarnate in one human being, or Christ, due to His singularity.⁵⁷⁹

2.5. INFINITY

According to Daiber,⁵⁸⁰ the infinity of God is neither mentioned by Ibn Sīnā, nor by many other Islamic theologians. However, we clearly see how God’s infinity comes from God’s being a necessary entity. God’s infinity means He has no beginning or end, and that there is no possibility for two infinite gods to exist ‘beside’ each other. God’s infinity is, in fact, not to be taken literally or mathematically: God is above space and, in His unity, above number. Therefore, His infinity is not to be interpreted quantitatively, which can only be ascribed to contingent things and beings, that can group together to become many. The infinity of God implies His unity and underlines the ontological necessity of monotheism, or the existence of a necessary being. ‘Umar explains this statement first by contrasting the infinity of God with the multitude of contingent beings.⁵⁸¹ Moreover, if God can bring forth an eternal being, this would mean that that being (the Son) could also bring forth an eternal being. This being would also be able to bring forth an infinite amount of eternal beings, which were all, in their turn, capable of bringing forth other eternal beings. There would, therefore, be an infinite number of eternal beings, which is impossible.⁵⁸² ‘Umar also claims that God, when creating an infinite being, would empty His own essence and that He would be annihilated. The Son would likewise lose His essence in spirating the Holy Ghost. Eventually, the Holy Ghost would be all that remains.⁵⁸³ Lastly, ‘Umar claims that God’s infinity also renders the Incarnation illogical, since God cannot be bound to the temporal or physical.⁵⁸⁴ Raimundus disagrees with ‘Umar’s statement, again referring to the correlatives. According to him, God’s infinity must be eternally in the act of *infinire*.⁵⁸⁵ Raimundus uses the divine correlatives to explain that infinity can indeed be many, that there can be many internal beings in one infinity.⁵⁸⁶ Raimundus parries the argument of ‘Umar, who says that if there was internal generation within God, this process would never end, with the Son creating infinite Sons of his own. According to Raimundus, the Person of the Son would not bring forth eternal entities Himself, since God’s unity does not allow that. He refers shortly to the section on unity, when he explains the Trinity according to

⁵⁷⁷ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, I, 1, 3, p. 179.

⁵⁷⁸ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, I, 1, 3, p. 179.

⁵⁷⁹ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 3, pp. 204-205.

⁵⁸⁰ Hans Daiber, “Raimundus Lullus in der Auseinandersetzung mit dem Islam” (cf. footnote 2 above), p. 144.

⁵⁸¹ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, I, 1, 3, p. 179.

⁵⁸² Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, I, 1, 3, p. 180.

⁵⁸³ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, I, 1, 4, p. 180.

⁵⁸⁴ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 4, p. 205.

⁵⁸⁵ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 4, p. 205.

⁵⁸⁶ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 4, p. 206.

God's unity.⁵⁸⁷ Raimundus claims that the generation of the Son or the spiration of the Holy Ghost do not empty God's essence, since the generation of the Persons is an eternal act, and since the Persons are co-essential, and come forth from the entirety of God's essence.⁵⁸⁸ Lastly, Raimundus defends the Incarnation, by saying that every infinite entity loves and understands its greater effect, which is, in God's case, the Incarnation.⁵⁸⁹ Raimundus also disagrees with 'Umar's statement that God, in His infinity, cannot bind Himself to the finite and temporal. According to him, God exalts the created by incarnating, which sanctifies His creation.⁵⁹⁰

2.6. ETERNITY

'Umar uses the eternity of God to explain that God cannot be a Trinity. Since God is eternal, He cannot have a beginning, which in turn means He cannot have been created. The fact that God cannot be created, or cannot have a beginning, also means that He cannot have the internal generation of the Persons – which would imply the creation of the divine. God's eternity also means He has no sequence or time within Himself. God therefore cannot have an act, which takes place within a time period. Furthermore, God cannot incarnate, since His divinity is eternal and cannot become a temporal being, which exists only one moment in time.⁵⁹¹

The eternity of God seems to have no base in Avicenna's works, but was mentioned extensively by al-Ġuwaynī. The similarities between a passage on eternity in al-Ġuwaynī's *Kitāb al-irshād ilā qawāṭi' al-adilla fī uṣūl al-I'tiqād*⁵⁹² are striking. Even though al-Ġuwaynī does not mention God's eternity in relation to the Trinity, we see clear similarities of the way both he and 'Umar discuss eternity. The character 'Umar follows al-Ġuwaynī in denying that God's eternity has a beginning or an end, and in stating that there is no 'sequence' or temporal order within God, since an infinite sequence would be impossible. According to al-Ġuwaynī, if God was produced temporally, then the same would be true for this very entity which produces God, and so there would be an infinite sequence of produced beings, going back in time eternally. According to al-Ġuwaynī, this is impossible. Therefore, God must be uncreated and eternal (and so without beginning), since He is the necessary being which lies at the base of creation. This same idea is mentioned by Ramon Llull in the section on goodness, when he describes the necessity of an infinite, eternal and uncreated goodness. According to him, there must be a kind of goodness which lies at the very base of every created goodness. This goodness is the divine goodness. If God's goodness were created, there would still be a divine goodness lying at the eventual base of this creation. Therefore, the existence of divine, eternal and uncreated goodness is an undeniable fact.⁵⁹³ For 'Umar and for al-Ġuwaynī, God's eternity means that nothing in God can be generated. Since God has no beginning, and since He is uncreated, He cannot 'make' or generate Himself, since this would imply beginning and temporality within an eternal being, which is then both necessary entity and contingent being. This matter is a

⁵⁸⁷ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 4, p. 206.

⁵⁸⁸ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 4, p. 206.

⁵⁸⁹ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 4, p. 206.

⁵⁹⁰ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 4, pp. 206-207.

⁵⁹¹ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, I, 1, 5, pp. 180-181.

⁵⁹² Al-Ġuwaynī, *A Guide to Conclusive Proof of the Principles of Belief* (cf. footnote 523 above), p. 20.

⁵⁹³ Cf. Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, I, 2, 1, p. 183.

more important matter for ‘Umar than for al-Ġuwaynī. ‘Umar also links this idea to the fact that God cannot have an internal act, which would imply time or sequence. Raimundus denies the claim made by ‘Umar. According to him, God’s eternity has an internal act and correlatives, without which it would be imperfect. Raimundus also claims that it would not be impossible for God to have an infinite act, since all creatures have the potentiality to have an infinite act, provided that they are supplied by sufficient resources to carry out this act. This means that God, who is infinite, eternal and all-powerful, should be capable of having even more power to act infinitely than created beings.⁵⁹⁴ Raimundus also replies to the claim made by ‘Umar, that God cannot be triune and cannot generate Persons, since there is no chronological sequence in Him. According to Raimundus, this would be true for the logic of the created and the temporal, but not for the eternal and the divine.⁵⁹⁵ He uses the same argument when he voices his disagreement with ‘Umar, who says that God cannot be triune because He has no beginning and end. Again, Raimundus says that this would be true if God was a temporal being, but He is above time itself.⁵⁹⁶

2.7. SIMPLICITY

Daiber compares ‘Umar’s connection of God with His simplicity with a passage in Ibn Sīnā’s *Kitāb an-nağāt*.⁵⁹⁷ In this passage, Ibn Sīnā discusses how the necessary entity needs to be ‘simple’ or ‘one-fold’. Throughout his chapter on simplicity, Ibn Sīnā stresses the fact that the first cause is simple and non-composite.⁵⁹⁸ Composition would mean that a certain entity contains form and matter, that it has accidents, and that it could be associated with another entity. This interpretation of composition leads ‘Umar to disagree with the Trinity. According to ‘Umar, there is also no ‘later’ or ‘earlier’ within God, meaning that God cannot emanate the Persons.⁵⁹⁹ Likewise, God’s simplicity means He cannot have any commonality, priority and posteriority, which rules out the generation of the Son and the Holy Ghost.⁶⁰⁰ This passage is reminiscent of the *Kitāb an-nağāt* by Ibn Sīnā, where he claims that God cannot be divisible into parts, due to their priority or posteriority in time, and due to the fact that anything which cannot independently exist, without attachment or association, cannot be a necessary being.⁶⁰¹ ‘Umar interprets the Trinity as the belief that God has three substances, but he denies that God is a substance since a substance is composed of form and matter, which is not possible in God:

“Further, the Saracen said: You, Christian, assume that the Father is a substance and the Son is a substance and the Holy Spirit is a substance. And because every

⁵⁹⁴ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 5, pp. 207-208.

⁵⁹⁵ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 5, p. 208.

⁵⁹⁶ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 5, p. 208.

⁵⁹⁷ Hans Daiber, “Raimundus Lullus in der Auseinandersetzung mit dem Islam” (cf. footnote 2 above), p. 146.

⁵⁹⁸ Avicenna, *Avicennae Metaphysices compendium*, trans. by Nematallah Caramé (Rome: Pontificum Institutum Orientalium Studiorum, 1926), pp. 72-74.

⁵⁹⁹ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, I, 1, 6, p. 181.

⁶⁰⁰ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, I, 1, 6, p. 181.

⁶⁰¹ Avicenna, *Avicennae Metaphysices compendium* (cf. footnote 598 above), pp. 72-74.

substance is composed of form and matter, it follows that any of the aforementioned substances is composed of form and matter.”⁶⁰²

‘Umar also claims that the mere act of creating the Persons would be impossible due to God’s simplicity. The bringing forth of the Son and the Holy Ghost would imply two separate actions, while the Person of the Son would have together one action and one passion (being generated from the Father and spirating the Holy Ghost with the Father), while the Holy Ghost would have two passions (being spirated by the Father and the Son). This multiplicity of actions and passions would subvert the simplicity of God.⁶⁰³

Raimundus answers most of ‘Umar’s claims by referring to the correlative theory. Most notably, Raimundus defends the notion of God as a substance, as one of the final co-essential attributes of God. While ‘Umar claims that the three Persons are not substances and that God cannot be substantial since He is not composed of form and matter, Raimundus claims that God is indeed a substance, but of an immaterial and non-temporal kind. He also includes substance as an attribute of God:

“The Christian said: ‘Every infinite being is a substance because it exists for itself. Yet God is an infinite being, as admitted by me and you; therefore God is a substance.

And when you say in the presentation of your position at the beginning of the book that goodness, greatness, etc., are not substantial for God, because no substance exists except through form and matter, I answer and say that you say something true of created substance, but not of the uncreated and infinite one. For as created substance exists by form and matter, so and much more, uncreated and infinite substance exists by its necessary entity, unity, singularity, eternity, itself existing as infinite form, divested of all matter.

It has been proven that God is a substance. Therefore, I will prove the blessed Trinity as follows: Every infinite substance is farther from an accident with ‘substancing’ than without ‘substancing’.

The reason for this is that it removes itself from any accident through infinite substancing. But God is an infinite substance, as has already been proved above; therefore God is further from an accident with substancing than without substancing. It follows that in the substance of God there are correlatives of equal importance, namely, a Substantiator and a Substantiating or Substantiated, without which the Substantiator could not be.

And those three I call the most blessed Trinity, existing in one substance, one Godhead, one God. It has been proven that God is a substance.”⁶⁰⁴

The arguments back and forth are heavily reminiscent of a passage in al-Ġuwaynī’s work. Al-Ġuwaynī connects the argument that God is not substantial with his own interpretation of the Christian Trinity. Just like ‘Umar, he disagrees with the view of God

⁶⁰² Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, I, 1, 6, p. 181. Translation by Annemarie C. Mayer.

⁶⁰³ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, I, 1, 6, p. 181.

⁶⁰⁴ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 7b, p. 215. Translation by Annemarie C. Mayer.

as a substance, which he links to Christian dogma. The Trinity is, according to him, posited on a substantial God, and al-Ġuwaynī vehemently disagrees with both dogmas.

“Chapter: Proving the impossibility that the Exalted Lord is a substance, some notes for a refutation of the Christians. In the idiom of the theologians, substance is what is spatially extended and we have already adduced a proof of the impossibility that the Creator is spatially extended. Substance is also often stipulated as that which received accidents. We have also already clearly established the impossibility of the Creator – hallowed and exalted is He – being susceptible to temporal contingencies. To whomever qualifies the Exalted Creator as a substance, the following dichotomy should be posed in rebuttal: if you intend, in speaking of Him as a substance, to characterize Him by the specific properties of substances, the proof of the impossibilities of that was given previously. Alternatively, you might intend the appellation not to carry with it the characterization that fits its property and particularity. However, either kind of appellation derives solely from tradition because reason provides no indication of them and there is no evidence for this sort of naming in traditional sources. It is, moreover, not permitted in any religion to make rules for the naming of the Creator arbitrarily.”⁶⁰⁵

Al-Ġuwaynī begins his refutation of God as a substance in a general way. According to him, God cannot be a substance, because a substance is a being that receives accidents, which are temporal. Moreover, a substance is a finite, individual entity that is ‘spatially extended’ and therefore limited. Since God is infinite, He cannot be a substance that occupies a defined locus in space. In this passage, al-Ġuwaynī warns his reader that, if one should rename God to fit the definition of substance, one might only be able to do so on the basis of tradition and not reason. Even this would be problematic since no tradition allows for a whimsical or ‘arbitrary’ redefining of God as a substance.

The idea that God is not a substance because He is not spatially extended is not mentioned literally by ‘Umar. However, *mutatis mutandis*, it can be compared with the argument that God does not have form and matter, by which He would take up space.

“The Christians teach that the Creator – hallowed and exalted is He beyond their claims – is a substance and that He is the third of a trinity. In His being a substance, they mean that He is the basis for the hypostases. The hypostases, according to them, are three: existence, life and knowledge. Further they call existence Father, knowledge, the word (also called the Son); and life, the Holy Spirit. The word [*logos*] does not mean speech in this instance because in their doctrine speech is created.

This means that these hypostases are, according to them, substance pure and simple without anything added. Substance is one and the hypostases are three. The hypostases, in their view, are not existent beings in and of themselves but rather they are possessions of substance that conform to modal states like the ones affirmed by those in Islam who accept the modes. The modal state is, for example, spatial extension in the case of substance; it is a mode that is additional to the substance’s existence. The modal state is characterized like this neither by non-existence nor by

⁶⁰⁵ Al-Ġuwaynī, *A Guide to Conclusive Proof of the Principles of Belief* (cf. footnote 523 above), p. 28.

existence but is instead an attribute of existence. The hypostases in Christian doctrine are conditions of the substrate to which these modal states apply.

Following this, they claim that the word is one with the Messiah and is clothed in His humanity. Various schools among them have different opinions about this Incarnation of the divine and the human. Some insist that it means that the word resides in the physical body of the Messiah in the same way an accident resides in its substrate. The Byzantines hold the doctrine that the word amalgamates with the body of the Messiah and mixes with it as thoroughly as might wine with milk.

These then are the basic principles of their doctrine and, in answer, we say to them: there is no sense in your restricting the hypostases in the manner you mention. What keeps you from claiming that the hypostases are four among which one is power? There is no better reason to exclude power from the list of hypostases than knowledge. Likewise, if it is permitted to argue that existence is a hypostasis, what prevents considering perpetuity a hypostasis? And, in accord with the preceding line of reasoning, such a consequence applies as well to hearing and seeing.”⁶⁰⁶

In this particular passage, al-Ġuwaynī explains how, according to his understanding, the idea of God as a substance lives in Christian dogma.⁶⁰⁷ Al-Ġuwaynī writes that Orthodox Christians believe that God is a substance, in so far as His substance is the “basis of the hypostases”. With hypostases, al-Ġuwaynī means the Persons of the Trinity. The substance of God is God Himself, the essence that never alters even if God is three Persons. Raimundus explains God in the same way: God’s substance is the basis, His essence never changes, even as His essence is a Trinity.

Al-Ġuwaynī continues by explaining the dogma of the Trinity. The three Persons are not existing entities in and of themselves, they are “modal states”. They describe how God exists. The hypostases are the “attributes of existence”. The concept “attributes of existence” are states of being, “attributes of existence” or “possessions of the substance” and should not be confounded with divine attributes. They are additional to the substance, without being separate beings themselves. This means that, according to this theory, the hypostases are not three times God, they are merely three ways in which God exist, meaning that God never loses His unity and remains essentially one entity. This is what Raimundus has been trying to say throughout the *Disputatio Raimundi*. God’s Trinity, explained with the theory of the correlatives, can be equated with the three “modes of existence,” since they describe God’s essence without being three separate entities. They are one essence, and constitute three manners of being God. They can be three and one since they do not imply any matter or form.

The hypostases, as al-Ġuwaynī explains them, are existence (the Father), knowledge (the Son); and life (the Holy Spirit).⁶⁰⁸ However, to al-Ġuwaynī, this sounds rather

⁶⁰⁶ Al-Ġuwaynī, *A Guide to Conclusive Proof of the Principles of Belief* (cf. footnote 523 above), pp. 28-29.

⁶⁰⁷ Simone Sari discusses al-Ġuwaynī’s interpretation of the Trinity in his article “‘Saracenus non considerat nomen Dei ita altum, sicut christianus’” (cf. footnote 11 above). He immediately also draws the link with Christian discussions of God as a substance and what this means for the Trinity: the *Sentences* by Peter Lombard (III, 6, 2, 5, 4, 2) and various passages in Augustine’s works.

⁶⁰⁸ This can be compared to a passage from the *Risālat al-Kindī*, a discussion between a Christian (al-Kindī, and a Muslim, in which al-Kindī states that God has two eternal attributes, life and knowledge. Al-

arbitrary, since these are only some of God's attributes. Al-Ġuwaynī wonders how power cannot be a hypostasis. This would mean God is not triune but, rather, exists in four Persons instead of three. Al-Ġuwaynī then argues that it would be possible to add hearing and seeing.

Raimundus sidesteps this problem completely. According to Him, God's attributes are not hypostases, rather they are God essentially. The three persons are, according to him, to be equated to the correlatives and not to certain divine attributes. Instead of defining God's hypostases with names that are traditionally held to be attributes, the correlatives are the same for every attribute, for which they each time form the "modal state". This way, Raimundus explains that God has to be three, that His attributes are not separate substances (since they are derivative from the same substance), and that they are descriptors of the substance (since they are symbolized by three [verbal] forms of the same attributes, all of which are convertible).

'Umar completely agrees with the interpretation of al-Ġuwaynī, that God cannot be a substance. He uses the same argument as al-Ġuwaynī, that God is not spatial and does not have any accidents. Just like al-Ġuwaynī, 'Umar connects the belief that God is a substance with the Christian Trinity: it is due to the fact that Christians call God a substance that they can describe Him as triune. However, by denying the possibility that God is a substance, 'Umar claims that God cannot be triune.⁶⁰⁹ However, Raimundus does argue that God is a substance, and that He is divine persons, and that each of them is of the same essence. Instead of equating every person with an attribute of God, his correlative theory seems to be a correction to the Trinitarian dogma of the hypostases, as recounted by al-Ġuwaynī.

2.8. LIFE

The last co-essential attribute that 'Umar poses is Life. This attribute is present in the works of many Islamic thinkers. Daiber⁶¹⁰ makes the connection to a passage in Ibn Sīnā's *Kitāb as-ṣifāh*,⁶¹¹ where life and knowing ('ilm) signify the same quality within God. Daiber also mentions 'the Living' as a divine name in al-Ġazālī's *Ninety-Nine Beautiful Names*.⁶¹² The

Kindī equates life with Christ, and knowledge with the Holy spirit. Cf. *Risalat al-Kindi, Dialogue islamo-chretien sous le Calife al-Ma'mun (813-834): Les epitres d'al-Hashimi et d'al-Kindi*, trans. by Georges Tartar (Paris: Nouvelles Editions Latines, 1985), pp. 125-127; This passage is discussed and cited by John V. Tolan, *Saracens: Islam in the Medieval European Imagination* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), p. 61.

⁶⁰⁹ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, I, 1, 6, p. 181.

⁶¹⁰ Hans Daiber, "Raimundus Lullus in der Auseinandersetzung mit dem Islam" (cf. footnote 2 above), p. 146.

⁶¹¹ Cf. Lat.: Avicenna, *Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina* (cf. footnote 565 above) vol. II, tract. VIII, cap. VII, p. 428: "Et uita eius est haec eadem etiam. Uita enim quae est apud nos perficitur apprehensione et actione quae est motio uenientibus ex duabus diuersis uiribus. Certum est autem esse animam apprehendentem; quod uero ipse intelligit omne causa est omnis et ipse est principium suae actionis quod est dare esse omni. Igitur una intentio de illo est apprehensio uiae dandi esse. Unde uita eius non est egens duabus uiribus ad hoc ut perficiatur duabus uiribus nec uita eius est alia a scientia eius quia hoc totum est ei per suam essentiam."

⁶¹² Cf. Al-Ġazālī, *Al-Maqsad al-asnā fī sharḥ asmā' Allāh al-husnā*, trans. by David B. Burrell (Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, 1999), p. 129: "63. Al-Hayy — the Living — is both agent and perceiver, so much so that one who does not act or perceive at all is dead. The lowest level of perception involves the one perceiving being conscious of itself, for what is not conscious of itself is inanimate and dead. But the

character of ‘Umar only mentions the attribute ‘life’ in connection to his own attacks against Christianity, and especially against the Incarnation. In ‘Umar’s eyes, it would be impossible to believe in an incarnate God, especially one that was crucified and killed, since this would be impossible in a forever-living entity.

‘Umar’s first argument is against the Trinity. ‘Umar’s main argument is subverting the correlative theory of ‘life’. Even though God has the attribute of ‘life’, ‘Umar believes it is impossible that God has the act of ‘living’, because this would imply an agent and a patient. The fact that these elements do not exist in God means that He is, in fact, not triune. This train of thought is quite strange, since it directly opposes the correlative theory, even though Raimundus still has to explain this theory. Arguably, Llull used this passage to underline the usefulness of the correlative theory.⁶¹³

‘Umar uses life in particular to deny the Incarnation: Christ as a human being was mortal, and during His crucifixion He would be both eternally alive (as He is God) and dead (since He is crucified).⁶¹⁴ This would be impossible, since God can only ever be life. Raimundus’ answer is that, even though Christ did die in a temporal way (meaning His soul and body were separated), He was also alive in a supernatural way: Christ’s soul was one with the divine soul.⁶¹⁵

2.9. CONCLUSION

The first category of attributes consist of every attribute the character ‘Umar finds essential. Llull was inspired by the division between the attributes of God, made by al-Ġuwaynī, between attributes which describe God’s essence, and attributes which describe God’s act within the created universe. Llull adopted this dichotomy when writing the *Disputatio Raimundi* in the voice of ‘Umar. However, he did not literally borrow every attribute which al-Ġuwaynī placed in these categories. While al-Ġuwaynī mentions hearing and speaking as some of the non-essential attributes of God, Ramon Llull replaces them with the attributes he typically discusses in his œuvre. While there is some overlap between the essential attributes of al-Ġuwaynī and the ones used by the character ‘Umar in the *Disputatio Raimundi*, the essential attributes mainly consist of the building blocks of Llull’s own metaphysical description of God. The dichotomy between the attributes of God is built on Islamic standards, but is interpreted according to Llull’s own philosophy.

The first category of non-essential attributes is meant to answer a few questions: (i) how can God be a Trinity if He is eternal and infinite, and if infinity and eternity cannot be divided into a certain number? (ii) How can God be perfectly one (due to His simplicity, unity and singularity) while also having a Trinity? Is this not a *contradictio in terminis* when it comes to God being infinite, eternal and the necessary being? (iii) How can God

perfect and absolute living thing is one under whose perception all perceived things are arranged, as are all existing things under its activity, so that no perceived thing escapes its knowledge and no action its activity, and that is God — great and glorious, for He is the absolutely living one. As for every living thing other than He, its life is commensurate with its perception and its activity, and all of that is circumscribed within narrow limits. Furthermore, the living things diverge among themselves in this, and their ranking is a function of this divergence, as we indicated earlier in considering the ranks of angels, men, and beasts.”

⁶¹³ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, I, 1, 7, p. 182.

⁶¹⁴ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, I, 1, 7, p. 182.

⁶¹⁵ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 7, p. 216.

be incarnated if He is infinite, eternal and one, and contingent beings are not? The fact that the first category of God's attributes does not have to be proven to be essential to Him does not mean that they do not pose any problems in debate between Muslims and Christians. Lull still needs to reconcile the essential attributes of God with Christian dogma, and show that they are in accord. In the second category of attributes, which 'Umar deems non-essential, Lull will need to prove that they are essential to God, and that they can have an eternal and infinite (intrinsic) effect, without destroying or altering creation. Even though Raimundus himself sees no difference between the first and second category of attributes, he still needs to debate each category in a different way, due to the preceding arguments made by the character of 'Umar. Therefore, the order of and the division between the attributes made by 'Umar, is still respected by Raimundus.

3. THE NON-ESSENTIAL ATTRIBUTES IN THE *DISPUTATIO RAIMUNDI*

3.1. INTRODUCTION

'Umar next discusses the 'qualities', which he deems non-essential to God. However, as mentioned above, Raimundus does not differentiate between essential and non-essential attributes, since he deems every attribute inherently essential to God. These qualities are goodness, greatness, power, understanding, will, virtue, truth, glory, perfection, justice, and mercy. According to 'Umar, these attributes describe God's action within the created universe, but not His essence or His very intrinsic being. God's goodness is a reflection of His nature within creation, His power is connected to His potency to create and sustain the universe, and His understanding signifies the connection of His intellect, which is omniscient, to the universe. When discussing each attribute, 'Umar will first explain why the attributes are not essential, in order to prove the Islamic view on the attributes. His main argument is that God's attributes cannot be eternal, since this would mean that their effect (in the created world, or within God Himself) is eternal, which would be impossible. From there, 'Umar attempts to prove that the Trinity cannot exist, since the non-essential attributes do not create another eternal, infinite and perfect being. Lastly, 'Umar argues for every attribute of God that the Incarnation cannot exist. His arguments for this point of view depend on the attribute which is discussed.

Raimundus' arguments against 'Umar's interpretation of the attributes of God mirror the latter's *exposé*. Rather than claim that this category of attributes describes God's action within the created world alone, Raimundus explains to 'Umar that the attributes he claims to be non-essential are indeed essential and describe God's very nature. God's goodness, power and wisdom do not merely describe God's act within the created universe. Rather, their primary act is upon God's very essence. God's goodness, power and understanding primarily exist for the act of bonifying, enabling and knowing Himself. Raimundus explains this interpretation of the attributes of God by continuing to refer to the correlative theory – as he has done when discussing the attributes which 'Umar deems non-essential. He immediately makes the connection to the Trinity: the act of God's attributes is the Holy Ghost, the agent is the Father, and the object or effect is the Son.

3.2. GOODNESS

The debate commences with the attribute goodness, the most exemplary of the attributes. According to ‘Umar, God’s goodness cannot be God’s essence, since this would make goodness *in se* infinite and boundless, meaning that there would only be goodness in the created world. This is impossible, according to ‘Umar.

“1. The Saracen said: God is good, for He acts in a good way in the created and created a good world. It is not that God would act according to His essence, bringing forth with His goodness something good; like the sun, which in lower things does not act according to its essence by bringing forth a sun, but practically causes the warm and dry with its virtue or by its shining. In a similar way, and even much more so, God practically causes goodness or the created goodnesses.

2. God is not His goodness, but goodness is a quality of His. For if He Himself were goodness, His goodness would be infinite and eternal. Whence it would follow, that there could be no evil; just like there could be no water provided the fire had infinite and eternal wood to burn; for it would burn all that is in the sky and the sky itself. And outside of the sky the sun would do the same thing, if the sun were warm and dry by itself; for it would burn up all the water and all the elements.”⁶¹⁶

This passage reflects what Lullus writes in the *Ars generalis ultima*, finished in the same year as the *Disputatio Raimundi* (Pisa, 1308). According to Lullus, Muslims do not understand the true nature of the divine attributes. They believe that the attributes of God only apply to His acting in the created world. If they applied to God’s very essence, however, Muslims believe that it would mean that they would be boundless and infinite. Accordingly, their effect within the created universe would also be infinite. Lullus vehemently disagrees with this, as can be seen from this passage of the *Art*:

“We inquired into the divine dignities and found that in God they are co-essential and substantial from eternity and in eternity. The final purpose of their existence is within themselves and not outside, for otherwise they and God would exist by accident, which is impossible. Now this argues against certain Saracens who believe that they have an elevated and subtle knowledge of God when they say that God is One and as such has no dignities in himself, but only has them for acting in creatures. In other words, He is good in order to create good creatures and great in order to create great creatures eternal so that creatures can be durable etc. Their statements involve an obvious contradiction, because if things were as they say, then if God was infinite due to his dignities, He would create infinite and eternal creatures, which He does not do, for as they themselves say, the world is new and limited in size. They imply a further contradiction when they call God the prime cause, because He would not be the prime cause if his reasons were only meant for the world, and thus God would exist with his dignities for the sole purpose of enabling the world to exist, which is a totally absurd thing to say.”⁶¹⁷

⁶¹⁶ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, I, 2, 1, p. 183. Translation by Annemarie C. Mayer.

⁶¹⁷ Lullus, *Ars generalis ultima*, CCCM, 75, ROL, XIV, 9, 1, p. 191. Translation: Abbott, Damberg, *Raymond Lull’s Ars Magna* (cf. footnote 147 above), p. 118.

Llull's detraction of Islamic thought in the *Ars generalis ultima* is echoed by the attack by 'Umar. His character seems to reflect the idea that Muslims do not believe in co-essential attributes, since they believe that these attributes have an infinite effect. However, Raimundus rejects it as implausible that God's attributes solely exist to effectuate creation. The passages in both the *Disputatio Raimundi* and the *Ars generalis ultima* can be compared to the same thoughts in Islamic theology. Daiber mentions Ibn Sīnā and al-Ġazālī as possible sources.⁶¹⁸ The theory that God's attributes are not co-essential but rather a description of His action in the world can be found in Ibn Sīnā's thought. According to Ibn Sīnā, God's attributes do not describe His essence, but only His existence, in as far as they become apparent by His acts within creation.⁶¹⁹ This is an interesting parallel with the passage in the *Ars*, where Llull lambasts this very theory. Al-Ġazālī describes God's goodness as the something which can be said about His act within the world in his *Maqāsid*. According to al-Ġazālī, God's *being* is the source of being in every created entity, which is adapted according to their very nature. Al-Ġazālī also uses a comparison of the sun to fortify his own reasoning: the light of the sun is not caused by any other being but the sun itself. Therefore, it is the source of all existing light within the world. This means that the sun can, *mutatis mutandis*, be compared to the necessary being, since it is uncreated and uncaused, but in turn causes every other being (or light source) which is its derivative.⁶²⁰ This is reminiscent of 'Umar's comparison, that the sun has the action of delivering light to the world, but that the sun's act is not co-essential since it does not bring forth another sun: after proving that God's goodness is not part of His essence, 'Umar proceeds to criticize the belief in the Trinity by stating that God cannot bring forth the divine Persons, since He cannot bring a perfect entity into being (like the sun cannot bring forth another sun).⁶²¹ 'Umar also argues against the Incarnation, since God's goodness, which is primordial, cannot become a goodness which is 'later', or created.⁶²²

Raimundus' reply is based on the proof, on his part, that the attributes of God are indeed co-essential. This co-essential nature of the attributes is necessary to understand and explain the correlative theory, and vice versa. Raimundus explains that God's goodness is co-essential since there has to be a 'necessary goodness', which lies at the base of the created goodness. If God's goodness is not uncreated (if it has a beginning and is not timeless), there has to be another goodness which caused its creation. Since this would again require

⁶¹⁸ Cf. Hans Daiber, "Raimundus Lullus in der Auseinandersetzung mit dem Islam" (cf. footnote 2 above), pp. 148-149.

⁶¹⁹ Harry A. Wolfson, *Studies in the History of Philosophy and Religion* (cf. footnote 516 above) vol. I, p. 151: "So also Avicenna, after he has laid down the general principle that all the predicates are properties, explains that as properties they do not show the essence of God; they show only His existence. And even as showing the existence of God they show it only by describing the actions of God or by describing His unlikeness to other beings, so that, even when predicates are adjectival or positive in form, they are to be interpreted as actions of God or as negations in meaning."

⁶²⁰ Al-Ġazālī, *Algazel's Metaphysics* (cf. footnote 571 above), p. 61: "(...) sequitur tunc quod mundo primum principium est id quod necesse est per se, et quod est unum omni modo, et cuius esse est a se ipso. Immo ipse est verum, et purum esse in seipso, et ipse est origo essendi aliud a se. Esse igitur eius est perfectum, et perfectissimum, ita quod omnia quecumque sunt, habent esse ab illo secundum ordinem suum. Et comparatio esse aliorum ad suum esse, est sicut comparatio lucis aliorum corporum ad lucem solis. Sol enim lucet per se non per aliud illuminans illum; est igitur fons lucis omni lucenti, eo quod emittit lucem a se in aliud a se, sine separatione alicuius a se, sed lux sue essencie est causa adventus lucis in aliud a se; hoc autem exemplum est congruum, si sol esset lux per se sine subiecto; est autem lux in corpore quod est subiectum; esse vero primi qui est fons esse universitatis non est in subiecto, differt enim adhuc alio modo scilicet, quod lux venit ab ipso sole naturaliter tantum, sic ut sol nullam habeat scienciam, que sit causa adventus eius."

⁶²¹ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, I, 2, 1, p. 183.

⁶²² Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, I, 2, 1, p. 183.

the existence of an uncreated goodness, it becomes apparent that the existence of primordial, infinite goodness is inevitable.

“(…) I adopt those three terms for better explanation: a b c. I take it that ‘a’ means eternity from eternity, ‘b’ goodness not from eternity, and ‘c’ goodness in eternity. Yet the goodness of God either exists from eternity or it does not. So if it does not, it is new.

And if we suppose it to be new in ‘c’, then when God created it in ‘c’, God ought to have had power in ‘b’, for without antecedent power He could not create it. For creation cannot exist without preceding power.

So there was power in ‘b’ earlier than in ‘c’. And that power which was in ‘b’ was good, because it was an effect of God. Now if we suppose that the created goodness had been created in ‘b’, it must have been created with power, which existed in ‘a’, without which God could not have created it in ‘b’; for God can do nothing without power, as He understands nothing without understanding, and loves nothing without will.

The power, therefore, by which God created in ‘b’ was in ‘a’. And that power was good because a power that exists from eternity must be good. And that power was good through goodness, because it could not have been good without goodness.

So goodness was as early from eternity as the power by which it was created. It follows that there are two goodnesses, distinguished from eternity by their essence: One is the divine goodness, the other is the created goodness preserved in it.

And so allegedly the singularity of divine eternity is destroyed, and also its unity and infinity; this is false and impossible, as is evident from what I and you have said in the chapter on singularity. From this it is concluded that the divine goodness does not differ from God by its essence, nor somehow from His necessary entity, nor from His unity, etc. And what we have said of the divine goodness by ‘a’, ‘b’, ‘c’, may also be said of the divine greatness, power, etc., up to the divine mercy.

In that step you can see how much the understanding of the Christians exceeds the understanding of the Saracens in contemplating the majesty of the divine attributes.”⁶²³

This passage in Raimundus’ part of the *Disputatio Raimundi*, where he tries to undermine ‘Umar’s attack on Christianity, proves a few major points concerning God’s goodness (and His other attributes, by extension). First of all, God’s goodness is co-essential, and as necessary as He Himself. Secondly, God’s goodness has no beginning, since otherwise it would need to be caused by another goodness. This last part is reminiscent of a passage in al-Ġuwaynī’s *Kitāb al-Irshād*, as I have mentioned in the section on simplicity, which likewise deals with eternity and timelessness. The passage in this work is devoted to showing how God, in His eternity, has no beginning. Al-Ġuwaynī tries to show how the existence of an eternal, infinite, unbegun first cause is a necessity, in order for a temporal chain of causation to exist. According to al-Ġuwaynī, God cannot have a beginning, precisely because He is the first cause. If God had a beginning, He would have

⁶²³ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 8, p. 217. Translation by Annemarie C. Mayer.

a cause that lies at the base of His creation. This cause would also have to be caused, if it was not infinite or if it had a beginning. The cause of this cause would also have to have a cause, in its turn. The number of causes would be infinite, and it would rule out the very existence of a first cause – and deny the very nature and necessity of God as the necessary entity. This is impossible, according to al-Ġuwaynī.

“Our master – may God’s mercy be with him – noted that each existent that is continuous in its existence extends over a prolonged time is called ancient [*qadīm*] in conventional speech. God, the Exalted, has said, ‘...until it returns like an old [*qadīm*] palm-bough’ [36:39]. Our purpose, however, is to prove, in the case at hand, that the existence of the eternal has no beginning. The proof is that, if it were temporally produced, it would have had a producer. If so, the same could be said of its producer. The result is the affirmation of a series of temporally produced things which have no beginning term, and the falsehood in that outcome was already made quite clear.

Someone else might remark at this point that affirming an existent that has no beginning is to affirm temporal periods that follow successively without end, since the continuous duration of existence is not intelligible except in terms of temporal units. This leads to the affirmation of a temporal series without a first term. Our answer is that this is an error on the part of those who believe it because temporal units are indicated as such on account of things that exist in conjunction with one another. Each existing thing bears a relationship to the thing which is in conjunction with it and that relationship defines its temporal moment. In ordinary usage this determination shows up in temporal periodization based on the movements of the heavenly spheres and the alternation of night and day.

Thus, although this stipulation applies in respect to the meaning of time, that it be conjoined with another existent is, nevertheless, not a condition for the existence of a thing. Hence the attachment of one of the two to the other is not a requisite intellectual presupposition in this matter. If every existent must have a temporal period and yet the temporal periods are measured by an existent which itself in turn requires temporal periods, this leads to absurdities no reasonable person embraces. Prior to the advent of temporally produced things, the Creator – hallowed is He – was alone in His existence and in His attributes, and nothing temporal was connected to Him in any way.”⁶²⁴

According to al-Ġuwaynī, God cannot have a beginning, since the universe needs a first cause. There can be no infinite succession, which goes back eternally. This would not agree with God’s divinity, since a succession of causes which are in relation with each other implies temporality, and there can be no temporality in God. Moreover, God’s infinity and His being above the temporal is necessary, since the temporal cannot be ‘measured’ by a divine being which, in turn, is temporal. Therefore, it is proven that God is, in fact, eternal and infinite ‘going back’ and ‘going forward’. He lacks an end, but also a beginning since He is uncreated.

⁶²⁴ Al-Ġuwaynī, *A Guide to Conclusive Proof of the Principles of Belief* (cf. footnote 523 above), p. 20.

The character Raimundus discusses God's goodness in almost the same manner, to prove to 'Umar that God's goodness is co-essential. However, he bases his argumentation directly on the fact that there has to be one supreme goodness at the base of every created goodness, and not purely on the fact that God Himself is entirely uncaused – therefore taking an eternal sequence of causation out of the picture. The theory of al-Ġuwaynī could also have been used by Raimundus in the section on “Necessary Entity”. However, Raimundus does more than just prove the necessity of God and His attributes by taking over the theory of al-Ġuwaynī. Raimundus proves the necessity of God's goodness and all of His other attributes as the primal causes of their derivatives in creation, and therefore, their co-essentiality to God. While Ibn Sīnā would argue that God's goodness especially describes His act within creation – a theory which Llull reviled – Raimundus proves the necessity and divinity of an eternal goodness, in order to prove the fact that goodness is part of God's essence, due to the fact that it, like every divine attribute, is inherently a necessary being, and that God therefore *is* His attributes. Another difference between the manner in which Raimundus uses the argument by al-Ġuwaynī is the fact that he inverts a part of the theory. While al-Ġuwaynī already accepted the fact that God is the eternal first cause *ab initio*, Raimundus needs to explain why God's goodness is the first cause of every created goodness. 'Umar himself does not argue against this theory at all, he only uses the comparison of the sun to argue that God's goodness is not co-essential.

3.3. GREATNESS

The attribute of greatness can be found as a Qur'ānic name of God, namely al-Kabīr (the Great). This name is explained at length by al-Ġazālī, who provides his readers with a theory which is reminiscent of the Ars. In this theory, he claims that God's greatness is “identical to the perfection of the essence”:

“38. *Al-Kabīr* – the Great – is one who possesses greatness [*kibriyā'*], where greatness is identical with the perfection of essence, and by ‘perfection of essence’ I mean perfection of existence. Now perfection of existence resolves to two things: first, His enduring in an everlasting and eternal manner. [...] Now if one whose span of existence is long may be called ‘great’, even though the span of his enduring might be limited, the one whose enduring is everlasting and eternal, and to whom non-existence is impossible, is even more deserving of being ‘great’. Secondly, His existence is that existence from which emanates the existence of every existing thing. So if the one whose existence is perfected in itself is said to be perfect and great, the one from whom existence pours forth to all existing things is even more deserving of being perfect and great.”⁶²⁵

God's greatness is not exactly necessarily described as co-essential by al-Ġazālī, but His greatness is described as absolute, since He is the source of the created world. However, 'Umar's logic is more akin to the detraction of Islam as we have read in the Ars, mentioned in the chapter on God's goodness. According to 'Umar, God's greatness describes His act of creating a great world and great creatures. God's greatness does not lie in His essence, though, since His creation is not eternally great and without limits. If God's greatness was part of God's essence, He would have an infinite extension. However, 'Umar claims that

⁶²⁵ Al-Ġazālī, *Al-Maqṣad al-asnā fī sharḥ asmā' Allāh al-husnā* (cf. footnote 612 above), p. 105.

God cannot have an infinite extension, since He is not a spatial entity. Therefore, His greatness only defines His material creation, which has a spatial extension. Moreover, God is not great in an ‘intensive’ measure, since intensive measure is not present in the essence of greatness.⁶²⁶

This same argument can be found in the Commentary on *Metaphysics* book XII by Ibn Rušd, where he discusses the concept of greatness. According to Ibn Rušd, no infinite being can partake in infinite “magnitude,” since magnitude supposes the existence of a finite entity which can be divided and does not have various parts. It is clear that Ibn Rušd criticized the belief in an infinite, divine greatness, since God is not finite and since that which is infinite is not spatially extended. Ibn Rušd first summarizes the ideas of Aristotle concerning the absence of magnitude in an infinite being.

“Aristotle says: It is clear from what has been said that there is a substance which is eternal, immovable and separate from sensible things. It has been explained that this substance cannot have any magnitude at all; on the contrary it has neither parts, nor divisions because it moves eternally and no finite thing can have an infinite power. If every magnitude is either infinite or finite, then it will not be in a finite magnitude, nor will it be infinite because there is no infinite magnitude at all. It is also clear that it will not be affected or alter, for all other motions are posterior to local motion.”

Ibn Rušd next summarizes his own interpretation of Aristotle’s ideas concerning the absence of magnitude in the divine. He focuses mainly on the fact that God lacks physicality.

“Commentary: (...) He also recalls that when he says: ‘it has been explained that this substance cannot have any magnitude at all; on the contrary it has neither parts, nor divisions’. He means: it has been shown in the *Physics* that this mover cannot be a faculty in a body, nor a body because it has no parts and is not divisible, neither essentially nor accidentally, and every body has parts and is divisible.”⁶²⁷

The idea that God cannot be eternal greatness, due to His lack of spatiality, can be compared to the idea of ‘Umar that God cannot essentially be great. God’s greatness does not describe or define God Himself, but rather the effect of God in creation, or the fact that God creates great things. The reason why God cannot be infinitely great, according to ‘Umar is, like in the argument of Ibn Rušd, because God is not spatially extended. The lack of spatial extension in the divine stems from His immateriality, which is the necessary consequence of His infinity. The immateriality or non-physicality of God is also an important aspect in the interpretation of Ibn Rušd.

‘Umar proceeds to demonstrate, again, how the non-essential nature of divine greatness makes the Trinity impossible. Just like in his exposé on goodness, he describes how God cannot bring forth an eternally great creature, because His greatness is not part of His essence, and can only effectuate created, finite greatness.⁶²⁸

⁶²⁶ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, I, 2, 2, p. 184.

⁶²⁷ Ibn Rušd, *Ibn Rušd’s Metaphysics* (cf. footnote 572 above), pp. 162-163.

⁶²⁸ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, I, 2, 2, p. 184.

Furthermore, ‘Umar denies that God’s greatness would leave room for the Incarnation. According to him, greatness is not divisible, since divisibility only counts for a body, which greatness (as a concept) is not. If God’s greatness incarnated as a whole, it would mean that the man Jesus Christ were infinitely great in size – which is not the case. Since God’s greatness also cannot partially incarnate (since greatness is indivisible), it means that the Incarnation is not possible.⁶²⁹

Raimundus’ reply consists of the redefinition of greatness and measure. According to him, God can be great, not by His material measure (which He does not have), but rather by His spiritual measure. Raimundus indirectly accuses ‘Umar, and the Islamic point of view he represents, to be too earthly and too materially oriented.

“When you say that if God were His greatness, a violation would follow, etc., I answer and say that God has no extensive measure; and that you say something true about it.

But as for His spiritual measure, He has an immeasurable and infinite measure; like eternity, which is an immeasurable measure.

And so also may be said of the divine unity, infinity, etc.; and also of the divine Trinity, which has been proved in the above chapters.”⁶³⁰

Raimundus also defends the Trinity by using the divine correlatives. According to him, God’s greatness would not be immeasurable without the act of magnifying, which, in turn, requires an agent and a patient. These three elements are called the Trinity.⁶³¹

3.4. POWER

The passage on God’s power seems to be based, in the first place, on the *Ars generalis ultima* and not in the first place on Islamic sources. However, Daiber⁶³² connects the attribute ‘power’ to Ibn Sīnā’s *Kitāb an-nağāt*⁶³³ and his *al-Ilāhiyyāt*⁶³⁴ as the word *qadr*. Daiber also mentions that al-Ġazālī discusses the same attribute in a passage in the *Maqāsid*.⁶³⁵ Especially the comparison of God’s power in the *Disputatio Raimundi* and in the works by al-Ġazālī can lead to interesting conclusions. While ‘Umar argued that God’s will is not divine and co-essential to Him, since He cannot create eternally powerful beings, al-Ġazālī did not reflect that point of view. In the *Maqāsid*, al-Ġazālī argued that God’s

⁶²⁹ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, I, 2, 2, p. 184.

⁶³⁰ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 9, pp. 219-220. Translation by Annemarie C. Mayer.

⁶³¹ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 9, p. 220.

⁶³² Hans Daiber, “Raimundus Lullus in der Auseinandersetzung mit dem Islam” (cf. footnote 2 above), p. 150.

⁶³³ Cf. Ibn Sīnā, *Kitāb an-nağāt* (cf. footnote 562 above), p. 603 (cited by Hans Daiber).

⁶³⁴ Cf. Ibn Sīnā, *Kitāb as-ṣifāh: al-Ilāhiyyāt*, vol. II., ed. by Yusuf M. Mūsā, Sulaiman Dunyā, and Said Zāyid (Cairo: Al-Hay’ a al-‘amma li-ṣū’ūn al-maṭābi’ al-amīriyya, 1960), p. 343 (cited by Hans Daiber).

⁶³⁵ Cf. Al-Ġazālī, *Algazel’s Metaphysics* (cf. footnote 571 above), p. 77: “Sentencia octava est quod primus est potens quod sic probatur; de potente hoc intelligitur ut faciat cum voluerit, et non faciat cum noluerit et huius modi est ipse. Iam enim ostendimus quod voluntas eius est sciencia eius. Et quia quod scivit bonum esse ut sit, illud est, et quod scivit quia quod scivit bonum esse ut sit, illud est, et quod scivit melius esse ut non sit, illud non est. Si quis autem dixerit quomodo potest hoc esse verum, cum secundum philosophos ipse non possit destruere celos ad terram, dicitur quod si vellet, destrueret, non vult autem destruere, quoniam eterna voluntas eius est ut sit esse perpetuum.”

power is eternal (even though he did not mention whether it is co-essential to God), and that it is only bordered and limited by the will of God. One example in al-Ġazālī's argumentation is that God has the potency to end all of creation. The fact that He does not go this far, is not due to the extent of His power, but due to the extent of His will. 'Umar's theory is, therefore, not directly based on al-Ġazālī or even Ibn Sīnā or Ibn Rušd, but on the subversion of Ramon Llull's *Ars*. 'Umar again explains the same interpretation of Islamic theology, mentioned in the *Ars*, that God's power cannot be co-essential, since He cannot create eternally powerful beings.⁶³⁶ Since God's power is not co-essential, it means that God cannot have an infinite act. 'Umar compares this fact to the illuminating power of one candle, which does not light the entire universe.⁶³⁷ 'Umar denies the Incarnation in a way which is not mentioned in the *Ars*. According to him, God's power cannot create the Incarnation, since it is not possible that one single existing power can turn a cause (God) into an effect (human being). Since God and human being are different in nature, because God is the ultimate cause and humankind is His creation, the Incarnation is impossible.⁶³⁸ Raimundus refutes 'Umar's attacks, by saying that God has co-essential power, since every infinite entity has to have co-essential power.⁶³⁹ Raimundus then proceeds by explaining the Trinity by using the correlative theory.⁶⁴⁰ He also rejects the comparison made by 'Umar, that God does not have infinite power like a candle cannot light the air of the entire universe. According to Raimundus, created power has inherent infinite potency, if it is given sufficient means – therefore, a candle can light the air of the universe, if given a sufficient amount of fuel. This means that God, by necessity, needs to have the same infinite potency – which is fully realized.⁶⁴¹

Ramon Llull discusses the supposed Islamic idea that God cannot be infinite power in his *Liber de ente*.⁶⁴² Here, he attributes the idea to Ibn Rušd. However, Ibn Rušd never mentioned in his works that he believed in the limitation of God's power. The reason why Llull attributes this belief to Ibn Rušd is, according to him, because Ibn Rušd believed that God cannot create that which is similar to Him. In other words: God's power is not infinite, according to Ibn Rušd, because God cannot create another God. This argument can be found throughout the *Disputatio Raimundi*, when 'Umar argues that God does not create or enact Himself. However, it is not clear which passage in the works of Ibn Rušd Llull based his theory on. The argument attributed to Ibn Rušd can be found in the list of Condemnations of Paris from 1277,⁶⁴³ where the statement is mentioned that Averroists believe that God cannot generate that which is equal to Him, since that which is created has a beginning or "principle" on which it depends. Therefore, it is not a sign of perfection within God to be created. Therefore, one could argue that 'Umar primarily reflects the ideas attributed to the Averroists, and not in the first place the original ideas of Ibn Rušd. In 1298, Llull had discussed the statement, which was part of the condemnations, being "*Quod Deus*

⁶³⁶ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, I, 2, 3, p. 185.

⁶³⁷ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, I, 2, 3, p. 185.

⁶³⁸ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, I, 2, 3, p. 185.

⁶³⁹ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 10, p. 221.

⁶⁴⁰ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 10, p. 221.

⁶⁴¹ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 10, p. 221.

⁶⁴² Lullus, *De ente*, CCCM, 34, ROL, VIII, IV, p. 214.

⁶⁴³ *La condamnation parisienne de 1277*, ed. by Claude Lafleur, and David Piché (Paris: Vrin, 1999), p. 292: "Quod Deus non potest generare sibi similem. Quod enim generatur ab aliquo, habet principium aliquod, a quo dependet. Et quod in Deum generare non est signum perfectionis."

non potest generare sibi similem. Quod enim generatur ab aliquod, a quo dependet. Et quod in Deo generare non est signum perfectionis.” The argument of the character of Socrates, who defends the statement that God cannot generate His own equal against the condemnation, is that God cannot create a perfect being, since creation would imply finiteness and corruption.⁶⁴⁴ The arguments of the character Raimundus in this passage of the *Declaratio Raimundi* are the same as Raimundus’ arguments in the *Disputatio Raimundi*: that it is only true if it pertains to the secondary (material) creation, and that God generates the Persons in eternity from His entire essence and His entire nature and substance, and that they are, therefore, all equal.⁶⁴⁵ It is therefore apparent that the argument of Raimundus predated the *Disputatio Raimundi*, and that it was an argument which could be used against Averroism as well as Islamic theology, in particular based on the works of Ibn Rušd.

3.5. UNDERSTANDING

For the attribute of understanding, or the intellect, ‘Umar again attempts to prove it is not co-essential with God. However, he uses a different argument this time, which cannot be found in the *Ars*. The main question at stake is whether God can possibly understand and know Himself, or have Himself as the object of His intellect. According to ‘Umar, God’s understanding is not co-essential, since this would mean that God understands Himself. Understanding supposes a difference between act and object, which cannot exist within God. Moreover, God has no nature which He can understand, since nature would require a position or order within the temporal.

“The Saracen said: God has understanding, by means of which He understands.

No, the understanding is not God. For understanding puts differences between its act and object; which cannot be in God because there is no difference in an infinite and eternal being. Furthermore, if God were understanding, He would understand Himself naturally.

Yet there can be no nature in God. For every nature exists by a beginning and an end point and by its act; which are the same with it by essence and it is the essence that is contained in them.

The point of beginning determines the matter; the point of ending determines the form; yet ‘naturating’ is the act that exists in ‘happening’ and not in ‘having happened’. However those three concepts cannot be God’s essence, nor can they be in it, since it is infinite and eternal; therefore God does not have a nature, but with His understanding He ‘naturates’ the ‘nurable’ created things.

Furthermore, if God were naturally understanding, He would, as He naturally understood Himself, naturally make Himself good and make Himself great, and make Himself infinite and eternal and possible, etc.; which is impossible, because no being makes itself.”⁶⁴⁶

⁶⁴⁴ Lullus, *Declaratio Raimundi*, CCCM, 79, ROL, XVII, p. 263.

⁶⁴⁵ Lullus, *Declaratio Raimundi*, CCCM, 79, ROL, XVII, pp. 263-264.

⁶⁴⁶ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, I, 2, 4, pp. 185-186. Translation by Annemarie C. Mayer.

Remarkably, in the Islamic theological world, there were no defenders of the view that God could not think Himself. The Islamic debate about God's intellect can be traced back to both Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Rušd. Daiber in particular connects the correlatives of intellect (intelligens, intelligibilis, intelligere) with Ibn Sīnā's philosophical discussion of the Arabic verbal forms 'aql, 'āqil, and ma'qūl,⁶⁴⁷ which come from the same root 'aql, or understanding, knowing. According to Ibn Sīnā, God's intellect has itself as an object, since God is immaterial. In beings which are immaterial and pure intellect, thinker and thought are the same.⁶⁴⁸ Ibn Rušd interprets the divine intellect in almost the same manner. He believed that it was only possible for God to really know Himself. Since God's intellect is infinite and eternal, and also due to its unity, this means that it can have no internal differentiation. This differentiation would come into existence if there was a difference between the divine intellect and the object of the divine intellect (the thinker/thinking and the thought). Therefore, God cannot have another being as the object of His intellect. This is why, in Ibn Rušd's opinion, God can *only* truly have Himself as an object. According to Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Rušd, this does not mean that God cannot have a knowledge of the created world, however. While God's intellect has only really Himself as an object, He also understands Himself as the creator of the finite, and therefore He understands creation. The knowledge of the created things does not come from those very particulars (for example, through the senses), and God's intellect does not have the particulars as its immediate object; rather, God understands creation as that which comes from His own act of creation, and from His understanding of Himself as the source of the created world. In the case of Ibn Sīnā, this means that God's knowledge is universal, meaning that He has purely conceptual knowledge of creation, as far as it is defined by God Himself, who is the source.⁶⁴⁹ Just like 'Umar, the Islamic philosophers believe that there can be no difference between the understanding and the understood within God. However, 'Umar proposes the opposite solution to this problem, namely that God cannot know Himself, since this would imply an internal difference within God (or between the understanding God and the understood God). According to Ibn Rušd, the opposite is true. Since there can be no difference between act and object within God, He can only truly understand Himself, since by understanding Himself, the object and the subject of His act are essentially the same being, which implies the complete lack of differentiation within the essence of God. The differentiation that 'Umar claims to exist in a triune God is generally based on a more temporal interpretation of God's essence, which is almost seen by 'Umar as something which resembles the material and the measurable. Arguably, the theory of Ibn Rušd and Ibn Sīnā lies closer to the theory of the correlatives, which states that God needs to have an internal act, of which He Himself is the object. Ibn Rušd defends the view that God understands Himself in his commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* XII, and even sees this as the only possible outcome of God's intellect being infinite and perfect.

“His words: ‘in this way, intellection is of itself throughout eternity’ mean ‘because it does not think anything outside itself, since it is simple, its thinking itself is

⁶⁴⁷ Cf. Hans Daiber, “Raimundus Lullus in der Auseinandersetzung mit dem Islam” (cf. footnote 2 above), pp. 150-151.

⁶⁴⁸ Peter Adamson, “The Simplicity of Self-Knowledge after Avicenna,” *Arabic sciences and philosophy: a historical journal* 28, no. 2 (2018): pp. 260-261.

⁶⁴⁹ Catarina Belo, “Averroes on God's Knowledge of the Particulars,” *Journal of Islamic Studies* 17, no. 2 (2006): pp. 179-180.

something which does not entail any change throughout eternity, and it is not to be feared that this should entail for it any weariness, as is the case of our intellect. This is how it must be in the case of all the other separate intellects, except that the first is the simplest of them. Therefore, the absolute one is that in which there is no multiplicity at all, neither on account of the differentiation between the intellect and the intelligible, nor on account of the multiplicity of intelligibles; for the multiplicity of intelligibles in the same intellect, as happens with our intellect, is the consequence of the differentiation which exists in it, that is between the intellect and the intelligible; for when the intellect and the intelligible are completely united, it follows that the many intelligibles of this (intellect) are united and become, for this intellect, one and simple in every respect, because if the intelligibles occurring in one intellect are many, then they are not united with its essence and its essence is distinct from them. This is what escaped Themistius when he allowed that the intellect may think many intelligibles at once, for this contradicts our theory that it thinks itself and not something outside itself and that the intellect and its intelligible are one in every respect. For he (= Themistius) says that it thinks all things by thinking that it is their principle; all this is the theory of somebody who did not understand Aristotle's demonstrations here."⁶⁵⁰

'Umar denies above all the correlative theory, and not in the first place the theory of Ibn Rušd. 'Umar quite literally uses the parallel to the intellect to deny any intrinsic act behind the other attributes of God: God does not 'magnify', 'infinite' and 'eternize' Himself. This is, again, evidence that the voice of 'Umar is based on the denial of the correlative theory. It is the character of Raimundus who reflects the theory of Ibn Rušd in his explanation of the intellect. Raimundus explains how the intellect of God does indeed understand Himself, and that the understanding God and the understood God are one and the same being. Raimundus' arguments are much closer to the original debate, led by Ibn Rušd and Ibn Sīnā, than the arguments by 'Umar are. However, Ibn Rušd did not specifically use this theory as a proof that the intellect of God is co-essential with Him. The co-essential nature of God's intellect is an obvious outcome of Ibn Rušd's theory in Raimundus' opinion. Raimundus explains that God's intellect is infinite, since God is the most definable or knowable entity, and therefore He knows Himself. This, again, means that God's intellect contains an internal act (understanding), an internal agent (the understanding God) and an internal patient (the understood God), which are essentially the same entity. It is apparent that the theory of Ibn Rušd is used, *mutatis mutandis*, to confirm Raimundus' own Christian theory, and not as a hostile argument which has to be fought against. The alterations which Lull made to the original debate, which is misrepresented by both the characters 'Umar and Raimundus, seem to have been made on purpose.

Obviously, Ramon Llull was aware of the crux of the original debate – regardless of how he came into contact with the theory. The idea that God could only understand Himself had been debated on by the Parisian philosophers who were invested in Averroism. In the Averroist interpretation, the fact that God can only truly understand Himself meant automatically that He could not understand the particulars, an idea which was avoided in the theories of both Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Rušd, and which stemmed from a more direct

⁶⁵⁰ Ibn Rušd, *Ibn Rušd's Metaphysics* (cf. footnote 572 above), pp. 196-197. Commentary on Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, XII, 1075a.

following of Aristotle.⁶⁵¹ However, this interpretation of Ibn Rušd's theory held the original basis of the idea intact, namely that God's intellect only really understands Himself. The statement "*Quod Deus non cognoscit alia a se*" has been listed in the 1277 Condemnations of Paris,⁶⁵² and was taken over literally by Lull in the *Declaratio Raimundi*, where he provided his own commentary. Raimundus' argument against the statement that God cannot understand the particulars is that, due to the immobility and infinity of God's intellect, there is never any differentiation between God and His intellect, no matter what the object of His intellect might be.⁶⁵³ This argument is not specifically mentioned in the *Disputatio Raimundi*. Therefore, one can safely argue that the original argumentation had been altered by Ramon Lull in order to fit the narrative of the *Disputatio Raimundi*.

'Umar next denies the Incarnation, by referring to the intellect. According to 'Umar, God cannot incarnate because the divine intellect cannot understand or think that God would ever be in the flesh, or part of humanity. This is such a contradiction, that it is utterly impossible for the rational mind to think this.⁶⁵⁴ However, Raimundus parries this attack, by stating that even though God understands that He became human, He does not understand that He became God. In this way, the priority of God and the posteriority of creation is still respected.⁶⁵⁵

3.6. WILL

Daiber⁶⁵⁶ associates the attribute of will in the *Disputatio Raimundi* with a passage on the will in Ibn Sīnā's *al-Ilāhiyyāt*. Here, Ibn Sīnā associates the will with God's act of creation: the created universe follows the structure and logic of God's goodness, which is understood by the intellect (*'ilm*) and willed by the divine will. God's will and His intellect are therefore the same in the thought of Ibn Sīnā.⁶⁵⁷ The passage underlines the importance of the will in the creation of the universe. By referring to the act of creation, both the internal creation

⁶⁵¹ Aristotle, *Metaphysics* XII, 1074b-1075a.

⁶⁵² *La condamnation parisienne de 1277* (cf. footnote 643 above), p. 80.

⁶⁵³ Lullus, *Declaratio Raimundi*, CCCM, 79, ROL, XVII, p. 266.

⁶⁵⁴ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, I, 2, 4, p. 186.

⁶⁵⁵ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 11, pp. 223-224.

⁶⁵⁶ Hans Daiber, "Raimundus Lullus in der Auseinandersetzung mit dem Islam" (cf. footnote 2 above), p. 152.

⁶⁵⁷ Avicenna, *Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina* (cf. footnote 565 above) vol. II, tract. VIII, cap. VII, p. 428: "Et stude considerare radices datas et dandas et aperietur tibi quod oportet aperiri. Primus igitur intelligit suam essentiam et ordinationem bonitatis quae est in omni et quomodo est. Igitur illa ordinatio ob hoc quod ipse intelligit eam fluit et fit et est et quod scitur fieri et modus fiendi ex suis duobus principiis est bonitas non refugienda sequens bonitatem essentiae principii et eius perfectionem eo quod sunt delectabilia utraque per seipsa ideo ipsum est uolitur. Sed uolitur primi non est secundum uolitur nostrum ita ut in eo quod est ex eo sit ei intentio (Sed tu iam nosti destructionem huius et adhuc scies), quia est uolens secundum modum uoluntatis intelligibilis purae. Et uita eius est haec eadem etiam. Uita enim quae est apud nos perficitur apprehensione et actione quae est motio uenientibus ex duabus diuersis uiribus. Certum est autem esse animam apprehendentem; quod uero ipse intelligit omne causa est omnis et ipse est principium suae actionis quod est dare esse omni. Igitur una intentio de illo est apprehensio uiae dandi esse. Unde uita eius non est egens duabus uiribus ad hoc ut perficiatur duabus uiribus nec uita eius est alia a scientia eius quia hoc totum est ei per suam essentiam. Et etiam quia forma intellecta quae fit in nobis causa est formae adinuentae artificialis si ipsum esse eius esset sufficiens ad essendum illam formam artificialem scilicet si formae essent in effectu principia eorum quorum ipsae sunt formae tunc intellectum apud nos esset ipsum posse sed non est ita."

(the existence of which ‘Umar denies) and the external creation of the universe, ‘Umar attempts to prove that God’s will is not co-essential. First of all, ‘Umar sees two outings of God’s will: love and hate. If God’s will was eternal, ‘Umar says, He would love and hate Himself eternally. This, of course, is utterly impossible, since God cannot hate Himself, and since the existence of both co-essential love and hate would destroy God’s unity.⁶⁵⁸ The argument seems to be based on the denial of the internal act and the divine correlatives, and not in the first place on the thought of Ibn Sīnā.

By connecting the will with creation, just like Ibn Sīnā in the abovementioned passage, ‘Umar states that God’s will cannot be eternal, for He would love and hate the creatures eternally, which means they would exist and not exist at the same time.⁶⁵⁹ This argument seems to be a reflection of the already mentioned passage in the *Ars*, that God’s attributes cannot be co-essential because they would have an infinite act within a finite creation, rendering creation impossible.⁶⁶⁰

Raimundus parries both arguments at the same time. He instantly refers to the correlatives, saying that God’s will must have an infinite act for it to be perfect and eternal. Moreover, he disagrees with ‘Umar that the eternal will of God would imply both eternal love and hate. According to Raimundus, God’s will only knows love, and not hate. This means that the unity of God’s will is rendered possible, and that creation is forever loved or willed and not hated.⁶⁶¹ This opinion is reminiscent of Ibn Sīnā’s *al-Ilāhiyyāt*, since he also claims that privation (or imperfection and evil) in itself is not desired by God, who only wills being and goodness.⁶⁶²

‘Umar also states that, since God’s will is not eternal and infinite, He cannot will Himself to be the Father. If He could will Himself to be eternally Father, He would be His will, which is impossible.⁶⁶³ ‘Umar proceeds to explain how God cannot incarnate due to the meaning of His divine will. Since ‘Umar claims that he already explained why God’s will is not co-essential, it is apparent, according to him, that the divine will is not great enough to cause the Incarnation, that God would become man and that man would become God. His will cannot will the Incarnation into existence. Moreover, ‘Umar claims that if God willed the Incarnation, it would make more sense for Him to become a higher creature such as an angel. It would suit God’s will better to ‘angelicate’ rather than to ‘incarnate’.⁶⁶⁴ Raimundus disagrees with all these statements, since he already denies the premise of ‘Umar’s argument. Raimundus proves that the will of God is co-essential, so the argument of ‘Umar is destroyed. Moreover, the Incarnation does make sense for God’s will, since

⁶⁵⁸ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, I, 2, 5, p. 187.

⁶⁵⁹ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, I, 2, 5, p. 187.

⁶⁶⁰ Cf. Lullus, *Ars generalis ultima*, CCCM, 75, ROL, XIV, 9, 1.

⁶⁶¹ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 12, p. 224.

⁶⁶² Avicenna, *Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina* (cf. footnote 565 above) vol. II, tract. VIII, cap. VI, p. 412: “Priuatō uero inquantum est priuatō non desideratur nisi inquantum eam sequitur esse et perfectio. Id igitur quod uere desideratur est esse et ideo esse est bonitas pura et perfectio pura. Et omnino bonitas est id quod desiderat omnis res iuxta modulum suum quoniam per eam perficitur eius esse.”

⁶⁶³ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, I, 2, 5, p. 187.

⁶⁶⁴ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, I, 2, 5, p. 187.

humanity has a broader nature (both spiritual and material), meaning that the Incarnation of God in humanity would mean the glorification of both soul and created matter.⁶⁶⁵

3.7. VIRTUE

In the section on virtue, ‘Umar follows the logic of the previous attributes.⁶⁶⁶ According to him, God’s virtue is an instrument, by which the created virtues in the universe are made. God Himself is not this instrument. Virtue is secondary to God, springing forth from Him, but not equal to Him.⁶⁶⁷

Next, ‘Umar explains that, since God’s virtue is not part of His essence, He cannot be triune. If God’s virtue is not part of His essence, and if it does not share in His perfection, it means that the Person of the Son and the Person of the Holy Ghost only have an imperfect form of virtue, which only pertains to one aspect of their being. If both Persons are God, this would mean that God is not perfectly virtuous.⁶⁶⁸ Also, ‘Umar claims that God would do injustice to Himself if He were a Trinity. It would mean that the Son is confined to His Son-hood, and cannot become a Father Himself. The Holy Ghost, likewise, would forever be the Holy Ghost, and never the Father or the Son. This injustice is contrary to the virtue of God.⁶⁶⁹ Raimundus answers mainly by referring to the correlative theory, which states that the Trinity is necessary, and that the three Persons are essentially one.⁶⁷⁰

‘Umar disagrees with the Incarnation, since he believes that this, too would be an injustice against God. First of all, it would be an injustice towards God’s attributes – which would make it a primordial injustice. Secondly, if only the Person of the Son incarnated and not the Father and the Holy Ghost, this would mean an injustice towards both of them.⁶⁷¹

Raimundus disagrees with ‘Umar’s views on the Incarnation. He states that God’s virtue has to be incarnated, since Incarnation would cause the greatest, most lovable effect, which has to be necessarily loved by a perfect entity.⁶⁷² Moreover, God’s Incarnation is not a form of injustice towards Him, since it increases the love for His divine attributes.⁶⁷³ Raimundus also parries the comment by ‘Umar, that the Incarnation of just the Son would be an injustice towards the Father and the Holy Ghost. According to Raimundus, it would destroy God’s unity if the Father was incarnated. In this case, the Father would be both the Father and the Son, which is quite impossible. Moreover, the exaltation of the universe by the Incarnation is already the highest grade achievable, and no other form of Incarnation could logically be able to top this.⁶⁷⁴

⁶⁶⁵ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 12, p. 224.

⁶⁶⁶ Cf. Hans Daiber, “Raimundus Lullus in der Auseinandersetzung mit dem Islam” (cf. footnote 2 above), p. 152.

⁶⁶⁷ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, I, 2, 6, p. 187.

⁶⁶⁸ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, I, 2, 6, p. 187.

⁶⁶⁹ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, I, 2, 6, p. 187.

⁶⁷⁰ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 13, pp. 225-226.

⁶⁷¹ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, I, 2, 6, p. 187.

⁶⁷² Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 13, p. 226.

⁶⁷³ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 13, p. 226.

⁶⁷⁴ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 13, p. 226.

3.8. TRUTH

Daiber connects the attribute ‘truth’ to a passage in Ibn Sīnā’s *Ilāhiyyāt*, and to al-Ġazālī.⁶⁷⁵ According to Ibn Sīnā the necessary being is most deserving to be called truth, since it is the most ultimate being.⁶⁷⁶ Likewise, al-Ġazālī mentions that God, as the necessary entity, is the only real truth, while contingent beings are true only in their dependence on the necessary entity.⁶⁷⁷ Ramon Llull seemed to be aware of this train of thought in Islamic philosophy regarding the nature of divine truth. He follows the idea of al-Ġazālī and Ibn Sīnā, when they claim that God is the most ultimate form of truth, due to His being the necessary entity. In his *Llibre de contemplació*, Llull also juxtaposes the ultimate, eternal truth of God to the human truth, which is contingent and finite.⁶⁷⁸ This idea reflects al-Ġazālī’s and Ibn Sīnā’s argument. ‘Umar’s discussion of the attribute of truth seems to be mainly based on the *Ars*. ‘Umar first claims that the truth of God cannot be God Himself, since it would mean that His intellect is a habitus, which is impossible. Moreover, according to ‘Umar, if God was His truth, it would mean that He would reveal all truth, and that there were no falsehood.⁶⁷⁹ Raimundus disagrees with this: according to him, God’s truth or intellect is not a habitus, since it is not an accident. However, Raimundus believes God’s truth has to be infinite. In Raimundus’ part of the *Disputatio Raimundi*, he also treats it in rather the same way as Ibn Sīnā and al-Ġazālī, since Raimundus links God’s truth with His being a necessary entity. This means, according to Raimundus, that God’s truth is a substance rather than an accident. Furthermore, Raimundus proves the Trinity by referring to God’s intrinsic action and His correlatives.⁶⁸⁰

Next, ‘Umar claims that, since the divine truth is finite, it is not great enough to encompass the Trinity. Truth would not suffice for the existence of something so illogical as God being triune. God’s own truth and understanding can likewise not think of Himself to be subject to temporal laws, such as space, time, movement and division, neither can God understand something ‘unnatural’, such as a child born without a mother.

“For if God were truth, God the Father would not just be Father in a simple way, but according to something; and so of the Son and the Holy Spirit; because the truth

⁶⁷⁵ Hans Daiber, “Raimundus Lullus in der Auseinandersetzung mit dem Islam” (cf. footnote 2 above), pp. 152-153.

⁶⁷⁶ Cf. Avicenna, *Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina* (cf. footnote 565 above) vol. II, tract. VIII, cap. VI, p. 413: “Ueritas enim cuiusque rei est proprietates sui esse quod stabilitum est ei. Igitur nihil est dignius esse ueritatem quam necesse esse. Iam etiam dicitur ueritas id de cuius esse est certa sententia. Igitur nihil est dignius hac certitudine quam id de cuius esse est sententia certa et cum sua certitudine est semper et cum sua sempiternitate est per seipsum non per aliud a se. Ceterarum uero rerum quidditates sicut nostri non merentur esse sed prout sunt in seipsis non considerata relatione earum ad necesse esse, merentur priuationem et ob hoc sunt omnes prout sunt in seipsis falsae sed propter ipsum est certitudo earum et respectu faciei sequentis sunt acquisita et ob hoc omnis res perit nisi secundum id quod est uersus faciem eius. Et ideo dignius est ut sit ipse necesse esse et ueritas.”

⁶⁷⁷ Al-Ġazālī, *Al-Maqṣad al-asnā fī sharḥ asmā’ Allāh al-husnā* (cf. footnote 612 above), p. 124: “He is forever and eternally thus; not in one state to the exclusion of another, for everything besides Him – forever and eternally – is not deserving of existence with respect to its own essence but only deserves it by virtue of Him, for in itself it is false; it is true only in virtue of what is other than it. From this you will know that the absolutely true is the One truly existing in itself, from which every true thing gets its true reality.”

⁶⁷⁸ Llull, *Llibre de contemplació*, NEORL, XIV, I, 8, 7-8, pp. 111-112.

⁶⁷⁹ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, I, 2, 7, p. 189.

⁶⁸⁰ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 14, pp. 227-228.

would not suffice for this, being finite. For a finite being does not suffice for being the cause of an infinite being. Yet you say that God the Father is truly infinitely and eternally Father, and the same about the Son and the Holy Spirit; which clearly is wrong. Further, what divine understanding cannot understand divine truth cannot verify. The reason for this is that God neither believes nor has faith, but understands. God cannot understand that a son can be without a mother, just as He cannot understand that the Son can be without the Father. Yet you do not say that the Son has a divine mother. I say the very same, because God cannot understand in Himself space, time, movement, division, and the like; which He would have in Himself, if as Father He begat the Son, because begetting without the aforementioned is not understandable. And, consequently, truth cannot verify these things, which are neither intelligible nor possible.”⁶⁸¹

The divine understanding can also never think itself to be enclosed into a finite space, such as the womb of the virgin Mary, or inside the flesh of Christ. Neither can God understand that a minor cause, such as humanity, is the cause of the major cause, being division in God, caused by the Incarnation.⁶⁸² Raimundus parries these arguments by stating that God Himself is not constricted by anything, and His truth can think boundlessly. He continues by stating that, even though it is true that a minor cause cannot cause a major cause, ‘Umar does not understand the matter correctly. While the minor cause is the incarnate Christ, it is effectuated by the major cause, being God’s truth.⁶⁸³

3.9. GLORY

Glory is mentioned by al-Ġazālī, as a Qur’ānic name of God (*al-Majīd*). Al-Ġazālī also describes God’s glory as the one which glorifies. This does not mean, however, that al-Ġazālī means this to be God’s internal action. However, he does establish that the name *All-Glorious* in itself implies an action of glorifying.

“*Al-Majīd* – the All-Glorious – is one who is noble in essence, beautiful in actions, and bountiful in gifts and favours. It is as if nobility of essence is called ‘glory’ when goodness of action is combined with it. He is also the one who glorifies [*Al-Majīd*] – yet one of these [glorious, glorifier] is more indicative of intensification.”⁶⁸⁴

‘Umar draws his main argument on why God’s glory is not co-essential from the earlier established rule that God cannot have a cause, or that He has no beginning. According to ‘Umar, God has glory, but He cannot *be* glory, since it is something which is caused or enacted by something else.⁶⁸⁵ It has already been established that God cannot have a cause outside Himself. However, Raimundus has already shown he can easily bypass this metaphysical argument with his correlative theory. After stating that God’s glory is general

⁶⁸¹ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, I, 2, 7, p. 189. Translation by Annemarie C. Mayer.

⁶⁸² Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, I, 2, 7, p. 190.

⁶⁸³ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 14, p. 229.

⁶⁸⁴ Al-Ġazālī, *Al-Maqṣad al-asnā fī sharḥ asmā’ Allāh al-husnā* (cf. footnote 612 above), p. 120.

⁶⁸⁵ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, I, 2, 8, p. 190.

and eternal and exists on behalf of itself, Raimundus mentions the correlative theory, which denies ‘Umar’s statement that God cannot be caused (since God causes Himself).⁶⁸⁶

‘Umar also denies that God has a Trinity by referring to His glory. If His glory is not co-essential to Him, this would mean that the Father, by creating the Son and the Holy Ghost, diminishes His glory, and so the three Persons would be of incomplete glory – which is impossible.⁶⁸⁷ This is reminiscent of the previous attributes, where it is also said that God would ‘empty Himself’ of an attribute by the production of the Trinity. The reply of Raimundus is swift, since he has already argued that God is His own glory. By again referring to the correlative theory, Raimundus concludes that ‘Umar’s statement does not make any sense. God forever generates the Persons from His entire essence, meaning that every divine Person is co-essential to Him. Therefore, God does not ‘empty’ Himself. Raimundus also uses the correlative theory to prove the Incarnation: as God’s correlatives are more inclined to love that created entity in which the correlatives are the highest, the Incarnation of God in Christ is the only logical outcome.⁶⁸⁸

‘Umar turns to the Incarnation and argues that it would violate God’s glory due to the pain, suffering and shame that are brought about by the flesh. Christ’s dying on the cross would have brought pain and degradation into the Godhead, which is impossible for God’s intellect to comprehend and for His truth to uphold.⁶⁸⁹ Raimundus answers that the corruption and shame of the body will never corrupt or alter the soul, and that the suffering of Christ did not transcend to His divine essence.⁶⁹⁰

3.10. PERFECTION

The attribute ‘perfection’, as apparent in the *Disputatio Raimundi*, has a clear presence in the thought of Ibn Sīnā. Daiber connects God’s perfection in the *Disputatio Raimundi* to a passage in Ibn Sīnā’s *al-Ilāhiyyāt*,⁶⁹¹ where he says that a necessary being, as the source of goodness, and as a being who is knowledgeable of itself, the universals and the particulars, must be perfect. According to Ibn Sīnā, God is perfect because He does not lack any kind of His own perfections, and nothing which belongs to God flows over into another being. This stands in contrast to one human being, who can lack certain qualities of his or her own humanity, or who shares his or her humanity with other human beings.⁶⁹² ‘Umar’s arguments are mainly based on the subversion of the correlative theory. First, he denies that perfection is co-essential, by stating that perfection is essentially the act of perfecting. An

⁶⁸⁶ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 15, p. 230.

⁶⁸⁷ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, I, 2, 8, p. 190.

⁶⁸⁸ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 15, p. 231.

⁶⁸⁹ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, I, 2, 8, p. 190.

⁶⁹⁰ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 15, p. 231.

⁶⁹¹ Hans Daiber, “Raimundus Lullus in der Auseinandersetzung mit dem Islam” (cf. footnote 2 above), pp. 154-155.

⁶⁹² Avicenna, *Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina* (cf. footnote 565 above) vol. II, tract. VIII, cap. VI, p. 412: “VI. Capitulum de ostendendo quod ipsum est perfectum et plus quam perfectum et bonitas attribuens quicquid est [...] et quomodo est hoc et quomodo scit seipsum et quomodo scit uniuersalia et quomodo scit particularia et qualiter non conceditur dici quod ipse ea apprehenda. Necesse esse est perfectum esse. Nam nihil deest sibi de suo esse et de perfectionibus sui esse nec aliquid generis sui esse egreditur ab esse eius ad aliud a se sicut egreditur ab alio a se uerbi gratia ab homine. Multa etiam de perfectionibus sui esse desunt unicuique homini et etiam sua humanitas inuenitur in alio a se.”

act requires a patient, which is secondary in time. This stands in an obvious direct contradiction to the *Ars*, questioning the logic of internal action within God.⁶⁹³ Raimundus disables this argument by claiming that, even though created and secondary perfection is always in ‘having happened’ (or secondary in time, as a consequence of an external act of perfecting), this does not apply to infinite and eternal perfection. Raimundus then refers to the correlative theory, by first stating that God’s perfection needs to have an act, and by then referring to the three Persons.⁶⁹⁴ Another reason why the Trinity does not exist, according to ‘Umar, is because if the Father creates the Son and the Holy Ghost, He is continuously perfecting them. Since the act of perfecting is always in ‘happening’, and never in ‘having happened’, it can therefore not be part of God’s essence. This is another obvious contradiction, or rather ‘straw puppet-argument’ against the internal act within God, according to Lullian thought.⁶⁹⁵ Raimundus’ counterargument is that perfecting exists in ‘happening’, but only within the created world. Within the divine, there is no time or sequence, which means that it is possible for God to have perfection as a part of His essence.⁶⁹⁶ In the end, ‘Umar also claims that the Incarnation is impossible due to God’s perfection. If someone perfect is bound to someone imperfect, his perfection becomes less. ‘Umar compares this to water in a hot vessel, that by nature must also be hot. If God’s perfection is exposed to the imperfection of the flesh, His perfection is tarnished.⁶⁹⁷ Raimundus disagrees with this, and claims that God would only ever be tarnished because of sin. However, Christ has no sins. He is the height of the created world, and can therefore be elevated by God. Raimundus makes a comparison with what happens to the soul and body in Paradise: the soul will be perfect, since the body is incorruptible. Raimundus also disagrees with ‘Umar’s comparison of the Incarnation with cold water in a hot vessel or over a fire. According to him, the human and the divine nature are not opposed in this way.⁶⁹⁸

3.11. JUSTICE

The tenth attribute, justice, is mainly discussed by the *Ars* of Ramon Llull, even though it has a very important place in Islam. In al-Ġazālī’s work on the ninety-nine names of God, he links God’s name of *al ‘Adl* (the Just) with God’s creation of the world. Since the human mind cannot find any fault within God’s creation, it is apparent that God is just and that His justice is infinite.⁶⁹⁹ First, ‘Umar argues that God’s justice is the attribute by which God judges every living being in the entire universe, such as angels and human beings. However, according to ‘Umar, it is impossible that God’s justice is co-essential to Him, since that would mean that the attribute of justice, in its perfection, eternity and infinity, would judge God Himself. This is quite impossible, ‘Umar says. This argument is reminiscent of the one which was first explained in the context of the attribute of understanding, that God Himself cannot be the object of His own attributes.⁷⁰⁰ Raimundus retorts that God has infinite

⁶⁹³ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, I, 2, 9, p. 191.

⁶⁹⁴ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 16, p. 232.

⁶⁹⁵ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, I, 2, 9, p. 191.

⁶⁹⁶ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 16, p. 232.

⁶⁹⁷ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, I, 2, 9, p. 192.

⁶⁹⁸ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 16, p. 233.

⁶⁹⁹ Al-Ġazālī, *Al-Maqsad al-asnā fī sharḥ asmā ‘Allāh al-husnā* (cf. footnote 612 above), p. 92.

⁷⁰⁰ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, I, 2, 10, p. 192.

justice, which has an internal act, but He does not judge His own actions, since He is infinitely good.⁷⁰¹

Next, ‘Umar also claims that God cannot have a Trinity, since He would have to bring forth the Son by eternal justice – which is impossible, according to ‘Umar, since justice is finite and contingent.⁷⁰² ‘Umar continues by stating that the Trinity in itself would be unjust. The Father cannot beget the Son justly, since He does not need to produce Him. In God there is no need for multiplication or for reproduction of His essence, which would mean that the Father does an unjustifiable act by creating the Son.⁷⁰³ Raimundus disagrees with this statement, and defends the need for the begetting of the Son by referring to the correlative theory.⁷⁰⁴ The Incarnation itself is also an act of injustice, ‘Umar claims. God did not incarnate as an angel, who is prior in hierarchy than a human being, and this way He does the angels injustice. He is also unfair to humankind, by only incarnating into one human being and not many or all. Lastly, He allowed His Son to suffer humiliation and pain on the cross. These are impossible side-effects for an all-just God, in the eyes of ‘Umar.⁷⁰⁵ Raimundus defends the Incarnation, by claiming it to be a necessary part of creation. According to Raimundus, the Incarnation is the highest tier of created goodness, and the highest being the divine intellect can think. This means that God’s being is more predisposed to create the incarnate Christ.⁷⁰⁶ Raimundus also voices his disagreement with ‘Umar on the idea that God would have committed injustice towards angels by not incarnating in one of them, by referring to the chapter on will. He also disagrees when ‘Umar states that God would commit injury to many humans, by not incarnating in them, by referring to the chapter on singularity.⁷⁰⁷

3.12. MERCY

Mercy (or *al-Raḥīm*, the Merciful) is the second name of God mentioned by al-Ġazālī, after the ‘Infinitely Good’ or *al-Raḥmān*.⁷⁰⁸ Al-Ġazālī notes the common root of these two names, which both come from ‘mercy’. Notably, al-Ġazālī says that God’s mercy is perfect and inclusive, since He is merciful to both the deserving and the undeserving. It is important to note that the mercy of God has a slightly different meaning in the interpretation of al-Ġazālī. While the *Disputatio Raimundi* talks about mercy only in connection to forgiveness of sins (and therefore in connection to the attribute of justice), al-Ġazālī interprets mercy as divine mercy to humanity, leading to help and liberality for those in need. However, a comparison between al-Ġazālī’s interpretation of mercy, and the interpretation in the *Disputatio Raimundi*, is still relevant, as will become apparent in this section.

“The mercy of God – great and glorious – is both perfect and inclusive [*tāmma wa-āmma*]: perfect inasmuch as it wants to fulfil the needs of those in need and does meet them; and inclusive inasmuch as it embraces both deserving and undeserving,

⁷⁰¹ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 17, p. 234.

⁷⁰² Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, I, 2, 10, p. 192.

⁷⁰³ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, I, 2, 10, pp. 192-193.

⁷⁰⁴ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 17, p. 235.

⁷⁰⁵ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, I, 2, 10, p. 193.

⁷⁰⁶ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 17, p. 235.

⁷⁰⁷ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 17, p. 236.

⁷⁰⁸ Al-Ġazālī, *Al-Maqṣad al-asnā fī sharḥ asmā ‘Allāh al-husnā* (cf. footnote 612 above), p. 52.

encompassing this world and the next, and includes bare necessities and needs, and special gifts over and above them. So He is utterly and truly merciful.”⁷⁰⁹

‘Umar first proves that God is mercy, but only insofar as He judges and forgives the sinners. God Himself is not mercy, according to ‘Umar, because if He were, He would forgive His own sins, which is impossible since God does not commit any sins. This would mean that God’s mercy, while being infinite and eternal, were also idle and vacant. This is once more a reiteration of the previous arguments, in which the correlative theory is directly subverted by the denial of the internal act of God’s attributes.⁷¹⁰

Raimundus argues that God has infinite mercy, but He indeed does not forgive Himself. Rather, He has the infinite possibility to forgive sinners, just like fire, which has the infinite potential to burn – but does not burn itself, while its act relies on the quantity of fire-wood. In some ways, Raimundus sidesteps the correlative theory, since He does not seem to posit the internal patient of God’s act of ‘mercifying’.⁷¹¹

‘Umar continues to explain his disagreement with God’s co-essential mercy. According to him, if God had infinite mercy, there would be no need for penance or contrition, since God would forgive everything. ‘Umar refers to the comparison of the fire: if fire was provided with a sufficient amount of firewood, it would burn all the water in the world, even though this never happens. If God forgives every sin without regard for penance or contrition, this would annihilate His mercy.⁷¹² This stands in contrast to what is said by al-Ġazālī in the *Al-Maqṣad al-asnā fī sharḥ asmā’ Allāh al-husnā*, where he claims that the mercy of God is all-inclusive, and forgives the undeserving as well. Raimundus rejects ‘Umar’s theory, since, according to him, fire and water may be opposites, but God’s mercy and justice are convertible. Raimundus refers to the correlative theory, but instead of saying that God has infinite ‘mercifying’, he says that the mercy of God is infinite due to the correlatives of His infinity. It is apparent that the interpretation of God’s mercy of Raimundus stands closer to the one by al-Ġazālī, even though al-Ġazālī never mentioned the correlative theory. ‘Umar’s reasoning is based on the subversion of the correlative theory, and not directly on the Islamic sources.⁷¹³

‘Umar next argues that, since the mercy of God is not part of God’s essence, the Trinity also does not exist. Since the Father, who is prior, creates the Son and the Holy Spirit, which are posterior, not every divine Person partakes evenly in God’s Mercy – thus rendering God’s mercy imperfect. This is reminiscent of ‘Umar’s earlier arguments, where he claims that the divine Persons do not partake evenly in God’s attributes because one has supposedly a priority over the other.⁷¹⁴ Raimundus answers that this does not make sense, since every Person of God is equal and the same. Raimundus refers to the chapter on simplicity in which he states that the Persons of God are essentially the same being, and therefore pose no real sequence or hierarchy.⁷¹⁵

⁷⁰⁹ Al-Ġazālī, *Al-Maqṣad al-asnā fī sharḥ asmā’ Allāh al-husnā* (cf. footnote 612 above), p. 53.

⁷¹⁰ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, I, 2, 11, p. 193.

⁷¹¹ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 18, p. 236.

⁷¹² Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, I, 2, 11, p. 193.

⁷¹³ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 18, pp. 236-237.

⁷¹⁴ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, I, 2, 11, p. 194.

⁷¹⁵ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 18, p. 237.

‘Umar ends his exposé on mercy by attacking the Incarnation. According to ‘Umar, it is impossible to posit that Christ lived and died for our sins, and for God’s mercy, because this would falsely limit the capabilities of God’s mercy.⁷¹⁶ Raimundus defends the Incarnation, saying that sinners can more easily attain redemption by praying to the incarnate Christ as a human being, since He is of the same *species* as they.⁷¹⁷ Moreover, God incarnated because it was a necessary step in human redemption. Just like humankind was cursed by original sin by one man, Adam, they were saved by one man, Christ.⁷¹⁸

3.13. CONCLUSION

As said in the introduction of this chapter, Ramon Llull believed firmly in his power to not just explain the Trinity, but also to prove it. He believed that the evidence for the Trinity and the Incarnation should come from logic alone, since (Christian) authorities were not enough to explain Christian dogma to those who did not accept them. Throughout the *Disputatio Raimundi*, Llull attempted to answer any kind of doubt which the Islamic scholar ‘Umar might have about Christianity, coming from Islamic philosophy, which is supposed to deny and subvert Christian views concerning the divine. Even though Llull claims that he wished to record his conversation with ‘Umar as realistically and truthfully as he possibly could, it becomes apparent that the account of ‘Umar’s arguments is mostly based on a subversion of both Llull’s grasp of Islamic philosophy, and of the *Ars generalis ultima*.

Ramon Llull wished to use the *Disputatio Raimundi* to convey the message that Islamic philosophy, used as a means to argue against Christianity, was flawed. Ramon Llull did not deny the intrinsic logic of the Islamic arguments, but he attempted to prove that the questions coming from Islamic philosophy were best solved by a Trinitarian interpretation. Any debate in Islamic philosophy, which seemed to contradict the Trinity or the co-essential nature of God’s attributes, was interpreted by Llull as being an erroneous reading of logic which, in fact, proved the Trinity and the co-essential nature of the divine attributes. Llull’s correlative theory, and the philosophical mechanisms of the *Ars*, were the ultimate answer to problems and voids which could be discerned in Islamic philosophy. The answer to Islamic problems regarding the divine could not be answered by a purely Islamic interpretation or a rigid, antitrinitarian form of monotheism. The answer was always the logical explanation of the Trinity, as can be found in the *Ars*. Arguably, Llull believed that Islamic philosophy could not contradict the Trinity, because no form of logic could contradict the logic of the *Ars*. Llull seemed to want to convey that the Trinity was the most absolute form of logic, since it described God’s very essence. Any kind of temporal, finite interpretation of logic could not inherently subvert the Trinity.

It is apparent that Raimundus did not entirely describe ‘Umar’s ideas truthfully. ‘Umar seems at times to directly subvert the theory of the *Ars generalis ultima*, only to be corrected by Raimundus. Without venturing too much into the realm of speculation, one could argue that the real-life ‘Umar would have had no reason to systematically debate the attributes of God in such a way that it would directly contradict the thought of Ramon Llull – which had

⁷¹⁶ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, I, 2, 11, p. 194.

⁷¹⁷ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 18, p. 137.

⁷¹⁸ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 18, p. 238.

already taken shape before he went to North Africa. Neither did ‘Umar have to limit himself to the same logical arguments time and time again. Moreover, neither ‘Umar nor Raimundus seem to properly address the existing Islamic philosophical debates. The question whether God can understand that which lies outside of Himself, which is discussed by Ibn Rušd, becomes a completely different question in the *Disputatio Raimundi*. Suddenly, the character ‘Umar argues that God can *only* discern that which lies outside of Himself. Raimundus then argues that God can discern His very essence, which is a statement which follows the logic of the *Ars*, but not the current debates in Islamic philosophy. Since Llull had already selected his arguments before he ventured to North Africa, it is apparent that, even though the *Ars* was meant to answer the great questions of Islamic philosophy, the *Ars* legitimized itself. Following the logic of the *Ars generalis ultima* was more important than accurately summarizing topics in Islamic philosophy.

One way to explain the importance of the *Ars* is to reconsider the goal of the *Disputatio Raimundi* as a whole. Rather than accurately portray Llull’s venture into Islamic territory, Llull wished to portray an idealized debate between an idealized *christianus Arabicus* and a learned Muslim. The *Disputatio Raimundi* is only partly autobiographic, it is mainly meant to promote the use of the *Ars* and to explain the particularities of debating Christianity based on Llull’s logic. If anything, the *Disputatio Raimundi* has to be read as a semi-fictional work and not as a diary entry. The character Raimundus displays ideal, honourable conduct during his imprisonment, and in Raimundus’ side of the story, he manages to dispel every one of ‘Umar’s arguments against Christianity. One should, however, take into account that Ramon Llull probably wrote the *Disputatio Raimundi* from a typically Christian point of view, where writings on Islam and Christian-Muslim encounter were often written to underline the virtue of one’s own faith. Therefore, a comparison between the ideas of the *Disputatio Raimundi* and other Christian authors of Llull’s time should enlighten the ideas and sentiments behind some of Raimundus’ statements. In the next chapter, I will compare the contents of the *Disputatio* with the Christian context of his time.

PART III: RAMON LLULL AND CHRISTIAN CONCEPTS OF MISSION IN INTERRELIGIOUS ENCOUNTER

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. RAMON LLULL AND THE DOMINICANS

Ramon Llull's connection to 13th century Catalan missionary traditions revolved for a great deal around his connection with the great missionaries of the time, such as Ramon de Penyafort and Ramon Martí. Those theologians, who were quite influential at the time, were both Dominicans. Ramon Llull had close ties to both the Dominican and Franciscan orders at the time of his conversion. Robin Vose stresses that the influence of the Dominican order was especially negative. Many times, Llull seemed to have learned from the Dominicans how *not* to interact with Islam, instead of simply looking up to their example.⁷¹⁹

Ramon de Penyafort (1185-1275), one of the key figures in many Dominican missionary endeavours, was especially influential on Ramon Llull. It was Ramon de Penyafort who advised Ramon Llull to drop his plans of travelling to Paris to attend the university just after his conversion, since de Penyafort believed that Llull could better come into contact with Arab thought and original sources while remaining in Majorca.⁷²⁰ According to Bonner, Ramon de Penyafort might also have hoped that Llull would revive the failing Majorcan language schools, since it was one of Ramon Llull's goals to establish a school for preachers where Arabic was taught.⁷²¹ The main initiatives, which came from the Dominicans and could have inspired Llull, were centred around Ramon de Penyafort or his pupils.⁷²² Bonner traces back initiatives from the Dominicans which could have been possible inspirations for Ramon Llull. One initiative was the foundation of a school where Dominican students could learn Arabic. By 1250, there existed a *studium* in Majorca, which was visited by Ramon Martí, the student of Ramon de Penyafort. However, this *studium* became inactive by 1259. These institutions could have been the inspiration for Ramon Llull to lobby for the founding of a school for the Arabic language and Arab philosophy, as a way to prepare preachers for their task in the Middle East.⁷²³ Vose nuances the importance and prevalence of the *studia*, arguing that they were more likely very unofficial

⁷¹⁹ Robin Vose, "Preachers, Teachers and Fools, Dominican Influence in Ramon Llull's Dialogue with Islam," Turnhout: Brepols, 2024.

⁷²⁰ Cf. Badia, Santanach, Soler, *Ramon Llull as a Vernacular Writer* (cf. footnote 16 above), pp. 227-228.

⁷²¹ Anthony Bonner, "Ramon Llull and the Dominicans" (cf. footnote 19 above), pp. 380-381. Cf. also Badia, Santanach, Soler, *Ramon Llull as a Vernacular Writer* (cf. footnote 16 above), p. 229.

⁷²² For a more complete overview regarding the influence of Ramon Martí on the medieval Iberic peninsula, cf. Damian J. Smith, "Ramon de Penyafort and His Influence," in *The Friars and Their Influence in Medieval Spain*, ed. by Francisco G. Serrano (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2018), 45-60.

⁷²³ Bonner, "Ramon Llull and the Dominicans" (cf. footnote 19 above), p. 378. For a clear outline of the Dominican language school in Toledo and its inspiration for Llull's endeavours to start a language school in Miramar, cf. also Laureano Robles, "El 'Studium Arabicum' del capítulo dominicano de Toledo de 1250: Antecedentes del 'Miramar' de Ramon Llull," *Estudios Lullianos* 24 (1980): 23-47.

and rather limited in size and membership. Ramon Llull eventually did not join this unofficial *studium*, but learned Arabic from a slave.⁷²⁴ However, the existence of certain circles where Arabic was taught and where there could be an exchange of ideas could have greatly inspired Llull, despite the limitations of such endeavours. Still, Llull became less invested in the seemingly lackluster attitude of the Dominicans in the first few decades after his conversion. Robin Vose stresses that even Llull's 1276 proposal for a *studium Arabicum* at Miramar was aimed at the membership of the Franciscans, not the Dominicans.⁷²⁵

However, there were also some examples of real life dialogues between Christian preachers and Muslims, but also with Jews, which might have influenced Ramon Llull's way of thought. One example was the Barcelona Disputation of 1263, held between Moses Ben Nahman and the Dominican Fra Pau Cristià (a converted Jew).⁷²⁶ The debate centred around the messiahship of Christ. Pau Cristià attempted to find solid evidence for the messiahship of Christ in his reading of Jewish sources, which Moses Ben Nahman sought to refute. The debate was presided by Ramon de Penyafort, and held before King James the Conqueror. One year after the Barcelona Disputation, Ramon Martí and Ramon de Penyafort were part of a committee which presided over the implementation of certain harsh measures limiting the religious freedom of the local Jewish community. Bonner underlines the fact that Ramon Llull experienced his conversion moment in the same year that this debate was held. Therefore, it could be argued that Llull did hear about the Barcelona Disputation, and that it might have inspired his religious inspiration of the year 1263.⁷²⁷ The *Ars* in particular could be a reaction to the failed debate which was based entirely on the reading of non-Christian authorities, instead of providing evidence based on a rationalization *ex nihilo*. Many of Llull's fictional disputes, such as the *Llibre del gentil*, seem to have purposely been written in a much more irenic and elegant way than the Barcelona Disputation. According to Ryan Szpiech, Ramon Llull's outlook on interreligious debate was at least partially a reaction to Martí's works against Judaism and the Barcelona Disputation. Martí's missionary tactic was based on using the authorities of other faiths (both Judaism and Islam) to either prove Christianity (for example, Christian dogma and the validity of Christian authorities) or to disparage the religion of his opponent. Martí used the Qur'an to prove the validity of the Old and New Testaments in Islam, which was also an important argument in the *Contra legem Saracenorum* by Riccoldo da Monte di Croce. Ramon Llull rejected a form of dialogue which was based on authority and not reason. He also rejected a form of dialogue where Christianity was not irrevocably proven,

⁷²⁴ Lullus, *Vita coetanea*, CCCM, XXXIV, ROL, VIII, p. 278. Cf. Robin Vose, "Preachers, Teachers and Fools" (cf. footnote 719 above).

⁷²⁵ Robin Vose, "Preachers, Teachers and Fools" (cf. footnote 719 above).

⁷²⁶ The debate has been recorded completely by both parties; for Moses Ben Nahman's account, cf. Moses Ben Nahman, *Disputation at Barcelona (Ramban)*, translated by Charles B. Chavel (New York: Shilo Publishing House, 1983). For the Latin account, cf. the Heinrich Denifle edition (Heinrich Denifle, "Quellen zur Disputation Pablos Christiani mit Mose Nachmani zu Barcelona 1263," *Historisches Jahrbuch des Görres-Gesellschaft* 8 (1887): 231-234); cf. also Robert Chazan's discussion on the topic: Robert Chazan, *Barcelona and Beyond: The Disputation of 1263 and Its Aftermath* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992). Marianne Moyaert likewise discusses the example of the Barcelona Disputation as an example of the oppressive climate created by certain mendicant preachers: Moyaert, *Christian Imaginations* (cf. footnote 31 above), p. 122.

⁷²⁷ Bonner, "Ramon Llull and the Dominicans" (cf. footnote 19 above), p. 379.

but where the religion of the other was attacked until one's opponent lost his or her faith.⁷²⁸ While Martí might have thought that the superiority of Christianity would be self-evident, Ramon Llull did not take this for granted. Llull saw a difference between arguments based on faith (which might not convince a non-Christian), and arguments based on reason.⁷²⁹

Another event which could have made a significant impact on Ramon Llull, and which happened within the environment of the Aragonese Dominican world, is the failed debate between a monk, usually identified with Ramon Martí, and Sultan al-Mustansir II (1210-1261). During this debate, the monk apparently tore down the Islamic teachings and the life of Muhammad, to the point where the sultan lost his faith. When he then asked the monk to provide evidence for his faith, he refused. He argued that the central dogmas of Christianity cannot be proven, but have to simply be believed in. According to the historical consensus, Ramon Llull was aware of the event, which he described throughout his *œuvre* as a bad example of a preacher who refuses to prove his own faith and only focuses on destroying the faith of another.⁷³⁰ I will further describe the event in the section on Ramon Martí.

According to Bonner, part of the Dominican influence on Ramon Llull was also negative. Ramon Llull was particularly sceptic about the Dominican methods of undermining the faith of one's religious opponent. In the thirteenth century, there was a special focus on converting the Jewish populace of the Iberian peninsula, in a mostly apologetic manner. In order to undermine the religion of one's opponent, Jewish sources were analyzed from a Christian point of view, especially after the Barcelona Disputation (in which Fra Pau Cristià used this technique). The Old Testament in its entirety, and also the bulk of the Rabbinic literature, was subjected to a tendentious reading, in order to defend (but not irrevocably prove) Christian dogma. Ramon Llull did not believe in having discussions based on authority.⁷³¹

1.2. NEW MISSIONIZING TENDENCIES IN THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY

The early thirteenth century saw the collapsing of the Almohad empire and *tā'ifa*-states. This meant new opportunities for Christian ventures into Islamic territory, motivated by both religious and economic reasons. Missionaries were active in both the newly conquered *tā'ifa*-states and in farther Muslim territory. Papal representatives and preachers filled the void left by the disappearing of Christian bishoprics in the Islamic world. Christian captives and slaves in particular were kept from receiving pastoral and spiritual care. Therefore, missionaries took it upon themselves to keep Christians in Islamic territory from giving in to religious doubt. There were two main tendencies among missionaries: some would

⁷²⁸ Cf. Raimundus Lullus, *Excusatio Raimundi*, ed. by Charles Lohr (Turnhout: Brepols, 1983), *CCCM*, 37, *ROL*, XI, 3, pp. 363-367.

⁷²⁹ Ryan Szpiech, *Conversion and Narrative: Reading and Religious Authority in Medieval Polemic*, Church, Faith and Culture in the Medieval West (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), pp. 122-142.

⁷³⁰ Bonner, "Ramon Llull and the Dominicans" (cf. footnote 19 above), p. 379.

⁷³¹ Cf. the phrase "Disputar per auctoritatis no ha repòs." In Ramon Llull, *Obres de Ramon Llull: Proverbis de Ramon*, ed. by Salvador Galmés (Palma de Mallorca: Institut d'estudis catalans de Barcelona, 1928), *ORL*, XIV, CCXLVIII, p. 271. Cf. Bonner, "Ramon Llull and the Dominicans" (cf. footnote 19 above), pp. 381-383.

preach the Gospel to every nation on earth, seemingly without care for their own safety, and some would preach the Gospel to Christians alone, within the limits of safety and what Islamic law permitted. Especially the last option would be most frequently chosen by preachers. Both Franciscan and Dominican friars could be categorized among one of the two options, even though Dominicans usually followed more discrete missionary tactics, mainly focused on an intellectual approach and never going further than what the local laws and regulations permitted.⁷³² Franciscans seemed to have a greater inclination to confrontational encounters, often without much regard for Islamic laws and their own safety, which at times resulted in their martyrdom.⁷³³

In 1225, Pope Honorius III called for the evangelization and conversion of non-Christians in his bull *Custodes vineae Domini*.⁷³⁴ Robin Vose underlines that, even though converting non-believers in Islamic lands was hereby advised, there were neither any concrete guidelines as to the desired methods of preaching, nor the conduct required of the preachers. However, it seems that the Dominicans were inclined to stick to a more discrete method of preaching, always keeping away from confrontation and choosing benevolent individuals as an audience. Moreover, the papal bull did press the need for the continuing of pastoral care for Christians in Islamic lands, and keep them from apostasy.⁷³⁵

Ten years after issuing the bull *Custodes vineae Domini*, Pope Honorius issued a new bull, *Cum hora undecima*, where he pressed the Dominican friars to preach to all peoples of the world, so that the greater part of humanity would enter heaven.⁷³⁶ Vose connects this event with the conquering of Cordoba and the conversion of the local ruler Zaid Abū Zaid to Christianity. At the same time, some Dominican friars had found their way into the Islamic lands, where they learned Arabic. The issuing of *Cum hora undecima* coincided with Ramon de Penyafort's writing of the *Responso*,⁷³⁷ where he answered questions of both laymen and Dominicans about proper conduct towards Muslims and fellow Christians in Islamic territory.⁷³⁸

It is apparent that the experience of Christians who were imprisoned in Islamic territory mattered a great deal to Ramon Llull. The *Disputatio Raimundi* is, in the first place, his account of his imprisonment in Islamic territory. Llull's account of his own behaviour in the dungeon in Bijāya was heavily idealized, and was meant to showcase an idealized example of the unwavering faith of a Christian who suffered abuse in Islamic territory. However, Llull did not seem to follow the mission paradigm of spreading the Gospel to

⁷³² Robin Vose, *Dominicans, Muslims and Jews* (cf. footnote 20 above), p. 199.

⁷³³ Vose uses the example of the martyrs of Morocco, cf. Vose, *Dominicans, Muslims and Jews* (cf. footnote 20 above), p. 199.

⁷³⁴ Demetrio Mansilla, *La documentación pontificia de Honorio III* (Rome: Instituto Español de Historia Eclesiástica, 1965), pp. 416–417. Work cited in Vose, *Dominicans, Muslims and Jews* (cf. footnote 20 above), p. 200.

⁷³⁵ Vose, *Dominicans, Muslims and Jews* (cf. footnote 20 above), p. 200.

⁷³⁶ Athanasius Matanić, “Bulla missionaria ‘Cum hora undecima’ eiusque iuridicum ‘Directorium apparatus’,” *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum*, 50 (1957): 364-378.

⁷³⁷ cf. Ramon de Penyafort, *Responso ad dubitabilia circa communicationem christianorum cum saracenis*, ed. by John Tolan in “Ramon de Penyafort's Responses to Questions Concerning Relations Between Christians and Saracens: Critical Edition and Translation,” in *Convivencia and Medieval Spain: Essays in Honor of Thomas F. Glick*, ed. by Mark T. Abate, Mediterranean Perspectives (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2019), 159-192.

⁷³⁸ Vose, “Preachers, Teachers and Fools” (cf. footnote 719 above).

just Christians in the Islamic world. He wished to make converts, and was prepared to take certain safety risks in order to do so – for example, by ignoring Islamic laws against Christian missionizing.

In the next few chapters, I will compare the works of Ramon Martí and Riccoldo da Monte di Croce with the *Disputatio Raimundi*. The focus will be on finding both differences and common ground in their attitude towards conversion, Islam, and their encounter with Muslims. I will attempt to find out whether Ramon Llull's voice could easily be compared to the voice of his contemporaries, or whether he was unique in his method and opinions.

CHAPTER 6: RAMON LLULL AND RAMON MARTÍ.

1. INTRODUCTION

The comparison between Ramon Llull and Ramon Martí opens the possibility of discussing Llull's connection to Dominican outlooks on conversion techniques in 13th century Iberia. Both authors lived and worked during almost the same period (Ramon Martí's final and most important work, the *Pugio fidei*, was written in 1270, a year before Llull wrote his first work, the *Logica Algazelis*). Both Llull and Martí lived and worked in the territory of the Crown of Aragon: Ramon Martí in Subirat and later Barcelona, and Ramon Llull in Palma de Mallorca, and later Montpellier.

Ramon Martí was a student of Ramon de Penyafort, belonging to a group of Dominican friars under his tutelage. While Ramon de Penyafort was the source of the 13th century Dominican endeavours to establish conversion from Islam to Christianity in the Crown of Aragon, Ramon Martí 'embodied' the discourse with his writings. His major works denote steps or paradigm shifts in the Dominican intellectual world. His works influenced the writings of Thomas Aquinas, and vice versa, Thomas Aquinas greatly influenced the work of Ramon Martí.⁷³⁹ According Miguel Asín Palacios and later Pierre Marc, the *Summa contra gentiles*⁷⁴⁰ (1259-1265) by Thomas Aquinas might have been influenced by Martí's *Capistrum Iudaeorum*⁷⁴¹ (even though its writing date is usually held to be 1267), and the later *Pugio fidei* again shows remarkable similarities to the *Summa contra gentiles*.⁷⁴² Bonner argues that the evolution of the Dominican approach towards mission, in 13th century Iberia at least, can be traced back to four cardinal moments: first, the Barcelona Disputation in 1263, which showed many similarities with Martí's *Capistrum Iudaeorum*, which in turn influenced the *Summa contra gentiles* by Thomas Aquinas, on which at least a part of Martí's *Pugio fidei* is based.⁷⁴³ Llull also witnessed the influence of Thomas Aquinas, as mentioned by Ángel Cortabarría Beitia, among others. According to him, Llull mentioned the importance of Thomas Aquinas' *Summa contra gentiles*.⁷⁴⁴ Llull discussed certain theological statements from the *Summa contra gentiles*, which he specifically

⁷³⁹ Anthony Bonner, "L'apologètica de Ramon Martí i Ramon Llull davant de l'Islam i del judaisme," in *El debat intercultural als segles XIII i XIV. Actes de les Primeres Jornades de Filosofia Catalana, Girona 25-27 d'abril del 1988*, ed. by Marcel Salleras, Estudi General 9 (Girona: Col·legi Universitari, 1989), p. 173.

⁷⁴⁰ Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra gentiles*, Taurini Londinum edition, 1896, edited by Roberto Busa; edited online by Enrique Alarcón in *Corpusthomicum.org*, 2019, <https://www.corpusthomicum.org/iopera.html>.

⁷⁴¹ Raimundus Martinus, *Capistrum Iudaeorum*, 2 vols., ed. and trans. by Adolfo Robles Sierra (Würzburg: Echter Verlag, 1990).

⁷⁴² Pierre Marc, *Liber de veritate Catholicae fidei*, vol. I: *Introductio*, Paris-Turin: Marietti, 1967, pp. 563-564; Miguel Asín Palacios, *El averroísmo teológico de Santo Tomás de Aquino, Homenaje a D. Francisco Codera en su jubilación del profesorado*, Estudios de erudición oriental, Zaragoza: Escar, 1904, pp. 271-331. The passage is also cited in Bonner, "L'apologètica de Ramon Martí" (cf. footnote 739 above), p. 174. Cf. also Pedro Ribes Montane, "Conocio Santo Tomas la explanatio symboli de Ramon Marti?" *Espiritu* 26, no. 76 (1977): p. 93.

⁷⁴³ Bonner, "L'apologètica de Ramon Martí" (cf. footnote 739 above), p. 178.

⁷⁴⁴ Cortabarría Beitia, "Connaissance de l'Islam" (cf. footnote 27 above), p. 38.

mentioned as a source, in his *Excusatio Raimundi*. Llull also voiced his admiration for Thomas Aquinas, whom he considered a great example of a theologian who used reason and not moralizing invectives as a missionizing method. His arguments were based on rational proof, Llull argued, because Muslims would never dismiss belief for belief, but only for understanding. Llull commended Aquinas for his method of argumentation, which was not based on the destruction of faith, which would be “uncatholic”.⁷⁴⁵

The Barcelona Disputation was a pivotal moment in the development of Martí’s œuvre, which defined the use of both the *Capistrum Iudaeorum* and the *Pugio fidei*. Syds Wiersma compares the respective goals and backgrounds of the *Capistrum Iudaeorum* on the one hand, and the *Pugio fidei* on the other. While the *Capistrum Iudaeorum* was written shortly after the Barcelona Disputation, the second part of the *Pugio fidei* is a continuation of the arguments of the *Capistrum*, while the third part reorganizes the arguments and adapts them to an audience of students.⁷⁴⁶

Ramon Martí was the most productive writer under Ramon de Penyafort. Even though his focus lay predominantly on Judaism, he also dealt extensively with Islam and with Islamic sources. Ramon Martí criticized al-Ġazālī and Ibn Sīnā, in the *Pugio fidei*, and he underlined the heretical disposition of philosophers, while his criticism in this text was mainly directed against the Jews.⁷⁴⁷ The first work by Ramon Martí dealing with Islam, *De seta Machometi* (1257?), delves into Islamic religious sources, the Qur’ān and the *Sunna*. By discussing passages from Islamic religious texts, Ramon Martí aims to find proof for the strength and validity of the Old and New Testaments, that Muhammad cannot be a prophet, and that Islamic culture is less moral than the Christian culture. Some arguments used by Ramon Martí are also important in the works of Ramon Llull, even though the manner in which the two authors prove their arguments is quite different, as I will show in this chapter. Martí aimed to ‘refute’ Islamic and Jewish theology, both by referring to sources of authority and to rational arguments stemming from philosophy.

The arguments of his later *Pugio fidei*, or *The Dagger of Faith*, is understood by Bonner as flowing from the Barcelona Disputation.⁷⁴⁸ As mentioned above, Anthony Bonner stresses the importance of the Barcelona Disputation in 1263 as a general turning point in the approach to interreligious debate by the Dominicans in the territory of the Crown of Aragon. However, even though his knowledge of the debate of the Barcelona Disputation was unmistakable, Badia, Santanach and Soler nuance the certainty of Martí’s presence during the debate.⁷⁴⁹ After the Barcelona Disputation, Martí immersed himself completely in Jewish scriptures, resulting in the *Pugio fidei*. He quoted the Jewish sources with great accuracy in their original Hebrew, seemingly out of fear for being accused of incorrect

⁷⁴⁵ Raimundus Lullus, *Excusatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 37, ROL, XI, 3, pp. 363-367; Raimundus Lullus, *Liber de conuenientia quam habent fides et intellectus in obiecto*, ed. by Fernando Domínguez Reboiras (Turnhout: Brepols, 2017), CCCM, 266, ROL, XXXVIII, 1, p. 116. Annemarie C. Mayer compares the missionary attitude of Thomas Aquinas in her dissertation: Mayer, *Drei Religionen, Ein Gott* (cf. footnote 109 above), pp. 99-108

⁷⁴⁶ Syds Wiersma, “Weapons against the Jews: Motives and Objectives in the Preface of the *Pugio Fidei*,” in *Ramon Martí’s Pugio fidei: Studies and Texts* (cf. footnote 26 above), pp. 137-138; Laureano Robles, *Tomás de Aquino* (Salamanca: Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca, 1992), p. 103.

⁷⁴⁷ Tolán, “Saracen Philosophers Secretly Deride Islam,” (cf. footnote 108 above), pp. 194-195.

⁷⁴⁸ Bonner, “L’apologètica de Ramon Martí” (cf. footnote 739 above), pp. 175-176.

⁷⁴⁹ Badia, Santanach, Soler, *Ramon Llull as a Vernacular Writer* (cf. footnote 16 above), p. 231.

rendition, but only in the second part of the book. His aim was solely to find proof in Jewish sources for the messiahship of Christ, which had been the main subject of the Barcelona Disputation. Martí devoted the entire first part of the book to a philosophical and theological exposition which is very similar to Thomas Aquinas' *Summa contra gentiles*, in which Martí deals extensively with philosophy, both Greek and Arabic.⁷⁵⁰

While earlier Dominicans used a more traditional approach, by attacking the scriptures of other faiths and pointing out their shortcomings, it became more acceptable after the Barcelona Disputation to find evidence for Christian dogma in non-Christian sacred texts. This was especially true for Jewish sources, but to some extent also for the Dominican arguments against Islam. Ramon Martí had also defended Christian beliefs in the *Explanatio symboli*,⁷⁵¹ using a mixture of Christian authority and logic, and by attacking Islam in the *De seta Machometi*,⁷⁵² by lambasting Islamic sources.⁷⁵³ The central motive of this new technique was the same as the one Ramon Llull had when he designed the logic of the *Ars*. Since non-Christians did not believe in the authority of the Old and New Testaments (as Jews did not believe in a purely Christian interpretation of the Old Testament, and did not accept the New Testament at all), one should not mention these scriptures as arguments against those who do not accept them. However, while Llull proposed a technique where one would only resort to the use of reason, Ramon Martí resorted to both the use of reason, and to the use of arguments coming from the works of those very non-Christians (Jews in particular) he chose to convert. However, Ramon Martí did defend the use of the Old and New Testaments multiple times in his œuvre (for example, in the *Explanatio symboli* and *De seta Machometi*) – even though he did not use them as a source in his *Capistrum Iudaeorum* or in his *Pugio fidei*. However, according to Vose, the *Explanatio symboli* was mainly targeting a Christian audience, only occasionally touching on Islamic arguments against Christianity, in order to defend their faith and belief in Christian doctrines against any religious or spiritual pressure they might experience in their contact with Muslims. This is a motivation which could likewise be ascribed to Ramon Llull, when he wrote the *Disputatio Raimundi*.⁷⁵⁴

Thomas E. Burman discusses Ramon Martí when he explains the growing tendency, among 13th century Dominicans, to inspect and discuss the religious texts of Islam. He nuances the prevalence of this tendency, however. According to Burman, interest in Islam was still not the norm, since most Dominican writers are not known to have discussed Islamic sources or traditions, even when entering into a dialogue with non-Christians.⁷⁵⁵ The importance of Ramon Martí, and the technique of debating based on non-Christian religious sources should, therefore, be put in the specific context of interreligious debate in

⁷⁵⁰ Bonner, “L’apologètica de Ramon Martí” (cf. footnote 739 above), p. 175-176.

⁷⁵¹ Raimundus Martinus, *Explanatio symboli apostolorum*, ed. by Josep M. March in “En Ramón Martí y la seva ‘Explanatio symboli apostolorum,’” *Anuari de l’Institut d’Estudis Catalans* 2 (1908): 443-496.

⁷⁵² Raimundus Martinus, *De seta Machometi seu de origine, progressu et fine Machometi et quadruplici reprobatione prophetiae eius*, ed. by Michelina di Cesare, in *The Pseudo-Historical Image of the Prophet Muhammad in Medieval Latin Literature: a Repertory*, Studien zur Geschichte und Kultur des islamischen Orients 26 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2012), 279-305.

⁷⁵³ Bonner, “L’apologètica de Ramon Martí” (cf. footnote 739 above), p. 175.

⁷⁵⁴ Vose, *Dominicans, Muslims and Jews* (cf. footnote 20 above), pp. 122-124.

⁷⁵⁵ Thomas E. Burman, “Inspicientes—et Non Inspicientes—eius Legem: Thirteenth-Century Dominicans, the Qur’ān, and Islam,” *Journal of Qur’ānic Studies* 20, no. 3 (2018): pp. 33-34; Cf. also Hames, “Through Ramon Llull’s looking glass” (cf. footnote 22 above), pp. 51-74.

the territory of the Crown of Aragon, or of the debate culture surrounding certain influential figures such as Ramon Martí, Ramon de Penyafort, Pau Christià and Thomas Aquinas.

When put in chronological order, the texts written by Ramon Martí mark a lifelong paradigm shift. Ramon Martí focused on the apologetic defense of Christianity in his *De explanatio symboli apostolorum* (1257). Here, Ramon Martí derives the proof for his arguments from Christian theology and logic. After the philosophical explanation of Christianity, and after defending the use of the Bible, Ramon Martí derives proof from the Old and New Testaments. *De seta Machometi* (1257?) derives its arguments against Islam from arguing against Muhammad and Islamic history. The *Pugio fidei* (1270) deals with Jewish sources, this time to prove Christian messianism, while also using logic to fortify the argumentation.

It is unclear whether Ramon Llull drew from Ramon Martí as a source, or whether he and Ramon Martí ever met one another. Ephrem Longpré⁷⁵⁶ has argued that Ramon Llull was familiar with Ramon Martí, or at least that he knew his œuvre. As a proof, Longpré discussed an example which can be found in Llull's *De acquisitione Terrae Sanctae*, where Llull recounts the story of a learned Christian monk, who wished to preach Christianity to the Islamic "King Miramamoli". After destroying the sultan's faith in Islam, the sultan asked the monk to prove his own faith. The Christian refused, since he claimed Christianity should only be believed in and that it cannot be proven by mere reason. The sultan claimed himself to be an unbeliever from then on.⁷⁵⁷ The story is an example of a method of preaching which Ramon Llull disagreed with: destroying the faith of one's opponent, but not using necessary reasons to prove Christian dogma – not just defending it, but establishing its rationality. Longpré identified the monk with Ramon Martí since, in his opinion, many elements of the description of the monk in the original passage (the Christian monk was well-versed in Arabic and Hebrew, and he was an active preacher and an apologist) seem to point to Martí's profile.⁷⁵⁸ Alexander Fidora adds to these arguments that it is mentioned in the *Liber de acquisitione Terrae Sanctae*⁷⁵⁹ and the *Liber de convenientia, quam habent Fides et Intellectus in obiecto*⁷⁶⁰ that the monk frequently conversed with a Jewish scholar. Llull also mentioned that he himself had met the friar in the latter work. However, the certainty of the theory that this friar was Ramon Martí is nuanced by Alexander Fidora, who stresses the fact that Ramon Martí was in fact versed in theology and philosophy, unlike the monk in Llull's anecdote. Moreover, Fidora claims that there is no evidence to believe that Llull and Martí ever met in real life, even though Llull mentions that he met the monk after his mission in the *Liber de acquisitione*.

Whether Ramon Llull met Ramon Martí or not, a comparison of their missiological approaches can lead to interesting conclusions. As mentioned above, the approaches that are used by Ramon Martí can be grouped in three main categories: (i.) the theological refutation of Islamic philosophy and (potentially) the defense of Christianity, by focusing

⁷⁵⁶ Éphrem Longpré, "Le B. Raymond Lulle et Raymond Martí, O.P.," *BSAL* 24 (1933), pp. 269-271.

⁷⁵⁷ Raimundus Lullus, *De acquisitione Terrae Sanctae*, ed. by Fernando Domínguez Reboiras, *ROL*, XXXVIII, CCCM, 266, 3, 1, p. 225.

⁷⁵⁸ Longpré, "Le B. Raymond Lulle et Raymond Martí O.P." (cf. footnote 756 above), pp. 269-271.

⁷⁵⁹ Fidora, "Ramon Martí in Context" (cf. footnote 25 above), pp. 376-381.

⁷⁶⁰ Raimundus Lullus, *Liber de convenientia, quam habent fides et intellectus in obiecto*, ed. by Fernando Domínguez Reboiras (Turnhout: Brepols, 2017), *CCCM*, 266, *ROL*, XXXVIII, pp. 127-128.

on Islamic sources, which is what happens in the *Pugio fidei*; (ii.) the critique of Islam and the life of Muhammad from a moralistic, anecdotal point of view, apparent in the *De seta Machometi*, again from Islamic sources and (iii.) logically explaining Christianity, as he does in the *Explanatio symboli apostolorum*. Ramon Martí also consulted some of the same philosophers which are connected to Lull in chapter four of this dissertation. According to Ángel Cortabarría Beitia, he most definitely read Ibn Sīnā's *Metaphysics*, which is called *al-Ilāhiyyāt*, and he was probably also familiar with the *Kitāb as-ṣifāh* in its entirety, which he read in Arabic. Martí called the metaphysical tract of Ibn Sīnā the *Liber de Scientia Divina*. From Ibn Sīnā, he also used the *Kitāb an-nağāt*. Martí also referred to al-Ġazālī, for example, to the *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, and to the *Maqāsid al-falāsifa*, which he called *Liber intentionum philosophorum*. He also referred to al-Ġazālī's *Al-Maqṣad al-asnā fī sharḥ asmā' Allāh al-husnā*, which he called *De nominibus Dei*. Martí also used Ibn Rušd as a source. He referred to the *Tahāfut al-Tahāfut*, which he named *Destructio destructionis* in Latin, and to Ibn Rušd's commentary of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*.⁷⁶¹

For this section, I will discuss the *Explanatio symboli*, the *De seta Machometi*, and the *Pugio fidei*, each time discussing relevant passages of a selection of chapters taken from each of the works. I will, each time, make a comparison with Ramon Lull's *Disputatio Raimundi* in more or less general terms.

2. EXPLANATIO SYMBOLI APOSTOLORUM

In the *Explanatio symboli*, Martí attempts to defend Christianity in a few major steps. First, he attempts to prove that the Old and New Testaments are valid sources to find evidence for the truth of Christianity. Next, he refutes Islamic critique against Christianity on logical ground, by answering with philosophical arguments, coming from Christian scholars.

Ramon Martí wishes to disarm Islamic retractors of Christianity on two main grounds. First, he establishes the validity of referring to Christian sources in a dialogue with Islam. Some of the reasons why Muslims did not accept the Old and New Testaments were, for example, that many Muslims believed that these scriptures were falsified by Jews and Christians wishing to erase any prophecies regarding the coming of Muhammad. Martí's argumentation is based on the refutation of Islamic readings of the Old and New Testaments. Arguably, Martí's arguments follow a technique which mirrors the Dominican point of view: while Dominicans inspect non-Christian sacred texts in order to find proof of their own religion and in order to find anti-Christian messages, Martí makes sure that Muslims would not be able to do the same thing with the Bible. After the defense of the Old and New Testaments, Ramon Martí defends Christian doctrine, such as the Trinity, against Islamic refutations by referring to philosophy. While Martí does not philosophically prove the Trinity, he does attempt to reply to certain philosophical problems concerning Christian dogma. Some of the proofs of the Trinity which Ramon Martí proposes, are also

⁷⁶¹ Ángel Cortabarría Beitia, "La connaissance des textes arabes chez Raymond Martin O.P. et sa position en face de l'Islam," trans. by Réginald Alvès de Sà, Cahiers de Fanjeaux 18 (Toulouse: Privat, 1983), pp. 280-284.

present in the *Disputatio Raimundi*, even though Ramon Llull only mentions his defense of the Trinity in combination with the philosophical proof of the correlatives.

2.1. THE DEFENSE OF THE USE OF THE OLD AND NEW TESTAMENTS

In the *Explanatio symboli*, Martí attempts to explain to his readers that the Old and New Testaments hold value in Islam and Christianity, and that the Bible can be used as a valid source of discussion. Even though later passages in the *Explanatio symboli* are meant to be based on logic and philosophy, Ramon Martí still attempts to prove that Christian sources, especially the Old and New Testaments, can be valid. Again, Martí uses Islamic sources to prove the validity of the Bible, since it would not be acceptable for Muslims to provide evidence based on the Bible itself. Many times in the Qur'ān and in certain passages of the *Sunna*, Muhammad does stress the need for some amount of respect for the religious texts of the other two 'religions of the Book'. Ramon Martí investigates these Qur'ānic passages, together with a collection of *aḥadīth*, and argues that, since these passages are accepted in mainstream Islam, it must mean that Muslims have to accept an argumentation based on Christian (and Jewish) scriptures. It also means, according to Martí, that the Christian scriptures possess truth even according to Islamic dogma, and likewise the Christian interpretations of the Bible. However, after Martí's exposé on the defense of the Old and New Testaments, he does not necessarily retrieve his evidence for Christian dogma from Christian sources. His argumentation is mainly logical and backed by philosophy, not in the first place by scriptural authority.

First, Ramon Martí mentions Qur'ānic verses, where it is prescribed that Muslims can still consult the Old and New Testaments as valid sources, even after the arrival of the Qur'ān (Q. 10:94). Naturally, this must mean that, according to the teachings of Islam, Christian and Jewish sacred texts must be truthful, and not mendacious.⁷⁶² The Old Testament, for example, can still be used as a source of Judgement for the Jews. Ramon Martí mentions the passage in the Qur'ān where it is described that, when a friend of Muhammad needed to function as a judge for the Jewish community of Mecca, Muhammad told him to use the Old Testament as a source (Q. 5:42 – 43).⁷⁶³ Also, since the Qur'ān described the New Testament as "God's memorial," protected by God, it makes sense that

⁷⁶² Raimundus Martinus, *Explanatio symboli apostolorum*, ed. by Josep M. March in "En Ramón Martí y la seva 'Explanatio symboli apostolorum,'" *Anuari de l'Institut d'Estudis Catalans* 2 (1908): p. 454: "Quod vero lex et Evangelium sint incorrupta potest ostendi per Alcoranum; unde in capitulo Jone dictum fuit Machometo secundum dictum suum sic: Si fueris in dubio de eo quod misimus super te, interroga eos, qui legunt librum prius quam tu. Sed constat quod Deus, vel Gabriel, qui, ut ipse dicit, loquebatur ei, non dicebant sibi, ut interrogaret falsarios, sed veraces, qui legebant librum secundum veritatem, non secundum mutationem, que inducit falsitatem. Unde per hoc ostenditur quod libri Evangelii et Legis erant incorrupti; quia illi qui legebant librum prius, quam ipse esset, erant iudei veraces et christiani, a quibus, secundum mandatum Domini, debebat requirere veritatem."

⁷⁶³ Martinus, *Explanatio symboli* (cf. footnote 762 above), p. 454: "Item, in cap. *mense*, quando iudei postulaverunt iudicium ab Ebi-horeyra, quem posuerat Machometus iudicem, ut iudicaret inter homines, et ille diceret eis: Non iudico inter vos, donec interrogem Machometum; et ille ivisset ad Machometum et interrogasset eum, respondit Machometus et dixit: Deus misit super me in facto iudeorum, et dixit: Si venerint ad te, iudica inter eos, aut avertere ab eis, et si avertaris ab eis, non nocebunt tibi in aliquo. Et si iudicaveris inter eos, iudica iuste; quia Deus diligit iuste iudicantes. Et quando veniunt ad iudicium tuum et apud eos est lex et in ipsa est iudicium Dei. Et ecce hic testatus est Machometus, quia tempore suo lex erat apud iudeos, in qua erat iudicium Dei: unde ex hoc patet quod remanserat incorrupta; quia, si corrupta fuisset, verum iudicium Dei non contineret."

it must be uncorrupted (Q. 15:9).⁷⁶⁴ Moreover, if the Bible is the Word of God, it can never alter.⁷⁶⁵ Ramon Martí repeats some Qur'ānic verses which complement the Bible as the word of God, which can be read together with the Qur'ān (Q. 3:3).⁷⁶⁶ Moreover, the Qur'ān stresses the importance of the Bible for Christians and Jews, speaking from the viewpoint of God, who gave these sources to them.⁷⁶⁷ Here, Martí plays into the idea that, even though Muhammad is supposed to be the last prophet in Islam and the end of a series of prophets and revelations, the scriptures from Jews and Christians have not suddenly become redundant. They are still valid for Jewish and Christian communities. Moreover, Martí stresses the divinity of the New Testament and the protection of the New Testament by God. This must mean that the New Testament is an authority in its own right, even in Islam, and that it cannot be corrupted, since God would not love or protect anything that is corrupted. Therefore, an argumentation based on the scriptures of both Jews and Muslims would be completely valid, and so would the Christian theology as it is interpreted from the New Testament.

In the next passages, Martí also discusses the idea in Islam that Muhammad's name has been erased from the Bible. This Islamic concept was broader known as *tahrīf*. It was insinuated in various Qur'ānic passages, that even though the Old and New Testaments had been divinely revealed, that both Christians and Jews altered their sources, to erase any prophecy regarding the arrival of Islam and Muhammad. There are two main kinds of *tahrīf* known in Islam: the falsification of the meaning of the text (*tahrīf al-ma'nā*), and the falsification of the text itself (*tahrīf al-naṣṣ*).⁷⁶⁸ Ramon Martí discusses an example from each category. However, it is unclear whether he knew the difference between the two interpretations of *tahrīf*. Even so, it is apparent that Ramon Martí was quite aware of the debate about *tahrīf* and the importance of dealing with the concept before he concluded his chapter on the Old and New Testaments. If Martí was to defend the notion that Muslims should accept the validity of the Old and New Testaments, he was also to deal with the Islamic argument against the Christian sources, which was based on the notion that these authorities were corrupted at some point.

⁷⁶⁴ Martinus, *Explanatio symboli* (cf. footnote 762 above), p. 454: "Item in cap. *Hvgr*, introducit Deum sibi loquentem. Nos demissus (sic) memoriale et sumus eius custodes. Vocat autem legem et Evangelium memoriale Dei, ut dicunt sarraceni. Quod, cum ipse Deus custodiat, non est corruptum ; alioquin non esset Deus [6. v] fidelis custos, quod absit."

⁷⁶⁵ Martinus, *Explanatio symboli* (cf. footnote 762 above), p. 454: "Item, in cap. V.: Non est mutatio verbo Dei ; sed verbum Dei est lex et Evangelium. Cum ergo verbo Dei non sit mutatio, lex et Evangelium non sunt mutata."

⁷⁶⁶ Martinus, *Explanatio symboli* (cf. footnote 762 above), p. 454: "Item in cap. Vace, in fine secunde distinctionis dicitur: Credimus Deum et id, quod fuit missum nobis, et quod fuit missum Abrahe et Ismaeli et Isaach et Jacob et tribus, et id, quod fuit datum Moysi et Jhesu, et id, quod fuit datum prophetis a Domino suo, et non separamus inter aliquem ex ipsis. Ecce in hiis verbis mandatur sarracenis, ut credant legem et prophetas et Evangelium Jhesu Christi, et quod non faciant differentiam inter aliquem prophetarum ; et ita de necessitate oportet eos credere legem et prophetas et Evangelium. Cum ergo dictum sit eis, quod credant omnia supradicta, nec Deus mandaret credi corrupta, nec erant corrupta, sed vera et incorrupta. Itero in V. cap. circa finem. Dedimus librum Moysi complementem ei, qui benefecit et discretionem in omni re et directionem et misericordiam; sed corrupta lex non dirigit, sed potius facit 55 errare; ergo lex Moysi non est corrupta."

⁷⁶⁷ Martinus, *Explanatio symboli* (cf. footnote 762 above), pp. 454-455: "Item in cap. . . (sic): Donec statueritis legem et Evangelium, in nichilo estis. Ibi loquitur Dominus christianis et iudeis, ut dicunt sarraceni. Sed cum Deus bonum consulat et malum dissuadeat, hoc eis non dixisset, si lex et Evangelium corrupta fuissent ; ergo incorrupta sunt lex et Evangelium apud christianos et iudeos."

⁷⁶⁸ Hava Lazarus-Yafeh, "TAHRIF," in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Second Edition (Leiden: Brill NV, 2012), accessed online 22/05/2023, https://referenceworks-brillonline-com.kuleuven.e-bronnen.be/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/*-SIM_7317.

The Old and New Testaments have never hidden a prophecy, Martí argues, neither of good prophets (Christ, John the Baptist), nor of evil entities (the Antichrist). There would be no motivation to do the same thing with Muhammad.⁷⁶⁹ Martí also disagrees with identifying Muhammad with a prophecy in the Book of Habbakuk, since he believes Muhammad is too different from the image evoked in this work.⁷⁷⁰

Next, Ramon Martí discusses the interpretation of the Gospel of John, where Christ says that He will send a helper or “paracletus” (or succourer) to the apostles in their hour of need (John 14, 26). According to the Christian interpretation, this paracletus is the Holy Ghost. However, Islamic teachings give a different interpretation, based on Qur’ān 61:6. Here, it is said that Muhammad is the helper promised by Christ, and that the New Testament does predict Muhammad. Christians are purposefully mendacious for hiding the true meaning of the passage. Ramon Martí disagrees with this approach, however. The paracletus is indeed not Muhammad, he writes, but rather the Holy Ghost.⁷⁷¹ Muhammad had a more negative role in human history: he was the “desolator” or the destroyer, while the Holy Ghost was the “consolator”.⁷⁷² Lastly, Muhammad was not alive at the time of the apostles and, while the Holy Spirit is a spiritual entity which cannot be seen by ordinary people, Muhammad is not.⁷⁷³

⁷⁶⁹ Martinus, *Explanatio symboli* (cf. footnote 762 above), p. 455: “Si quis vero dicat, quod in hoc sunt corrupti libri, quod nomen Machometi est inde amotum, respondemus, quod non est causa, quare nomen eius amoveretur; quia, si bonus erat futurus, utile erat sciri nomen eius, ut, cum venisset, sicut bonus et de quo iam prophetatum erat, reciperetur; sicut contigit in Johanne Baptista precursore Christi, de cuius adventu prophetarunt Isayas et Malachias. Item, sicut scriptum est etiam de Elia et Enoch, quorum adventus in fine mundi predictus est in veteri et in novo testamento, per quos iudei in fine mundi convertentur. Si vero malus futurus erat, necesse fuit similiter sciri nomen eius et mores, ut cum veniret, per huius noticiam caveretur ab eo; sicut scriptum est de antichristo et de moribus eius, et de seductione, et de falsis miraculis, que facturus erat; ut per ista iam scripta, cum venerit, cognoscatur et a fidelibus caveatur. Unde, sicut non est ablatum nomen antichristi, nec nomen dyaboli de libris; eodem modo nec nomen Machometi inde fuisset ablatum, si ibi fuisset scriptum. Unde esset frivola excusatio, que assumitur in defensione mendacii et erroris.”

⁷⁷⁰ Martinus, *Explanatio symboli* (cf. footnote 762 above), p. 455: “Quod autem dicunt pro se nomen eius scriptum fuisse in libro Abacuch prophete c. III: Deus ab austro veniet, et sanctus de monte Faran (Hab 3, 3), non potest convenire Machometo; quia nec Deus fuit, nec sanctus, sed potius peccator et immundus. Fuit enim luxuriosus et raptor bonorum alienorum, et interfector hominum sine iusticia; sicut colligitur ex ystoriis et gestis de eo scriptis, nec venit de monte Faran, imo de monte Meche; nam mons Meche, unde ipse fuit oriundus, dicitur Cayquiyan; sicut dicitur in libr. Ayci. Nam Pharan, quem iactant esse montem Meche, est in introitu terre promissionis; sicut habetur ex tertio libr. Moysi c. XIII (Nm 13, 1). Mecha vero distat a terra promissionis per longa terrarum spacia, itinere mensis unius et ultra. Prophetia vero predicta verius Christo convenit; sicut patet per precedentia et sequentia.”

⁷⁷¹ Martinus, *Explanatio symboli* (cf. footnote 762 above), p. 455: “Item, quod dicunt quod Christus predixit de Machometo in Evangelio, ubi promisit mittere discipulis paraclitum, volentes intelligere, per paraclitum Machometum, hoc non potest stare: quoniam Johannis XIII, promisit et dedit paraclitum apostolis, quorum tempore non venit Machometus, dicens: Paraclitus autem Spiritus Sanctus, quem mittet Pater in nomine meo, ille vos docebit omnia (Io 14, 26). Unde cum Paraclitus sit Spiritus Sanctus, qui docuit apostolos omnia, non convenit Machometo, ut dicatur Paraclitus; cum nec Spiritus Sanctus fuerit, qui est Deus, nec apostolos docuerit.”

⁷⁷² Martinus, *Explanatio symboli* (cf. footnote 762 above), p. 455: “Item, paraclitus idem est quod consolator, quod Machometus non fuit; imo desolator, quia venit cum gladiis cogens homines ad suscipiendam suam sectam, quod tamen Deus facere noluit, cum hominum liberum creaverit, et suo voluntatis: nec aliquis propheta vel iustus hoc attemptaverit unquam; sicut patet legentibus gesta antiquorum.”

⁷⁷³ Martinus, *Explanatio symboli* (cf. footnote 762 above), p. 455: “Item, Spiritus Sanctus non videtur ab hominibus mundanis, nec scitur ab eis. Unde, Johannis XIII, Ego rogabo Patrem et alium paraclitum dabit vobis, ut maneat vobiscum in eternum. Spiritum veritatis, quem mundus non potest accipere; quia non vidit eum nec scit eum; vos autem cognoscetis eum, quia apud vos manebit et in vobis erit (Io 14, 16–17). Ecce

2.2. SECUNDA RATIO

In the second passage of the *Explanatio symboli*, which deals with the rational proof of the Trinity, Ramon Martí attempts to explain the eternal generation of the Son. Ramon Martí quotes Jeremiah 2:13, when he compares God to an eternal spring or font. This is why, according to Ramon Martí, one should attribute eternal emanation to God. This is a prove for the existence of the Father and the Son: when there is generating, there is also something generated. The generator is the Father, and the generated is the Son.

“Since there is no accident in God, as Boethius says in the book on the Trinity, this emanation of God is essential and non-accidental. By generating the Son, He gives His entire essence to Himself; because, since He is very simple, in Him cannot fall any part, and this is why He cannot give a part of His essence. It is necessary that He has given it all, and that is why the Son is completely equal to the Father. Do not think that in the divine generation the Son is posterior in time than the Father, as happens in the carnal generation, in which the son is necessarily later in time than the father. But in this case, it is not like that. Therefore, since the Father is from eternity, the Son is likewise from eternity. The Father was not without the Son at any point, as a spring is never without the outflow of water.”⁷⁷⁴

Ramon Martí provides evidence that the generation of the Son is non-accidental, since there are no accidents in God, as mentioned by Boethius in *De Trinitate*.⁷⁷⁵ Martí explains that the ‘overflowing’ of God’s essence to His divine Persons is eternal and infinite, since God is eternal, and therefore, the generation of the Son is beyond time. This is why the Father and the Son are not to be placed in a temporal order: the Father does not come before the Son, as is the case in the material world. Moreover, since God is one and indivisible, meaning that while the Son generates from the Father, the Father lets His entire essence flow in the Person of the Son, and not just a part. This is why the Father and the Son are co-essential, without any kind of hierarchy.

Raimundus discusses the same ideas in the second chapter of the first part of the *Disputatio Raimundi*. In the chapter on infinity, Raimundus refutes ‘Umar’s claim that the

per ista, que hic dicuntur, patet manifeste, quod nullo modo potest dici Machometus Paraclitus, cum non fuerit datus apostolis. Inter illos enim et ipsum fluxerunt prope DC anni, nec fuerit consolator, sed potius desolator, nec fuerit Spiritus Sanctus, qui videri non potest, sed potius corporalis et visibilis.” Cf. The discussion of the *Secunda Ratio* in Martí’s *Explanatio symboli* in Marcial Solana, “Corroboración filosófica del dogma de la Trinidad por Ramón Martí,” *Revista de filosofía* 22, no. 86 (1963): pp. 337-339.

⁷⁷⁴ Martinus, *Explanatio symboli* (cf. footnote 762 above), p. 459: “Cum autem in Deo nullum sit accidens, sicut dicit Boetius in libro de trinitate, hec emanatio Dei essentialis est, non accidentalis. Generando ergo Filium, totam essentiam suam sibi dedit; quia cum sit simplicissimus, in eo pars cadere non potest; et ideo partem essentie sue dare non potuit. Necessario ergo dedit totam, et ideo Filius omnino equalis est Patri. Nec putes in generatione Divina Filium posteriorem Patre tempore, sicut fit in generatione carnali, in qua filius necessario est posterior patre tempore. Sed in illa non sic. Imo sicut Pater est ab eterno, similiter et Filius est ab eterno. Non enim aliquando fuit Pater sine Filio, sicut nec fons sine emanatione aque.” Translation by Margot Leblanc. Cf. The discussion of the *Secunda Ratio* in Martí’s *Explanatio symboli* in Marcial Solana, “Corroboración filosófica del dogma de la Trinidad por Ramón Martí,” *Revista de filosofía* 22, no. 86 (1963): pp. 337-339.

⁷⁷⁵ Boethius, *Quomodo trinitas unus Deus ac non tres dii*, ed. by Hugh F. Stewart, Edward K. Rand and Stanley J. Tester (Cambridge: Loeb, 1973), cap. 3, p. 12: “Deus vero a deo nullo differt, ne vel accidentibus vel substantialibus differentiis in subiecto positus distent. Ubi vero nulla est differentia, nulla est omnino pluralitas, quare nec numerus; igitur unitas tantum.”

Father would ‘empty Himself’ in the Son during His generation,⁷⁷⁶ and that He would be destroyed. Raimundus’ argument against ‘Umar’s claim follows the same logic as Ramon Martí. He states that God’s generation of the Son is eternal and He must forever generate the Son from His whole essence. Therefore, He is not emptied into the Son.⁷⁷⁷ The idea that the Persons of the Trinity are eternally generated from God’s essence is also an argument against the idea that there is a hierarchy among God’s Persons, meaning that the Son would be less than the Father, and the Holy Ghost would be less than both the Father and the Son. Both Raimundus and Martí claim that, if God, in as far as He is the Father, eternally generates the Persons from His entire essence, this must mean that all Persons are equal. In the chapter on simplicity, ‘Umar claims that in the system of generation which defines the Trinity, there is a matter of priority, posteriority and commonality.⁷⁷⁸ This subverts the simplicity of God. Raimundus disagrees, and says that since God generates the Persons from His entire essence, all three Persons are equal.⁷⁷⁹ This is roughly the same argument as Ramon Martí’s, who likewise says that the three Persons of God are equal, since God the Father generates the Persons from His entire essence. Since the Persons of the Son and the Holy Ghost are eternally generated from the entire essence of God, this means that they are essentially equal to one another, and that they are of the same essence. This is upheld by both Martí and Raimundus. Other than Ramon Martí, however, Raimundus does not prove this idea with biblical evidence. This does not mean that Ramon Lull was not somehow inspired by the same biblical passage at the point of writing the *Disputatio Raimundi*.

Ramon Martí does not only credit God the Father with the generation of the Person of the Son which is God’s primary act of ‘making’, but also with a secondary act, which is the procession of the Holy Ghost. This procession stems from the will, understood as love, and the generosity of the Son and the Father, which together form one will and one generosity. If God is eternal generosity and eternal love, He must bring forth what Ramon Martí calls a “gift,” which flows from the shared will and generosity of the Father and the Son. The result of this further forth bringing is the Holy Ghost. This gift does not stem accidentally from God, but comes from Him essentially and as a result of His entire essence. Therefore, the gift which is brought forth from the Father and the Son, being the Holy Ghost, is in itself God.⁷⁸⁰

⁷⁷⁶ Cf. Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, I, 1, 4, p. 180.

⁷⁷⁷ Cf. Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 4, p. 206.

⁷⁷⁸ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, I, 1, 6, p. 181.

⁷⁷⁹ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 2, 2, p. 199.

⁷⁸⁰ Martinus, *Explanatio symboli* (cf. footnote 762 above), p. 460: “Item, cum duo sint principia emanationis nobilis, natura, scilicet, et voluntas, quedam est enim emanatio per modum nature, que generatio dicitur, quedam vero per modum voluntatis, qui ad liberalitatem spectat cum in Deo sit prima emanatio, que, scilicet, fit per modum nature, id est, generatio Filii, est etiam in Deo emanatio secunda, que est per [14.] modum voluntatis, scilicet, liberalitas doni. Quia igitur ad summe liberalem pertinet, ut semper ab eo aliquod donum procedat, alioquin summe liberalis non esset, Deus autem summe liberalis est ab eterno, non enim fuit aliquando sine liberalitate; ergo aliquod donum ab eo procedit ab eterno. Et quia una est voluntas Patris et Filii, una est etiam eorum liberalitas; et quia una et eadem liberalitate voluntatis unum et idem donum procedit, unum et idem donum est Patris et Filii; hoc autem donum appellat fides catholica et sacra Scriptura Spiritum sanctum. Cum vero in Deo nullum sit accidens, ut predictum est donum, quod a patre procedit et Filio, non accidentale, sed essenziale est donum. Et quia Deus simplicissimus est, suo dono partem essentie sue communicare non potest; necessario ergo tota Dei essentia

As mentioned before, Raimundus likewise argues that the Holy Ghost is brought forth from the entire essence of the Father and the Son, and that He is, therefore, also God. However, Raimundus does not call the Holy Ghost the gift of God. However, Raimundus also mentions that the Holy Ghost is brought into existence by the love of the Father and the Son, which is the same logic Ramon Martí uses, when he states that the will of both the Father and the Son become one in order to bring forth the Holy Ghost (note that in Llull's and Martí's works, will and love are related concepts).⁷⁸¹

Lastly, Ramon Martí explains the creation of the world by God. According to certain philosophers, Martí states, the created universe does not have a beginning or an end, since they believe that the world eternally proceeds from God. According to Martí, the philosophers do not understand the creation of the universe, and believe that, since the first cause is infinite and eternal, His effect must also eternally and infinitely come from Him. However, Ramon Martí argues that it would be a contradiction to believe that creation is caused and at the same time does not have a beginning. As an example of this logic, he claims that philosophers believe that the universe, as the effect of God, is coeternal with Him, in the same way that the heat of the sun is of the same duration as the sun itself, and the heat of fire is of the same duration as fire.⁷⁸² This argument, that creation does not have a beginning or an end, but is still created by God, can be traced back to the thirteenth century interpretation of Averroism. Following Aristotle, the adherents of this philosophical current believed that the universe was infinite, meaning it did neither have a beginning nor an end. Arguably, this could mean that God did not create the universe, ruling out the necessity of a creator. However, this did not have to be the conclusion of the theory, as some thirteenth century scholars argued that, while creation is endless as far as it is nature, it still has a divine origin. The same philosophical argument was recounted by Thomas Aquinas, in his *De aeternitate mundi* (1226-1227), where he explains the opinion of philosophers who believe the world is co-eternal with God. These philosophers believe that a cause which causes a whole substance of a thing is not less perfect than a cause which merely produces a form. The philosophers argue that often, when a being causes a form to exist, the cause and the effect exist simultaneously. They compare this to the light of the sun, which exists simultaneously with the sun. God is all the more glorious since He makes whole substances which exist simultaneously with Him.⁷⁸³ The comparison of the eternity of the world with

in divino est dono. Sed quicquid habet divina essentia, ipsum est Deus, ergo donum Patri et Filii necessario est Deus.”

⁷⁸¹ Cf. Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 5, p. 208.

⁷⁸² Martinus, *Explanatio symboli* (cf. footnote 762 above), p. 460: “Si quis dicat quod mundus licet sit causatus, potest esse sue cause coeternus, sicut calor solis qui causatur a sole est soli coevus et esset ei coeternus, si sol esset eternus, similiter et calor ignis et similia: dicimus quod hoc non potest esse in Deo et mundo causato ab ipso. Quid, si Deus ab eterno mundum creavit? Aut creavit eum de essentia sua, aut de materia extranea, aut de nichilo. Si primo modo, ergo mundos, cum sit de divina essentia, est Deus, quod falsum est. Si secundo modo, ergo aliqua materia extranea a Deo est eterna, quod etiam est falsum. Si tertio modo, nichil precessit mundum: ergo mundus non est eternus. Non potest ergo divina emanatio intelligi de hoc mundo.”

⁷⁸³ Thomas Aquinas, *Opuscula philosophica: De aeternitate mundi*, L. Baur Monasterii Westfolorum edition, 1933, edited by Roberto Busa; edited online by Enrique Alarcón in *Corpusthomicum.org*, 2019, <https://www.corpusthomicum.org/iopera.html>: “Praeterea. Causa producens totam rei substantiam non minus potest in producendo totam substantiam, quam causa producens formam in productione formae; immo multo magis: quia non producit educendo de potentia materiae, sicut est in eo qui producit formam. Sed aliquod agens quod producit solum formam, potest in hoc quod forma ab eo producta sit

the light of the sun and the heat of fire, where the effect appears simultaneously with the source, seems to have been rather commonplace and can later also be found in the work by Peter of Auvergne (†1304) *Utrum Deus potuit facere mundum ab eterno* (1296),⁷⁸⁴ where he explains the philosophical idea that the world is eternal, without a beginning and an end, but is still eternally created by God.⁷⁸⁵ Here, the concept of *creatio continua* means that the world ‘co-eternates’ with God. In the mind of Ramon Martí, this is impossible, since that which is created *must* have a beginning and *cannot* be co-eternal with God. To him, it would be a metaphysical inconsistency to believe otherwise.

The comparison of the heat of the sun and the heat or the light of fire can be found in the works of Ramon Llull, and also in the *Disputatio Raimundi*, but in a different context. In the *Disputatio Raimundi*, it is used by ‘Umar to claim that, while the sun can cause heat, it does not create another sun in the lower universe. Therefore, God does not create Himself, since His creation is only His operation in the lower universe.⁷⁸⁶ This is a perversion of the original argument, that the universe is eternal beside God in the same way as the light of the sun is the simultaneous effect of the sun. However, ‘Umar uses the comparison to highlight his argument that the sun does not produce another sun, but that the act of the sun is not co-essential to itself (and therefore finite in both time and space). Raimundus uses the argument of the fire, by saying that if fire has the potency to infinitely have the act of burning, then God must even more so have an infinite potency to create the divine Persons.⁷⁸⁷ Here, Ramon Llull does acknowledge the validity of the statement of the philosophers, as reported by Thomas Aquinas, Peter of Auvergne and Ramon Martí, that God can have an eternal act or an eternal effect, in the same way as fire or the sun have an eternal infinite effect. However, in Ramon Llull’s interpretation (voiced by Raimundus in the *Disputatio Raimundi*, but present in the rest of Llull’s œuvre as well), the effect which is symbolized by the light of the sun or the power of fire is not the created universe, but the divine Persons. In this way, Llull reinterprets an existing paradigm, which was commonly known in the thirteenth century Christendom, and used it in order to prove his own philosophy of the Trinity, as apparent in the *Ars*.

2.3. QUARTA RATIO

In the fourth argument of the *Explanatio symboli*, Ramon Martí attempts to explain the Trinity, by referring to three attributes of God, being wisdom, power and will. No single wise person will deny that these attributes belong to God, Martí argues. He continues by stating that they are one with the divine essence, but internally different. What can be said of God’s will cannot be said of God’s wisdom or power. For example, God has the power to destroy the world in one moment, but His will does not desire to do so. Also, God has

quandocumque ipsum est, ut patet in sole illuminante. Ergo multo fortius Deus, qui producit totam rei substantiam, potest facere ut causatum suum sit quandocumque ipse est.”

⁷⁸⁴ Petrus de Alvernia, *Utrum Deus potuerit facere mundum esse ab eterno*, ed. by Richard C. Dales and Omar Argerami, in *Medieval Latin Texts on the Eternity of the World*, Brill’s Studies in Intellectual History 23, Leiden: Brill, 1991, pp. 145-146.

⁷⁸⁵ Richard C. Dales, *Medieval Discussions of the Eternity of the World*, Brill’s Studies in Intellectual History 18 (Leiden: Brill, 1990), pp. 197-198.

⁷⁸⁶ Cf. Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, I, 2, 1, p. 183.

⁷⁸⁷ Cf. Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 6, p. 210.

the wisdom to know sins, He does not have the power to sin, and He does not want sin and evil to exist.

Martí equates power, wisdom and will to the three Persons of God. He equates power to the Father, wisdom to the Son and will to the Holy Ghost. According to Martí, this is similar to the faculties of the human rationality. First, human beings have the power to know, then there is knowledge, which eventually triggers will or love. This way, the human rational faculties of the mind reflect the Trinity. The wisdom comes from the power, and both power and wisdom create the will. In the same way, the Father creates the Son, and both the Son and the Father create the Holy Ghost.⁷⁸⁸

Martí argues that the philosophers understood that God has a power, wisdom and will, but this did not mean that they made the link with the three Persons of God in the same way that the apostles, theologians and patriarchs would later do. They understood the Persons of God only by their effect, or that which is “appropriated” to the Persons (being, for example, eternal wisdom, will and power, or perhaps the faculties of the soul). They could not yet understand the Trinity, except those, who had read the prophets and the Old Testament. If a philosopher did have some notion of the idea that the power, wisdom and will of God reflected the three Persons, their knowledge would come from the biblical prophets which preceded them. One such example was the philosopher Mercury (or Hermes Trismegistus). Martí recounts the story of Monas who begets himself, and reflects his love (or ardour) within Himself (with the phrase *monas monadem genuit*). The phrase comes from the anonymous *Liber XXIV philosophorum*, which was traditionally attributed to

⁷⁸⁸ Martinus, *Explanatio symboli* (cf. footnote 762 above), p. 461: “Hanc autem trinitatem non negaverunt philosophi. Cognoverunt, enim, potentiam Dei per magnitudinem creaturarum, et sapientiam per dispositionem et ordinem earumdem, et bonitatem per earumdem utilitatem. Attamen eorum noticia non fuit secundum proprietates personales, que sunt in ipsis personis distincte, sed secundum ea, que ipsis personis appropriantur, que sunt communia cuilibet persone. Nam quelibet trium personarum est sapiens, potens, et volens, et ipsarum trium personarum una est potentia, sapientia et voluntas, sive bonitas. Est tamen appropriata potentia Patri, sapientia Filio, voluntas, sive bonitas, Spiritui sancto. Et huius simile ostenditur in anima rationali. Primo enim potentia, secundo scientia, tercio voluntas. Primo enim habet homo potentiam sciendi, deinde scit, et postea vult et amat, quod est sibi notum per scientiam. Et sic inter hec tria, potentia est quidem prima et a nullo illorum trium. Et ab ipsa potentia est sapientia, et a potentia et sapientia est voluntas, sive amor. Considerans igitur anima rationalis et fidelis hec tria in se sic ordinata, ascendit quodammodo ad noticiam summe trinitatis, et cognoscit in trinitate Patrem a nullo esse, sicut dicit fides catholica, per hoc quod invenit in se potentiam que non est a sapientia, vel voluntate. Sed ipsa potentia, ut dictum est, est principium carum duarum, et ideo attribuit Patri potentiam. Cognoscit etiam Filium esse a Patre per hoc quod invenit in se sapientiam esse a potentia, et ideo attribuit Filio sapientiam. Cognoscit etiam Spiritum sanctum esse a Patre et Filio per hoc quod invenit in se voluntatem, sive amorem, esse a potentia et sapientia. Et ideo attribuit voluntatem, sive amorem, Spiritui sancto.”

Hermes Trismegistus.⁷⁸⁹ According to Martí's interpretation, the begetting Monas is the Father, the begotten Monas is the Son, and the love is the Holy Ghost.⁷⁹⁰

Ramon Martí also refers to the combination of God's power, wisdom and will in his *Pugio fidei*. In chapter five of part three, distinction one, he uses his own interpretation of the Jewish attributes of God to arrive at the notion of the Trinity. In his opinion, all of the divine attributes, which are ascribed to God by Jewish theologians, can be brought back to three main attributes, being power, wisdom and goodness or good will (*bona Dei voluntas*), which Ramon Martí recognized as Jewish divine attributes or *middōt*. These three attributes are not inherently the same as the Trinity, but they are the properties of the Trinity. Therefore, the divine attributes imply the existence of the Trinity, whether a religion (in this case, Judaism) believes in the Trinity or not.⁷⁹¹ It is important to note that, while the argument in the *Explanatio symboli* treats God's power, wisdom and will as ancient philosophical concepts that overlap with the Christian Trinity, the same argument is used differently in the *Pugio fidei*, where power, wisdom and will are treated as divine attributes which are accepted by both Jews and Christians – even though they inherently seem to prove Christian doctrine in Martí's interpretation.⁷⁹² In the interpretation of Martí, the divine power, wisdom and will proved the Trinity, moving from both a purely philosophical

⁷⁸⁹ Cf. Anonymus, *Liber viginti quattuor philosophorum*, ed. by Françoise Hudry (Turnhout: Brepols, 1997), p. 5: "I. Deus est monas monadem gignens, in se unum reflectens ardorem. Haec definitio data est secundum imaginationem primae causae, prout se numerose multiplicat in se, ut sit multiplicans acceptus sub unitate, multiplicatus sub binario, reflexus sub ternario. Sic quidem est in numeris: unaquaqueque unitas proprium habet numerum quia super diuersum ab aliis reflectitur." Monica Calma finds this false attribution in many authors of the twelfth and thirteenth century. The phrase "monas genuit monadem" was relatively commonplace in the medieval period, and was used to refer to the alleged instinctive knowledge of philosophers of the Trinity. The phrase can also be found in the *Summa Theologiae* of Thomas Aquinas (I, Quaestio 32, art. 1, Leonina editio p. 349) and in the *Commentarii in primum librum Sententiarum* by Albert the Great (3F, art. 18, Borgnet edition via Brepols, p. 113). Monica Calma, "La Connaissance Philosophique de la Trinité selon Pierre d'Ailly et la Fortune Médiévale de la Proposition Monas Genuit Monadem," *Przegląd Tomistyczny* 15 (2009): pp. 121-147. For more information on the *Liber XXIV philosophorum*: cf. also Marie-Thérèse d'Alverny, "Un témoin muet des luttes doctrinales du XIIIe siècle," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* 17 (1949): 223-248. Cf. also Kurt Flasch, *Was ist Gott? Das Buch der 24 Philosophen* (München: Verlag C.H. Beck, 2011).

⁷⁹⁰ Martinus, *Explanatio symboli* (cf. footnote 762 above), p. 461: "Cum vero hec noticia trinitatis non sit nisi per appropriata personis tantum, recte supra diximus quod noticia philosophorum de Deo, scilicet, quod in Deo est potentia, sapientia et voluntas, non fuit noticia ipsarum personarum distincte, sed noticia eorum, que ipsis personis appropriantur. Noticia autem trinitatis, sicut crediderunt patriarche et prophete et apostoli, et sicut credunt hodie christiani que est secundum proprietates, que sunt in ipsis personis, distincte, altiori modo intelligitur quam intellexerunt philosophi. Quem modum non possunt intelligere, nisi illi, qui credunt et recipiunt legem et prophetas et novum testamentum in quo clarius et manifestius declarats est trinitas que est unus Deus propriis nominibus personarum, que sunt pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus. Per quod patet quod, si aliquis de philosophis intellexit proprietates personarum distincte, prout sunt in singulis personis, hoc videtur accepisse de dictis prophetarum, qui precesserunt; sicut Mercurius philosophus qui memoravit proprietates trium personarum, dicit: Monas monadem genuit, et in se suum reflectit ardorem. Per hoc quod ait monas genuit, notatur persona Patris quoniam qui gignit Pater est. Per hoc quod ait genuit monadem, notatur persona Filii; quoniam, qui ab alio gignitur filius est. Per hoc vero quod ait, in se suum reflectit ardorem, notatur persona Spiritus sancti, qui est ardor, id est amor utriusque."

⁷⁹¹ Raimundus Martinus, *Pugio fidei adversus Mauros et Judaeos*, ed. by Joseph de Voisin, Johann Benedict Carpov, and Hermannus Coloniensis, 1687; republished as a facsimile (Westmead: Gregg, 1967), pp. 501-506; Thomas E. Burman, "Ramon Marti, the Trinity, and the Limits of Dominican Mission," in *The Friars and Their Influence in Medieval Spain*, ed. by Francisco G. Serrano (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2018), pp. 89-91.

⁷⁹² Thomas E. Burman, "Ramon Marti, the Trinity, and the Limits of Dominican Mission" (cf. footnote 791 above), pp. 92-93.

point of view, by treating them as purely metaphysical concepts (without an inherent attachment to God *ab initio*), and from a religious point of view, by interpreting them as divine attributes.

Throughout his œuvre, Ramon Llull uses the combination of power, wisdom and will to explain the workings of the divine attributes, or the correlative theory. The combination is especially common in the *Llibre del gentil* and in the *Cent noms de Déu*. In most of Llull's works, God's power, wisdom and will are mentioned together. They mainly describe the unity of all attributes of God, the Incarnation, or the creation of the world as stemming from God's power, will and intellect. As mentioned in the introduction of this dissertation, Lohr explains that the Latin triad of *potestas*, *sapientia* and *benignitas* was a commonplace in the 12th century.⁷⁹³ It seems to have been a commonplace argument, stemming from an interreligious reading of the attributes of God. Thomas E. Burman also compares Ramon Martí's use of God's power, wisdom and will to prove the existence of the Trinity to the thought of the Syriac Orthodox theologian Yahyā ibn Jarīr (†1103/4). According to ibn Jarīr, the Islamic attributes of God could be brought back to three main attributes, being power (*qudrah*), knowledge (*'ilm*) and liberality (*jūd*). These three attributes corresponded to the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost.⁷⁹⁴ However, Ramon Llull was not keen on basing any divine Person on one attribute alone. Instead, he based his interpretation of the Trinity on the co-essential and interchangeable nature of the attributes, and their communal correlatives. Ramon Martí used the combination of power, wisdom and will in the *Pugio fidei* as a way to prove that the attributes of God in Islam and Judaism do allow for a Trinitarian interpretation. In the *Explanatio symboli*, he used the comparison to prove that philosophy unwittingly supports Trinitarian doctrine. Even though the (pagan) philosophers did not understand the Trinity, and even though they had not read the Old and New Testaments, they were aware of the existence of transcendental will, wisdom and power. Therefore, one might argue that Martí believed that the elevated use of reason led to some form of assertion of the doctrine of the Trinity, even if the philosophers were not literally aware of the doctrine due to the absence of Christian sources in their lives. Ramon Llull believed one could move from philosophy alone to come to a more direct and pressing interpretation of the Trinity and the Incarnation. He used the correlative theory to move towards a literal explanation of the Trinity through philosophy, where the Christian doctrines were reflected by the very nature of logic, with less room for interpretation.

3. DE SETA MACHOMETI

In the *De seta Machometi* (written around 1257), Ramon Martí attempts to explain Islam according to Islamic religious texts. The work is an attack on Islam, consisting of the refutation of the prophethood of Muhammad. In the *De seta Machometi*, Ramon Martí attempts to prove that Muhammad cannot be called a prophet, since prophethood can be recognized by four major character traits, or 'signs': a prophet needs to be virtuous, he needs to tell the truth, he should be able to perform miracles and strive for a peaceful,

⁷⁹³ Charles Lohr, "The New Logic of Ramon Llull" (cf. footnote 115 above), p. 26.

⁷⁹⁴ Burman, "Ramon Martí, the Trinity, and the Limits of Dominican Mission" (cf. footnote 791 above), pp. 93-95.

saintly life.⁷⁹⁵ Ramon Martí attempts to prove that only the opposite could ever be said of Muhammad, and that he can therefore not be called a prophet. By giving tendentious reading of Islamic sources, and by mentioning certain dogmas, precepts and traditions in Islamic teaching, Ramon Martí tries to prove that Muhammad was not saintly or peaceful, that his message was a lie, that he could not perform miracles and that he was sinful, leading to the conclusion that he was in fact a false prophet. Ramon Martí gives an introduction which maps out the life of Muhammad from his birth to the early rise of Islam. First, he explains the upbringing of Muhammad (*De origine Machometi*), next, the period when he first receives the Qur'ān (*De falsa inspiratione Machometi*), and next the formation of Islam (*De seta Machometi*). He then proceeds to attack Islam with a “fourfold refutation”. First, he explains the “lies” which Muhammad told his followers, and which are still upheld in Islam (*De mendatiis Machometi*). Next, he explains the elements of Muhammad’s life which he deems were “unclean” or impure (*De immunditiis Machometi*). Ramon Martí also explains that Muhammad did not perform any miracles (*Ad probandum quod Machometus non fecit miracula*). He then proceeds to discuss Islamic “law” or religious precepts (*De lege Machometi*). After discussing the signs that prove that Muhammad is not a prophet, Martí resumes his biography of Muhammad, focusing on the misfortunes and death that befell him (*De infortuniis, infirmitate ac fine Machometi*). After this refutation, Ramon Martí defends the use of Christian sources, and their validity in Islam, which concludes the work (*Probationes de veritate et incorruptione Veteris et Novi Testamenti*). This part is largely the same as the defense of the Old and New Testaments in the *Explanatio symboli apostolorum*. For this thesis, I will discuss three items of the fourfold refutation: *De mendatiis Machometi*, *De immunditiis Machometi*, and *De lege Machometi*. These passages can most easily be compared to the *Disputatio Raimundi*.

It has long been the academic consensus that Ramon Martí based his compilation of *Sunna* and Qur'ānic passages on his own in-depth study. However, recent developments have nuanced this stance to the point of disproving it completely. Pieter S. Van Koningsveld has only recently addressed the similarities between the *De seta Machometi* and a famous anti-Islamic tract, called the *al-Sayf al-murhaf*.⁷⁹⁶ The work was written in Damascus in 1260, during the time of great turmoil directed against Christianity which ensued after the Mongols were expelled from the city during the battle of ‘Ain Ġālūt.⁷⁹⁷ The work only survives as a number of fragments in the commentary of the Islamic scholar al-Ṭūfī. Van Koningsveld composed a critical edition of the commentary of al-Ṭūfī on the *al-Sayf al-murhaf*, and highlighted the similarities between Ramon Martí’s *De seta Machometi* and the surviving fragments of the *al-Sayf al-murhaf* which were passed down through this commentary.⁷⁹⁸ Van Koningsveld argues that at least the *De seta Machometi* was probably not based on Martí’s own findings and that Martí did not engage in an in-depth study of the Qur'ān, but that his work was mostly based on the arguments of the *Al-*

⁷⁹⁵ Di Cesare, *The Pseudo-Historical Image* (cf. footnote 752 above), p. 278.

⁷⁹⁶ Pieter S. Van Koningsveld provides a full edition of the *Al-Sayf al-murhaf ‘alā al-muṣḥaf* with an introductory study: Pieter S. Van Koningsveld, *An Arabic Source of Ramón Martí: Al-Sayf al-murhaf ‘alā al-muṣḥaf* (“The Whetted Sword in Refutation of the Koran”): *Introductory Study with Text and Transmission of its Surviving Fragments* (Leiden: Aurora, 2018).

⁷⁹⁷ The fall of Baghdad under the Mongols was also described by Riccoldo da Monte di Croce, cf. Riccoldus de Monte Crucis, *Liber peregrinationis*, cap. 22, edited online by Emilio Panella, 2005, <https://www.e-theca.net/emiliopanella/riccoldo/liber.htm>.

⁷⁹⁸ Van Koningsveld, *An Arabic Source* (cf. footnote 796 above), pp 36-150.

Şayf. Just like the *De seta Machometi*, the *al-Sayf* derives its critique against Islam from four “conditions” by which prophethood is established, and seeks to prove, from a critique of the same Islamic authorities, why Muhammad was not supposed to be called a prophet.⁷⁹⁹ The theory of Van Koningsveld makes much sense, since it is unlikely that Ramon Martí’s *De seta Machometi* would be based on a direct contact with Islamic sources. Many times, Ramon Martí seemingly misrepresents Qur’ānic passages, or misinterprets their contents in order to stir the sentiments of his readers. This explains the inconsistencies in his rendition of certain passages, or his focus on providing an immediate moral commentary of certain passages, instead of merely offering a clear outline of the source. Due to the current fragmentary nature of the *al-Sayf*, only a few passages from the *De seta Machometi* can be compared to the work. However, it seems likely that the *De seta Machometi* was based mostly on the *al-Sayf*.

Throughout the *De seta Machometi*, Ramon Martí uses examples from the *Sunna*, or dicta about the life of Muhammad in order to prove the inferiority of Islam to Christianity. Many of these arguments, such as Islamic traditions concerning marriage and even food, can be found in the *Disputatio Raimundi* in the second part. However, the manner in which these subjects are treated is immensely different in the works of each author. Elements from the life of Muhammad or Islamic traditions were not the most relevant part of the *Disputatio Raimundi*, and were only briefly discussed in part 2. Raimundus is still locked in the dungeon as the discussion with ‘Umar takes place, so he cannot simply base his reasoning on anti-Islamic anecdotes. The bulk of the arguments that Ramon Llull uses against Islam are philosophical and logical by nature, not anecdotal. Critique on Islamic culture comes only after the character Raimundus has already established the irrefutability of Christian theology in his part of the debate. Raimundus does not venture into an in-depth study of Islamic beliefs and traditions, but only mentions them briefly in as far as they contribute to the systematic image Raimundus wants to create of Islam. Ramon Martí goes much more into detail, and bases his entire study on Islamic sources, being the Qur’ān and the *Sunna*.

3.1. DE MENDACIIS MACHOMETI

In the *De mendaciis Machometi*, Ramon Martí discusses various passages, which he collected from the Qur’ān and the *Sunna* (*al-Bukhari* and *Muslim*). Each time, he discusses what is not according to Christian teachings, or what seems, for a Christian audience, in any way nonsensical. Certain points of critique are also discussed by Ramon Llull in the *Disputatio Raimundi*, but he does not mention the sources, and he always ventures more deeply into theological differences.

In this passage, Ramon Martí explains the differences between Islamic and Christian traditions, claiming that the Islamic views on Christ and the gospel are “lies”. First, he explains that in Islam Mary was supposed to be the sister of Aaron and the daughter of Abraham (Q. 66:12). Moreover, he mentions that in the Qur’ān, Christ prophesized Muhammad as the next messenger of God (Q. 61:6). He rebukes this belief, since the New Testament does not mention this at all.⁸⁰⁰ Ramon Martí finally also mentions the Islamic belief that Christ was not actually killed, but that only an image or an illusion of Him was

⁷⁹⁹ Van Koningsveld, *An Arabic Source* (cf. footnote 796 above), pp. 25-26.

⁸⁰⁰ Cf. *al-Sayf al-murhaf*: Van Koningsveld, *An Arabic Source* (cf. footnote 796 above), p. 56.

captured and crucified (Q. 5:157).⁸⁰¹ This, according to Ramon Martí, is a subversion of the Passion of Christ.⁸⁰² The *Disputatio Raimundi* mentions the Christian belief in the Crucifixion in part 2, explaining it as a sign of the superiority of Christianity. In the chapter on charity, it is explained by Raimundus that Christians have a higher degree or form of charity, since they believe that God is His will, and since charity is a virtue of the will, Christians therefore respect it more. Christians also believe in the crucifixion of Christ, which is the highest form of charity, their regard for charity is all the greater.⁸⁰³ However, Raimundus does not venture too deeply into the differences between Christianity and Islam concerning the crucifixion, only that it is central in Christian dogma and that it is denied in Islam. Raimundus does not explain where the Islamic interpretation of the death of Christ comes from, and he again does not simply state the difference without any guiding reflection or without making a conclusion. Raimundus explains the difference between Islam and Christianity on a more philosophical level, while also using it to underline the superiority of Christianity. Even though he does mention Islamic ideas which have a Qur'ānic background, the focus is more on the ideology and thoughts which accompany them.

Ramon Martí next discusses the idea in Islam that God brings sin and disbelief over humanity. As an example, Ramon Martí discusses a passage from the Qur'ān (Q. 4:88) and the *Sunna* (*Al-Bukhari* 82:9). He next mentions the quote from a “very wise Saracen,” saying that, if God forbids sin in humanity, then instills it in them, and judges them for those sinful feelings, then it must be Satan and not God who instills sin in humanity.⁸⁰⁴ The phrase comes from a rather obscure source, that was hardly known in Latin Europe at the

⁸⁰¹ Cf. *al-Sayf al-murhaf*: Van Koningsveld, *An Arabic Source* (cf. footnote 796 above), pp. 62-63.

However, Ramon Martí does not mention the reference made by the author of the *al-Sayf al-murhaf* to the Tafsīr by Ibn 'Atīyya, the Zoroastrian accounts and the book of al-Suhrawardī.

⁸⁰² Raimundus Martinus, *De seta Machometi seu de origine, progressu et fine Machometi et quadruplici reprobatione prophetiae eius*, ed. by di Cesare, in *The Pseudo-Historical Image* (cf. footnote 752 above), pp. 283-284: “Verba autem ipsius falsa multa fuerunt. Primum quod dixit in Alcorano, in tractatu Raharim, id est, Prohibitionis, ubi, loquens de beata Virgine, ait quod fuit filia Ambram (Q. 66:12). Item quod dixit in Alcorano, in tractatu Marie, quod beata Maria Virgo fuit soror Aaron (Q.19:28). Per que ostendit quod ipse credebat et dicebat quod beata Virgo fuit filia Abram et soror Aaron, quod patet esse falsum per libros prophetarum et Evangelia et libros ystoriales. Item quod dixit in Alcorano, in tractatu Araf XVI c., ubi, loquens de se ipso, dixit: ‘Illi qui secuntur nuntium, prophetam ydiotam, inveniunt eum scriptum in Lege Moysi et Evangelio (Q. 7:157)’. Et hoc est falsum, cum non inveniatur scriptum in istis libris. Item quod dixit in Alcorano, in tractatu Zaf, id est, Ordinis, quod Christus prophetavit de eo dicens: ‘Veniet post me nuntius mei, est Ahmet,’ hoc intelligens de se ipso (Q. 61:6). Et hoc est falsum, cum Christus nunquam legatur hoc dixisse. Item quod dixit in Alcorano, in tractatu Mulierum XVI c., inducens iudeos loquentes sic: ‘Nos interfecimus messiam Ihesum, filium Marie, nuntium Dei’; et non interfecerunt eum neque crucifixerunt eum sed assimilatum fuit eis Hic negat passionem et mortem Christi, et hoc patet esse falsum per libros Prophetarum et Evangeliorum, per dicta Apostolorum et per relationem multorum antiquorum et signum crucis, quod est memoriale passionis Christi.”

⁸⁰³ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 2, 3, 7, p. 252.

⁸⁰⁴ Martinus, *De seta Machometi* (cf. footnote 802 above), p. 284: “Item quod dixit in Alcorano, in tractatu Mulierum IX c.: ‘Nunquid vultis dirigere illos quos Deus ponit in errore (Q. 4:88)’. Item dixit in libro qui dicitur Boari, in capitulo Predestinationis, quod Deus scripsit super hominem partem suam de luxuria et necessario oportet ipsum consequi illam partem (al-Bukh. 82, 9). Unde per hoc et alia multa ostenditur quod Deo attribuit quod ponit homines in errore ut necessario fornicentur. Et hoc est falsum et blasfemia, homini enim dictum est Genesis III.: ‘Super te erit appetitus tuus et tu dominaberis illius (Gn 4, 7)’. Et contra illud dixit quidam sapiens sarracenorum satis pulchre: ‘Si Deus prohibet me a peccato et postea compellit ad illud et dampnat me propter illud, ego sum primus qui dico quod qui hoc facit non est Deus sed diabolus’.”

time. Martí does not mention this source by name. However, according to Pieter S. Van Koningsveld, the "very wise Saracen" must be identified as al-Zamachšarī, and the quote probably stems from his commentary on Qur'ān 2:6-7 in the exegetic work *al-Kaššāf*. The particular passage was quoted in the *al-Sayf al-murhaf*.⁸⁰⁵

Next, Ramon Martí discusses heaven according to the Qur'ān, which is described in sensual terms. Martí mentions the rivers of milk, honey, wine and water (Q. 47:15), the food and drink (Q. 52:17-19), and the women (Q. 56:46-56) that will await the believers in afterlife. He puts these ideas in contrast to the Christian Heaven, where the delights that await the faithful are non-sensory and non-physical. Martí quotes multiple biblical verses to prove his statement, that Christianity has the most subtle and elevated view of Heaven, from both the Old Testament (Genesis 15:1, and Isaiah 64:4) and the New Testament (1 Corinthians 2:9, Luke 20:34, Matthew 22:30, and John 17:3).⁸⁰⁶ Raimundus discusses Islamic paradise multiple times in the *Disputatio Raimundi*, but only in the chapter 2 of part 2.⁸⁰⁷ In the *Disputatio Raimundi*, the mention of the Islamic views on heavenly pleasures serves to reinforce the notion that Muslims have an inferior and more sensual world view due to their theological ideas (being that God does not have a co-essential will and intellect, a belief which makes Muslims sin with their own will and intellect), while Christianity is more elevated. In the chapter on the Ten Commandments, Raimundus claims that the Islamic view of Heaven is adulterous, and that Muslims therefore do not heed the commandment against adultery.⁸⁰⁸ In the chapter on the seven deadly sins, Raimundus states that Muslims are more prone to lust and gluttony than Christians, since they expect food and women in Heaven. In the passage on gluttony in particular, Raimundus mentions streams of oil, wine, honey and butter (almost the same as in Martí's summary), and contrasts this interpretation of Heaven with the Christian view, where the faithful will become spiritual instead of physical, "like angels".⁸⁰⁹

⁸⁰⁵ Cf. *al-Sayf al-murhaf*: Van Koningsveld, *An Arabic Source* (cf. footnote 796 above), pp. 85-87.

⁸⁰⁶ Martinus, *De seta Machometi* (cf. footnote 802 above), pp. 284-285: "Item quod dixit in Alcorano, in tractatu Errohen, id est, Misericordis, ubi, describens paradysum in alia vita, dixit quod ibi erunt fontes, fructus, uxores, tapecia de serico et puelle vel virgines, cum quibus iacebunt et concumbent, et non fedaverunt illas puellas vel virgines ante eos homo vel diabolus (Q. 56:46-56). Item quod dixit in Alcorano, in tractatu Alquitel, id est, Pugne, quod in paradiso erunt rivi aque incorrupte et rivi lactis, cuius sapor non immutabitur, et rivi vini, quod erit delectabile bibentibus, et rivi mellis colati. Et habebunt ibi de omnibus fructibus (Q. 47:15). Item quod dixit in Alcorano, in tractatu Nelmurtillet, ultimo capitulo, quod timentes Deum erunt in umbris et in fontibus et habebunt fructus quas concupiscent, et dicitur eis: 'Comedite et bibite sine perturbatione secundum quod optati estis' (Q. 52:17-19). Per hec et multa alia ostenditur quod Machometus credidit et predicavit quod beatitudo eterna consistit in cibo, potu, cohitu et delectationibus corporalibus, quod patet esse falsum per hoc quod dicitur in Genesi XV, ubi Dominus dixit ad Abraham: 'Ego protector tuus et merces tua magna nimis (Gn 15, 1)'. Item Ysaia LXIII: 'Oculus non vidit, Deus, absque te, que preparasti expectantibus te (Is 64, 4)'. Item Apostolus ad Corinthios in II: 'Oculus non vidit nec auris audivit nec in cor hominis ascendit que preparavit Deus hiis qui diligunt illum (1 Cor 2, 9)'. Sed cibum et potum et mulieres, in quibus dixit Machometus esse beatitudinem, videt oculus, audit auris, cor hominis cogitat, ergo in illis non consistet beatitudo eterna. Item per hoc quod dicit Lucas XX: 'Filii seculi huius nubent et tradentur ad nuptias, illi autem qui digni habebuntur seculo illo et resurrectione ex mortuis (sic) neque nubent neque ducent uxores, equales enim angelis sunt et filii Dei (Lc 20, 34-36)'. Item Mattheus XXII: 'In resurrectione neque nubent neque nubentur, sed sunt sicut angeli Dei in celo (Mt 22, 30)'. Item Iohannes XVII: 'Hec est vita eterna (Io 17, 3), et cetera.'"

⁸⁰⁷ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 2, pp. 239-261.

⁸⁰⁸ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 2, 1, 6, p. 243.

⁸⁰⁹ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 2, 4, 3, pp. 254-255 on the sin of lust. On the sin of gluttony: II, 2, 4, 2, pp. 253-254.

Ramon Martí also mentions an anecdote from the *Sunna*, that Muhammad forbade his followers to pray at sunrise or sunset (al-Bukh. 59, 9, 5). The reason for this precept is that the sun rises and sets between the horns of the devil. This is false, according to Ramon Martí, not only due to the obvious largeness of the sun, but also because the devil does not have horns at all, being a spiritual entity.⁸¹⁰

In the next passage, Ramon Martí discusses Islamic demonology. First, he mentions a passage from the *Sunna*, saying that, according to Muhammad, Muslims should eat with their right hand because the devil eats with his left. Also, that the devil is a black dog (al-Bukh. 70, 2 and 5; 59, 7, 2). Moreover, Martí mentions some verses from both the Qur'ān and the *Sunna*, in which is stated that when Muhammad recited the Qur'ān, some demons were made Saracens (Q. 72:12). This, according to Martí, created a special bond between Muslims and some demons. More precisely, a passage in the *Sunna*, in the book of Muslim, states that this is why the faithful should not clean themselves with the waste and bones of their goats and sheep, but that these are preserved for the demons for their meal (*Muslim* 4, 30, 902 and 903).⁸¹¹

Another argument mentioned by Ramon Martí is the failed attempt of Muhammad to predict the coming of the End of Times. According to the *Sunna*, Muhammad had predicted that the End of Times would be upon the world within a century after his arrival, and that no human being would survive (*Muslim* 31, 53, 6160 and 6162). This was an obvious error, Ramon Martí says, and a false prophecy.⁸¹²

Ramon Martí ends his exposé on the “lies of Muhammad” by a few mentions of *al-Bukhari*, where Muhammad seems to explain some ritualized beliefs. One such belief is that when a mosquito falls in a glass, one should submerge it, since mosquitoes carry poison in one wing and medicine in another. One should first drench the poisonous wing in the glass, and then the medicinal wing (al-Bukh. 54, 537). Next, Martí mentions a passage in *al-Bukhari*, where Muhammad is reported to have said that when a cock crows, he sees an angel, and when a donkey beams, he sees the devil (al-Bukh. 59, 15, 4). These passages are cherry-picked from *al-Bukhari* at random, since Martí believed that they are a proof that Muhammad was telling lies to his followers. They are not mentioned by Raimundus in the *Disputatio Raimundi*, since they do not contribute to the systematic view which Llull had on Islam. The passages are anecdotal and random, and do not seem to reinforce any idea from the *Ars*. Raimundus does not necessarily accuse Muslims of superstition. Rather, the

⁸¹⁰ Martinus, *De seta Machometi* (cf. footnote 802 above), p. 285: “Item quod dixit in libro qui dicitur Bohari, in tractatu Creationis, ubi, loquentes de demonibus, dixit suis quod in ortu solis vel in occasu eius non facerent orationem, quia sol ascendit vel oritur inter duo cornua diaboli et occidit similiter (al-Bukh. 59, 9, 5). Quod quidem patet esse falsum, considerata magnitudine solis et quod diabolus non habet cornua, cum sit rex spiritualis.” Cf. *al-Sayf al-murhaf*: Van Koningsveld, *An Arabic Source* (cf. footnote 796 above), pp. 78-79.

⁸¹¹ Cf. *al-Sayf al-murhaf*: Van Koningsveld, *An Arabic Source* (cf. footnote 796 above), pp. 75-74.

⁸¹² Martinus, *De seta Machometi* (cf. footnote 802 above), pp. 285-286: “Item in libro qui dicitur Muzlim, loquens de die iudicii, dixit: ‘Antequam veniant centum anni non remanebit super terram anima nata, id est, aliquis vivens’ (*Muslim* 31, 53, 6160 and 6162). Item alibi dixit Axa quod quidem arabes veniebant ad prophetam Machometum et interrogabant eum de die iudicii, et ipse, aspiciens minorem in etate, dicebat: ‘Si vixerit iste, non perveniet ad decrepitam etatem donec sit dies iudicii’. Per hec et alia ostenditur quod ipse predicabat et aserebat quod dies iudicii debebat esse ante centum annos, quod patet esse falsum, cum iam fluxerint sexcenti anni ex quo ista dicta sunt.” Cf. *al-Sayf al-murhaf*: Van Koningsveld, *An Arabic Source* (cf. footnote 796 above), pp. 101-102.

implication is that Muslims have a lack of belief and adhere to a worldview which is purely rational.

3.2. DE IMMUNDITIIS MACHOMETI

In this passage, Ramon Martí attempts to explain that Muhammad was unclean, or impure and sinful. He gives an overview of details from the life of Muhammad which he deigns unclean, or unfitting for a prophet. Ramon Martí writes extensively about Muhammad's behaviour towards the faithful while being a prophet. He mainly describes Muhammad as what today would be called a cult-leader, who uses his status as a prophet to gain access to as many women as possible. By mentioning passages from the Qur'ān and the *Sunna*, Martí constructs an image of a false prophet with ulterior motives, thus refuting that Muhammad was virtuous (one of the signs necessary to speak of prophethood).

First, he quotes two passages from the *Sunna*. The first passage contains the story that Muhammad slept with each of his (eleven) wives in one hour at day- or nighttime. According to the witness producing the story, Muhammad had the power of thirty men in having sex (al-Bukh. 5, 24, 1). Martí also mentions that Muhammad was still intimate with his wife during her period (al-Bukh. 6, 5, 1). Moreover, Ramon Martí mentions a Qur'ānic verse and a passage from the *Sunna* where it is predicated that Muhammad can marry or court any woman in his direct inner circle: his wives, his servants, the daughters of his relatives, and every woman who belongs to the Islamic community. However, this should not be allowed to any faithful apart from Muhammad (Q. 33:50-51; al-Bukh. 65, 7, 1).⁸¹³

Martí next discusses a passage from the Qur'ān, saying that Muhammad's wives are the mothers of the Muslims (Q. 33:6), that Muhammad should not be harmed, and that after the death of Muhammad, his wives should not remarry any of the other Muslims (Q. 33:52). He also refers to a passage in the Qur'ān, where a friend of Muhammad presents his wife as a concubine to Muhammad (Q. 66:1-3).⁸¹⁴ Finally, Martí mentions that Muhammad

⁸¹³ Martinus, *De seta Machometi* (cf. footnote 802 above), pp. 286-287: "Dicitur enim in libro qui dicitur Buhari, in capitulo Lotionis, filium Melich dixisse quod Machometus circuibat mulieres suas iacendo cum eis in una hora noctis vel diei. Erant undecim. Et dictum fuit isti enim: 'Numquid poterat istud facere?'. Dixit: 'Nos dicebamus inter nos quod potestas vel virtus triginta virorum fuit data sibi, scilicet Machometo, in coitu.' (al-Bukh. 5, 24, 1). Item in eodem libro continetur quod dixit Axa, uxor eius: 'Ego et propheta lavabamus nos de uno vase simul et eramus polluti; et mandabat me cingere cum linteamine et sic iacebat mecum seu coniungebat se michi, et eram menstruata' (al-Bukh. 6, 5, 1). Item in Alcorano, in tractatu Elahaze IIII c., dixit Machometus quod Deus loquens sibi sic: 'Nos licentiavimus tibi uxores tuas, quibus debes dare sponsalium, et omnes ancillas tuas, quas tibi Deus dedit, et filias patris tui et filias amite tue et filias avunculi tui et filias matertere tue, que secute fuerunt te, et omnis mulier credens, si obtulerit corpus suum sive seipsam prophete, si voluerit propheta coire cum ea. Liceat hoc pure seu tantum tibi et non aliis credentibus. Et post pauca dabis spem quibus volueris, secundum quod offerunt se, et recipies quas volueris.' (Q. 33:50-51) Et, propter hoc multe mulieres offerebant ei seipsas, quod probatur et per hoc quod decitur (sic) in libro qui vocatur Bohari, in tractatu Alcorani, dixisse Axam: 'Ego zelabam contra illas mulieres que offerebant seipsas nuntio Dei et dicebam: 'Mulier offert seipsam prophete.' Sed postquam dedit Deus istam legem, scilicet quod Machometus daret spem quibus vellet et reciperet quas vellet, dixit Machometus: 'Video Dominum Deus (sic) tuum velociter implentem desiderium tuum.' (al-Bukh. 65, 7, 1)" Cf. *al-Sayf al-murhaf*: Van Koningsveld, *An Arabic Source* (cf. footnote 796 above), pp. 106-107.

⁸¹⁴ Martinus, *De seta Machometi* (cf. footnote 802 above), p. 287: "Item in eodem dixit: 'Non licet vobis nocere prophete, nec licet ducere uxores eius post eum in uxores aliquomodo, quia istud esset magnum quid apud Deum (Q. 33:52)'. Item tangitur in Alcorano, in tractatu Prohibitionis in principio et in glossa que est ibi, quod quidam nomine Macauquique presentavit Machometo mulierem, qui vocabatur Meria Captia, qui assumpsit eam in concubinam. Contigit quod semel coibat cum ea in domo et uxoris sue, nomine Axa, que non erat presens.

forbade stealing to the generation of Muslims following his death, even though it was allowed to him and his followers (al-Bukh. 65, 8, 1).⁸¹⁵

These passages highlight the dependence of the faithful on Muhammad. A few passages do not contribute to this image (for example, the passage dealing with Aisha's menstruation), but most passages together form the image of Islam as a construction to give Muhammad certain privileges, instead of being a genuine revelation from God. The *Disputatio Raimundi* mentions only once that Muhammad had a large amount of wives in the chapter on the Ten Commandments: in this chapter, Raimundus explains that Muhammad sinned against the ninth commandment (against desiring the wife of one's neighbour), by taking the wife of his friend after being told to do so by the archangel Gabriel. This is arguably the same story as the one told by Ramon Martí, where a woman called Maria Captia is offered to Muhammad. Moreover, Raimundus explains that Muhammad was allowed to marry any woman he desired, and that he said so in front of the entire early Muslim community. Raimundus contrasts this with the life of Christ, who lived and died as a virgin. This, according to Raimundus is a sign that Islamic law is false, and that Christianity is correct.⁸¹⁶

Raimundus does not shy away from discussing the life of Muhammad where it seems relevant (for example, by discussing his views on marriage, or the raids and the expansionism of early Islam). However, even in the second part of the *Disputatio Raimundi*, the life of Muhammad is not systematically discussed as an argument for every topic. Raimundus wished to refute and criticize Islam, but instead of only attacking its prophet as *immundus*, he criticized the *immunditas* of Islamic culture as a whole, coming from Muhammad. The life and sayings of Muhammad are not the ultimate proof against Islam for Raimundus. Only a theological argumentation, accompanied by a superficial study of Islamic norms and culture in general can provide this. The life of Muhammad, where it is mentioned in the *Disputatio Raimundi*, is only an illustration of a deeper theological problem, rather than the actual proof against Islam.

3.3. DE LEGE MACHOMETI

Ramon Martí discussed Islamic culture and history extensively in the *De seta Machometi*. He mainly used Islamic authorities, such as the Qur'ān and the *Sunna* against Islam, as a motivation for critique. Martí was mainly interested in the sexual and moral scandals surrounding the rise of Islam and the life of Muhammad, such as polygamy, the carnal

Cum autem venit, vidit eos comiscentes et displicuit sibi multum et redarguit eum dicens: 'Propheta Dei, non erat inter mulieres tuas vilior me? Cur coibas cum ea in domo mea et super lectum meum?'. Dixit ei volens placere ei: 'Placet tibi quod abstinence ab ea semper?' Que dixit sic et ille iuravit quod ulterius ad ipsam non accederet et dixit ei: 'Non dicas hec alicui'. Et post istud, contra istam promissionem et iuramentum, coivit cum ea (Q. 66:1-3). Et dixit in Alcorano quod Deus constituerat eis, scilicet Sarracenis, satisfactionem iuramentorum suorum. Hoc est: Quod si facerent aliquod iuramentum et vellent contravenire, cum possent, facerent satisfactionem sive compensationem, de qua dicitur infra."

⁸¹⁵ Martinus, *De seta Machometi* (cf. footnote 802 above), p. 287: "Ad ostendendum etiam inmunditias suas facit quod dicitur in Alcorano, in tractatu (sic) Alfatha, quod Deus pepercit sibi peccata preterita et futura (Q. 48:2). Item dicitur in libro qui vocatur Bachari quod dixit Machometus: 'Rapine licentiate sunt michi et non fuerunt licentiate alicui ante me.' (al-Bukh. 65, 8, 1). Ad astendendum (sic) hoc idem facit quod tradidit suis leges inmundissimas et abhominabiles, de quibus dicentur ista in tractatu de lege quam tradidit."

⁸¹⁶ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 2, 2, 9, p. 245.

delights of Heaven, and the habits he proscribed in Muslim texts. In the chapter of the *De seta Machometi* called *De lege Machometi*, Martí picks a number of passages about the life and sayings of Muhammad, coming from both the Qur'ān and the *Sunna*, and which Martí lambasts for their frivolousness.

The first, and perhaps most important, of the Qur'ānic passages, describes the Islamic take on marriage. Martí quotes the Qur'ān, sura 4:3–4 to describe the Islamic laws regarding polygamy in particular. According to the rules of Muhammad, Martí says, a man should be able to have one, two, three or four wives, for as far as he is able to provide for them. Apart from these wives, a man should also be able to own as many concubines and slaves as he wishes. Martí notes the un-Christian nature of this law, and notes that God established monogamy in Paradise, as the truest form of matrimony.⁸¹⁷ Ramon Llull likewise discusses the Islamic view on lawful polygamy in the final part of the *Disputatio Raimundi*. In the chapter discussing the Christian sacraments, he argues that the Islamic view on marriage is out of balance rather than unnatural, since it would only make sense within marriage for two intellects to bind themselves, one male and female, and two forms. By binding one intellect with one intellect, an inseparable bond is created. This bond does not exist when there is a multitude of intellects, Llull argues, and a woman does not feel the same bond with a man if she does not have him exclusively. Llull does not mention the source, but only explains the reasoning behind the superiority of monogamy from a philosophical standpoint.⁸¹⁸

Martí likewise voices his disagreement with Islamic traditions concerning divorce, as apparent in Qur'ān, sura 2:229–30. In this sura, Muhammad suggests that a man can send his wife away twice without consequence, but the third time he can only reclaim her if another man has slept with her. Ramon Martí disagrees with divorce in general, and calls it unnatural and unreasonable. Moreover, men and women should be judged more equally in marriage, he argues, and a wife should not have the same position as a servant. He also mentions the need for chivalry in marriage: since women are seen by him as weaker, they should be punished less harshly for their crimes. Martí also expresses his disgust for the sexual habits, which are implied by the Qur'ān, sura 2:223. Here, it is mentioned that men

⁸¹⁷ Martinus, *De seta Machometi* (cf. footnote 802 above), p. 290: “Sunt autem iste leges ipsius. Lex super Machometo et mulieribus. Dixit Machometus in Alcorano, in tractatu Mulierum, in principio: ‘Contraitis quantum cum mulieribus que placebunt vobis et possunt esse bine et terne et quaterne; et si timueritis quod non potestis omnibus sufficere equaliter, ducite unam; ut habeatis de mulieribus que placebunt vobis quod possedit dextera vestra (Q. 4:3–4)’. Hec est lex: quod haberent de ancillis concubinas quod possent emere vel habere. Et secundum hanc legem quilibet sarracenus potest habere quatuor uxores et unam concubinam vel decem vel centum vel mille vel amplius, si potuerit et voluerit ipsas tenere. Hanc autem legem constat esse falsam, cum nullus possit habere simul plures uxores sed unam tantum. Deus enim, institutor mundi, in principio mundi non concessit Ade nisi unam (Gn 2, 21 – 24). Et, si voluntas eius fuisset quod quilibet homo aliquando plures posset habere, inde videretur quod ei concessit plures, pro eo quod, cum solus esset, maior erat necessitas, quod per usum plurium uxorum multiplicaretur genus humanum. Patet etiam eiusdem legis iniquitas in hoc quod concedit adulterium et fornicationem in eo quod dicit quod quilibet possit habere preter uxores plures concubinas, ut supra ostensum. Quod quidem est contra divinum preceptum et contra naturalem rationem.” Cf. *al-Sayf al-murhaf*: Van Koningsveld, *An Arabic Source* (cf. footnote 796 above), pp. 124–125.

⁸¹⁸ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 2, 2, 2, p. 246;

are allowed to sleep with their wives in any way they want. According to Martí, this means *ante et retro*. Martí vehemently disagrees with this law, which he finds uncivilized.⁸¹⁹

Raimundus discusses the same Islamic traditions of divorce in the *Disputatio Raimundi*. In the chapter where Raimundus compares the Ten Commandments in Christianity with their treatment in Islam, he discusses the precept against adultery. He argues that the Islamic views on divorce are based on adultery. Like Martí, he describes the tradition that a woman can only remarry her husband a fourth time after intercourse with another man. However, Raimundus adds that women can also be forced against their will in order to fulfill the precept. This makes Muslim men sin against the commandment against adultery, he concludes.⁸²⁰

Ramon Martí further discusses passages from the *Sunna*, which he deems proof of the lack of decency and cleanliness of Islamic culture. The passages are not profoundly reflected upon, but merely mentioned. One such dictum prescribes a certain type of eating habit:

“The law on how to eat. It is said in the book which is called Muzlim, in the tract on food, that Muhammad ordered his followers to lick their fingers and the dish, and they say elsewhere that Muhammad said: ‘When anyone of you eats, he should not wipe his hand until he licked or sucked it, or until someone else licked it for him.’ And Muhammad licked his hand and then he wiped it. This is filthy, beastly and ridiculous.”⁸²¹

⁸¹⁹ Martinus, *De seta Machometi* (cf. footnote 802 above), p. 290-291: “Lex super repudio. Dixit Machometus in Alcorano, in tractatu Vace: ‘Repudium uxorum vestrarum licet vobis bis’, etcetera; si aliquis repudiaverit uxorem suam tertio, ‘non licet ei reducere eam quousque uxor cognoscatur ab alio viro’ (Q. 2:229–30). Secundum hanc legem sarracenus potest dimittere uxorem vel uxores suas sine omni causa et ratione legitima quocumque vult. Quod quam inconueniens sit et iniquum patet ex hoc: Est manifeste contra mandatum divinum, contra legem naturalem et contra rationem, quoniam vir et uxor no (sic) adimpar iudicantur quantum ad contractum; et quod licet viro debet licere uxori cum quantum ad legem contracti non sit ancilla vel subjecta, sed potius equalis et socia; et insuper propter sui sexus fragilitatem in culpis et in penis cum eis mitius est agendum. Legem predictam Sarraceni non faciunt sed potius totum contrarium. Lex cognoscendi mulieres. Dixit Machometus in Alcorano, in tractatu Vace: ‘Mulieres vestre sunt ratio vestra, ergo intrate ad rationem vestram quocumque modo volueritis.’ (Q. 2:223) Ubi dicit glosa Sarracenorum expositorum Alcorani super istud verbum: ‘quocumque modo’, scilicet, ante et retro. Hanc detestabilem turpitudinem et inordinationem onerosam intellectus manifeste intelligit esse contra Deum et contra rationem. Primo: quia videtur quasi blasphemia quod Deus, qui est summa munditia, det de talibus immunditiis instructionem aliquam seu doctrinam, cum etiam ipsa bruta animalia talia non faciunt ordinate sine alio instructore. Secundo: quia Deus fecit omnia in ordine, unde consequens est quod talis inordinatio nunquam de voluntate sua processit. Tertio: quia lex nature iam dicta hoc detestatur (sic) et prohibet, quod patet etiam in brutis animalibus, que non patiuntur talem inordinationem. Quarto: quia secundum hoc vel conceditur illud detestabile vitium, propter quod ira Dei venit in filios diffidentie, vel saltem ulla occasio ad perpetrandum istud. Quinto: quia per istam ordinationem potest impedi fructibus proles, quod est unum de maximis bonis matrimonii, et propter quod primo et principaliter fuit contrarium institutum.” Cf. *al-Sayf al-murhaf*: Van Koningsveld, *An Arabic Source* (cf. footnote 796 above), pp. 128-130.

⁸²⁰ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 2, 1, 6, p. 243 ;

⁸²¹ Martinus, *De seta Machometi* (cf. footnote 802 above), p. 291: “Lex de modo comedendi. Dicitur in libro qui vocatur Muzlim, in tractatu Ciborum, quod Machometus mandavit suis quod lamberent digitos et parapsidem (Muslim 23, 16, 5043). Et dicunt alibi quod Machometus dixit: ‘Quando comederit aliquis vestrum non tergat manum suam quousque lambat aut suggat eam aut lambat eam sibi aliquis.’ (Muslim 23, 16, 5037). Et ipse Machometus lambebat manum suam et antequam ipsam tergeret (Muslim 23, 16, 5040). Hoc autem immundum et bestiale ac ridiculosum est.” Cf. *al-Sayf al-murhaf*: Van Koningsveld, *An Arabic Source* (cf. footnote 796 above), p. 138. Translation by Margot Leblanc.

Martí quoted directly from the *Sunna, Muslim*, 23, 16. He believed that the passage alone should have counted as an evidence of the *immunditia* of Islamic culture. Ramon Llull, however, discusses the same tradition in the *Disputatio Raimundi* – without mentioning the source. However, he does attach a theological explanation to the passage. In the chapter on the seven sins in the second chapter of part 2 of the *Disputatio Raimundi*, the habit of licking one's fingers in Islamic culture is a sign of gluttony, which stems from the alleged theological inferiority of Muslims. According to Llull, Muslims do not see God's intellect and will as a part of His essence, which has been discussed at length in the first chapter of part 2, recounting the discussion between Raimundus and 'Umar. This supposedly leads them to not taking their own human will and intellect seriously, and made them more prone to sin, such as gluttony. This, in turn, makes Muslims supposedly more prone to strange eating habits.⁸²²

Ramon Martí again consults the *Sunna*, when he discusses Islamic views concerning theft and robbery. The passage is quite short and blunt: according to the book of *al-Bukhari* 57, 8, 4, which belongs to the *Sunna*, Muhammad told his followers that God allowed them to rob, due to their innate weakness. Ramon Martí sees this dictum as “against the precepts of God” and “against nature,” presumably due to the manner of dealing with crime and sin.⁸²³

According to Martí, Muslims do not hold their oaths in as high a regard as Christians do. If a Muslim wishes to remove an oath, all he needs is “satisfaction” in the form of mild penance, such as fasting and almsgiving. Martí gives the Qur'ān, suras 5:89 and 66:1-3 as his sources, and likewise mentions the *Sunna*, namely *al-Bukhari* 65, 7, 2.⁸²⁴

Another argument against Islamic ethics, according to Ramon Martí, is the lack of strictness when it comes to the crime of jealousy. However, this might count for any mental or unpracticed crime. According to the *Sunna (al-Bukhari* 49, 6, 1-2), Muhammed believed that a Muslim who sins mentally, without putting his thought into action, will not be punished since he or she has not committed any sin. This is against the beliefs of Christianity.⁸²⁵

⁸²² Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 2, 4, 2, pp. 253-254.

⁸²³ Martinus, *De seta Machometi* (cf. footnote 802 above), pp. 291-292: “Lex super rapinis. Dicitur in libro qui vocatur Bochari quod Machometus dixit suis: ‘Deus concessit nobis rapinas’ (al-Bukh. 57, 8, 4). Item: ‘Deus licentiavit nobis rapinas. Vidit enim debilitatem nostram et defectum nostrum et licenciavit eas nobis.’ (al-Bukh. 57, 7, 6). Hoc est contra preceptum Dei et legem naturalem.”

⁸²⁴ Martinus, *De seta Machometi* (cf. footnote 802 above), p. 292: “Lex super transgressione iuramenti. Dicitur in Alcorano, in tractatu Mense X c.: ‘Non reprehendet vos Deus de iuramentis vestris iocosis, sed reprehendet vos de iuramentis que nodastis seus (sic) affirmastis. Satisfactio periurii est ut pascatis X pauperes de illo cibo quo pascistis familiam vestram mediocrem, vel quod induatis eos, aut redemption unius captivi. Et qui non potest hoc facere ieiunet tres dies. Hoc est satisfactio iuramentorum vestrorum.’ (Q. 5:89). Secundum hanc legem, si sarracenus iurat aliquid et vult contravenire potest licite, dum tamen satisfaciatur post ea, ut tactum est. Et Machometus sic fecit super Meriaquibde, ut habetur in Alcorano, in tractatu Prohibitionis c. I: Juravit enim eam non cognoscere et postea cognovit eam, faciens contra iuramentum (Q. 66:1-3). Et sic per legem supra positam dedit causam hominibus periurandi, quod est expresse contra preceptum Dei. Unde dicitur in libro qui vocatur Bochari quod Axa dixit in tractatu Expositionis Alcorani quia pater eius nunquam periuravit quousque venit lex satisfactionis iuramenti. (al-Bukh. 65, 7, 2)”

⁸²⁵ Martinus, *De seta Machometi* (cf. footnote 802 above), p. 292: “Lex contra illud ‘non concupisces’. Dicitur in libro qui vocatur Bohari, in tractatu Redemptionis, quod Machometus dixit: ‘Deus dimittit

Ramon Martí likewise accuses Muslims of being too lenient towards homosexuality. The approved conduct for female homosexuality, according to the Qur'ān, sura 4:15-16, is to only proceed to action when the women have been caught by at least four witnesses. The prescribed punishment is that the women would be sealed in their house. According to Ramon Martí, it would be impossible that it would ever occur that four witnesses can be found for such a case.⁸²⁶

Throughout this passage in the *De seta Machometi*, Ramon Martí uses sources from the *Sunna* and the Qur'ān dealing with morality and daily habits, especially concerning sexual sins, perjury and theft. Martí summarizes every passage in Latin and gives a latinized name of the Qur'ānic chapters and authors of the *Sunna*. Even though the passages mentioned by Ramon Martí are actual excerpts from Islamic religious sources, they are interpreted pejoratively each time.

When comparing the *Disputatio Raimundi* to *De seta Machometi*, it becomes apparent that, even though both authors had almost the same view about Islamic culture, their approaches were vastly different. The most obvious difference in attitude is the one concerning the mentioning of sources. Raimundus never mentions the Qur'ān or the *Sunna* even once throughout his *Disputatio Raimundi*, although, in chapter 2 of the second part, he does venture now and then into a discussion of Islamic culture. He did not see the need to prove his stance on Islamic morality by mentioning Islamic sources, since he believed that sources held less argumentative power than the use of reason and philosophy. Instead, he decided to prove his point about Islam by referring to the theological differences between Christianity and Islam. In Llull's opinion, logic and theology were far more revealing about Islamic culture than the sources they seemed to derive from. The superiority of Christianity did not have to be corroborated by mere reference to Islamic sources, since it had been proven philosophically that the theological pillars of Christianity are valid. Every other argument about Islamic culture, as far as they are made in the *Disputatio Raimundi*, is proven by the theory of the chapters of the *Disputatio Raimundi* which were devoted to the debate between 'Umar and Raimundus. This approach should be framed in Llull's general attitude towards interfaith dialogue and conversion: before the religion of the other is attacked or disproven, and before arguments against the tradition of

pertransire populo meo peccatum cordis, dum tamen non perveniat ad opus.' (al-Bukh. 49, 6, 1–2). Secundum monitionem sensus est quod pro peccato cordis non punietur aliquis Sarracenus, quod est contra illud preceptum 'non concupisces' et cetera."

⁸²⁶ Martinus, *De seta Machometi* (cf. footnote 802 above), pp. 292-293: "Lex super peccato sodomitico. Dixit Machometus in Alcorano in tractatu Mulierum c. II: 'Contra mulieres vestras, que comittunt facinus inter se, inducatis quatuor testes ex vobis; et, si testificati fuerint super hoc, retinete eas in domibus quousque moriantur aut Deus ponat eis aliquam viam, hoc est, det eis aliquod consilium. Et, si reperti fuerint aliqui vestrum comittentes inter se illud facinus, arguite eos et reprehendite.' (Q. 4:15-16) Super ista auctoritate dicit glosa quod probatio huius sceleris inter mulieres non potest compelli nisi per IIIor. testes. Ubi nota quod per hoc quodammodo aperuit viam et didit (sic) causam ut mulieres idem facinus perpetrarent, raro enim erit quod quatuor testes, qui ad hoc probandum sunt necessarii, videant totum scelus. Item notandum quod in hoc quod dixit quod homines tale facinus perpetrantes arguerentur, non adiecta alia pena, dedit intelligere quod istud peccatum non reputat magnum, cum Dominus dicat quod 'secundum mensuram debet esse plagarum modus (Dt 25, 2)'. Et ex hoc quod talem legem tradidit super tanto scelere dedit causam et occasionem suis quod quasi sine verecundia et timore multi perpetrarent illud scelus. Per istas leges quas tradidit suis patet quod leges sue fuerunt inmundissime et pessime et per consequens non fuerunt leges Dei nec ipse propheta vel nuntius Dei."

the other are mentioned, one's own religion has to be proven by sound logical arguments. Only by proving the validity of Christianity, Islam can truly be proven to be flawed.

Only at the end of the debate between 'Umar and Raimundus, when the superiority of Christian theology (or rather, Llull's Christian theology) has been established, does Raimundus venture into a systematic treatment of Islamic culture in comparison to Christianity. As Ramon Llull claims to have established that Christianity is the better faith, he uses it as the primary example. Therefore, Islamic religious traditions are each time compared to Christian religious concepts, even if their respective meanings do not perfectly overlap. Ramon Martí does not discuss Islamic traditions and stories in the same systematic way, but rather 'cherry-picks' his arguments from the Qur'ān and the *Sunna* randomly. He chooses the Islamic traditions and precepts which are most likely to cause negative feelings in his reader. The choices Ramon Llull makes in choosing his own selection of Islamic precepts and traditions are mainly meant to systematically reinforce his views of Islam which he already established in part 1 and part 2 chapter 1 of the *Disputatio Raimundi*. The discussion of Islamic culture in the *Disputatio Raimundi* only serves to illustrate that every Christian standard is not held in the same regard in Islam, and any Islamic norms, traditions and values are only mentioned briefly, in as far as they contribute to the image Raimundus wishes to construct of his opponent. However, the true accusation that Raimundus makes at the address of Islam is not that Muslims have different traditions and values than Christians, but that they do not believe in the Trinity and the Incarnation.

4. PUGIO FIDEI

Even though Ramon Martí's *Pugio fidei* is mainly aimed against Judaism, many passages still treat Islamic philosophy and a defense of the Trinity. The importance of Islamic interpretations of metaphysics, and the necessity to retort these claims in a philosophical manner, are clear in the *Pugio fidei*. Certain passages in the *Pugio fidei* dealing with philosophy can also be found in the *Disputatio Raimundi*. The main goal of Ramon Martí in the following passages is to battle Averroist philosophy and to prove the Christian point of view. He divides the beliefs of Averroism concerning God's intellect in a few chapters, which he divides each time in a few columns, each discussing a different argument. These arguments are often philosophical, but sometimes also scriptural or based on the writings of Christian theologians.

One very important theologian who dealt with Averroist ideas was Thomas Aquinas, who wrote the *Summa contra gentiles* (1259-1265) as a collection of arguments to philosophically defend Christian doctrine. Almost every one of the arguments against Averroist interpretations of God's intellect can be found in the *Summa contra gentiles* by Thomas Aquinas, who uses the same numbering to organize these arguments. It is interesting to note the similarity between Thomas Aquinas' *Summa contra gentiles* and Martí's *Pugio fidei*, as it highlights the connection between both authors, and the influence of Thomas Aquinas on Martí, especially in the parts of the *Pugio fidei* which are devoted to philosophy. Throughout the first book of the *Pugio fidei*, about seventeen chapters are directly copied from Aquinas' *Summa contra gentiles*. Certain chapters of the *Pugio fidei* omit or reorganize the original arguments of the *Summa contra gentiles*. Some chapters of the *Pugio fidei* likewise include guiding citations of Aristotle's works. According to Ann

Giletti, the *Pugio fidei* also contains borrowings from the *De Anima* by Albertus Magnus, and the commentary of the *Sententiae* by Peter of Tarantaise (the later Pope Innocent V).⁸²⁷ A structural comparison between the *Pugio fidei* and the *Summa contra gentiles* has been made by Laureano Robles, in his book *Tomàs de Aquino*⁸²⁸ and his article “En torno a una vieja polémica: el ‘*Pugio fidei*’ y Tomás de Aquino.”⁸²⁹ I will mention his comparison between the *Pugio fidei* and the *Summa contra gentiles* in the footnotes where applicable, in order to stress the general embeddedness of Martí’s arguments in a Christian context, his dependence on Christian sources (in contrast to Lull’s relative lack of care for them), and his connection to the works of Thomas Aquinas in particular.

4.1. WHY AVERROISTS BELIEVE THAT GOD DOES NOT KNOW THE PARTICULARS

In chapter sixteen of the *Pugio fidei*, Ramon Martí discusses the debate in Islam, that God cannot know particular, material entities. First, Martí discusses the reasons why certain philosophers believe that God does not know the particulars. This argumentation was widely discussed in 13th century academia, and seemed to stem from the effect of Ibn Rušd’s works on Christian philosophy – even though Ibn Rušd denied that God had absolutely no knowledge of creation. Both Martí and Ramon Lull discussed this theory, in works aimed at both Muslim followers of Ibn Rušd and Christian Averroists.

Martí first argues that the particulars can only be recognized and known by the material senses. Since every kind of knowledge and recognition implies a form of assimilation, it makes sense, according to the philosophers, that only the particular, material senses can discern the particulars. The divine intellect cannot recognize them.⁸³⁰

Another argument is that the particulars are finite. This means that God cannot know them forever. He either does not know them forever, or He knows them at some point in time and does not know them at some other point. Both aspects are impossible, since

⁸²⁷ Ann Giletti, “Early Witness: Thomas Aquinas, Albert the Great and Peter of Tarantaise in Ramon Martí’s *Pugio fidei* (c. 1278)” in *Ramon Martí’s Pugio fidei: Studies and Texts* (cf. footnote 26 above), pp. 137-138.

⁸²⁸ Laureano Robles, *Tomàs de Aquino* (Salamanca: Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca, 1992), pp. 121-139.

⁸²⁹ Laureano Robles, “En torno a una vieja polémica: el ‘*Pugio fidei*’ y Tomás de Aquino,” *Revista española de teología* 34, no. 4 (1974): 321-350.

⁸³⁰ Raimundus Martinus, *Pugio fidei adversus Mauros et Judaeos*, ed. by Joseph de Voisin, Johann Benedict Carpzov, and Hermannus Coloniensis, 1687; republished as a fascimile (Westmead: Gregg, 1967), p. 237: “Quarum prima talis est. Cum ex ipsa singularitate partium est materia signata, non videntur per aliquam virtutem immaterialem singularia posse cognosci, si omnis cognitio per aliquam assimilationem fiat; unde et in nobis illae solae potentiae singularia apprehendunt, quae materialibus utuntur organis, ut sunt imaginatio, sensus, et huiusmodi: Intellectus autem, quia immaterialis est, singularia non cognoscit: multo ergo minus intellectus divinus singularium, ac particularium est cognoscitivus, qui maxime a materia distat. Nullo ergo modo videtur, quod Deus particularia cognoscere possit.” Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra gentiles*, lib. I, cap. 63, n. 2: “Prima est ex ipsa singularitatis conditione. Cum enim singularitatis principium sit materia signata, non videtur per aliquam virtutem immaterialem singularia posse cognosci, si omnis cognitio per quandam assimilationem fiat. Unde et in nobis illae solae potentiae singularia apprehendunt quae materialibus organis utuntur, ut imaginatio et sensus et huiusmodi; intellectus autem noster, quia immaterialis est, singularia non cognoscit. Multo igitur minus intellectus divinus singularium est cognoscitivus, qui maxime a materia recedit. Et sic nullo modo videtur quod Deus singularia cognoscere possit.” Robles, “En Torno a una Vieja Polèmica” (cf. footnote 829 above), p. 330.

something that is not in being cannot be knowledge, and since God's intellect contains perfect knowledge.⁸³¹ The argument is based on the notion of Aristotle, who argued that the first intellect is eternal, unchangeable thought, and must have an eternal object, while the secondary intellect is composite, and is posited in space and time (and must, therefore, have an object in space and time).⁸³² Aristotle stresses that a finite intellect must have a finite object, and that the infinite intellect must have an infinite object. Ibn Rušd agrees with this view, but lingers on the aspect of the theory which discusses (a) the exalted nature of the object of God's knowledge, and (b) the simple (or non-composite) nature of the object of God's intellect.⁸³³

Martí next argues that particulars are often contingent, meaning that their existence depends on the existence of something that comes before. Contingents are very difficult to predict, and knowledge of them can falter. This is why God cannot know the contingent particulars, since His knowledge is certain and infallible.⁸³⁴

⁸³¹ Martinus, *Pugio fidei*, p. 237 (cf. footnote 830 above): "Secunda est, quod singularia non semper sunt: aut ergo non semper scientur a Deo, aut quandoque scientur, et quandoque non scientur. Primum esse non potest; quia de eo, quod esse non potest, non potest esse scientia, quae solum verorum est: ea autem, quae non sunt, vera esse non possunt. Secundum etiam esse non potest, quia intellectus divini cognitio est invariabilis omnino." Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra gentiles*, lib. I, cap. 63, n. 3: "Secunda est quod singularia non semper sunt. Aut igitur semper scientur a Deo: aut quandoque scientur et quandoque non scientur. Primum esse non potest: quia de eo quod non est non potest esse scientia, quae solum verorum est; ea autem quae non sunt, vera esse non possunt. Secundum etiam esse non potest: quia divini intellectus cognitio est omnino invariabilis, ut ostensum est." Robles, "En Torno a una Vieja Polèmica" (cf. footnote 829 above), p. 330.

⁸³² Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 12.1075a, in *Aristotle in 23 volumes*, Vols.17-18, trans. by Hugh Tredennick (Cambridge, MA; London: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann Ltd, 1933, 1989), accessed online through Perseus.edu: <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0052%3Abook%3D12%3Asection%3D1074b>: "There still remains the question whether the object of thought is composite; for if so, thought would change in passing from one part of the whole to another. The answer is that everything which contains no matter is indivisible. Just as the human mind, or rather the mind of composite beings, is in a certain space of time (for it does not possess the good at this or at that moment, but in the course of a certain whole period it attains to the supreme good, which is other than itself), so is absolute self-thought throughout all eternity.

⁸³³ Ibn Rušd, *Ibn Rušd's Metaphysics* (cf. footnote 572 above), pp. 191-198.

⁸³⁴ Martinus, *Pugio fidei* (cf. footnote 830 above), p. 237: "Tertia est ex eo, quod non omnia singularia de necessitate proveniunt; sed quaedam contingentur; unde de iis certa cognitio esse non potest, nisi quando sunt. Certa enim cognitio est, quae falli non potest: cognitio autem omnis, quae est de contingentibus, falli potest, cum futurum est: potest enim venire oppositum ejus; quod cognitione tenetur. Si enim non posset oppositum evenire, jam necessarium esset; unde etiam de contingentibus futuris non potest esse scientia, seid conjecturalis existimatio quaedam. Supponere autem oportet, omnem cognitionem Dei esse certissimam et infallibilem, ut supra ostensum est: impossibile est etiam, quod Deus aliquid de novo cognoscere incipiat propter ejus immutabilitatem, ut dictum est. Ex his igitur sequi videtur, quod singularia contingentia non cognoscat." Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra gentiles*, lib. I, cap. 63, n. 4: "Tertia, ex eo quod non omnia singularia de necessitate proveniunt, sed quaedam contingentur. Unde de eis certa cognitio esse non potest nisi quando sunt. Certa enim cognitio est quae falli non potest: cognitio autem omnis quae est de contingentibus, cum futurum est, falli potest; potest enim evenire oppositum eius quod cognitione tenetur; si enim non posset oppositum evenire, iam necessarium esset. Unde et de contingentibus futuris non potest esse in nobis scientia, sed coniecturalis aestimatio quaedam. Supponere autem oportet omnem Dei cognitionem esse certissimam et infallibilem, ut supra ostensum est. Impassibile est etiam quod Deus aliquid de novo cognoscere incipiat, propter eius immutabilitatem, ut dictum est. Ex his igitur videtur sequi quod singularia contingentia non cognoscat." Robles, "En Torno a una Vieja Polèmica" (cf. footnote 829 above), p. 330.

Another argument is that many particulars are caused by someone's will. The effect of that will cannot be known except in its cause. However, the will cannot be known except by the one who wills. This means that God cannot have an eternal knowledge of the particulars that are caused by the will.⁸³⁵

Next, Martí states that when an intellect takes knowledge of something, it measures it as to its quantity. However, the particulars are infinite in number, or in potential. This is why the intellect of God does not know all of the particulars.⁸³⁶ The argument is based on a passage of Ibn Rušd's Commentary on *Metaphysics* XII, where he says that the particulars are infinite and "no knowledge encompasses them," including divine knowledge.⁸³⁷ This argument goes against the thought of al-Ġazālī, who believed that God can know an infinite number of particulars (such as, an infinite multiplication in mathematics), while human thought cannot, and is dependent on the particular thoughts of the moment, which shows the difference between divine and human intellect.⁸³⁸ Still, al-Ġazālī does not seem to be the primary source of this passage, and seems to be of less importance than Ibn Rušd in this case. The argument seems to stem from a Christian reading or interpretation of Ibn Rušd and Aristotle.

Another reason is that the particulars are vile (or ordinary and earthly), and cannot be thought by the divine intellect. The vileness of the intellect can be seen by the vileness of the object of its intellect. This means, that since God's intellect is noble, He cannot think the particulars, which are vile. Martí mentions a passage from Hieronymus' commentary on the Biblical book of Habakkuk as an example.⁸³⁹ He also refers to Aristotle's *Prima*

⁸³⁵ Martinus, *Pugio fidei* (cf. footnote 830 above), p. 237: "Quarta est hoc, quod quorundam singularium causa est voluntas: effectus autem antequam sit, non potest nisi in sua causa cognosci. Sic enim solum esse potest, antequam in se esse incipiat: motus autem voluntatis a nullo possunt per certitudinem cognosci, nisi a volente, in cuius potestate sunt. Impossibile est ergo, quod Deus de his singularibus, quae causam ex voluntate sumunt, notitiam aeternam habeat." Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra gentiles*, lib. I, cap. 63, n. 5: "Quarta est ex hoc quod quorundam singularium causa est voluntas. Effectus autem, antequam sit, non potest nisi in sua causa cognosci: sic enim solum esse potest antequam in se esse incipiat. Motus autem voluntatis a nullo possunt per certitudinem cognosci nisi a volente, in cuius potestate sunt. Impossibile igitur videtur quod Deus de huiusmodi singularibus quae causam ex voluntate sumunt, notitiam aeternam habeat." Robles, "En Torno a una Vieja Polèmica" (cf. footnote 829 above), p. 330.

⁸³⁶ Martinus, *Pugio fidei* (cf. footnote 830 above), p. 237: "Quinta est ex singularium infinitate. Infinitum enim, in quantum huiusmodi, ignotum est. Nam omne, quod cognoscitur, sub cognoscentis comprehensione quodammodo mensuratur: cum mensuratio nihil aliud sit, quam certificatio rei mensuratae: unde omnis ars infinita repudiat. Singularia autem sunt infinita, ad minus in potentia. Impossibile ergo videtur, quod Deus singularia cognoscat." Cf. Thomas Aquinas, lib. I, cap. 63, n. 6: "Quinta est ex singularium infinitate. Infinitum enim, in quantum huiusmodi, est ignotum: nam omne quod cognoscitur sub cognoscentis comprehensione quodammodo mensuratur; cum mensuratio nihil aliud sit quam quaedam certificatio rei mensuratae. Unde omnis ars infinita repudiat. Singularia autem sunt infinita, ad minus in potentia. Impossibile igitur videtur quod Deus singularia cognoscat." Robles, "En Torno a una Vieja Polèmica" (cf. footnote 829 above), p. 330.

⁸³⁷ Ibn Rušd, *Ibn Rušd's Metaphysics* (cf. footnote 572 above), p. 198.

⁸³⁸ Cf. Abdu R. Rahman Abu Zayd, *Al-Ghazali on the Divine Names and their Properties* (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1990), pp. 25-26.

⁸³⁹ Cf. Hieronymus, *Commentarii in prophetas minores: Abacuc*, ed. by Marc Adriaen (Turnhout: Brepols, 1964), *CCSL*, 76A, I, 1, 13-14, p. 24: "Ceterum absurdum est ad hoc Dei deducere maiestatem, ut sciat per momenta singula quot nascantur culices, quot ue moriantur, quae cimum et pulicum et muscarum sit in terra multitudo, quanti pisces in aqua natitent et qui de minoribus maiorum praedae cedere debeant."

Philosophia,⁸⁴⁰ in which he claims that God does not know anything but Himself. Aristotle also mentions that the intellect can only think that which is supremely good, and therefore, only itself. The conclusion that God cannot think particulars, since they are too vile, is the later, religious interpretation of Aristotle's words. Martí clearly wished to underline the Aristotelian source of the thought, and show how one should argue against a non-Christian interpretation of Aristotle's works.⁸⁴¹ The argument was also taken over by Ibn Rušd in the Commentary on *Metaphysics* book XII,⁸⁴² where he follows Aristotle by saying that the divine Intellect cannot think that which is outside of itself, since the divine intellect cannot think the lower. In the commentary by Ibn Rušd, there is a clear mention of the "exalted" and the "lower," which was not literally there in the work by Aristotle.

Finally, Martí continues, another argument by the Averroists is that God cannot know the particulars, since many of them are evil. Within God, there can be no evil, which is why God does not understand evil and privation. Since evil and privation can only exist in those beings that are in potentiality, it follows that God cannot understand the particulars. This argument is reminiscent of the previous one, mentioned by Martí, which says that God cannot know the particulars since they are vile.⁸⁴³ The previous two arguments can be

⁸⁴⁰ This is Martí's own interpretation of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* 1074b.34 since, of course, Aristotle does not mention God but only the "mind" (ὁ Νοῦς). Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1074b.34 (cf. footnote 832 above): "The subject of Mind involves certain difficulties. Mind is held to be of all phenomena the most supernatural; but the question of how we must regard it if it is to be of this nature involves certain difficulties. If Mind thinks nothing, where is its dignity? It is in just the same state as a man who is asleep. If it thinks, but something else determines its thinking, then since that which is its essence is not thinking but potentiality, it cannot be the best reality; because it derives its excellence from the act of thinking. Again, whether its essence is thought or thinking, what does it think? It must think either itself or something else; and if something else, then it must think either the same thing always, or different things at different times. Then does it make any difference, or not, whether it thinks that which is good or thinks at random? Surely it would be absurd for it to think about some subjects. Clearly, then, it thinks that which is most divine and estimable, and does not change; for the change would be for the worse, and anything of this kind would immediately imply some sort of motion. Therefore if Mind is not thinking but a potentiality, (a) it is reasonable to suppose that the continuity of its thinking is laborious; (b) clearly there must be something else which is more excellent than Mind; i.e. the object of thought; for both thought and the act of thinking will belong even to the thinker of the worst thoughts. Therefore if this is to be avoided (as it is, since it is better not to see some things than to see them), thinking cannot be the supreme good. Therefore Mind thinks itself, if it is that which is best; and its thinking is a thinking of thinking."

⁸⁴¹ Martinus, *Pugio fidei* (cf. footnote 830 above), p. 237: "Sexta est ex ipsa vilitate singularium: cum enim nobilitatis scientiae ex nobilitate scibilis quodammodo pensetur; vilitas enim scibilis in vilitatem scientiae redundare videtur. Divinus autem intellectus nobilissimus est; non ergo ejus nobilitas patitur, quod Deus inter singularia quaedam, quae sunt vilissima, cognoscat. Huic autem rationi videtur assentire B. Hieronymus super Abacuc dicens: Absurdum est, ad hoc majestatem Dei deducere, ut dicamus, eam per momenta singula scire, quot culices nascantur, quotve moriantur: quanta sit muscarum, vel pulicum multitudo. Aristoteles quoque in prima philosophia dicit, quod Deus non cognoscit alia a Se." Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra gentiles*, lib. I, cap. 63, n. 7: "Sexta est ex ipsa vilitate singularium. Cum enim nobilitas scientiae ex nobilitate scibilis quodammodo pensetur, vilitas etiam scibilis in vilitatem scientiae redundare videtur. Divinus autem intellectus nobilissimus est. Non igitur eius nobilitas patitur quod Deus quaedam vilissima inter singularia cognoscat." Robles, "En Torno a una Vieja Polèmica" (cf. footnote 829 above), p. 330.

⁸⁴² Ibn Rušd, *Ibn Rušd's Metaphysics* (cf. footnote 572 above), pp. 191-193.

⁸⁴³ Martinus, *Pugio fidei* (cf. footnote 830 above), pp. 237-238: "Septima Denique sit malum, quod in quibusdam singularibus invenitur. Cum enim cognitum sit aliquo modo in cognoscente, malum in Deo esse non possit; videtur sequi, quod Deus malum, et privationem omnino non cognoscat; sed solum intellectus, qui est in potentia. Privatio enim non nisi in potentia esse potest. Et ex hoc sequi videtur, quod non habeat Deus singularium notitiam, in quibus malum, et privatio invenitur." Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra*

compared to ‘Umar’s arguments against the Incarnation in the *Disputatio Raimundi*, when he argues that God cannot bind Himself to the particular and the material, since this would tarnish God’s glory and perfection, which He cannot comprehend.⁸⁴⁴

Most of Ramon Martí’s list of arguments, which he attributes to Averroism, is based on the discrepancy between the finiteness and imperfection of the particulars, and the perfection, infinity and eternity of the divine intellect. His arguments, which follow Thomas Aquinas, are reminiscent of many of ‘Umar’s arguments, that God cannot “bind” Himself to the imperfect and finite particulars, since they cannot mix with God’s perfection and boundlessness. The list is most definitely a direct reaction to Averroism, the works of Ibn Rušd, and also directly on the Aristotelian ideas concerning God’s intellect. Most of the arguments stem from the reading of one particular passage by Ibn Rušd and Aristotle. While Ibn Rušd also argued that God does not know the particulars since this would damage the unity of His intellect (as I have shown in the section on the divine intellect in chapter four), this is not mentioned as an argument by Ramon Martí. Another direct source was the Christian interpretation of Averroism. One of the arguments listed above, that God cannot know the particulars since they are not certain, is reminiscent of one of the statements in the condemnations of Paris, where it is said that God cannot know the future, since the future is contingent upon other beings, and that they are particulars.⁸⁴⁵ The lack of capability of God to know the particulars is here also explained by the fact that they cannot be predicted.

In the *Disputatio Raimundi*, ‘Umar likewise discusses the intellect of God. However, as stated in the previous chapter, the character ‘Umar misrepresented the argumentation of the Islamic philosophers. While Ibn Rušd argued that God does not know the particulars, and only really knows Himself,⁸⁴⁶ ‘Umar argued that God can only know His effect and His creation, and not Himself, since He does not have a nature.⁸⁴⁷ The question for both Ramon Llull and Ramon Martí is whether they were completely aware of the original debate, or not. Clearly, both authors reacted on both Ibn Rušd’s works and on their presence in the Christian intellectual world as Averroism. Their arguments seemed to be in the first place directed against a reading of Aristotle which was not inherently Christian, and of which the counter-arguments could be directed against certain Islamic (or Western Averroist) philosophers who considered themselves part of the Aristotelian tradition.

Another issue which becomes apparent in the comparison between the arguments of the *Disputatio Raimundi* and the *Pugio fidei* is the exhaustiveness of the latter. Ramon Llull only uses those parts of the debate which he can use to form his own particular philosophy (mainly Ibn Sīnā’s and Ibn Rušd’s view concerning God’s intellect). He does not mention

gentiles, lib. I, cap. 63, n. 8: “Septima est ex malitia quae in quibusdam singularibus invenitur. Cum enim cognitum sit aliquo modo in cognoscente; malum autem in Deo esse non possit, ut supra ostensum est: videtur sequi quod Deus malum et privationem omnino non cognoscat, sed solum intellectus qui est in potentia; privatio enim non nisi in potentia esse potest. Et ex hoc sequitur quod non habeat Deus de singularium notitiam, in quibus malum et privatio invenitur.” Robles, “En Torno a una Vieja Polèmica,” p. 331 (cf. footnote 829 above).

⁸⁴⁴ Cf. Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 15, p. 231; Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, I, 2, 9, p. 192.

⁸⁴⁵ *La condamnation parisienne de 1277* (cf. footnote 643 above), p. 92.

⁸⁴⁶ Cf. Ibn Rušd, *Ibn Rušd’s Metaphysics* (cf. footnote 572 above), pp. 196-197.

⁸⁴⁷ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, I, 2, 4, pp. 185-186.

any other argument behind the idea that God cannot know the particulars, such as the vileness or the probability of evil in the particulars. This could have meant that the *Disputatio Raimundi* and the correlative theory as apparent from the *Ars generalis ultima*, were based mainly on one aspect of the debate on the divine intellect, which was represented by Ibn Rušd and Ibn Sīnā. The *Pugio fidei* gives a complete systematic overview of the entire debate (without going into too much detail or mentioning too many sources), and answers every argument accordingly. The treatment of the Islamic philosophical debate by Lull is much more pragmatic, and is used to serve only the progress of Lull's philosophy. Arguably, the *Ars* and the correlative theory are more important in the works of Ramon Lull, while loyal rendition of the original source material is more important for Ramon Martí.

4.2. WHY GOD MUST KNOW THE PARTICULARS

In chapter 18, Ramon Martí attempts to explain that God must know the particulars, since they are caused by Him, in as far as He makes them be in act. This is reminiscent of the view, propagated by both Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Rušd, that God, in knowing Himself, understands His own act of creating, and therefore also creation. Martí counters the idea that exists in Islamic philosophy, that God can only know universal truths (which has been argued by Ibn Sīnā). According to Ramon Martí, universals only exist within the particulars, which is based on Aristotle's explanation of universals in *Metaphysics* VII, 1028b. They are therefore not more known than those particulars. He argues against the intellectual dichotomy between the possibility of understanding the universals and the particulars, claiming that they are both equally understandable for God.⁸⁴⁸

Another reason why God needs to understand the particulars, is that God understands the beginning or principles of the particulars. For example, by understanding the rational soul and the body, humankind is also understood. God understands principles, form and matter, and His intellect is essential, which means that He also has to understand the particulars in His essence.⁸⁴⁹

⁸⁴⁸ Martinus, *Pugio fidei* (cf. footnote 830 above), p. 238: "Primo igitur ostendetur, quod singularium cognitio Deo deesse non potest: ostensum est enim supra capitulo decimo quinto, quod Deus cognoscat alia a se, in quantum est eis causa. Effectus autem Dei sunt res singulares, hoc enim modo Deus causat res, in quantum facit eas esse in actu. Universalia autem non sunt res subsistentes; sed habent esse solum in singularibus, ut probat Aristoteles in septimo Metaphysicorum. Deus ergo cognoscit res alias a se non solum in universali; sed etiam in singulari." Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra gentiles*, lib. I, cap. 65, n. 1: "Primo igitur ostendemus quod singularium cognitio Deo non potest deesse. Ostensum enim est supra quod Deus cognoscit alia in quantum est causa eis. Effectus autem Dei sunt res singulares. Hoc enim modo Deus causat res, in quantum facit eas esse in actu: universalia autem non sunt res subsistentes, sed habent esse solum in singularibus, ut probatur in VII metaphysicae. Deus igitur cognoscit res alias a se non solum in universali, sed etiam in singulari." Robles, "En Torno a una Vieja Polèmica" (cf. footnote 829 above), p. 331.

⁸⁴⁹ Martinus, *Pugio fidei* (cf. footnote 830 above), pp. 238-239: "Item cognitionis principiis, ex quibus constituitur essentia rei, necesse est illam cognosci: ut cognita anima rationali, et corpore tali, cognoscitur homo. Singularis autem essentia constituitur ex materia designata et forma individuata: ut Socratis essentia ex hoc corpore, et hac anima: ut essentia hominis universalis ex corpore et anima, ut in 7. *Metaphysic*. Unde sicut haec cadunt in definitionem hominis universalis; ita illa caderent in definitionem Socratis, si posset

The next argument is that God needs to know the particulars in order to understand the very nature of the universals. God needs to know their particular differences and passions. God would not know the universals, if He did not know the intention or the reason of the universal thing (which is the particulars), and He would not know the universal (like human being or animal) if He did not know the particular.⁸⁵⁰

In these two arguments, it becomes clear that Martí was aware of the argument of Ibn Rušd, that even though God does not know the particulars directly, or by contemplating those very particulars, He does know the universals behind those particulars, coming from His own essence. Martí understood the basic tenets on the Islamic views concerning the knowledge of the particulars by God, as argued by both Ibn Rušd and Ibn Sīnā, but doubted the inherent necessity of the arguments. The difference between the universals and the particulars, and the fact that knowledge of the particulars cannot be reconciled with the infinity and eternity of the divine intellect, is negated by Martí, who claims that the particulars and the universals are in accord, and that knowledge of one implies knowledge of the other.

definiri. Cuicumque igitur adest cognitio materiae, et eorum, per quae materia designatur, et formae in materia individuatae, non potest deesse cognitio singularis. Sed Dei cognitio usque ad materiam, et accidentia individuata, et formas pertingit. Cum enim suum intelligere sit sua essentia, oportet quod omnia, quae sunt quocumque modo in ejus essentia, intelligat: in qua quidem sunt, sicut in prima origine, omnia, quae esse quocumque modo habent, cum sit primum et universale essendi principium, a quibus materia et accidens non sunt aliena, cum materia sit ens in potentiali, accidens autem sit ens in alio. Deo ergo cognitio singularium non deest.” Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra gentiles*, lib. I, cap. 65, n. 3: “Item. Cognitis principiis ex quibus constituitur essentia rei, necesse est rem illam cognosci: sicut, cognita anima rationali et corpore tali, cognoscitur homo. Singularis autem essentia constituitur ex materia designata et forma individuata: sicut Socratis essentia ex hoc corpore et hac anima, ut essentia hominis universalis ex anima et corpore, ut patet in VII metaphysicae. Unde, sicut haec cadunt in definitione hominis universalis, ita illa caderent in definitione Socratis si posset definiri. Cuicumque igitur adest cognitio materiae, et eorum per quae materia designatur, et formae in materia individuatae, ei non potest deesse cognitio singularis. Sed Dei cognitio usque ad materiam et accidentia individuata et formas pertingit. Cum enim suum intelligere sit sua essentia, oportet quod intelligat omnia quae sunt quocumque modo in eius essentia; in qua quidem virtute sunt, sicut in prima origine, omnia quae esse quocumque modo habent, cum sit primum et universale essendi principium; a quibus materia et accidens non sunt aliena, cum materia sit ens in potentia et accidens sit ens in alio. Deo igitur cognitio singularium non deest.” Robles, “En Torno a una Vieja Polèmica,” p. 331 (cf. footnote 829 above).

⁸⁵⁰ Martinus, *Pugio fidei* (cf. footnote 830 above), p. 239: “Amplius. Natura generis non potest cognosci, nisi ejus differentiae primae, et passiones propriae acgnoscantur: non enim scirentur perfecte natura numeri, si par et impar ignorarentur. Sed universale, et singular sunt differentiae, vel per se passiones entis. Si ergo Deus cognoscendo essentiam suam, perfecte cognoscit naturam communem entis, oportet quod perfecte cognoscat universale, et singulare. Sicut autem perfecte non cognosceret universale, si cognosceret intentionem intentionem universalitatis, et non cognosceret rem universalem, ut hominem vel animal; ita non perfecte cognosceret singulare, si cognosceret rationem singularitatis, et non cognosceret hoc, vel illud singulare. Oportet ergo quod Deus res singulares cognoscat.” Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra gentiles*, lib. I, cap. 65, n. 4: “Amplius. Natura generis perfecte non potest cognosci nisi ejus differentiae primae et passiones propriae cognoscantur: non enim perfecte scirentur natura numeri si par et impar ignorarentur. Sed universale et singulare sunt differentiae, vel per se passiones entis. Si igitur Deus, cognoscendo essentiam suam, perfecte cognoscit naturam communem entis, oportet quod perfecte cognoscat universale et singulare. Sicut autem non perfecte cognosceret universale si cognosceret intentionem universalitatis et non cognosceret rem universalem, ut hominem aut animal; ita non perfecte cognosceret singulare si cognosceret rationem singularitatis et non cognosceret hoc vel illud singulare. Oportet igitur quod Deus res singulares cognoscat.” Robles, “En Torno a una Vieja Polèmica” (cf. footnote 829 above), p. 331.

The next argument made by Martí, is that God does not have the same kind of knowledge as humankind does. While humankind takes its knowledge from the things around them, God's own very knowledge is the cause of the world. His knowledge is practical. However, this divine practical knowledge would not be perfect if He did not have knowledge of the particulars, since He has to know and His knowledge has to cause everything.⁸⁵¹ Here, Martí agrees with the idea that God's knowledge knows its creation as He is the creator but he argues that, if so, God's knowledge must know the particulars which He creates. The argument by Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Rušd, that God's knowledge of creation happens due to His act of creating, is changed and altered by Martí to prove God's knowledge of the particulars by referring to the creative nature of His intellect.

The next argument is quite simple: according to Martí, who cites Aristotle against Empedocles, God would be quite ignorant if He did not know the particulars, which even human beings know.⁸⁵²

When comparing these chapters (16 and 18) to the *Disputatio Raimundi*, it becomes apparent that Raimundus' chapter on intellect and Martí's chapters 16 and 18 of the *Pugio fidei* draw from the same Averroist thought. Both authors devote a passage to the intellect of God. However, this does not mean that both authors use the same technique or argumentation in their discussion.

In the *Pugio fidei*, Martí gives a neat and loyal rendition of the Averroist arguments. He discusses why, in Islamic philosophy, it is held that God does not know particulars, and why His intellect is believed to only know Himself. He maps out every Aristotelian or Averroist argument, and provides a structured answer in the next chapter, coming from Christian philosophy. Apart from philosophical sources, Martí also supplies his reader with biblical passages from the Old Testament, which have to be acceptable to a Jewish audience, or a Muslim audience that could be convinced of the validity of the Bible. Martí counters the Averroist thought patterns, discussed in chapter 18, by providing an exhaustive answer, and by seeing the basis of each argument in a different light. The very basis why Ibn Rušd and Ibn Sīnā disagree with God's knowledge of the particulars is nuanced by Martí, who claims that they are based on false or one-sided premises, or who disagrees with the conclusions made by the Averroists, by providing solid answers. He does not alter the thought of Ibn Rušd, but provides an interpretation of his philosophy where he denies the

⁸⁵¹ Martinus, *Pugio fidei* (cf. footnote 830 above), p. 239: "Amplius: Divinus intellectus non sumit ex rebus cognitionem, sicut noster: sed magis per suam cognitionem est causa rerum, ut infra dicitur; et sic ejus cognitio, quam de rebus aliis habet, est ad modum practicae cognitionis. Practica autem cognitio non est perfecta, nisi ad singularia perveniatur. Nam practicae cognitionis finis est operatio, quae in singularibus est. Divina igitur cognitio, quam de rebus aliis habet, usque ad singularia se extendit." Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra gentiles*, lib. I, cap. 65, n. 7: "Amplius. Divinus intellectus ex rebus cognitionem non sumit, sicut noster, sed magis per suam cognitionem est causa rerum, ut infra ostendetur: et sic eius cognitio quam de rebus aliis habet, est ad modum practicae cognitionis. Practica autem cognitio non est perfecta nisi ad singularia perveniatur: nam practicae cognitionis finis est operatio, quae in singularibus est. Divina igitur cognitio quam de aliis rebus habet, se usque ad singularia extendit." Robles, "En Torno a una Vieja Polèmica" (cf. footnote 829 above), p. 331.

⁸⁵² Martinus, *Pugio fidei* (cf. footnote 830 above), p. 239: "Alioqui sequeretur inconveniens, quod Aristoteles contra Empedoclem inducit; scilicet, Deum esse insipientissimum, si singularia non cognoscit, quae etiam homines cognoscunt." Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra gentiles*, lib. I, cap. 65, n. 10: "Praeterea. Sequeretur inconveniens quod philosophus contra Empedoclem inducit, scilicet Deum esse insipientissimum, si singularia non cognoscit, quae etiam homines cognoscunt." Robles, "En Torno a una Vieja Polèmica" (cf. footnote 829 above), p. 331.

validity of its fundamental premises. Other than Ramon Llull, Martí does not accept the Islamic point of view completely. Rather, he lists each Islamic philosophical argument and immediately provides it with an apologetic defense of Christian doctrines, whenever the philosophical currents in the works of Ibn Rušd deny their validity. This again ties into the earlier critique by Llull, that many Christians can philosophically defend, but not prove, Christian doctrines.

The *Disputatio Raimundi* completely alters the train of thought, both the arguments of Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Rušd and the ideal answer to them. As said before, instead of arguing that God cannot think the particulars, ‘Umar argues that God only knows the particulars and not His own essence. The main reason is that God does not have a nature which He can contemplate or think. Raimundus, in turn, argues that God knows His entire essence, since His intellect is eternal, and must therefore have itself as an object.⁸⁵³ He explains God’s internal contemplation by referring to the correlative theory. When looking at the passage of the *Disputatio Raimundi* through a more general lens, it seems that the argumentation about God’s intellect serves two main purposes: first, to underline the generalization made by Islam in the *Ars*. In the *Ars generalis ultima*, Llull argues that Muslims do not believe that God’s attributes are part of His essence, since they are only His working in the created, material world. This is why God cannot have an internal act, and why His attributes are not part of His essence. It would make sense, in the *Disputatio Raimundi*, to argue that God’s intellect cannot think Himself, since this would prove the statement made about Islamic theology in the *Ars*. Llull’s works remained ever loyal to one another and to the philosophy of the *Ars*, instead of proving new thoughts and ideas, only changing the scope or motivation behind mentioning certain aspects of Llull’s theology. When discussing Islamic philosophy, Llull adapts his arguments on his correlative theory and the content of the *Ars*, instead of prioritizing a loyal rendition of Islamic theology or philosophy. As mentioned in the chapter on Islam,⁸⁵⁴ Ramon Llull wished to show to his reader that the Christian side of the story provided a more loyal and a more accurate answer of the dialogue represented by Ibn Rušd and Ibn Sīnā than the Muslim side.

Ramon Martí does not go as far as to appropriate and Christianize the debate of whether the intellect of God can know the particulars. Rather, he renders the arguments loyally – albeit in a slightly more simplistic manner – and denies the truth claim of those Islamic philosophers who held that God can only know Himself. He bases his arguments each time on the particular problems of the Islamic debate, without attempting to find an overarching theory which would have to explain every aspect of Islamic philosophy for good, as Ramon Llull meant to do. Ramon Martí dealt with the topic in a less holistic and more systematic and detailed way, moving directly from the debate itself, and without sacrificing the correctness of his rendition for the greater good of his own philosophical systems. Arguably, the *Pugio fidei* was based more directly on the source material and the authorities, while Llull’s *Disputatio Raimundi* dealt with philosophy in a more intuitive manner. It becomes apparent that Llull’s contact with the Islamic philosophical ideas about the intellect of God was coloured mainly by his own philosophical axiomata, while Ramon

⁸⁵³ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 12, pp. 222-223.

⁸⁵⁴ Cf. above, p. 189.

Martí's grasp of the matter was based directly on his own precise and meticulous study of the entire debate and on his systematic rendition and treatment of every argument.

4.3. WHY GOD MUST KNOW THE INFINITE

In chapter 22, Martí explains that God does not only have knowledge of the particulars, but also of the infinities. The first reason is that He knows that He is the cause of all things. Since He is the cause of the infinite entities, He understands and knows those entities.⁸⁵⁵

The second reason is that God knows His own virtue perfectly. Virtue cannot be understood unless it is considered in all things in which it can be. God's virtue is infinite, and extends itself to infinity. This is why God's intellect is infinite.⁸⁵⁶

The third reason is that God's understanding is His essence, and His essence is infinite. Therefore, He is infinite understanding. The capacity of humankind to understand the finite is limited, since we ourselves are finite. Since God Himself is infinite, His understanding can think the infinite.⁸⁵⁷

Moreover, if the human intellect has the potency to think infinitely by endlessly multiplying numbers (but this is not an actualized potency), then the divine intellect, which is eternally in act, needs to be even more prone to think the infinite.⁸⁵⁸

⁸⁵⁵ Martinus, *Pugio fidei* (cf. footnote 830 above), p. 245: "Quinto ostendendum est, quod Deus infinita cognoscit. Cognoscendo enim se esse causam rerum, alia a se cognoscit: ut supra capitulo decimo patet. Ipse enim est causa infinitorum. Sed si infinita sunt entia, est omnium quae sunt causa. Est ergo infinitorum cognoscitivus." Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra gentiles*, lib. I, cap. 69, n. 2: "Cognoscendo enim se esse causam rerum alia a se cognoscit, ut ex superioribus patet. Ipse autem est causa infinitorum, si infinita sunt entia: est enim omnium eorum quae sunt causa. Est igitur infinitorum cognoscitivus." Robles, "En Torno a una Vieja Polèmica" (cf. footnote 829 above), p. 332.

⁸⁵⁶ Martinus, *Pugio fidei* (cf. footnote 830 above), p. 245: "Item. Deus suam virtutem perfecte cognoscit: virtus autem non potest cognosci perfecte nisi cognoscantur omnia, in quae potest: cum secundum ea quantitas virtutis quodammodo attendatur: sua autem virtus, cum sit infinita, as infinita se extendit: est igitur Deus infinitorum cognitor." Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra gentiles*, lib. I, cap. 69, n. 3, "Item. Deus suam virtutem perfecte cognoscit, ut ex supra dictis patet. Virtus autem non potest cognosci perfecte nisi cognoscantur omnia in quae potest: cum secundum ea quantitas virtutis quodammodo attendatur. Sua autem virtus, cum sit infinita, ut ostensum est supra, ad infinita se extendit. Est igitur Deus infinitorum cognitor." Robles, "En Torno a una Vieja Polèmica" (cf. footnote 829 above), p. 332.

⁸⁵⁷ Martinus, *Pugio fidei* (cf. footnote 830 above), p. 245: "Praeterea: Esse Dei est suum intelligere: sicut ergo suum Esse est infinitum, ita suum intelligere est infinitum. Sicut autem se habet finitum ad finitum, ita se habet infinitum ad infinitum: si ergo secundum intelligere, quod finitum est, finita capere possumus, etiam Deus secundum suum intelligere infinita capere potest." Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra gentiles*, lib. I, cap. 69, n. 6: "Praeterea. Esse Dei est suum intelligere. Sicut igitur suum esse est infinitum, ut ostensum est, ita suum intelligere est infinitum. Sicut autem se habet finitum ad finitum, ita infinitum ad infinitum. Si igitur secundum intelligere nostrum, quod finitum est, finita capere possumus, et Deus secundum suum intelligere infinita capere potest." Robles, "En Torno a una Vieja Polèmica" (cf. footnote 829 above), p. 332.

⁸⁵⁸ Martinus, *Pugio fidei* (cf. footnote 830 above), pp. 245-246: "Amplius: cum intellectus noster sit cognoscitivus infinitorum in potentia: potest enim in infinitum species numerorum multiplicare; si intellectus divinus non cognosceret infinita etiam in actu, sequeretur, quod vel plurium esset intellectus humanus cognoscitivus, quam divinus; vel quod intellectus divinus non cognosceret omnia actu, quorum est cognoscitivus in potentia: quorum utrumque est impossibile, ut suo loco probatur." Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra gentiles*, lib. I, cap. 69, n. 10, "Item. Cum intellectus noster sit cognoscitivus infinitorum in potentia, potest enim in infinitum species numerorum multiplicare; si intellectus divinus non cognosceret infinita etiam actu, sequeretur quod vel plurium esset cognoscitivus intellectus humanus quam divinus; vel quod intellectus

The human intellect, Martí continues, cannot know the infinite, since the infinite cannot be counted or known in a quantitative way. However, the divine intellect is capable of knowing the infinite, since it knows without sequence or succession. While the finite intellect is impeded by the absence of quantity in the infinite, God's intellect is above quantity.⁸⁵⁹

Martí argues that God can think multiple things that consist of quantity, without having a difference in His intellect. In God's intellect, all becomes one species. This is also true for the infinity: God is not given internal difference by thinking multiple finites or infinites.⁸⁶⁰ This can be compared to the system of the correlatives in Lull's works, and with his notion of the divine Persons in the *Disputatio Raimundi*. Since the intelligent, the intellect and the intelligible (and the other correlatives likewise) are essentially the same, they do not pose any inherent difference or multitude within God. As Martí argues, every divine Person becomes one, being God. In Ramon Lull's interpretation of these arguments, they become a closed metaphysical system, being the system of the correlatives which Lull describes in the *Ars*.

When comparing the above chapter to the *Disputatio Raimundi*, a few similarities can immediately be discerned. First, Martí's explanation of the infinity of God's intellect follows almost the same logical standards as Raimundus' arguments. First, the idea that God's intellect must be infinite because He "knows His virtue perfectly" or because He knows Himself perfectly can be found in the works of both authors. Both Raimundus and Martí believe that God's intellect must have Himself as an object, or His virtue, and must

divinus non cognosceret omnia actu quorum est cognoscitivus in potentia. Quorum utrumque est impossibile, ut ex supra dictis patet." Robles, "En Torno a una Vieja Polèmica" (cf. footnote 829 above), p. 333.

⁸⁵⁹ Martinus, *Pugio fidei* (cf. footnote 830 above), p. 246: "Adhuc: Infinitum cognitioni repugnant, in quantum repugnat numerationi: nam partes infiniti numerare secundum se impossibile est, quasi contradictionem implicans. Cognoscere autem aliquid per numerationem suarum partium, est intellectus successive cognoscentis, partem post partem: non autem intellectus simul diversa, et non partes post partes comprehendentis. Cum ergo divinus intellectus absque successione cognoscat omnia, non magis impeditur cognoscere infinita, quam finita." Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra gentiles*, lib. I, cap. 69, n. 11: "Adhuc. Infinitum cognitioni repugnat in quantum repugnat numerationi: nam partes infiniti numerari secundum se impossibile est, quasi contradictionem implicans. Cognoscere autem aliquid per numerationem suarum partium est intellectus successive cognoscentis partem post partem, non autem intellectus simul diversas partes comprehendentis. Cum igitur intellectus absque successione cognoscat omnia simul, non magis impeditur cognoscere infinita quam finita." Robles, "En Torno a una Vieja Polèmica" (cf. footnote 829 above), p. 333.

⁸⁶⁰ Martinus, *Pugio fidei* (cf. footnote 830 above), p. 246: "Amplius: omnis quantitas in quadam multiplicatione partium consistit, et propter hoc numerus est prima quantitas: ubi ergo pluralitas nullam differentiam operatur, ibi nec aliquid, quod quantitatem sequatur, aliquam differentiam facit. In cognitione autem Dei plura cognoscuntur hoc modo in unum, cum non per diversas species, sed per unam speciem, quae est Dei essentia, cognoscuntur; unde et simul multa cognoscuntur a Deo; et ita in Dei cognitione nullam differentiam pluralitas facit. Ergo nec infinitum, quod quantitatem consequitur. Nihil ergo differt ad intellectum divinum finitorum, et infinitorum cognition; et sic cum cognoscat finita, nihil prohibet cognoscere etiam infinita." Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra gentiles*, lib. I, cap. 69, n. 12: "Amplius. Omnis quantitas in quadam multiplicatione partium consistit: et propter hoc numerus est prima quantitas. Ubi ergo pluralitas nullam differentiam operatur, ibi nec aliquid quod quantitatem consequitur aliquam differentiam facit. In cognitione autem Dei plura hoc modo cognoscuntur ut unum: cum non per diversas species, sed per unam speciem, quae est Dei essentia, cognoscantur. Unde et simul multa cognoscuntur a Deo. Et ita in Dei cognitione nullam differentiam pluralitas facit. Ergo nec infinitum, quod quantitatem consequitur. Nihil ergo differt ad intellectum divinum infinitorum et finitorum cognitio. Et sic, cum cognoscat finita, nihil prohibet eum cognoscere etiam infinita." Robles, "En Torno a una Vieja Polèmica" (cf. footnote 829 above), p. 333.

therefore be infinite or be able to think the infinite. Moreover, both Raimundus and Martí believe that since the intellect of God is part of His essence, it must therefore be capable of thinking the infinite.

It is also apparent that both authors have different viewpoints concerning the meaning of infinity in God's intellect. In the *Disputatio Raimundi*, Raimundus attempts to prove that God's intellect is eternal, and that He therefore must have Himself as an object, since He is the only true being which is actually infinite. In the *Pugio fidei*, Martí argues that God is capable of thinking infinite matters, since His intellect is part of His infinite essence, and since He thinks His own virtue. The capability of thinking infinities means, in the *Disputatio Raimundi*, that God must have the correlatives. In the *Pugio fidei*, the capability of the divine intellect is explained in more general terms, and infinity is seen as a theoretical matter. While Ramon Llull seeks to prove the contents of the *Ars* and the correlative theory, Martí seeks to form a more *ad hoc* explanation of God, answering to philosophy and sacred scriptures.

5. CONCLUSION

The main differences between Ramon Martí and Ramon Llull were their treatment of scriptures and sources of authority in general. Ramon Martí was a fervent believer in authority- and scripture-based argumentation. This included both scripture from Christian and Islamic sources. His treatment of sources had two main goals: to attack Islam and to fortify faith in Christianity. However, Ramon Llull believed mainly in the use of 'necessary reasons'. While, according to him, a real authority could be backed by necessary reasons, the problem was that authorities were open for interpretation. When a preacher mentions a passage from a sacred text belonging to another faith as evidence, members of said faith might criticize the interpretation of the passage or bring up another passage contradicting the interpretation given by the preacher. This would lead a Christian preacher into a never ending discussion with his opponents, which would not bear much fruit. However, when discussing religion based on necessary reasons, being irrefutable logic, the more subtle minds of unbelievers could more easily be swayed, since they would not "be willing to dismiss belief for belief, but for understanding".⁸⁶¹ This is why Ramon Llull, or his character Raimundus, never mentions any authoritative source in his *Disputatio Raimundi*, nor does he ever directly quote another author.⁸⁶²

Llull and Martí held different views concerning the general use of scriptures: while Martí believed he could use Islamic authorities to defend the legitimacy of Christian authorities in interreligious debate, and to attack Islam, Ramon Llull wished to end scripture-based debates altogether. Llull was especially sceptic of the use of scriptures at a real life debate. It could not be expected that Muslims or Jews would accept an alternative interpretation of their own sources, nor would they care to accept Christian sources for any possible reason. This might have been Llull's personal motivation, coming from his own

⁸⁶¹ Raimundus Lullus, *Liber de acquisitione Terrae Sanctae*, ed. by Fernando Domínguez Reboiras (Turnhout: Brepols, 2017), *CCCM*, 266, *ROL*, XXXVIII, p. 276. Cf. Mayer, *Drei Religionen – ein Gott* (cf. footnote 109 above), pp. 31-37 (in particular chapter 1.3.3.2.: "*Nolunt dimittere credere pro credere*" and 1.3.3.3. "*Infideles non stant ad auctoritates fidelium*").

⁸⁶² Cf. Bonner, "L'apologètica de Ramon Martí" (cf. footnote 739 above), pp. 179-180.

interpretation of the Barcelona Disputation (which all in all ended in the failure to convince Moses Ben Nahman and the Barcelonese Jews) and possibly other disputations. When discussing the case of Islamic sources, however, it becomes apparent that Ramon Martí was likewise not very keen on finding his information directly from Islamic sources. He rather chose to base his work on a compilation and discussion of certain passages in a Christian source. It can therefore be said that Ramon Martí had certain reservations towards Islamic sources, and that he did not fully indulge in the study of Islamic source material, which had previously been the ruling image of Martí. The dealing of Christian authors with Islamic sources was still delicate, even if they used it as the base of their reasoning against Islam.

The fact that Llull and Martí had opposing views concerning the treatment and use of scriptures and authorities, did not mean that they held opposing views on Islam. The arguments which matter in the works of Martí can also be seen in Llull's *Disputatio Raimundi*. The accusation towards Islam, that Islamic culture is immersed in carnality, is an important matter for both authors. However, while Martí corroborates his statement with a selection of Qur'ānic passages and parts of the *Sunna*, Raimundus defends his statement by referring to logical and theological differences between Islam and Christianity, which supposedly make it impossible that Muslims would behave in any different way. While Martí attempts to prove *the fact that* Islamic culture is sinful, Raimundus already treats this as a given fact and explains on a deeper level *why* Islamic culture is sinful. Mentions of Islamic culture in the *Disputatio Raimundi* are not sufficient as arguments in and of themselves, but only insofar as they lead to reflection on Islamic theology. In Llull's opinion, the fact that Muslims do not believe in the co-essential divine attributes, and their subsequent denial of the Trinity and the Incarnation is what makes them sinful. The sources and prescriptions seem to matter far less to him.

A final topic which stands out when comparing the method of Martí and Llull is the different way in which they dealt with Islamic philosophy. The rendition of the Islamic arguments in the *Pugio fidei*, made by Martí, was more or less loyal and correct, while Ramon Llull often twisted the original arguments made by Islamic philosophers, to suit his own philosophical narrative. It is important to note that the main difference between Martí (and most other Christian authors) and Ramon Llull is the *Ars*. Llull's encounter with Islam should be put in the context of the *Ars*, his own overarching philosophical narrative. While Ramon Martí was relatively free from philosophical presumptions in his dealing with Islam (except for his obvious anti-Islamic sentiments), Ramon Llull needed to fit every encounter with Islamic philosophy in his own thought system. The topics from Islamic philosophy which were discussed by Llull, or rather, the manner in which Llull referred to them, were supposed to prove rather than nuance or alter his *Ars*. One could argue, therefore, that Martí's grasp of Islamic philosophy was more thorough and more realistic, since he did not have the same all-encompassing philosophical *idée fixe*. However, this would not suffice as an explanation. Rather, it is apparent that Llull's knowledge of Islamic philosophy, which was thorough, directly supplied material for the *Ars* rather than just adding to his arsenal of rebuttals. Instead of directly dealing with every Islamic philosophical topic specifically, he logically bound them together in one thought system, which was supposed to turn every non-Christian argument into the necessary proof of Christianity. Ramon Llull wished to defend his thought system against anyone who would deny its validity, and his

direct rebuttal of typically Islamic arguments was a secondary goal, at least in the *Disputatio Raimundi*.

CHAPTER 7: RAMON LLULL AND RICCOLDO DA MONTE DI CROCE

1. INTRODUCTION

Riccoldo da Monte di Croce (1243-1320), a Dominican missionary, attempted to write a conclusive guide to both Islamic culture and religion, both of which he treated differently. His arguments often came from his own reading of Islamic sources, even though he was likewise inspired by earlier Christian works about Islam. The manner in which Riccoldo came into contact with Islamic culture was quite daring, however. Instead of learning about Islam only from Islamic and Christian sources circulating in a mostly Christian society, Riccoldo da Monte di Croce ventured into Islamic territory, just like Ramon Llull did. Supported by his Dominican order, and with the permission of its Master General Muño de Zamora, he travelled to the Holy Land in 1288, where he recorded the local habits and customs of its inhabitants in his work *Liber peregrinationis* (ca. 1288).⁸⁶³ After venturing to Acre and the Iranian Ilkhan Khanate capital Tabriz, where he managed to preach to the locals through an interpreter, he settled down in Baghdad where he studied the Qur'ān and where he mastered the Arabic language.

After his stay in Baghdad, he was shortly enslaved and seemingly forced to convert. After this traumatizing period, he escaped and travelled back to Florence, where he stayed in Santa Maria Novella.⁸⁶⁴ Here, he finished his *Liber peregrinationis* and his *Contra legem Saracenorum* (1300).⁸⁶⁵ He also wrote the *Libellus ad nationes orientales* (1300),⁸⁶⁶ a tract against Christian denominations and schisms in the East. John Tolan remarks that the text is mostly a loyal rendition of the classification of the sects made by Thomas Aquinas, although Riccoldo da Monte di Croce spent so many years in the East, and probably had more direct knowledge of the culture.⁸⁶⁷ The *Libellus ad nationes orientales* does not deal with Islam, but only with Eastern Christians, Tartars and Jews. In a very small section devoted to Islam, Riccoldo simply states that he has written enough about Islam in his

⁸⁶³ René Kappler, *Riccoldo de Monte Croce, Pérégrination en Terre Sainte et au Proche-Orient: Texte latin et traduction: Lettres sur la Chute de Saint Jean d'Acre: Traduction* (Paris, Honoré Champion, 1997). Throughout this chapter, I will use the version of Emilio Panella, accessible through e-theca.net. <https://www.e-theca.net/emiliopanella/riccoldo/liber.htm>.

⁸⁶⁴ Iris Shagrir, "The Fall of Acre as a Spiritual Crisis: The Letters of Riccoldo of Monte Croce," *Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire* 90, no. 4 (2012): p. 1107.

⁸⁶⁵ Riccoldus de Monte Crucis, *Contra legem saracenorum*, ed. by Jean-Marie Mérigoux, in Jean-Marie Mérigoux, "L'ouvrage d'un frère prêcheur florentin en Orient à la fin du XIIIe siècle: le Contra legem Saracenorum de Riccoldo da Monte di Croce," *Fede e Controversia, nel '300 e '400, Memorie Domenicane*, n. s., 17 (1986): 1-144, ed. online by Emilio Panella, e-theca.net, 2005, last accessed: 31/05/2023: <https://www.e-theca.net/emiliopanella/riccoldo2/cls.htm>.

⁸⁶⁶ Riccoldus de Monte Crucis, *Libellus ad Nationes Orientales*, ed. online by Emilio Panella, e-theca.net, 2005, last accessed: 31/05/2023, <https://www.e-theca.net/emiliopanella/riccoldo2/adno.htm>.

⁸⁶⁷ Tolan, *Saracens* (cf. footnote 608 above), pp. 245-246.

Contra legem saracenorum.⁸⁶⁸ Riccoldo's relation to Islam is marred by a profound religious crisis: if God was merciful and if His covenant with Christians through the Gospel was real, how could it be explained that Islam was thriving at the expense of Christianity?

Later in his life, Riccoldo believed in the strength of Christian martyrdom, or the divine call for collective Christian retribution through the hardships brought about by Islam. Despite these profound sentiments, Riccoldo admired many moral and religious aspects of Islamic culture. He did not shy away from referring to positive elements of Islamic culture in his *Liber peregrinationis*. However, despite Riccoldo's apparent admiration and respect for Islamic society, he still lambasted Islamic theology in his works. Just like his contemporaries, Riccoldo heavily criticized the Islamic religious precepts on marriage and sexuality, for example, and the Islamic views on heaven.⁸⁶⁹ After the fall of Acre and the conversion of the Mongols to Islam, Riccoldo concluded that Muslims would not be willing to convert to Christianity peacefully, but rather only by force.⁸⁷⁰

The comparison between Riccoldo da Monte di Croce and Ramon Llull provides unique insights into the difference in opinion that both authors had on the Middle East. Both authors journeyed to the Islamic East and wrote about their experiences, even though Riccoldo da Monte di Croce was more thorough in his descriptions of what he saw during his travels. His account of his travels to the Middle East was reasonably neutral in tone, and he provided his reader with an objective story. He did not neglect writing down the positive aspects of Islamic society either, which was relatively rare for clerics at the time. By recording his findings during his journey, Riccoldo seemingly put existing preconceived notions of the Islamic world into question.⁸⁷¹ Another important aspect of Riccoldo's attitude towards Islam was his enthusiasm for Arabic. This was a typically Dominican attitude, since the Dominican order had already established language schools for Arabic earlier in the thirteenth century. Just like Ramon Llull and Ramon Martí, Riccoldo attempted to read Arabic works in their original language. Riccoldo claimed that he read many Islamic works in their original version, such as the Qur'ān, and that he had read the Gospel in both Arabic and Chaldean.⁸⁷² This, however, did not mean that he had a wholly positive judgement about Islam as a religion. He often criticized Islamic theology and the Qur'ān for the same reason as his contemporaries, such as Ramon Llull and Ramon Martí.

Riccoldo da Monte di Croce has often been treated with an anachronistic or overly positive interpretation of his work, which came into existence from the early twentieth century. Iris Shagrir argues that this positive outlook on Riccoldo's work was mainly caused by the 'eisegesis' of his peculiar religious voice during a time of heightened interest in interfaith dialogue in the 20th century.⁸⁷³ Just like Ramon Llull, Riccoldo da Monte di Croce has often been seen as the forerunner of Islamic-Christian dialogue, a tendency which was quickly nuanced by scholars like Jean-Marie Merigoux and Emilio Panella. Due

⁸⁶⁸ Riccoldus de Monte Crucis, *Libellus ad Nationes Orientales*, cap. 4 (cf. footnote 866 above): "De saracenis autem nihil amplius addo ad illud quod scripsi in illo tractatu *Quot sunt dies servi tui*, ubi per legem eorum confutatur lex ipsa."

⁸⁶⁹ Tolan, *Saracens* (cf. footnote 608 above), pp. 247-249.

⁸⁷⁰ Tolan, *Saracens* (cf. footnote 608 above), pp. 250-251.

⁸⁷¹ Rita G. Tvrtković, *A Christian Pilgrim in Medieval Iraq: Riccoldo Da Montecroce's Encounter with Islam*, *Medieval Voyaging* 1 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2012), p. 119.

⁸⁷² Tvrtković, *A Christian Pilgrim in Medieval Iraq* (cf. footnote 871 above), pp. 122-123.

⁸⁷³ Shagrir, "The Fall of Acre as a Spiritual Crisis" (cf. footnote 864 above), pp. 1109-1111.

to the intellectual tendencies that existed after the Second Vatican Council, Riccoldo was at first viewed as a modern, tolerant writer on Islam. However, after a more careful consideration of Riccoldo's *Contra legem saracenorum*, Merigoux sought to nuance this general point of view. Merigoux argued that, while Riccoldo was at times reasonably mild towards Islamic culture, which was reasonably rare, he was by no means an example of a perfect, irenic bridgebuilder between Christianity and Islam. Merigoux concluded that Riccoldo should be read for his historical relevance alone, and not as an example for contemporary interreligious debate.⁸⁷⁴ Emilio Panella likewise stressed the inaccuracy of the modern interpretation of Riccoldo, and argued that seeing him in light of modern interreligious dialogue was wrong in both a theological and historical perspective.⁸⁷⁵ However, it can be enlightening to understand when Riccoldo chose to be honest and neutral in his depiction of Islam, and when he chose to be more vitriolic. The main question here is when Riccoldo believed an attack on Islam or Islamic culture would be effective, and when he believed it would not, or whether Riccoldo believed that it would be appropriate to compliment Islam, and for what reason.

2. LIBER PEREGRINATIONIS

2.1. DE SARACENIS

Riccoldo discusses Islamic culture in the *Liber peregrinationis*. He uses a more general perspective, with brief attention to the city of Baghdad and local politics. Riccoldo relates how Baghdad is the capital of Islamic intellectual culture, and how it is the see of the Caliph (Latin: Califfa). Riccoldo mentions that Baghdad holds one of the most important intellectual centres of the Islamic world.⁸⁷⁶ He is also aware of the meaning of the word Caliph, being the successor of Muhammad or the face of God in the world. Riccoldo explains that the Tartars killed the caliph (when he discussed the revolt of the Tartars). This is to say, the Mongols under the charge of Khan Hulagu destroyed Baghdad in 1258, an event which was – albeit naively – welcomed by Eastern Christians, who believed they could form a diplomatic connection to the Khan. Even though some Nestorian Christians had high ranking positions at the court of Mongka, Hulagu's brother, Mongol rulers did not typically make alliances. After the death of Mongka, the Mongol dynasty entered into an uncertain state, during which they were defeated during the battle of 'Ain Ġālūt, by the

⁸⁷⁴ Cf. Jean-Marie Merigoux, "L'ouvrage d'un frère prêcheur florentin en Orient à la fin du XIIIe siècle: le *Contra legem Sarracenorum* de Riccoldo da Monte di Croce," *Fede e Controversia, nel '300 e '400, Memorie Domenicane*, n. s., 17 (1986): p. 2. Work cited in Shagrir, "The Fall of Acre as a Spiritual Crisis" (cf. footnote 864 above), p. 1110.

⁸⁷⁵ Cf. Emilio Panella, "Preghiera e protesta. La prima lettera di Riccoldo," *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum* 59 (1989): p. 21. Work cited in Shagrir, "The Fall of Acre as a Spiritual Crisis" (cf. footnote 864 above), p. 1110.

⁸⁷⁶ Riccoldus de Monte Crucis, *Liber peregrinationis*, 22 (cf. footnote 863 above): "In eadem civitate scilicet in Baldacco fuit sedes et principalitas saracenorum quantum ad studium et religionem et quantum ad dominium. Ibi enim regnabat califfa, quod interpretatur successor scilicet Maccometti, et dicunt saraceni quod ipse erat facies Dei in terra. Quem califfam tartari occiderunt, ut superius patuit. In ipsa quidem civitate, licet sit pro maiori parte destructa, est maxima multitudo populi. Nam preter cristianos et iudeos qui sunt ibi multa milia, sunt ibi ultra ducenta milia saracenorum, ut probabiliter creditur, omnes quidem sub dominio tartarorum. Ibi habent maxima studia ipsi saraceni et magnos magistros. Ibi sunt multi religiosi saracenorum. Ibi conveniunt diverse secte ipsorum. Ibi sunt magna monasteria illorum sarracenorum que appellantur megerrede, quod interpretatur contemplativi."

Egyptian Mamluks.⁸⁷⁷ Riccoldo was not sympathetic towards the Mongols since, according to his own findings, they lacked any cultural or moral refinement. Even though he stressed in his *Ad nationes orientales* that the Mongols were more tolerant towards Christians than Muslims, this did not mean that he harboured hope for their conversion to Christianity, since Christianity was supposedly too strict for the Mongol way of life.⁸⁷⁸ It is interesting to note that, even though the Fall of Acco left an indelible mark on the thoughts and beliefs of Riccoldo da Monte di Croce, he still leaves room to mention – and perhaps even mourn – defeats and destruction of Islamic cities by the hands of non-Christians. The ravishing of Baghdad was not mentioned by Ramon Llull. However, Llull did mention the Tartars in his *Liber de fine*, as an unlearned people without morality, science or abstract thinking, who should be brought to science and Christianity. Even though Llull did have the same judgement about the Mongols as Riccoldo da Monte di Croce, he did believe in their conversion and in their potential to becoming educated, if only confronted with his writings, and in particular with the *Llibre del gentil e dels tres savis*.⁸⁷⁹ This is to say that Llull believed in the universality of his ability to convert, and that his methods did not only work for Muslims and Jews. Even peoples which are not typically schooled in logic can be converted to Christianity by using Llull's œuvre. Riccoldo seems to have been less inclined to believe in the universal potential of conversion, since he believed that being a Christian requires a specific kind of discipline (such as the ability to fast, or monogamy).

Riccoldo relates how he wished to debate Islamic theology with Muslims in their sacred spaces and their places of study. In Riccoldo's story, Muslims welcomed him and his companions "like angels of God," without any kind of hostility. Riccoldo observed the Islamic traditions and, in his own words, he was dumbfounded of how such a "perfidious" law can produce such good deeds.⁸⁸⁰

The surprise of the good treatment by Muslims and their good deeds is an important theme in the *Liber peregrinationis* by Riccoldo, but not in Llull's *Disputatio Raimundi*. Not even once in the *Disputatio Raimundi* does Llull express admiration or respect for Islamic culture. In a certain way, this could not fit in his world view, or in his logical view of Islam: if Islamic theology is more materialistic and if they have a poorer view of God, it cannot be that Islamic culture has any redeeming qualities. In Llull's opinion, moral virtues or positive habits would imply, in some way, intellectual and spiritual strength.

⁸⁷⁷ Bernard McGinn, *Visions of the End: Apocalyptic Traditions in the Middle Ages*, Records of Civilizations: Sources and Studies 96 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), pp. 150-151.

⁸⁷⁸ Riccoldus de Monte Crucis, *Libellus ad Nationes Orientales*, 5 (cf. footnote 866 above): "Meliores tamen reputant cristianos quam sarracenos. Sed difficulter accedunt ad nos propter legem strictam, ut dicunt, et quia habent plures uxores et filios de eis et diligunt aliquando magis ultimam quam primam, et quia nolunt ieiunare et quia semper comedunt carnes - non enim habent panem nec volunt laborare ut habeant -; unde difficile esset nimis inducere super multitudinem tartarorum quadragesimam vel aliquod longum ieiunium."

⁸⁷⁹ Raimundus Lullus, *Liber de fine*, ed. by Aloïsius Madre, *CCCM*, 35, *ROL*, IX (Turnhout: Brepols, 1981), 1, 5, pp. 266-267.

⁸⁸⁰ Riccoldus de Monte Crucis, *Liber peregrinationis*, 22 (cf. footnote 863 above): "Nos igitur cum desideramus evacuare perfidiam Maccometti, et intendentes eos aggredi in sua sede et in loco generalis studii, necesse habuimus aliquantulum conversari cum eis. Et recipiebant nos sicut angelos Dei in suis scholis et studiis et in monasteriis et in ecclesiis seu sinagogis et domibus eorum. Et attendimus diligenter legem ipsorum et opera, et obstupuimus quomodo cum lege tante perfidie poterant opera magne perfectionis inveniri."

2.2. DE ORATIONE

In the following chapter of the *Liber peregrinationis*, Riccoldo discusses the good deeds and habits that can be found in Islamic culture (or in the society of Baghdad). The evaluation of these deeds is always positive. Riccoldo does not shy away from being fair about his experiences, and from praising certain elements of Islamic culture. The reason why Riccoldo mentions these positive features of Islamic culture, he writes, is not necessarily for the recommendation of the Islamic faith, but to confuse and marvel the Christian reader.⁸⁸¹ According to Rita George Tvrtković, mentioning Islamic virtues to marvel one's fellow Christians was a common trope in medieval anti-Islamic polemic. Sometimes, the mention of Islamic virtues served to chastise Christians for not doing enough good themselves. Other times, however, Islamic virtues were only mentioned in order to compare them negatively to their Christian equivalents, which were supposedly higher or better (as is the case in the *Disputatio Raimundi* of Ramon Llull). In the case of Riccoldo, the goal was to criticize the laziness and sloth of Christians who did not seem to do enough good, not to commend Islam (as Riccoldo himself argues). He also wished to increase the knowledge of Islam by giving a true, original account of Islamic culture.⁸⁸²

Riccoldo discusses the tradition of prayer in the Islamic world, and how strictly the prayer rituals are adhered to. He mentions his own stay in the Arabian desert among camel drivers (during the short period when he was enslaved), and he recounts how, at set hours of the day, his Islamic companions would be relieved from their duties and pray together. Riccoldo describes the prayer-ritual in detail, how Muslims would sing and sometimes even dance during prayer, how they would seem "enraptured," and how they would not pray before having ritually washed themselves.⁸⁸³

Riccoldo describes the ritual washing before prayer, and it is not clear whether he wished to commend this kind of devotion, or whether he wished to stress its ridiculousness. By any means, he describes Islamic prayer as a more enrapturing, or even a more intense and immersive experience than Christian prayer. In Christianity, there is also the tradition of praying at set hours of the day, but this does not include washing, and it does not necessarily

⁸⁸¹ Riccoldus de Monte Crucis, *Liber peregrinationis*, 23 (cf. footnote 863 above): "Referemus igitur hic breviter quedam opera perfectionis sarracenorum magis ad confusionem cristianorum quam ad commendationem sarracenorum."

⁸⁸² Tvrtković, *A Christian Pilgrim in Medieval Iraq* (cf. footnote 871 above), pp. 43-44.

⁸⁸³ Riccoldus de Monte Crucis, *Liber peregrinationis*, 23 (cf. footnote 863 above): "De oratione vero eorum quid dicam? Nam tanta est in eis sollicitudo in oratione et tanta devotio quod stupui cum per experientiam et vidi et probavi. Nam et ego ivi tribus mensibus et dimidio continue et fui cum camelariis saracenis in deserto Arabie et persarum, nec unquam propter aliquem laborem nec propter aliqua discrimina dimiserunt arabes camelarii quin statutis horis orarent et de die et de nocte, et precipue mane et sero. Devotionem autem tantam in oratione pretendunt quod omnia alia totaliter dimictunt; et aliqui eorum pristinum faciei colorem subito in pallorem mutant et videntur rapi, et aliqui cadunt et aliqui saltant et vocem variant et caput demittunt, ut aliqui ex eis videantur rapi et aliqui arreptitii. In oratione vero maxime osservant quandam munditiam corporalem ut nullo modo audeant orare nisi prius lavent culum et veretrum, postea manus, deinde fatiem, ad ultimum plantas pedum. Et sic orant. Hic qui vocantur *henefa* - et isti reputantur alii perfectiores - isti si intrarent in forum et tangeret eos cata vel canis vel asinus vel aliquid immundum, non potest lavari ut oret nisi sint mille quingenti rotuli aque. Unde indigent fluvio. Quando autem volunt orare intrant in fluvium et postquam totus fuerit lotus infigit digitum in anum et ponit ad nares; et si sentit aliquid fetoris, non est aptus ut oret sed in flumen revertitur. Et hoc totiens facit infigendo digitum et ponendo ad nares quousque nichil fetoris sentiat, et tunc est aptus orare."

invoke the kind of trancelike inspiration Riccoldo ascribes to Islamic prayer. Perhaps he wishes to underline that Muslims here, too, experience their religious traditions in a more devoted and intense manner than most Christians do. However, he does not seem to have had much knowledge of Islamic prayer apart from the outside appearance, and the way in which it was conducted.

2.3. DE ELEMOSINIS

Next, Riccoldo discusses the Islamic tradition of *zakāt*, or almsgiving. In the Islamic world, Riccoldo writes, Muslims usually give tithes to the poor (traditionally, the percentage of *zakāt* is always two and a half, not ten).⁸⁸⁴ This number amounts to one fifth of their belongings if these are the spoils of war. Moreover, Muslims often liberate other Muslims who have been enslaved by buying their freedom. Sometimes they even liberate Christian slaves. They also help poorer members of their community buying the freedom of slaves: they can simply free caged birds for the same reason.⁸⁸⁵ The Islamic almsgiving is even extended to the animals in the city: some people include providing food for stray dogs and birds in their will. Apart from that, there are special caretakers appointed by the city who feed the stray dogs, and even supply bread to the ducks. Lastly, the alms of Muslims also supply money to the care for the weakened or for people who fall victim to mental illness (“due to the immense heat”).⁸⁸⁶

It is clear that Riccoldo gave his honest opinion on Islamic culture, and that, even though he did criticize Islamic theology and the Qur’ān, his views on Islamic society were not tainted too much by preconceived notions and prejudices. Ramon Llull discusses some of the same aspects of Islamic culture in the *Disputatio Raimundi*, among them prayer and almsgiving. However, the way in which Ramon Llull evaluates these aspects of Islamic culture is quite different from the way Riccoldo describes them in his *Liber peregrinationis*. In the second chapter of the second part of the *Disputatio Raimundi*, Raimundus discusses

⁸⁸⁴ Cf. Tvrtković, *A Christian Pilgrim in Medieval Iraq* (cf. footnote 871 above), p. 42.

⁸⁸⁵ Riccoldus de Monte Crucis, *Liber peregrinationis*, 23 (cf. footnote 863 above): “De misericordia ad pauperes sciendum est quod sarraceni sunt maximi elemosinarii. Habent enim in alcorano strictum mandatum quod dent decimam; et de his que acquirunt per violentiam armorum tenentur dare quintam partem. Preter hec autem faciunt magna testamenta et ponunt ea in gaçofilatium; et statuto tempore aperiunt ea et dant ea saraceno fide digno, qui vadit ad diversas provintias et redimit captivos et sclavos saracenos qui detinentur captivi apud cristianos vel alias nationes. Frequenter autem emunt etiam sclavos cristianos qui detinentur captivi apud ipsos saracenos, et ducunt eos ad cimiterium et dicunt ‘Tot reddimo [*sic*] pro anima patris mei et tot pro anima matris mee’; et dant eis literas libertatis et dimittunt. Propter pauperes autem qui non possunt redimere sclavum, ipsi saraceni portant per civitatem aves incaveatas et captivas in caveis, et clamant ‘Quis vult istas aves emere et dimittere liberatas pro anima patris sui?’. Et pauperes emunt eas et dimittunt eas habere [= abire], ne anima patris sui detineatur captiva.”

⁸⁸⁶ Riccoldus de Monte Crucis, *Liber peregrinationis*, 23 (cf. footnote 863 above): “Ipsi etiam faciunt testamenta pro canibus nutriendis; et in civitatibus ubi sunt multi canes sicut in Turchia et Perside et etiam in Baldacco, invenimus quod ipsi canes habebant quosdam procuratores qui requirunt testamenta relicta pro canibus; et quando deficiunt testamenta, querunt elemosinam per civitatem et dividunt inter canes. Mittunt etiam bonam elemosinam de pane avibus fluvialibus que certa hora congregantur ad certum sonum; et ipsi<s> congregatis prohibent elemosynam. Et hoc maxime invenimus in Baldacco et in Ninive civitate grandi. In Baldacco ubi infatuantur multi propter maximum calorem, habent iuxta civitatem pulcerimum locum pro ipsis fatuis et providetur eis optime in comuni de cibo et servitoribus et optimo medico; quibus omnibus solvitur a comuni.”

the ways in which Islamic and Christian religious standards and traditions differ, and how the Christian version of these traditions is superior.⁸⁸⁷

In the subchapter on prayer, Raimundus discusses the differences between Christian and Muslim prayer. First of all, he writes, for every prayer made by an Islamic cleric, Christian clerics make ten prayers. Moreover, Christians pray during the Eucharist (or the sacrificial offering), while Muslims do not. Christianity also holds more religious men and women, who pray to God for the sake of the believers, who ask for their favour. Next to these quantitative reasons, Raimundus also gives theological reasons why Muslim prayers should be seen as inferior: while Christians believe that God's goodness is part of His essence, Muslims believe God's goodness is only present in His act within creation. This means, according to Raimundus, that Muslims ascribe the greatest good to the created world, which again means that Islamic prayer is worth less than the Christian one. Moreover, Christians believe in the Incarnation and in the divinity of Christ, and they believe that Christ, in as far as He is human, prays for us to God. This is why the Christian prayer is supposedly higher than the Muslim prayer.⁸⁸⁸

Raimundus' evaluation of Islamic views on almsgiving is likewise negative. For example, Lull adds the dimension of almsgiving, where the faithful donate money to the clerics, the monks and the nuns. He explains that in Christianity there are many religious men and women, who are gifted with housing and necessities by the faithful. Moreover, the Christian world has many hospitals for the sick, the wounded and travelers. However, in the Islamic world only two of those can be found, one in Tunis and one in Alexandria. Christians also give more alms in general, according to Raimundus. A Christian gives more on a holy day, than a Muslim during an entire year, he writes. Also, Christians give more "by the door" (when asked for money by poor citizens) than Muslims when giving tenths. Lastly, Christians give tenths of their income to clerics, while Muslims do not. While Muslims give a set rate of their income to charity, as the ritual of *zakāt* prescribes, Raimundus focuses on what is given by Christians to the religious communities in particular, something which has no direct Islamic equivalent due to the apparent lack of religious orders in Islam. Raimundus also does not only discuss the tradition of almsgiving as the literal giving of tenths, but also the maintenance of religious communities, and the building of hospitals for the needy.⁸⁸⁹

When comparing the *Liber peregrinationis* with the *Disputatio Raimundi*, it becomes apparent how differently both authors dealt with their own preconceived notions. Riccoldo's discussion of Islamic morals and traditions was based on his own experience, while conversing directly with Muslims – even living among them as an equal. His account is meant to put everything in perspective. While he states that Islamic religious doctrine is inferior to Christianity, he still argues that their habits and religious practices are admirable. Riccoldo does not draw a link between Islamic theology – which he criticizes in his *Contra legem saracenorum* – and the character of the Baghdad citizens who adhere to this religion. His account is most likely more truthful, since it does not omit any of the known religious practices in the Islamic world, and since it does not provide the reader with an unreasonably

⁸⁸⁷ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 2, pp. 239-261.

⁸⁸⁸ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 2, 5, 3, p. 258.

⁸⁸⁹ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 2, 5, 4, pp. 258-259.

negative evaluation. However, Riccoldo does disagree with Islamic religious dogma *in se*, since he says quite clearly that his account of Islamic culture is meant to be marvelous, but not to bring about conversion of Christians to Islam.⁸⁹⁰

The manner in which Raimundus discusses the same religious aspects in the *Disputatio Raimundi* is quite different. Raimundus does not believe that Islamic interpretations of religious customs (such as almsgiving and prayer) can be of any value, since the underlying theology is carnal and untrue. Never in the *Disputatio Raimundi* does Raimundus refer to any redeeming quality of Islam. He also explains the connection between Islamic religious dogma and their perceived cultural inferiority. According to Raimundus, Muslim prayer means less, since they do not believe that God's attributes are part of His essence and therefore, Lull argues, they hold God in lesser regard in their prayers. The same applies to every other aspect of Islamic habits and customs, since they all stem from the same theological undercurrent. By any means, the references to Islamic culture in the *Disputatio Raimundi* are only meant to reinforce the views put forward in the *Art*: that Muslims do not believe in the co-essentiality of God's divine attributes, that their interpretation of God is more material, and that nothing good can come from this attitude towards spirituality and the divine.

2.4. DE REVERENTIA AD NOMEN DEI

Riccoldo next discusses the respect that Muslims have for the name of God. According to him, Muslims have a great reverence for the name of God, for prophets and saints, and for holy places. Muslims say, write or do nothing notable without first mentioning the name of God: when they write a letter, they first call His praise. This is why they do not rip or throw a piece of paper that has writing on it. When they find a piece of paper on the ground, they pick it up and place it on a high position against the wall. The name of God is also spoken with reverence, and followed by the words "God, may He be praised". Blasphemy is punished by death. Holy places and mosques are always kept clean, and only to be entered with bare feet. They also never touch the floor with their buttocks, but sit on their heels. They tell their children to do the same.⁸⁹¹

⁸⁹⁰ Riccoldus de Monte Crucis, *Liber peregrinationis*, 23 (cf. footnote 863 above): "Referemus igitur hic breviter quedam opera perfectionis sarracenorum magis ad confusionem cristianorum quam ad commendationem sarracenorum. Quis non obstupescat si diligenter consideret quanta est ipsis sarracenis sollicitudo ad studium, devotio in oratione, misericordia ad pauperes, reverentia ad nomen Dei et prophetas et loca sancta, gravitas in moribus, affabilitas ad extraneos, concordia et amor ad suos."

⁸⁹¹ Riccoldus de Monte Crucis, *Liber peregrinationis*, 23 (cf. footnote 863 above): "Reverentiam vero maximam habent ad nomen Dei et prophetas et sanctos et loca sancta. Nam hoc maxime osservant quod nichil notabile faciunt vel dicunt vel scribunt quod non incipiant a nomine Domini; unde in suis literis omnibus quas sibi invicem mittunt, reverenter nomen Domini prius scribunt. Et ideo diligenter osservant quod nullum scriptum dilanient vel in terram prohiciant. Si autem in terra inveniunt aliquid de carta scriptum, reverenter recolligunt et ponunt in loco alto in fixuris murorum ne nomen Domini conculcetur. Quando autem eis occurrit nomen Domini vel legendo vel loquendo, nunquam esset ausus ipsum nominare solum sed semper cum certa laude scilicet 'Deus laudetur ipse' vel aliquid tale. Si quis autem sarracenus Deum vel aliquem de prophetis eius blasphemaret, nunquam eum vivere paterentur. Loca vero sancta sicut suas ecclesias semper mundissima servant, nec ibi intrant nisi pedibus discalciati et nunquam ibi expuunt. Et cum ibi sedent, osservant diligenter ne cum natibus tangant pavimento sed sedent cum natibus super calcaneos suos; ita adsuescunt sedere parvulos suos scilicet super calcanea, ne postea fatigentur sic multum sedere in ecclesia."

According to Tvrtković, Riccodo here addresses the practice of the *Basmala*; which is a contraction of *bi-smi llāhi r-raḥmāni r-raḥīm*, meaning “In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate”. The phrase can be read at the beginning of each Qur’ānic sura, except the ninth. Riccodo claims that any important act or writing should be started with the name of God, but Tvrtković states that the *Basmala* is appropriate in almost every context, even though Muslims believe that, according to Muhammad, any important act, writing or *dictum* that is not preceded by the name of God is void of spirituality, and therefore ‘defective’. Riccodo’s understanding of the Islamic respect for writing shows his deep understanding of the culture of reverence for the name of God and for the written word. He also seems perfectly aware that the *Basmala* means that Muslims have a specific reverence for God’s name, whether it be spoken or written, and not uniquely for God Himself.⁸⁹²

The reverence for the name of God, as it was known in Islam, does not seem to have had the same equivalent in Christianity. However, Christians and Jews did respect the precept in the Ten Commandments, which said that one should not disrespect the name of God, by uttering it ‘in vain’. This would mean as a curse, or otherwise in a frivolous way. There were no exact precepts, however, about when exactly to mention God, or about the treatment of documents containing His name. The bible might have been treated with reverence, but that did not mean that there was any kind of ritualistic treatment, or phrases, accompanying the names of saints and prophets, or the name of God.

Whether Ramon Llull possessed the same kind of insight is difficult to tell. According to Dominique Urvoy,⁸⁹³ Llull did understand certain Islamic sensibilities, of which he sometimes showed his admiration. Ramon Llull understood the admiration for the name of God in Islam in particular. In the *Llibre d’amic e amat* (1276-1283), Llull addresses almost the same issue as Riccodo did, that Muslims begin their letters by invoking God’s Muhammad’s name. He urges Christians to do the same, by mentioning the name of Christ or God.⁸⁹⁴ However, in the *Disputatio Raimundi*, Raimundus does mention the Islamic regard (or rather, alleged disrespect) for the name of God. However, the character Raimundus discusses Islam according to Christian standards, and he does not do any justice to the ritualistic and reverent treatment of the name of God in Islam. In the *Disputatio Raimundi*, Raimundus discusses the Islamic treatment of the name of God when he discusses one of the Ten Commandments, being the commandment to respect the name of God. While Raimundus does not even touch on the Christian treatment of the name of God, he does say that Muslims do not hold the name of God in the same high regard, as the Christians. The reasoning behind this is that Muslims do not believe in the divine correlatives of *deitatem*, *deitatum* and *deitare*. In other words, since Muslims do not describe God’s deity as being one with His essence, and since they do not ascribe the correlatives to His deity, they necessarily hold a defective view on the divinity of God. This means that they hold God’s name (*Deus*) to be imperfect and non-divine, which makes their reverence for His name less than the reverence held by Christians, Raimundus argues.⁸⁹⁵ The opinion Raimundus has on the Islamic respect for the word ‘God’ is not based on the

⁸⁹² Tvrtković, *A Christian Pilgrim in Medieval Iraq* (cf. footnote 871 above), pp. 55-58.

⁸⁹³ Dominique Urvoy, *Penser l’Islam* (cf. footnote 3 above), p. 166.

⁸⁹⁴ Ramon Llull, *Llibre d’amic e amat*, ed. by Albert Soler i Llopart, *Els nostres Clàssics*. Col·lecció B 13, Barcelona: Editorial Barcino, 1995, p. 116.

⁸⁹⁵ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, *CCCM*, 114, *ROL*, XXII, II, 2, 1, 7, p. 243.

findings of the historical Ramon Llull in Bijāya, but on the *Ars*. The correlative theory and the theory of the essentiality of God's attributes explain every difference between Christianity and Islam, which means that there is no need – and no space – for personal opinion or experience. According to Raimundus, Muslims simply *cannot* respect the name of God in the same way as Christians do, despite any cultural expression of reverence, because of their theological outlook on the divine. Even if Ramon Llull did have experiences with the Islamic treatment of God's name, it would not make sense to have the character of Raimundus address any part of it, since it would distract from the core message of Ramon Llull's message, that the Trinity defines everything.

3. EPISTOLE AD ECCLESIAM TRIUMPHANTEM

In the wake of the fall of Acre, Riccoldo wrote five open letters in which he expressed his anguish for the event. One letter was addressed to God, another to the Virgin Mary, one to the Church, and a fourth to the deceased patriarch and friars in Acre. In his letters, Riccoldo lamented the success of Islam, to which God seemed to allow such great prosperity, that they managed to conquer entire nations which used to fall under Christian territory. Especially in the letter to God, Riccoldo discusses the sins of Islam and Muhammad, and his inability to understand that God would allow Islam to be successful. The letter to God is mainly concerned with dogmatic differences between Christianity and Islam, such as the Trinity. The letter to the Virgin Mary is much more emotive, and is more directed to the figure of the Virgin Mary. Therefore, it discusses the divinity of Mary's son Christ, for example. The letter to the Church and the patriarch of Acco, lastly, talks about the fate of the mendicant friars who venture into Islamic territory, and about Riccoldo's own experiences with his own vulnerability. Riccoldo reassures his fellow friars that they are blessed in death, since they died for their faith. Finally, the fifth letter deals with the imaginary response from God, according to the teachings of Pope Gregory X. In the *Divina Responsio (Epistola V)*, Riccoldo recounts his revelation that God already answered every possible question he could possibly ask. Riccoldo hears the Augustinian phrase "*Tolle, lege*" resound in his heart, a call to read the Bible. Guided by Pope Gregory's interpretation of Job 33:13-14, Riccoldo learns that God does not answer every individual lament of humankind, but He builds a language in order to do so. Even when an afflicted soul wonders why something happens outside of their expectations, the Bible offers the answer.⁸⁹⁶

⁸⁹⁶ Riccoldus de Monte Crucis, *Epistole ad Ecclesiam Triumphantem*, 5, ed. online by Emilio Panella, e-theca.net, 2005, last accessed: 31/05/2023, <https://www.e-theca.net/emiliopanella/riccoldo2/adno.htm>.: "Et tunc audivi vocem, quasi in corde meo, quam ego dicens: 'Tolle lege, tolle lege!'. Et cum librum subito aperirem, appositione digiti et oculorum aspectui 'apparuit michi una facies eloquiorum castorum', in qua toti sic mee questioni respondit Dominus per servum suum Gregorium, ut non oporteat questionem nostram apud alium iudicem ventilari. Occurrit enim illud in *Iob*: 'Adversus eum contendis quod non ad omnia verba responderit tibi? Semel loquitur Deus, et secundo ad ipsum non repetit!'. Quod exponens Gregorius, a quo michi responderi petiveram, dicit: 'Afflicti cordis est proprium ut in omne quod appetit, et tamen non rerum ordinem contrarium sensit si possit fieri, cur ita vel non sit ita, Dominus sibi vocibus responderi velit. Heliu autem, previdens quod scripturam sacram Dominus conderet ut in ea vel publice vel occulte cunctorum questionibus responderet, ait: *Adversus eum contendis* etcetera; et post: *semel loquitur Deus* etcetera, ac si aperte diceret: Deus singulorum cordibus privatis vocibus non respondit, sed tale eloquium construit per quod cunctorum questionibus satisfecit. In scripturis quippe causas nostras si requirimus, invenimus. Ita enim nobis omnibus in eo quod specialiter patimur comuniter respondetur; ibi

Riccoldo's decision to write letters to addressees that would not reply to him can be seen as a manner to vent his desperation. Each time, he changes the addressee, since he claims he received no reply to his previous letter. After sending a letter to God, and after receiving no reply, Riccoldo addresses Mary, then the Triumphant Church (among whom are some saints, such as Saint Francis, Dominic and Mary Magdalene) and the celestial curia, then the deceased Patriarch of Acco. Eventually he seems to receive a divine letter giving a conclusive reply. While writing his letters, Riccoldo gives a vast exposition of his own feelings and thoughts, without the initial expectation of a real reply.

According to Iris Shagrir, Riccoldo's bitter tone and his at times aggressive attitude towards his addressees represented the newer tendency among Christian preachers, to believe that the loss of Jerusalem was complete and could not be reversed. Riccoldo seemed to express doubt whether God was actually on the side of the preachers and the crusaders – which was something which Ramon Llull would never believe, even when he expressed skepticism towards the validity of the crusades. Riccoldo seemed to become less certain whether Christians could ever win the Holy Land, and whether God was actually in their favour.⁸⁹⁷ This does not mean that Riccoldo believed in the moral defeat of Christianity by Islam, however. In the *Epistole*, Riccoldo expressed his disdain for the treatment of Christian holy places and people by Muslims, whom he accused of barbarism. The irenic interpretation of Islamic culture, which could be found in the description of Baghdad in the *Liber peregrinationis*, is of no relevance in the *Epistole*. The tone has shifted from nuanced to vitriolic.

3.1. EPISTOLA AD DEUM VERUM ET VIVUM

In the *Epistola ad Deum*, Riccoldo addresses God, asking why He allows His own religion to be trampled and suppressed by Islam. Riccoldo mentions his disdain for Islam as a religion, while also giving information about Islamic theology.

Riccoldo explains in his *Letter* that while Christians believe that they will be saved by Christ, Muslims believe that they will be saved by Muhammad (or at least by Islam). Riccoldo next claims that Muslims call themselves *Messalammos*, meaning 'the saved', in the same manner in which Christians call themselves Christians after Christ, and call themselves saved because of God (or their faith in God).⁸⁹⁸ The word *Mesallammos* is

vita precedentium fit forma sequencium etcetera'. Et post pauca repetit beatus Gregorius dicens: '*Semel loquitur Deus et secundo ad ipsum non repetit: quia in hiis que per scripturam sacram ad patres nostros protulit nos erudire procuravit. Discant itaque sancti doctores ecclesie, discant etiam arrogantes cum in terra ecclesiam laborare quosdam pusillimos conspiciunt, quia Deus nobis ad omnia verba non respondet; id est cogitationibus vel temptationibus singulorum iam non passim per prophetarum voces, nec per angelica officia satisfacit, quia scriptura sacra, quidquid potest singulis evenire, comprehendit, atque in illa per exempla precedentium etiam vitam sequentium informare curavit.*'"

⁸⁹⁷ Shagrir, "The Fall of Acre as a Spiritual Crisis" (cf. footnote 864 above), p. 1108.

⁸⁹⁸ Riccoldo de Monte Crucis, *Epistole ad Ecclesiam Triumphantem*, 1 (cf. footnote 896 above): "Exurge Domine, salvos nos fac et ne repellas in finem! Quare faciem tuam avertis et oblivisceris inopie nostre et tribulationis nostre? Exurge, Domine, adiuva nos!". Et si non propter nos quia peccatores sumus, sed 'propter nomen tuum libera nos! (Intr. dom. LX; Cfr. Ps 105, 47; Ps 43, 23 –24 et 26)'. 'Tu in nobis es, Domine, et nomen sanctum tuum invocatum est super nos' (Ier 14, 9). Nam a te Christo dicimur christiani et a te Iesu salvatore nominamur salvati. Ipsi autem sarraceni credunt salvari per suum tyrannum dampnatum Machometum, quem de latrocinio et tyrannide transtulerunt prophetam, et talem sequentes non sarracenos appellant sed messalammos, quod interpretatur salvati. Et nos igitur dampnatos reputant et nos

Riccardo's Latinized interpretation of the word *al-Muslimūn*, which means 'the submitted'. Riccardo's translation of the word is wrong, but he is one of the very few Christian authors who mentions the autonym 'Muslim' instead of 'Saracen'. This probably again comes from Riccardo's own experience in Islamic territory, and his interest in Islamic society apart from Christian sources. Riccardo also wished to underline his knowledge of Arabic, which he deemed indispensable for establishing the conversion of Muslims.⁸⁹⁹ In the same way, Ramon Llull also mentioned some Arabic terms in his œuvre, such as the term *Hujuden Muclach* (*wujūd Mutlaq*, necessary entity)⁹⁰⁰ or *cifers* (*ṣifat*, attributes)⁹⁰¹ in the *Disputatio Raimundi*, to underline his knowledge of Arabic and his experience with Islamic sources in their original language. However, he did not go as far as Riccardo, by mentioning the term 'Muslim'.

In the *Epistola ad Deum Verum et Vivum*, Riccardo laments that Muslims have no understanding of the Trinity, and that they even deny it. According to Riccardo, Muslims do not believe in the Incarnation, because the idea of personhood is impossible to them. In Islam, God cannot have a Son, since He does not have a wife. However, if the Father and the Son do not exist, there is nothing to bring forth the Holy Ghost. This cannot be logical, since Muslims believe in the Holy Ghost as the creator of Christ in the womb of Mary.⁹⁰² This Islamic argument against divine personhood is also mentioned by Peter the Venerable, a potential source of Riccardo.⁹⁰³ The argument seems to stem directly from the Qur'ān, where various passages underline the impossibility of the Fatherhood or Sonhood of God, especially, for example, Qur'ān 112:1.3.⁹⁰⁴ The argument is repeated by Riccardo in his second letter. It is the *Epistola ad Beatam Virginem*, where he again addresses the belief that God cannot have a Son without having a wife. However, instead of arguing that this argument is invalid since it negates the existence of the Holy Ghost, Riccardo addresses the vulgarity of the argument, stating that it is "lecherous and obscene and utterly carnal". This is an example of how Riccardo adapts his argumentation to his perceived audience

persequuntur quia te sequimur, et nos occidunt inimicitie gratia et se salvatos reputant quia latronem et homicidam sequuntur."

⁸⁹⁹ Cf. Tvrtković, *A Christian Pilgrim in Medieval Iraq* (cf. footnote 871 above), p. 123.

⁹⁰⁰ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 1, p. 196; Cf. Simone Sari, "Saracenus non considerat nomen Dei ita altum, sicut christianus" (cf. footnote 11 above).

⁹⁰¹ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, I, 2, 8, p. 191; Cf. Simone Sari, "Saracenus non considerat nomen Dei ita altum, sicut christianus" (cf. footnote 11 above); Mayer, "The Contribution of Islamic Doctrines to the Thought of Ramon Llull" (cf. footnote 14 above), pp. 98-99.

⁹⁰² Riccoldus de Monte Crucis, *Epistole ad Ecclesiam Triumphantem*, 1 (cf. footnote 896 above): "Et ut de ceteris sileam, hec duo tibi non taceo, quia tuam sanctissimam trinitatem. et misterium incarnationis totaliter evacuare conatur. Tollit enim a Patre Filium et a Filio Patrem et ab utroque Spiritum sanctum. Nam te presente legi arabyce in predicto alchorano quod non uno loco sed pluribus locis ponit et repetit pro efficacissimo argumento dicens: Impossibile est Deum habere filium quia non habet uxorem. Qui vero Filium negat nec Patrem habet; si vero nec Pater nec Filius, cuius erit Spiritus sanctus? In alio vero loco in alchorano scriptum legi quod omnes peccatores obtinebunt a Deo veniam dummodo non dixerint quod Deus habet filium. Dicit enim in pluribus locis, sicut ibi legi, quod Deus orat pro Machometo."

⁹⁰³ Cf. Petrus Venerabilis, *Summa totius haeresis saracenorum*, ed. by Peter Kritzeck, in Peter Kritzeck, *Peter the Venerable and Islam*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964, p. 204: "Illi item caeci, Deum creatorem patrem esse negant, quia secundum eos nullus fit pater sine coitu."

⁹⁰⁴ Cf. Petrus Venerabilis, *Summa totius haeresis saracenorum* (cf. footnote 903 above), p. 119.

(with a focus on purity for the Virgin Mary). He lambasts the denial of the divinity of the Son which, likewise, could be interpreted as an insult to His mother Mary.⁹⁰⁵

Even though Llull also wished to defend the divine personhood, he did not even mention the Islamic argument which Riccoldo discusses (that God cannot have a Son without a woman). Ramon Llull only engages with philosophical arguments against Christianity, and not with the arguments that stem from the Qur'ān or that seem too literal in their interpretation of Christian dogma. He is willing to reply to metaphysical arguments for or against the Incarnation and the Trinity, and not to any other.

Riccoldo equates the spread of Islam with the revelations about the End of Time which can be found in *Daniel* and the *Book of Revelation*. He especially compares Islam to the image of the dragon and the twofold beast, both of which refer to the figure of the Antichrist. In the *Book of Revelation* 13:1 and in *Daniel* 8: 4, one beast emerges from the water, and the other from the earth. Riccoldo compares these ferocious beasts to the rise of Islam. Moreover, he recounts a story he has heard from the Oriental Christians, that God is now increasingly held to be the “executor of the Qur'ān”. According to David Scott, Riccoldo means that the Eastern Orthodox Christians believe that the eschatological predictions of the Qur'ān are being executed by God, especially after the Fall of Acre. In Riccoldo's argumentation, God seems to have left the plan of eschatology and salvation, as he put it in *Daniel* 8:4 and the *Book of Revelation* 13:1.7.⁹⁰⁶ Riccoldo laments that God promised to end the *Book of Revelation* quickly, by sending His Son as a soldier to humanity. However, Islam has been dominant in many regions for quite some time, as Riccoldo writes his letter.

The popular 13th century point of view, that the *Book of Revelation* was imminent, was also held by Riccoldo. Scott argues that Riccoldo believed that he was living through the end of the third and final era of the militant Church. In his mind, the Church had dealt with three series of persecutions; one by pagans and one by heretics, and the final one by Muslims.⁹⁰⁷ The three-age model was commonly accepted in Christianity, but was given a new *élan* by Joachim of Fiore in the twelfth century. In this final stage, no missionaries and clerics can completely destroy Islam and reconstitute Christianity. In his own retelling, Riccoldo was sent by the “Vicar of God,” or the pope, to fight the beast and to make the teachings of Islam invalid.⁹⁰⁸

⁹⁰⁵ Riccoldus de Monte Crucis, *Epistole ad Ecclesiam Triumphantem*, 2 (cf. footnote 896 above): “In quo alchorano, quantum te et tuum sanctissimum filium blasphemant, tu melius nosti; nec ego credere potuissem nisi oculata fide legissem. In quo maxime miror quomodo mater de filio, et omnipotens filius tam de sanctissima matre quam de altissimo patre, tanto tempore tot blasphemias sustinuit pacienter. Nonne legis arabice in pluribus et pluribus locis in alchorano quod Machometus inducit pro demonstrativo argumento dicens ‘Impossibile est Deum habere filium quia non habet uxorem’? In quo brevi et fatuo verbo, illecebris et obscenus et carnalissimus ille blasphemus nititur tollere a patre filium et a filio patrem et deitatem.”

⁹⁰⁶ David Scott, “Riccoldo da Monte di Croce and the Origins of the Qur'ān as a deviation from Christian Salvation History,” in *The Latin Qur'ān, 1143-1500: Translation, Transition, Interpretation*, ed. by Cándida F. Hernández, and John V. Tolan (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2022), p. 371.

⁹⁰⁷ Scott, “Riccoldo da Monte di Croce and the Origins of the Qur'ān” (cf. footnote 906 above), p. 371.

⁹⁰⁸ Riccoldus de Monte Crucis, *Epistole ad Ecclesiam Triumphantem*, 1 (cf. footnote 896 above): “Vere credo quod instent dies illi pessimi de quibus tu, ipsa veritas, prophetasti; sed promisisti quod dies illi pessimi breviarentur. Quare igitur tam longo tempore tam crudelissima bestia grassatur et dominatur in christianos? Quare non surrexit ‘forcior illo qui eum devinceret et arma eius auferret et spolia eius

Around the thirteenth century, many prophecies about the Apocalypse, especially in light of Christian-Muslim relations, centred around the fate of Acco or Baghdad. For example, the *Prophecy of the Son of Agap* predicted the conquering of recently fallen Acco by a Christian monarch, and the *Prophecy of William of Tripoli* promised that the Apocalypse would come soon after the destruction of Baghdad by Hulagu.⁹⁰⁹ Each of these events (the desolation of Baghdad and the loss of Acco) made a great impression on Riccoldo. However, he did not seem to follow these prophecies in particular. As expressed by Riccoldo in the *Epistole*, the Apocalypse as predicted in the Bible did not happen in a sufficiently linear motion. Riccoldo did not understand the place of the Fall of Acco in the greater eschatological plan of God, and in the greater plan of salvation. Riccoldo believed that Christianity would procure the salvation of Christian faithful, within a greater eschatological plan where God's love for Christianity would become apparent, by saving Israel from the occupation of a Satanic army, once and for all. However, there did not seem to be an immediate political proof for God's favour for Christianity over Islam, neither in the immediate present, nor in the long term. The beast should be destroyed, and the Second Coming should be imminent by now. However, Christianity was still losing footing and was still suffering defeat.

This interpretation of the events is a somewhat different approach to the role of Islam in Christian eschatology than the one which Riccoldo mentions later in the *Contra legem saracenorum*. In this work, Riccoldo follows the ideas of Peter the Venerable, who said that Muhammad was a *Praecursor Antichristi*, but not yet the Antichrist himself, and not yet the harbinger of the Apocalypse. One might argue that Riccoldo used the reference to the beast of the Apocalypse and the lack of aid from God at the Apocalypse as a trope, expressing the religious and political desolation that came from the rise of Islam and the lack of success of Christians to end this event. The circumstances in the 13th century, in the wake of the Fall of Acco, could have been so disorienting as to make Riccoldo draw parallels between his time and the Apocalypse, or to make him believe that the Apocalypse was already upon the Christian world and did not seem to end, since the lack of consistency of the future of Christianity with his own expectations apparently pushed him in a religious and existential crisis.

Ramon Llull's view on Islam was less eschatological, even though Llull did seem to hint at similarities between the Antichrist and his followers and Muhammad, as I will discuss more at length in my section on the *Contra legem saracenorum*. However, it is not clear whether Llull believed in the imminence of the Apocalypse. While in the letter of Riccoldo da Monte di Croce, conversion and the crusades were important in order to fight against the Apocalypse, Llull seemed to mention this view less. However, as will be discussed in

distribueret' [Luc. 11,22]? Et ego sicut presumptuosus intra memet ipsum longo tempore cogitavi quod possem illum in tua virtute deicere et eius doctrinam pestiferam evacuare. Quamobrem assumpta voluntate commissa michi a tuo vicario obediencia veni ad profundas partes istas orientis. Et dum predicando circuivit debilis iste frater Predicator <ut> predicaret te Christum, incidit in hostes fidei, qui minis et verberibus volebant me cogere predicare Machometum et eius perfidam legem."

⁹⁰⁹ Two other examples are the Toledo Letter, which speaks of the climatological destruction of Baghdad, Mecca, Barsara and Babylonia, and the *Prophecy of the Son of Agap*, which mentions the conquering of Acco by a Christian king. For a translation of the prophecies mentioned in the text and in the footnotes: cf McGinn, *Visions of the End* (cf. footnote 877 above), pp. 152-156.

section four on the *Contra legem saracenorum*, Lull arguably believed in the *Praecursor Antichristi*-model since, according to him, Muhammad shows the first signs of apocalyptic false prophethood.

Next, Riccoldo recounts his own struggle while attempting to preach Christianity in Islamic territory. As mentioned in the introduction, Riccoldo was captured and forced to be a camel driver, after his mission in Baghdad. Riccoldo recounts that becoming a camel driver made him “weep tears of joy,” since Muhammad himself had been a camel driver before he became a prophet. Was this a sign of God, that Riccoldo would “defeat the camel driver in the habit of a camel driver”? After some time, Riccoldo claims he started feeling immense guilt, since he could not accomplish what he wanted.⁹¹⁰

To console himself, and to live with his failure, Riccoldo remembers the fate of other, more authoritative preachers. Each time, he compares the monks and friars to knights or soldiers, and Islam to the ferocious beast or dragon of the Apocalypse. None of the brave preachers managed to vanquish Islam, no matter how admirable their efforts were. This soothes Riccoldo, who is doubting his own devotion and accuses himself of negligence due to his lack of success. He first recounts the life of Saint Dominic, who sought to expunge Islam from the West (or the South of Iberia), while also suffering greatly. A number of Dominican friars who missionized in Morocco were killed there, without successfully procuring anyone’s conversion. The “beast” of Islam was thus not yet vanquished. He next mentions Saint Francis, who “attacked” Muhammad in the East, by preaching in front of the ‘Sultan of Babylon’, trying to convince him by walking alone in a fire.⁹¹¹ This account is based on Bonaventure’s version, in the *Legenda maior Sancti Francisci* (written somewhere between 1260 and 1266). In the original events, Francis visited Sultan *al-Malik al-Kamil* (1177-1238), Sultan of Damietta, Egypt, during the Fifth Crusade. The goal of Saint Francis was, supposedly, to save al-Kamil’s soul by converting him to Christianity, thus procuring his salvation. It is possible that Francis and al-Kamil had an amicable conversation about faith.⁹¹² Bonaventure’s *Legenda* is the first source which mentions Francis walking through a fire to prove his faith, while previous sources do not mention

⁹¹⁰ Riccoldus de Monte Crucis, *Epistole ad Ecclesiam Triumphantem*, 1 (cf. footnote 896 above): “Quod quia te adiuvante renui, post verbera, que leviter portavit amor, privaverunt me sancto habitu ordinis mei. Et ego sic expoliatus et confusus assumpsi habitum camellarii et cepi camelum ducere per catenam. Et sic ego, qui tanto tempore fueram frater Predicator negligens, subito factus sum camellarius sollicitus. Et tunc lacrimando pre gaudio dixi: ‘O Domine, audivi Machometum fuisse camellarium. Numquid forte decrevisti quod ego in habitu camellarii deiciam camellarium? Nam ego non recuso sub quocumque habitu militare tibi.’ Sed dum ad me ipsum introrsus redeo, dum cotidie per experienciam invenio me non posse complere que cogitaveram, culpans memet ipsum dixi: ‘Ne forte contingat quia non veni pauper in illa perfectione apostolica sicut apostolis tuis sanctis mandasti.’”

⁹¹¹ Riccoldus de Monte Crucis, *Epistole ad Ecclesiam Triumphantem*, 1 (cf. footnote 896 above): “Et ecce subito occurrit animo magnus ille et ferventissimus predicator et Predicatorum ordinis inventor, quem in fine temporis ab occidentali parte mundi doctrinis et miraculis suscitasti, beatus Dominicus, quam ferventi proposito invasit Machometum a parte occidentali, pro quo eciam aliquanto tempore barbam nutrit. Et nec ferocissimam bestiam evacuavit, quin potius e contrario bestia Machometus fratres Predicadores missos ad predicandum occidit in Morrocho et aliis locis. Occurrit eciam animo pauper ille perfectus et vere paupertatis amator Franciscus, vir catholicus et totus apostolicus, quam ferventi animo invasit bestiam Machometum versus partes orientales, dum peccit eciam a successore Machometi soldano Babilonie poni cum sarracenis vel solus in igne ardenti ut evacuaret, nec tamen bestiam evacuavit.”

⁹¹² For a complete study of the meeting between Saint Francis and al-Kamil: cf. John V. Tolan, *Saint Francis and the Sultan: The Curious History of a Christian-Muslim Encounter* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

this particular event.⁹¹³ Lastly, Riccoldo mentions Iordanus, who performed great miracles, and who sailed across the sea to convert Muslims. He too could not vanquish the “beast”. If these giants cannot secure any victory, then he, a humble man, can certainly not succeed.

Riccoldo argues that Islam, which he had previously described in apocalyptic terms, cannot just be defeated by preaching and writing. It seems as if the strength of Islam has a higher, preternatural source. While Riccoldo doubted the use and effectivity of preaching, Llull held theological argumentation and conversion in a high regard throughout his entire life. Even when he doubted the non-violent method of preaching and martyrdom alone later in life, he never ceased to believe in the importance of preaching to Muslims. Ramon Llull believed that his method, based on the various versions of the *Ars*, would be enough to accomplish victory where other preachers and theologians had failed. While later in his œuvre, Llull doubted the willingness of Muslims to believe without being forced to listen, he did not know the desperation and hopelessness which Riccoldo shows in his *Epistole*.

3.2. EPISTOLA AD BEATAM VIRGINEM MARIAM

In the *Epistola ad beatam virginem Mariam*, Riccoldo repeats certain dogmatic differences between Christianity and Islam, this time related to the Virgin Mary. The selection of arguments against Islam is adapted to the person of Mother Mary, meaning that the subjects differ or are differently interpreted. For example, as mentioned above in the chapter on the *Epistola ad Deum verum et vivum*, the Qur’ānic argument that God cannot have a son because He does not have a wife is reiterated in the letter to the Virgin Mary, but here it is lambasted for its lack of chastity and not for the lack of dogmatic consistency. Riccoldo also accuses Islam of having the wrong view about the Virgin Mary. According to the ideas of the Qur’ān, the Virgin Mary was the daughter of Amram, and Moses and Aaron were her brothers. Moreover, Riccoldo recounts the story that, in the Qur’ān, the Virgin Mary called out that she would rather be dead than give birth to her son, Isa. Later in this passage, Riccoldo recounts that Muslims believe that Christ will come back at the End of Times, and He will convert to Islam. The passage on the Virgin Mary is the wrong interpretation of Qur’ān 19:23, where she wishes for her own death due to the pain of childbirth she experiences. Christ therefore causes a stream of water to spring in front of her to freshen and soothe her. Mother Mary does not wish to die because she does not want to be the mother of Christ. Clearly, Riccoldo is misinterpreting the Qur’ānic tradition about the Virgin Mary on purpose, in order to better form an accusation against Islam. It is almost the same technique as Ramon Martí uses in his treatment of the Qur’ān, even though Riccoldo seems more inaccurate in this regard. The main goal here is to rally up the sentiments of his audience, and not to provide an accurate depiction of Islamic theology.

In a way, Ramon Llull’s depiction of Islamic theology and culture also contained these kinds of calculated inaccuracies. Even though Ramon Llull did not tendentiously read Islamic sources, he did often tendentiously misinterpret Islamic philosophy, or even cultural differences between Islam and Christianity. The reasoning behind this could have been similar to the one of Riccoldo da Monte di Croce. It was the main goal of 13th century works against Islam, from any author, to explain why Islam is less than Christianity, and not to understand Islam. If the *Disputatio Raimundi* had a mainly Christian audience,

⁹¹³ Bonaventura, *Legenda maior S. Francisci Assisiensis et eiusdem Legenda minor* (Quaracchi, Florence: Ex typ. Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1941), pp. 74-82.

especially for the second part of the work, and if the *Epistole* of Riccoldo was likewise aimed at a Christian audience, it would not make sense to interpret the Islamic faith in a neutral way, but to only go as far as to explain its perceived defects. However, one vast difference between Riccoldo and Ramon Llull is the scope of their intellectual dishonesty. While Riccoldo gives an adequate and neutral interpretation of Islamic culture and daily life, and while he seems to respect and even admire the rules about good works in Islam, he still heavily criticizes Islamic theology and religious dogma. The character Raimundus pretends to give a neutral interpretation of Islamic theology, only to dismiss it as worldly. The consequent dismissal of Islamic culture stems immediately from Llull's interpretation of Islamic theology. In other words, while Riccoldo believed that Islam needed to be attacked on a theological, dogmatic and scriptural level alone, but that Islamic society should be left alone, Ramon Llull did not believe the same thing. He stressed the causality between culture and theology. Even though Llull likewise stressed the importance of theological debate, he did not set clear boundaries between Islam as a religion and Islamic society. If one aspect of the Islamic world had to be criticized and interpreted negatively, the other aspect needed to undergo the same treatment.

3.3. EPISTOLA AD TOTAM ECCLESIAM TRIUMPHANTEM

Riccoldo repeats the fate of preachers and mendicant orders by seeking to battle against Islam. Just like in Riccoldo's *Epistola ad Deum*, he recounts the struggle and the hardships faced by Dominic, and the bravery of Saint Francis, who wished to enter a fire to prove his faith.⁹¹⁴ This time, the connection to Riccoldo's own life becomes clearer. While travelling in Islamic territory, he often found Dominican habits and breviaries for sale. However, he never met with any of his fellow friars. When he found a bloody Dominican tunic, pierced by a sword, he understood that his friars often did not survive their mission.⁹¹⁵ This makes the laments of Riccoldo, and his mentioning of earlier famous examples of missionaries more obvious: while going against Islam, friars and preachers face endless hardship. Even though their devotion to mission is real, there is still no end to their suffering in the name of God, and Islam is not defeated. This is the general background of Riccoldo's religious crisis: while his efforts are relentless, and while Christian missionaries are giving their best efforts, God does not necessarily reward them with the defeat of Islam. As he writes this letter, Riccoldo wonders how this could be possible.

⁹¹⁴ Riccoldus de Monte Crucis, *Epistole ad Ecclesiam Triumphantem*, 3 (cf. footnote 896 above): "O magne pater sancte Dominice, o pater et institutor ordinis Predicatorum, qui zelo fidei et devocionis accensus, licet generaliter contra hereticos, tamen spirituali zelo contra sarracenos barbaram nutristi. Tu cogitasti in virtute Dei posse estirpare machometistas a parte occidentali. Voluisti quidem sed non potuisti. Nunc autem quando introisti ad Deum tuum, quando factus es potencior et nos tantum tuo patrocinio indigemus, silere poteris? [...] O beate Francisce, cui ab infancia mea et usque nunc fui devotus, o vere pupertatis amator, ad te clamito et flebiliter ingemisco. Tu zelo fidei et devocionis accensus adisti soldanum Babilonie, a quo petisti poni cum sarracenis in igne vel eciam solus, ut perfidiam Machometi destrueres. Tunc quidem voluisti sed non potuisti."

⁹¹⁵ Riccoldus de Monte Crucis, *Epistole ad Ecclesiam Triumphantem*, 2 (cf. footnote 896 above): "Invenio tamen tunicas et paramenta, libros eciam et breviaria inter sarracenos. O fratres Predicatores, quovis sine tunicis et breviariis? Non est enim vestre consuetudinis ut fratres vestri sine tunicis et breviariis vadant in viam longinquam. Tunc vero a redeuntibus de excidio michi oblata est tunica lancea vel gladio perforata; que eciam modico cruore rosea erat. Et tunc eiulans et plorans dixi: 'Tunica fratrum meorum est, tunica ordinis est!'. Et redemi eam modico pretio."

In a further passage in the *Epistola*, Riccoldo mentions how, after reading the Qur'ān in Arabic, he often put an opened copy of the Qur'ān on the altar of Christ and the Virgin Mary. He pleaded for them to act immediately against Islam, saying "Read! Read what Muhammad says!". The exclamation "read!" is seen by Shagrir as having a bipartite meaning. According to her, it refers to both the conversion moment of Augustine ("Tolle, lege!") and the revealed voice of the angel Gabriel who, according to Islamic tradition, delivered the Qur'ān to Muhammad while saying "Iq'ra!" ("read!") (Q. 96:1-5). It is therefore a reference to both the Christian and the Muslim tradition.⁹¹⁶ Arguably, one might consider that the word *Iq'ra* more likely meant "recite" or "read out loud," not merely "read (for yourself)". However, the likeness between this passage in the *Epistola ad Ecclesiam Triumphantem* and the Qur'ānic tradition is sufficiently obvious.

However, even though this passage mixes two traditions, being the Christian and the Muslim tradition, and even though it uses an apparent Augustinian reference to refer to the Qur'ān, this does not mean that Riccoldo meant to write about the Qur'ān with an open mindset, or that he had his mind set on proving the likeness between Islam and Christianity. The passage in the *Epistola*, where he begs the Virgin Mary and Christ to read the Qur'ān so that they might see how their lives are described there, is meant to underline its depravity and wrongness. Riccoldo did not mean to create a meeting point between religions or to find useful messages in non-Christian texts, but rather to show how Islam subverts Christian truths. In this way, Riccoldo did not go as far as, for example, Ramon Martí who saw Christian truths in non-Christian works, and even celebrated them to a certain extent. He also did not have Ramon Llull's ambition to neglect the Qur'ān altogether or to focus on philosophical rather than dogmatic differences and likenesses, or how the greater philosophical currents in Islam still proved Christian dogma. It is apparent that, when it comes down to the evolution of theological thought, Riccoldo's attitude to Islamic scriptures was not as nuanced as some of his Iberic contemporaries. He is merely shocked by what he reads in the Qur'ān and the traditions about the life and sayings of Muhammad, and does not seem to have developed a special interest in the theology and philosophy around it, or at least not beyond the mainstream theology of the day. However, Riccoldo did have a sense of "literal knowledge" of Islamic scripture and religious traditions, as is shown in the passage here discussed. The conclusion he drew from his study was not exceptional, however, as he simply lambasts the Qur'ān for its perceived slights to Christ and the Virgin Mary.

4. CONTRA LEGEM SARACENORUM

The *Contra legem saracenorum* was written by Riccoldo during his stay in Florence, from 1300 to 1301. In the previous years, he had studied the Qur'ān, and he had familiarized himself with the philosophical language of the Arab world. The main sources for the *Contra legem saracenorum* were the Qur'ān, of which he cites and criticizes certain passages, and also various tracts against Islam, such as the *Summa* by Peter the Venerable. In the *Contra legem saracenorum*, Riccoldo only discusses Islamic theology and scripture as apparent in writings of and about Islam. He rarely mentions his own experiences – except for one occasion, which will be discussed in this section. Arguably, the goal of the *Contra legem*

⁹¹⁶ Shagrir, "The Fall of Acre as a Spiritual Crisis" (cf. footnote 864 above), p. 1114.

saracenorum did not allow a more holistic or experience-based approach, since Riccoldo aimed at making a scholarly compendium of Islamic teachings, as can be read in authoritative texts.

The tone of the *Contra legem saracenorum* is not very irenic or nuanced. It is clear that Riccoldo wished only to underline what he perceived as the worst aspects of Islam. He argues that Islamic theology foreshadows the works of the Antichrist and that Islam quickens the Apocalypse (cap. I), and that Muhammad is a wrongdoer, who established his own religion as an act of self-service (cap VIII). The latter thought can be found in the works of Ramon Martí as well, but the former – being the eschatological interpretation of Islam – was relatively more obscure, even though it defined the thoughts of Riccoldo in many of his writings. Only in the *Liber peregrinationis*, Riccoldo was more objective.

4.1. CAPITULUM I: A HERESIOLOGICAL APPROACH

In the first chapter of the *Contra legem saracenorum*, Riccoldo connects Islamic theology to Christian heresies in order to make his reader understand the nature of Islam. First, Riccoldo mentions Sabellius, who denies the Trinity. Instead, Riccoldo argues, Muhammad posits a duality in God, which is why the Qur’ān speaks about God in plural. In Islamic theology, Christ and the spirit of God are of a different essence than God Himself.⁹¹⁷ The comparison with Sabellius seemed relevant for Riccoldo, since Sabellius denied a literal interpretation of the Trinity, stating that there is no distinction between the Persons of the Trinity, for this would imply a lack of monotheism. Sabellius therefore proposed the theory of modalism, meaning that the three Persons of the Trinity are merely descriptors of God’s role within the universe.⁹¹⁸ The fact that Riccoldo ascribes a duality to the Islamic notion of God might be explained by the Islamic concepts *Rūh* and *Nafs*, being spirit (or holy, immortal spirit) and essence or self. These concepts can be attached to humanity and God. In Islam, Christ is often associated with the Holy Spirit (or *Rūh al-qudus*), that was sent to Christ as His aid.⁹¹⁹ According to this dogma, God’s spirit is not God’s essence, and the Holy Ghost is not Christ. The comparison of Islam with Sabellius does pose a problem, since Sabellius never believed in a dual interpretation of God. The juxtaposition is, therefore, not entirely valid. The mentioning of Sabellius seems to be taken from Peter the Venerable’s *Summa*, in which he describes Islamic theology in the wake of the First Crusade.⁹²⁰ However, Peter the Venerable does not mention Sabellius in connection to the

⁹¹⁷ Riccoldus de Monte Crucis, *Contra legem saracenorum*, 1 (cf. footnote 865 above): “Et sciendum quod omnium antiquorum hereticorum feces, quas diabolus in aliis sparsim seminauerat, simul in Machometum reuomuit. Ipse namque Machometus cum Sabellio negat trinitatem; ponit tamen in diuinis quendam binarium, qui est numerus infamis et alteritatis principium. Ponit enim ipsam diuinam essentiam et eius animam; unde Deum pluraliter loquentem introducit in alchorano. Et sic uidetur ipsa anima et ipse Christus alterius essentie a Deo, et Deo minor et ei subiectus.”

⁹¹⁸ Cf. Ian A. McFarland, “Modalism,” in *Cambridge Dictionary of Christian Theology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 318.

⁹¹⁹ Cf. Michael Sells, “Spirit,” in *Encyclopaedia of the Qur’ān*, ed. by Johanna Pink, et al., *Brill Online*, s.d., doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1875-3922_q3_EQCOM_00193.

⁹²⁰ Cf. Petrus Venerabilis, *Summa totius haeresis saracenorum* (cf. footnote 903 above), p. 204: “In primis primus et maximus ipsorum execrandus est error, quod trinitatem in unitate deitatis negant, sicque dum in una diuinitatis essentia trinum personarum numerum non credunt, in unitate numerum euitantes, dum ternarium inquam omnium formarum principium atque finem, sicque rerum formarum causam et originem atque terminum, non recipient, Deum licet ore confitentes, ipsum penitus nesciunt. Ipsi autem

perceived duality of God in Islam, but in connection to his denial of the Trinity through modalism. Peter the Venerable does mention the duality between God's spirit and His essence, but he does not mention Sabellius in that particular passage. Therefore, it is possible that Riccoldo misinterpreted Peter the Venerable's *Summa*, and that his mention of Sabellius is inappropriate. Perhaps both authors misunderstand Sabellianism, or simply practice "name-dropping" as a means to further disparage the Islamic skepticism of the Trinity.

Riccoldo also compares Islamic theology with the teachings of Arius and Eunomius, in as far as Muslims deny the divinity of Christ and posit that He was a creature – albeit an exalted one.⁹²¹ Arius believed Christ was a man, and Mary was the "mother of Christ" and not the "mother of God," and after him, Eunomius followed closely in his footsteps.⁹²² This comparison of Islamic philosophy (or "gentile" philosophy) was also made by Thomas Aquinas, who criticized the view that Christ was not of the same essence as God; that He was therefore a created entity and therefore subject to God like every other creature, which is what Arius and Eunomius believed. Moreover, Riccoldo also mentions Islamic philosophers, who hold a "Platonic" view about God. He argues that certain Islamic philosophical currents hold the belief that from God's essence an intellect flows, which creates the entire universe and all creatures. This intellect is called the "paternal intellect".⁹²³

Thomas Aquinas mentions the same Islamic viewpoint in his *Summa contra gentiles*. After discussing the connection between the Islamic denial of the Trinity and Arius and Eunomius, he also discusses the Islamic belief that from God a mind flows, which intelligates the entire world. From this divine mind, the mind of the world flows, and then creation. Therefore, Thomas Aquinas claims, Muslims believe that God breathes the divine mind instead of bringing forth the Person of Christ.⁹²⁴ The creation of the universe from

deuii, ipsi variabiles, principium uarietatis et alteritatis omnis, uidelicet binarium solum in unitate confitentur, scilicet ipsam diuinam essentiam, et eius animam. Vnde Deum pluraliter loquentem, introducit semper Alchoran, quo nomine legem suam nuncupant, et interpretatur Alchoran ex Arabico, collectio preceptorum." and p. 207: "Inter ista, omnes pene antiquarum heresum feces, quas diabolo imbuente sorbuerat, reuomens, cum Sabellio trinitatem abnegat, cum suo Nestorio Christi deitatem abicit, cum Manicheo, mortem Domini diffitetur, licet regressum eius non neget ad Caelos."

⁹²¹ Riccoldus de Monte Crucis, *Contra legem saracenorum*, 1 (cf. footnote 865 above): "Et in hoc conuenit cum Arrio et Eunomio, qui ponebant Christum puram creaturam licet excellentissimam."

⁹²² Cf. Anon., "Arius (336)," in *The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church*, ed. by Frank L. Cross and Elizabeth A. Livingstone, *Oxford University Press online*, 2005, last accessed 7/03/2023, <https://www-oxfordreference-com.kuleuven.e-bronnen.be/display/10.1093/acref/9780192802903.001.0001/acref-9780192802903-e-470?rskey=d3zBkW&result=1>.

⁹²³ Riccoldus de Monte Crucis, *Contra legem saracenorum*, 1 (cf. footnote 865 above): "Et uidetur hec positio a platoniorum dictis exorta, qui ponebant summum Deum patrem et creatorem omnium rerum; a quo primitus effluxisse dicebant quandam mentem, in qua essent forme omnium rerum, superiorem omnibus aliis rebus, quam 'paternum intellectum' nominabant, et post hanc animam mundi, deinde alias creaturas. Quod ergo in scripturis sacris de Dei filio dicitur, hoc de mente intelligebant; et precipue quia sacra scriptura Dei filium 'Dei sapientiam' nominabat et 'uerbum Dei'. Cui etiam opinioni consonat opinio Auicenne, qui supra animam primi celi ponit intelligentiam primam mouentem primum celum; supra quam ulterius Deum in summo ponebat. Sic igitur arriani de Dei filio suspicati sunt quod esset quedam creatura supereminens omnibus aliis creaturis, qua mediante Deus omnia creasset."

⁹²⁴ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra gentiles*, ed. online by Roberto Busa and Enrique Alarcón, in *Corpusthomisticum.com*, 2019, 4, 6, 14, <https://www.corpusthomisticum.org/scg4001.html>: "Et uidetur a Platoniorum dictis exorta, qui ponebant summum Deum, patrem et creatorem omnium rerum, a quo primitus effluxisse dicebant quandam mentem, in qua essent omnium rerum formae, superiorem omnibus

God's divine mind is compared by both Riccoldo and Thomas Aquinas with the spiration and generation of the divine Persons in Christianity. Thomas Aquinas links the Islamic belief in the paternal intellect with Ibn Sīnā, who believed that God was the first intellect, from which the intellects of the heavenly spheres emanated. God Himself was the highest tier of this hierarchy of intellects, since He was at the highest sphere. Every sphere had its own intellect, derived from God, which spirated the sphere and the intellect below. The intellect of our 'sublunar' material world was the final one.⁹²⁵ The interpretation of Ibn Sīnā's cosmology of intellects is the same for Riccoldo as for Thomas Aquinas, just like the juxtaposition of this theory to the heresies of Arius and Eunomius (which are mentioned right before the interpretation of Ibn Sīnā by both Riccoldo and Thomas Aquinas). It can therefore be argued that Thomas Aquinas was a likely source of Riccoldo da Monte di Croce for this passage.

Ramon Llull likewise discusses the Islamic beliefs concerning the creation of the universe, and the absence of the primordial creation of the Person of the Son, in his *Ars generalis ultima*.⁹²⁶ As mentioned earlier in this dissertation, Llull argued in the *Ars generalis ultima* that Muslims believed that God was first inclined to create the universe, and that His attributes (among which His intellect) served to facilitate this act of creation. Llull states that Muslims do God injustice, since He is more inclined to create the divine Persons and not the material world, which is a secondary act. In Riccoldo's interpretation of the Islamic point of view of the creation of the universe, the created world flows from God's intellect. What emanates from God in Islam is the created universe, not the divine Persons. This means that, in Islam, God's first act is the creation of the universe, and not the internal generation of Himself as the Son and the Holy Ghost. Riccoldo still addresses the Islamic belief that God is primarily inclined to create the universe, but he delves deeper in the philosophical approach of the matter.

Riccoldo continues his arguments against Islamic dogma, by stating that the heresies and the theological views that he mentioned as being part of Islamic dogma play a significant part in the Christian Apocalypse. More precisely, Riccoldo argues that Muhammad was a *Praecursor Antichristi*. The role of the *Praecursor Antichristi* is to spread disbelief in the divine Incarnation and in the message of Christ. When the actual Antichrist arrives, it will be his goal to bring this plan to a higher level, by spreading the belief that Christ was not only not the Son of God, but also not a good man. The Antichrist wants to destroy faith and love for Christ, the *Praecursor Antichristi* wants to prepare the minds of humankind for this lie.⁹²⁷ The argument against Islamic teachings, that they make

aliis rebus, quam paternum intellectum nominabant; et post hanc, animam mundi; et deinde alias creaturas. Quod ergo in Scripturis sacris de Dei filio dicitur, hoc de mente praedicta intelligebant: et praecipue quia sacra Scriptura Dei filium Dei sapientiam nominat et verbum Dei. Cui etiam opinioni consonat positio Avicennae, qui supra animam primi caeli ponit intelligentiam primam, moventem primum caelum, supra quam ulterius Deum in summo ponebat."

⁹²⁵ Cf. Avicenna, *Avicennae Metaphysices compendium* (cf. footnote 598 above), pp. 186-199.

⁹²⁶ Cf. Lullus, *Ars generalis ultima*, *CCCM*, 75, *ROL*, XIV, 9, 1, p. 191.

⁹²⁷ Riccoldus de Monte Crucis, *Contra legem saracenorum*, cap. I (cf. footnote 865 above): "Hec igitur prolixius exposui ut manifeste sciatur quod illud quod diabolus in mundo incepit per Arrium, sed consummare non potuit, postea tepescente in ecclesia feruore et crescente malicia per Machometum compleuit; denique tamen ad plenum consumabit maliciam per antichristum, qui suadebit mundo quod Christus nec uerus Deus fuerit nec filius Dei nec bonus homo."

way for the Antichrist, was not invented by Riccoldo, but can also be found in the *Summa* of Peter the Venerable, which was, likely, Riccoldo's source.⁹²⁸

The heresiological approach to Islam, and the apocalyptic interpretation of its theological dogma, does not seem to be present in the *Disputatio Raimundi*. The *Disputatio Raimundi* stresses that there is no Trinity in Islam, and mentions the Islamic view of the divine intellect as a creating force, without making the connection to Christian heresies, and without explaining the Islamic belief in the intellect which emanates from God and intelligates the universe – like Christians believe that the Persons are generated from God. Certain arguments for the Trinity made by Raimundus can be compared to Christian arguments against heretics, or against any person who would deny the Trinity. However, Lull did not discuss heresy, nor did he connect his arguments specifically to heresiology. However, while Ramon Lull did not follow the heresiological approach of Peter the Venerable, he did seem to agree with Riccoldo da Monte di Croce about the apocalyptic meaning of Islam. Throughout his *Disputatio Raimundi*, Ramon Lull describes Islam as a carnal religion, and the figure of Muhammad as a false prophet, who seduces his followers with the material, sin, and luxury. Jordi Pardo Pastor underlines the pervasiveness of the archetype of the Antichrist in Lull's œuvre, particularly in passages which discuss Islam or the figure of Muhammad. Jordi Pardo Pastor cites the *Disputatio Raimundi*⁹²⁹ in particular, where he links certain passages concerning Muhammad's life (his proneness to jealousy, his extramarital affairs) to the *Doctrina pueril*,⁹³⁰ where Lull describes Muhammad in the same terms, after giving a parallel description of the Antichrist. In both passages, the violence and carnality of both Muhammad and the Antichrist are underlined

⁹²⁸ Petrus Venerabilis, *Summa totius haeresis saracenorum* (cf. footnote 903 above), p. 208: "Summa uero huius heresis intentio est, ut Christus Dominus neque Deus, neque Dei filius esse credatur, sed licet magnus Deoque dilectus, homo tamen purus, et uir quidem sapiens, et propheta maximus. Quae quidem olim diaboli machinatione concepta, primo per Arrium seminata, deinde per istum Sathanan scilicet Mahumet, prouecta, per Antichristum uero, ex toto secundum diabolicam intentionem complebitur."

⁹²⁹ In particular Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 1, 7, p. 244, and II, 2, 1, 10, pp. 245-246.

⁹³⁰ Jordi Pardo Pastor refers to the edition of the *Doctrina pueril* by Gret Schib: Ramon Lull, *Doctrina Pueril*, ed. by Gret Schib (Barcelona: Editorial Barcino, 1972), pp. 163-164: "E Mafumet anà-sse'n en un pug prop Triple e estech-hi quaranta jorns, a significança de la quarentena que Jhesuchrist féu al desert e que Moysès féu en lo munt de Sinaý. [6] Com Mafument devalà del munt, adonchs se n'anà a la vila de Triple e faÿa's propheta, e dix que Déus lo trametia al poble d'aquella ciutat, e promès-los que en paradís haurían paria de fembres, e que menjarien mantega e mel, e beurien vi e ayga e let, e que haurien bels palaus d'aur e d'argent e de péres precioses, e que haurien aytals vestidures com se volriren. Moltres d'altres benances los promès, per ço que·l creguessen; e gítava's en la terra, e turcia les mans e los uyls quax endemoniat, e depuys dehia que sanct Gabriel li venia, e que li aportava paraules de Déu, les quals són en lo libre qui és appellat *Alcorà* [...] [7] Les gents, qui eren pegues e qui no havien creensa que après la mort no fossen res, que oÿen ço que Mafumet los prometia de paradís e que resucitarien, havien plaer de ço que Mafumet lus deya; e convertiren-se a él totes les gents d'aquella vila. E les gents de Meca no·s volgueren convertir a la secta de Mafumet tro que Mafumet hi anà ab grans gents e pres la Meca per força; e tot home qui no·s faés sarrahí havia a morir, e enaxí Mafumet fo senyor de tota aquela terra. [8] Mafumet fo home molt luxuriós e hac IX mullers, e ac paria ab moltes d'altres fembres, e donà la secta molt ampla; e per la amplea que donà, les gents hagueren creensa en ses paraules, e après sa mort seguiren la secta." And pp. 230-231, about the Antichrist: "Antecrist naxerà de fembra e serà nudrit en babilònia, e con serà de la edat on fo Jhesuchrist, com comensà a preÿcar, preÿcarà aytant de temps com Jhesuchrist preÿcà, e farà falsament miracles, e prometrà grans dons, darà dels béns temporals, als hòmens, ço que li demanaran, per ço que l'adoren e que·l creguen e que reneguen nostre senyor Jhesuchrist. Grans menases e grans morts farà a aquels qui no·l creuran ne l'obeyran, e forts rahons e semblances darà per ço que parega veer ço que dirà. [...] molts lo seguirán e·l creuran d'açò qu'él farà; cor com ara, en aquest temps en què som, són tants hòmens en error [...]."

and discussed. In Llull's works, both figures can be easily compared when it comes to their vices and overall character.⁹³¹

To summarize, Ramon Llull did not explicitly link Islamic theology, such as the denial of the Trinity, with the Antichrist. Throughout his works, he mainly linked the life of the figure of Muhammad with the Antichrist, not Islamic thought in general, like Riccoldo. Ramon Llull did not follow the paradigm of Peter the Venerable, who saw the Islamic denial of the Trinity as a step closer to the Apocalypse. However, it is apparent that Llull likewise subscribed to an apocalyptic view of Islam, albeit in a more general and more moralistic manner.

4.2. CAPITULUM II AND III: THE DEFENSE OF THE USE OF THE OLD AND NEW TESTAMENTS

Riccoldo discusses in chapter II of the *Contra legem saracenorum* how to deal with a Muslim opponent, and what kind of attitude one should adopt if one were to seek out his or her conversion. Riccoldo argues that in order to establish the conversion of Muslims one should not attempt to prove that the Christian faith is true. One should merely try to prove that Islam is "frivolous". Faith is about that which cannot be seen, and it is a gift from God, Riccoldo explains. Riccoldo seems to believe that, after supposedly proving that Islam is a frivolous faith, the factual conversion of Muslims to Christianity would be a matter of divine grace. Riccoldo apparently held that the belief in Christian dogma does not come from our own rationality, but from faith and perhaps even divine inspiration. While Christians do not have tools to explain the Trinity and other articles of faith, they do have the Gospel, to which the Qur'ān refers a couple of times, and they have miracles.⁹³²

This attitude is the diametrical opposite to the opinion of Ramon Llull. Riccoldo, and to some extent Ramon Martí, believed it was their particular mission to convert to Christianity and to end faith in Islam. Riccoldo held the belief that Christianity could be explained to some extent, but not at all irrevocably proven. However, a more important aspect of his conversion method was to simply attempt to destroy the faith of Muslims by either disproving certain claims against Christianity, or by lambasting and criticizing Muhammad or certain passages from Islamic sacred scriptures. Ramon Llull was against this technique, and believed that destroying faith in Islam is simply not enough without the proof of Christian dogma. This proof should come from sound logic, and not from Christian authority, since there would be no reason for a Muslim – or even an ex-Muslim – to want to believe in the Trinity *per se*. Ramon Llull also critiques Muhammad in the *Disputatio Raimundi*, but he only does this after thoroughly defending *and* proving the Trinity and the Incarnation. Instead of destroying the faith of his opponent, he first makes Christianity appear more logical and more probable, before he criticizes Islamic beliefs in the second part of the *Disputatio Raimundi*. The point of critique that Llull has against the criticism of

⁹³¹ Jordi Pardo Pastor, "Mahoma y el Anticristo en la obra de Ramon Llull," *Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía* 22, no. 22 (2005): pp. 164–167.

⁹³² Riccoldus de Monte Crucis, *Contra legem saracenorum*, 2 (cf. footnote 865 above): "Est etiam uia facilius eligenda in omnibus; est autem facilius ostendere fidem ipsorum esse friuolam quam probare nostram fidem esse ueram, quia fides est de non uisis et donum Dei. Unde nostra solam habet existentiam sine apparentia, illa uero habet solam apparentiam sine existentia. Et licet non habeamus rationes ad probandam trinitatem et alia que sunt fidei, quia tunc fides non esset fides nec meritoria, habemus tamen auctoritatem euangelii, cui et alchoranus dat testimonium, et habemus miracula."

Islam without providing proof of Christianity is an important element of the story about the monk who wished to convert the sultan. This monk has often been identified with Ramon Martí. In Lull's interpretation of the events, the monk failed to convert the sultan to Christianity, because he became so invested in destroying his belief in Islam, that he failed to prove Christianity. This method of preaching leads to nothing, as the story concludes with the sultan banishing the monk for making him neither Christian nor Muslim.⁹³³ Ramon Lull would, therefore, not agree with Riccoldo's view on conversion, where Islam only needs to be disproven.

Riccoldo continues his explanation of the ideal conduct of preachers by explaining the basis of Islamic belief further. According to Riccoldo, Muslims do neither have miracles nor authority. Every argument which Muslims make against the Trinity can be solved, Riccoldo believes. The Qur'anic point of view concerning God and the Trinity is that God cannot be triune, because there is only one God. Christians do not believe the opposite of monotheism, Riccoldo argues, but they also believe in one God, who is *simplicissimus*. Christians do not attribute any other divine being or companion to God while Muslims do, according to Riccoldo, by referring to the spirit of the world, or the Holy Ghost, or the intellect. The human intellect cannot be equated or equalized with the divine majesty, Riccoldo says, because Muslims cannot understand a difference in Persons without understanding a difference in essences, which is why they reject the idea of divine Persons. This is enough to defend the Christian notion of God, Riccoldo argues.⁹³⁴ Riccoldo's defense of the Christian notion of the Trinity is very short and blunt, and does not contain much complex theory like Lull's defense. Riccoldo also discards Islamic philosophy – almost in its entirety – because he deems it heretical and non-monotheistic. Lull has a deeper and more complex answer to Islamic philosophy, which he completely accepted and sought to give a conclusive Christian answer to, as has been shown in chapter II of this dissertation.

In order to prove Christian dogma, Riccoldo believes that the authority of the Gospel should be proven by referring to the Qur'an, so that "Goliath's throat is cut by his own sword".⁹³⁵ Riccoldo's first argument is the referential unity of the Old and New Testaments, since every prophet predicts the coming of the other. Every event and prophet of the Old and New Testaments is predicted by his predecessor, like the rings of a chain. However,

⁹³³ Cf. Introduction of section about Ramon Martí. Lullus, *De acquisitione Terrae Sanctae (ROL XXXVIII, CCCM 266)*, 3, 1, p. 225.

⁹³⁴ Riccoldus de Monte Crucis, *Contra legem saracenorum*, 2 (cf. footnote 865 above): "Ipsi tamen nec miracula nec auctoritatem habent. Nam etsi alchoranus eorum dicat de Deo 'non dicatis tres', statim reddit rationem dicens 'quia unus est solus Deus'. Huius contrarium nos non dicimus, sed affirmamus cum eis unum esse Deum, quem dicimus non solum unum sed simplicissimum. Nec damus ei consortem neque participem, sicut ipsi: animam mundi uel uerbum uel spiritum uel diuinum quendam intellectum, ut superius patet. Nec est equanda diuina maiestas humano intellectui, ut quia illi non possunt intelligere distinctionem personarum sine distinctione essentie, quod ideo non sit. Nec etiam ipsi habent contra hoc rationes efficaces quas de facili non possimus soluere. Et hoc sufficit ad defensionem fidei."

⁹³⁵ Riccoldus de Monte Crucis, *Contra legem saracenorum*, 3 (cf. footnote 865 above): "Sed quia ipsi saraceni iam negarent tam miracula apostolorum quam dicta ipsorum pro eo quod sunt contraria alchorano, insistendum est ad confutationem tam perfide legis, et ostendendum quod non sit lex Dei, et quod saraceni tenentur recipere auctoritatem euangelii et ueteris testamenti. Hoc autem ostendere possumus per ipsum alchoranum, ut Goliath proprio gladio iuguletur."

not one single prophet ever predicted the coming of Muhammad, except perhaps by warning against pseudoprophets.⁹³⁶

Christ had made it clear, that He was the final general prophet and that there would be no other prophets after Him, Riccoldo continues. Muhammad claims that he is the next general prophet. Riccoldo laments that a seducer has never been followed by such a great amount of people.⁹³⁷

Riccoldo next discusses the Islamic belief in *tahrīf*. Just like Ramon Martí, Riccoldo attempts to prove that the Gospel can be used and has value, and that it is not falsified. First, Riccoldo explains the meaning of *tahrīf*. According to him, Muslims believe that in the Bible, Muhammad's arrival was announced several times since Moses, and that Christ literally predicted him. That most copies of the Old and New Testaments did not contain these predictions was, according to Muslims, due to the fact that Christians and Jews falsified the Bible.⁹³⁸

Riccoldo next discusses a passage in the Qur'ān, sura 10:94, where Muhammad says that when there is any doubt about Muhammad's revelation, that Muslims should consult with them who have read "the book" before them. With them, Muhammad means Christians and Jews, who have received the Old and New Testaments. This means that Muhammad told Muslims to ask advice from Jews and Christians about uncertain matters.⁹³⁹

Riccoldo next discusses sura 15:9 of the Qur'ān, where it is said that God has made the memory of God descend, and we guard it. The "memory of God" is the Law of Moses and the Gospel, Riccoldo argues. Therefore, Muhammad himself believed that the Old and New Testaments were valid.⁹⁴⁰

⁹³⁶ Riccoldus de Monte Crucis, *Contra legem saracenorum*, 2 (cf. footnote 865 above): "Nos enim inuenimus legem Dei esse quandam cathenam continuam ab eodem artifice fabricatam, ut unus anulus alteri cohereat et correspondeat, et unus propheta de alio prophetat et mentionem facit, et omnes alii prophetauerunt de Christo. Si igitur lex saracenorum esset lex Dei, et uocatio ad legem illam non esset peruersio sed conuersio - ut ipsi dicunt -, quomodo omnes alios prophetas latuisset quod nullus de eo dixisset aliquid? Nos tamen non inuenimus quod Moyses uel aliquis prophetarum uel ipse Christus aliquid dixerit de Machometo uel de sua lege, nisi quando dixit de pseudoprophetis cauendis."

⁹³⁷ Riccoldus de Monte Crucis, *Contra legem saracenorum*, 3 (cf. footnote 865 above): "Dixit etiam Christus quod 'lex et prophete usque ad Iohannem', ut mundus sciret quod generalis propheta non erat uenturus ulterius. Machometus autem dicit se esse generalem prophetam, et quod ipse sit propheta nescimus. Scimus tamen, proh dolor!, quod nunquam fuit aliquis seductor in mundo quem tot homines et tot populi in tam breui tempore sequerentur."

⁹³⁸ Riccoldus de Monte Crucis, *Contra legem saracenorum*, 3 (cf. footnote 865 above): "Ad hoc autem respondent saraceni dicentes quod Moyses et alii prophete prophetauerunt de Machometo. Christus autem de ipso prophetauit expressius omnibus quia dixit etiam nomen, unde dixit filiis Israel: 'Euangelizo uobis de legato Dei qui ueniet post me, et nomen eius Machometus'. Sed dicunt quod iudei corruperunt legem Moysi et prophetas, et christiani corruperunt euangelium, et quod non remansit de ueritate legis et euangelii nisi quantum est in alchorano."

⁹³⁹ Riccoldus de Monte Crucis, *Contra legem saracenorum*, 3 (cf. footnote 865 above): "Sed quod hoc non possit stare, probo primo per alchoranum eorum. Nam dicitur in capitulo de *Iona*: 'Si fueritis in dubio de hoc quod reuelauimus uobis, petatis ab illis qui legerunt librum priusquam uos'. Illi autem qui prius legerunt librum quam saraceni sunt iudei et christiani, qui receperunt Pentatheuchum et euangelium, sicut exponit Machometus. Ergo Machometus dicit saracenis quod petant a christianis et iudeis de dubiis. Sed quomodo mitteret eos Machometus ad mendacia testimonia si est propheta ueridicus, ut dicunt?"

⁹⁴⁰ Riccoldus de Monte Crucis, *Contra legem saracenorum*, 3 (cf. footnote 865 above): "Non erant igitur uiciati libri iudeorum et christianorum tempore Machometi. Nec possunt dicere quod postea fuerint

Riccoldo next recounts a story from Qur’ān 5:42b-43a, where a Muslim judge asks Muhammad for advice, when Jews came to him for a legal matter. Muhammad argues that Jewish people should look at their Old Testament for justice, and wonders why they would come to the Islamic judge in the first place.⁹⁴¹ This again proves that Muhammad believed in the validity of the Bible.

Moreover, if Christians and Jews had falsified their scriptures, other religions would likewise know of it. Moreover, if the Old and New Testaments were falsified, ancient versions without falsifications would be found, and there would be multiple versions of the falsification. However, every copy of the Bible, in every single country and throughout the ages, contains the same message. Therefore, the Bible cannot be falsified.⁹⁴² Moreover, the Gospel has been written down in different languages (Hebrew, Greek and Latin) and in different places in the world, and translated into Latin by Jerome before the birth of Muhammad, after which copies were made in different languages. Therefore, a falsifier would have no chance to change the contents of the New Testament.⁹⁴³

Riccoldo argues that, if the Christians had had the ambition to change the contents of the New Testament, they would not merely have erased the name of Muhammad from their scriptures. At the very beginning of Christianity, the Romans were prosecuting Christians, for two main reasons. First, because Christians believed in the Incarnation of God in Christ, and in the divinity of Christ, even though the Roman state had not given the permission to ‘deify’ Christ. Second, because Christians are monotheists, they do not allow for the belief in multiple gods. If there were falsifiers among Christians, they would have erased these core dogmas from the Gospel, Riccoldo argues, to remain safe. However, the sacredness of the Gospel did not allow for the alteration of the scripture. If Christians do not change the Gospel in order to remain safe, by erasing the dogma that brings them in danger, they will also not erase the name of Muhammad.⁹⁴⁴

uiciati. Nam dicitur in capitulo *Elhagar*, quod interpretatur lapis: ‘Nos, inquam, in persona Dei descendere fecimus recordationem Dei, et nos eandem custodiemus’. Lex Moysi et euangelium apud eos dicuntur “recordatio”. Igitur Deus semper apud suos fideles testimonium sue scripture conseruauit ante Machometum, et conseruabit postea.”

⁹⁴¹ Riccoldus de Monte Crucis, *Contra legem saracenorum*, 3 (cf. footnote 865 above): “Preterea in capitulo *Elmayde*, quod interpretatur mensa, dicitur quod iudex est Ebazoene dixit Machometo, quando iudei querebant iustitiam et iudicium ab eo, et respondit: ‘Si uenerint ad te, iudica inter eos iuste, quia Deus diligit iustitiam facientes. Et quomodo petent ipsi a te iustitiam, cum sit apud eos uetus testamentum in quo est Dei iustitia?’”

⁹⁴² Riccoldus de Monte Crucis, *Contra legem saracenorum*, 3 (cf. footnote 865 above): “Preterea talis corruptio et mutatio scripture non potuit esse generalis et manifesta, quia sic alie naciones sciuisent; nec particularis et occulta, quia sic aliqui codices integri et incorrupti remansissent. Sed in omni lingua et in omni prouincia inueniuntur lex et euangelium eodem modo scripta.”

⁹⁴³ Riccoldus de Monte Crucis, *Contra legem saracenorum*, 3 (cf. footnote 865 above): “Preterea quatuor euangelia non sunt scripta nec eodem tempore nec eodem loco nec eodem idiomate nec ab eodem scriptore; sed Matheus in hebreo in Iudea, Iohannes in greco in Asia, Lucas in greco in Achaia, Marcus in latino in Italia euangelium scripsit. Et eorum translatio facta est in latinum per Ieronimum et alios ante tempora Machometi, et remanserunt exemplaria in omnibus linguis. Ergo non potuerunt per aliquos falsarios uiciari quin manifeste sciretur.”

⁹⁴⁴ Riccoldus de Monte Crucis, *Contra legem saracenorum*, 3 (cf. footnote 865 above): “Preterea nichil est in fide christiana ita arduum sicut incarnatio Dei, scilicet quod homo ille sit Deus. Et istud fuit maxime difficile suadere mundo. Vnde et romani et alii pagani propter hoc persecuti sunt christianos CCC annis continuis et generaliter; et distulerunt recipere fidem et euangelium quia dicebatur quod homo ille erat Deus. Non quia non recepissent iam plures homines et mulieres deos et deas, sed quia Christus fuit dictus Deus absque licentia romanorum, quod ipsi prohibuerunt quod nullus diceretur deus sine auctoritate

Riccardo also argues that Christians and Jews would not be able to meet one another and set aside their differences in order to falsify their scriptures in an effort to impede Islam. When it comes to Christ, Christians are more in accord with Muslims than with Jews.⁹⁴⁵

At the time of Muhammad, Riccardo continues, there were two main Christian currents: the Jacobites (or Syrian Orthodox Christians) and the Nestorians.⁹⁴⁶ The Nestorians and the earliest Muslims had a particularly close connection, and Muhammad ordered his followers to respect Nestorians in particular. However, if the Nestorians and the Jacobites were enemies, they could not work together to falsify their scriptures. Moreover, Riccardo argues, the Jacobite and Nestorian copies of the New Testament are exactly the same as the Latin ones.⁹⁴⁷ Riccardo also wonders why Christians would erase the name of Muhammad from the Gospel if Muhammad complimented Christ, the Virgin Mary and the Gospel.⁹⁴⁸

Riccardo next defends the crucifixion of Christ on the cross, a matter which is doubted by Muslims. According to Riccardo, Christians would not lie about the crucifixion of Christ, since it would be seen as more honourable, if He had not been crucified, and since it would not seem right that Christ, who is truly God, would die on the cross. Therefore, Christians would lie about the crucifixion, if they had the intention of lying.⁹⁴⁹

senatus. Et etiam quia iste Deus non patiebatur consortem; nam si istum Deum reciperent, cogeantur omnes alios deos relinquere; quod etiam erat contra pacta prouinciarum, et legis et consuetudinis romanorum. Quomodo igitur christiani in dampnationem suam et detrimentum fidei, et prouocationem romanorum et principum mundanorum, hoc maxime arduum et minus suasibile in suis scripturis et euangelis addidissent? Omnes enim consentiebant hanc legem esse sanctissimam et rationabilissimam, hoc solo excepto quod rationem omnino excedit, scilicet quod homo ille sic uere Deus et huiusmodi. Magis igitur christiani, si aliquid de euangelio mutassent, quod erat arduum et minus suasibile a principio subtraxissent, ut plures ad fidem accederent, et addidissent aliquid suasibile, quam e contrario.”

⁹⁴⁵ Riccoldus de Monte Crucis, *Contra legem saracenorum*, 3 (cf. footnote 865 above): “Preterea quomodo christiani cum iudeis potuerunt conuenire, a quibus odio tam antiquo diuiduntur, ut corrumpere scripturas, et maxime hoc addendo in quo non conueniunt? Neque enim iudei dicunt Christum esse Deum nec bonum hominem. Vnde quantum ad hoc, magis conueniunt christiani cum saracenis, qui dicunt Christum ad minus fuisse sanctissimum hominem.”

⁹⁴⁶ Nestorianism was a Christian schism which generally followed the teachings of Nestorius (450), who claimed that Christ has two separate but united natures of Christ; one human and one divine. Mother Mary should, therefore, be considered the *Christotokos* and not *Theotokos*. Cf. Ian McFarland, “Nestorianism,” in *Cambridge Dictionary of Christian Theology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 340-341. Peter the Venerable wrote in his *Summa totius haeresis saracenorum* that Muhammad himself was a Nestorian, since he supposedly did not believe that Christ is God (which is, of course, a false interpretation of Nestorianism). Cf. Petrus Venerabilis, *Summa totius haeresis saracenorum*, p. 206 (cf. footnote 903 above).

⁹⁴⁷ Riccoldus de Monte Crucis, *Contra legem saracenorum*, 3 (cf. footnote 865 above): “Preterea christiani ante aduentum Machometi fuerunt divisi in diuersissimas sectas, et precipue orientales in iacobinos et nestorinos. Nestorini autem maxime conueniunt cum saracenis, et Machometus mandauit eos singulariter honorari. Et quomodo conuenissent nestorini cum iacobinis ad uiciandum euangelium, qui tanto odio diuiduntur quod ad inuicem occiduntur? Et tamen legi et inueni apud utrosque euangelium omnino idem, sicut et apud nos.”

⁹⁴⁸ Riccoldus de Monte Crucis, *Contra legem saracenorum*, 3 (cf. footnote 865 above): “Preterea, nomen Machometi quare christiani subtraxissent de euangelio, cum ipse tantum commendauerit Christum et matrem suam et euangelium, ut diceret in alchorano quod in euangelio Christi est ‘directio et perfectio’, et non subtraxerunt inde nomen dyaboli, nec nomen Pilati qui Christum flagellauit, nec nomen Iude qui prodidit?”

⁹⁴⁹ Riccoldus de Monte Crucis, *Contra legem saracenorum*, 3 (cf. footnote 865 above): “Preterea quare apposuissent christiani in euangelio quod Christus sit uere mortuus et crucifixus cum uideatur hominibus magis honorificum quod non sit crucifixus, nec uideatur ei proprie conuenire cum sit uere Deus, ut in

If Christians did falsify the New Testament, Riccoldo continues, the question arises how they would be able to convince such a large group of people of the Gospel. Still, even though no change has been made to the original text, as Riccoldo has established, Christians (among which many poor and uneducated people) did manage to convince princes, kings, and scholars of the Gospel. Even a Caliph of Baghdad, whose name Riccoldo does not mention, has been found wearing a small crucifix around his neck after he died – which is why he was buried separately from the other caliphs. This proves that Christianity is the true faith, Riccoldo believes.

Riccoldo concludes that, since he has established that the Gospel was never falsified, and since Muhammad commended the Bible himself, Muslims have to accept the authority of the Bible.⁹⁵⁰ Riccoldo also mentions a passage in the Qur’ān (Q. 5:68) where Muhammad says that the “family of the book” is nothing unless they fulfill the law and the Gospel. The family of the book includes the Muslims, says Riccoldo. Therefore, Muslims should head the Gospel.⁹⁵¹

Riccoldo defends the validity of the Christian holy scriptures, mainly as a guideline for Christians on why they should continue defending the Gospel in the presence of Muslims or why it should be valid to use the Gospel in an argumentation. Throughout his œuvre, he does not systematically refer to the Gospel. However, Riccoldo did argue that it would be necessary for Muslims to accept argumentations based on the Bible, since they should respect its authority.

4.3. CAPITULUM VIII: MORE CRITIQUE ON MUHAMMAD

Chapter 8 is devoted to the perceived irrationality of Islam. To prove this standpoint, Riccoldo mentions the life of Muhammad, and his actions. Riccoldo enumerates the sins of Muhammad: robbery, incest, adultery, and murder. These should be signs for Muslims that their religion is based on immorality, he argues. However, Riccoldo mentions an argument made by Muslims that prophets are not necessarily morally outstanding throughout their lives. For example, David committed adultery and murder, and Moses committed murder. This never diminished their prophethood, however.⁹⁵²

euangelio habetur? Et quomodo uidetur consequens quod tam duo diversa posuissent de suo, scilicet quod sit vere Deus et uere mortuus?”

⁹⁵⁰ Riccoldus de Monte Crucis, *Contra legem saracenorum*, 3 (cf. footnote 865 above): “Omnibus igitur modis constat et auctoritate alchorani et rationibus ualidis et apertis, quod euangelium est inuariabile et non uiciatum neque corruptum. Cum igitur Machometus super omnes alios libros commendet euangelium, et post illud uetus testamentum, coguntur saraceni recipere auctoritatem euangelii et ueteris testamenti.”

⁹⁵¹ Riccoldus de Monte Crucis, *Contra legem saracenorum*, 3 (cf. footnote 865 above): “Preterea in alchorano, in capitulo *Elmeyde*, quod interpretatur ‘mensa’, dicitur quod ‘familia libri nichil omnino sunt nisi compleant legem et euangelium’. Familia uero libri sunt saraceni, sicut ibidem ostendit; unde dicit: ‘Nisi compleant legem et euangelium et quod reuelatum est tibi’. Illud autem quod reuelatum est accipitur alchoranum, quod reuelatum est solis saracenis, ut ipsi dicunt. Ergo ipsi tenentur habere legem Moysi et euangelium sicut et alcoranum, et etiam osservare.”

⁹⁵² Riccoldus de Monte Crucis, *Contra legem saracenorum*, 8 (cf. footnote 865 above): “Primo igitur patet quia est irrationabilis ratiōe ministri. Est enim omnino irrationabile quod lex tam sancta, sicut ipsi asserunt quod alchoranum sit recte sermo Dei, sit data per tam sceleratum hominem, raptorem, adulterum, incestuosum, homicidam et aliis peccatis obnoxium, que omnibus uitam ipsius scientibus patent. Et respondent saraceni quod Dauid commisit adulterium pariter et homicidium, et Moyses fuit homicida, et

According to Riccoldo da Monte di Croce, this example does not make sense, since David and Moses did repent afterwards. Muhammad never repented. Rather, he added blasphemy to his sins, by installing a new religion which justified what he did. Riccoldo recounts the story about the fact that Muhammad loved a woman, Mary the Jacobite, and that he was caught in the act with her by two of his wives, one of them being Ā'īša. When the women confronted him, he swore never to do it again.⁹⁵³

The story can be compared, *mutatis mutandis*, to the story mentioned in the *De seta Machometi* by Ramon Martí, where it is likewise used to explain the sinfulness of Islam (since the life of Muhammad is used as a proof against Islam by both authors). The *De seta Machometi* explains how Muhammad committed adultery with a woman and was caught by his wife Ā'īša (the second wife is not mentioned), and how he swore not to repeat the act. Ramon Llull also claims that Islam supports adultery in the *Disputatio Raimundi*,⁹⁵⁴ particularly in the second chapter of part 2. More specifically, he also mentions that Muhammad married his friend's wife, perhaps the same woman as in the *De seta Machometi* of Ramon Martí (there she is named Maria Captia).⁹⁵⁵

Another notable theme in the argumentation of Riccoldo is the inclusion of his interpretation of the counterargument made by the larger Muslim population. According to many Muslims, he claims, the sinfulness of Muhammad does not diminish the truth-claim of Islam, since many prophets in the Old Testament were sinful. This argument can neither be found in the work of Martí nor Llull, and is perhaps a first-hand account from Riccoldo, who might have heard it during his time in the East. While most other arguments made by Martí, Riccoldo and Llull were derived from written sources (both religious and philosophical), this particular argument in the *Contra legem saracenorum* by Riccoldo might be the only one we could trace back to actual direct contact with Muslims. This makes the point of view of Riccoldo quite unique: Riccoldo's venture and contacts in the Islamic world were more enduring and less explosive, and he actually managed to converse with the local population quite well, which he documented in his *Liber peregrinationis*. It seems impossible to distinguish whether the sources behind certain views in Riccoldo's works were the result of autodidactic study or hearsay, or rather both. By any means, one could argue that Riccoldo's study was probably greatly influenced by his contact with the local population of Baghdad, meaning both Eastern Christians and Muslims. Even though Llull himself likewise journeyed to North Africa multiple times during his life, he did not

tamen uterque ipsorum legitimus Dei propheta fuit. Sic et Mahometus potuit esse uerus Dei propheta, quamuis aliquando peccator fuerit."

⁹⁵³ Riccoldus de Monte Crucis, *Contra legem saracenorum*, 8 (cf. footnote 865 above): "Sed hec responsio non ualet. Nam Moyses et Dauid fecerunt penitentiam de peccato, et hoc inuenitur. Dauid enim dixit suam culpam et se grauiter afflixit et ueniam meruit. Vnde postquam dixit 'Peccavi', dixit ei Nathan ex ore Dei: 'Et Dominus transtulit peccatum tuum'. Sed de Mahometo non inuenitur quod dixerit suam culpam uel quod fecerit penitentiam, quin potius addidit semper super peccato blasphemiam, confirmando illud per legem iniquam. Nam sicut certum est omnibus saracenis, Mahometus diligebat quandam dictam Mariam Iacobinam, quam presentauerat ei Macouques rex iacobinorum. Due autem ex uxoribus Mahometi, scilicet una dicta Aiesse filia Hebibekr, nobilissima inter eas, et Haassa filia Homar, mouebantur zelotipia. Que, cum die quadam intrarent ad eum, inuenerunt dictum Mahometum concubentem cum dicta Maria, et dixerunt ei: 'Decetne sic facere prophetam?'. Qui erubuit et iurauit se nunquam de cetero cognosciturum eam. Sicque placate sunt ad iuramentum eius."

⁹⁵⁴ Lullus, *Disputatio Raimundi*, CCCM, 114, ROL, XXII, II, 2, 1, 9, p. 245.

⁹⁵⁵ Cf. Martinus, *De seta Machometi*, p. 287 (cf. footnote 802 above).

have the chance to engage openly with the local population there, and his study methods were probably not altered very much by close contact with Muslims.

5. CONCLUSION

When comparing the work of Riccoldo da Monte di Croce with the *Disputatio Raimundi* of Ramon Llull, a difference in the treatment of Islam, and in overall worldview, becomes apparent. While Riccoldo mentions many admirable customs in his works, especially in the *Liber peregrinationis*, Ramon Llull does not. On the contrary, while Riccoldo delivers an exposé on the virtue and the excellence of Islamic almsgiving and overall religious reverence, Ramon Llull does the opposite in the *Disputatio Raimundi*, each time mentioning how Islamic customs are inferior to their Christian counterpart (in as far as they realistically possess any). However, this did not mean that Riccoldo commended Islam, or that he agreed with any aspect of Islamic theology or theory concerning God. In Ramon Llull's works on the other hand, both Islamic theology and Islamic customs were lambasted without much room for nuance.

The reason behind this different approach is mainly that both authors looked differently at the connection between culture or morality and religion. While Riccoldo made a clear distinction between an Islamic society and their religious ideas, Llull made no such distinction. According to Llull, there was a clear connection between Islamic views on God and their morality. There was no way, in Llull's mind, that any kind of good could come from a religion that did not uphold the Trinity and the essentiality of God's attributes. According to Llull, the worldliness of the Islamic views on God transferred to their carnality in their daily life. Therefore, Llull never nuanced or corrected the existing tropes and prejudices about Islamic culture. Rather, he justified and fortified these stereotypes by explaining them through the *Ars*. The attitude that kept Muslims from believing in the correlatives or the Trinity was the same attitude which defined their very existence. Any other kind of judgement about Islamic culture could not be logical or relevant since, in Llull's mind, the idea of God and the comportment in daily life were connected, like God with every tier of the created world.

In Riccoldo's works, Islamic traditions can have merit despite the perceived theological error Islam was based on, and Muslims can have a great moral culture, even while not believing in the Trinity. This is not to say that Riccoldo felt admiration or even respect for Islamic culture, however. He mentioned the virtues of Islamic culture only to admonish Christians against negligence or waywardness. Riccoldo fears his own lack of success in battling such a culturally strong foe, and gives the example of Christian monks and friars attempting to accomplish the fall of Islam in the *Letters to the Triumphant Church*. Riccoldo believed in both the crusades and in preaching, as did Ramon Llull at the time of his venture into Bijāya, but Riccoldo put more emphasis on the immense difficulty and hardship which often meant the failure of the missionaries.

Riccoldo's knowledge of Islamic culture and everyday life was much greater and more honest than his knowledge of Islamic theology. Much of his accounts on Islamic culture came from his own observation, while most of his theological knowledge seemed to come from the works of Christian authors against Islam. He includes a paraphrase of the *Summa*

of Peter the Venerable in his writings, without questioning its content. All the while, Llull was much more invested in a direct confrontation with the original sources of the theological side of Islam, since he seemed to believe that a thorough knowledge of Islamic theology would explain Islamic culture and customs as well. One might argue that Llull did not witness Islamic culture himself since he was, for the major part of his stay in Bejaya, locked in a dungeon. However, Llull did travel extensively to places that had a major Islamic presence where he could learn to understand certain elements of Islamic culture. If it was merely Llull's desire to convert non-Christians, there would be no real need, it seems, to learn about the local customs. Arguably, if Llull did learn a lot about the local customs of Muslims, the literary aim of the *Disputatio Raimundi* (which was aimed at educating Christians and discouraging conversion to Islam) did not imply the need to include an in-depth, objective study of Islamic culture.

However, despite the fact that Riccoldo was more objective in his depiction of Islamic culture, this more nuanced approach became increasingly problematized as time went on. After the fall of Acre, Riccoldo became increasingly distressed due to the success of Islam and its expansion. Riccoldo recounted in his *Epistole* what he had witnessed in the slave markets, for example, how Christian virgins and monks were sold, and how he found a blood-drenched habit which belonged to a Christian friar. He did not mention this in the *Liber peregrinationis*, however, even though he did mention Islamic traditions concerning the freeing of slaves. It is apparent, therefore, that Riccoldo's opinions became more and more embittered as the success of Islam grew, and as he became more aware of the impending defeat of the Church and the lack of success of the crusading endeavours. Arguably, Ramon Llull went through a similar evolution in his oeuvre. While at first, Llull believed in the virtue of open debate and preaching, and while he did not agree with using force in the dialogue between Christians and Muslims at first, this conviction became less poignant as time went on. Even more, Ramon Llull believed that mere preaching would probably be in vain, and that a military intervention would be necessary. Ramon Llull also held Muslims in an ever-lower regard as time went on, which can be illustrated by how 'Umar was depicted in the *Disputatio Raimundi*. Riccoldo likewise lost his admiration, or rather his relative optimism, for Islamic culture, even though he almost seemed to lose his faith in crusading and battling Islam altogether. It is, therefore, impossible to ascribe one particular thought or point of view to either Llull or Riccoldo, given the fact that their opinions changed as their experiences and visions of the future changed. When it comes to the development of their views on the task of Christian preachers, and the future of Muslim-Christian dialogue, both authors behaved relatively similar. It should be especially noted, however, that the opinions, as apparent in the entire oeuvre of both authors, ended on a sour note. Both Llull and Riccoldo lost their optimism in both their perceived enemy and in their own anticipated success.

When discussing the differences between Riccoldo and Martí on the one hand, and Ramon Llull on the other, a few things immediately come to one's attention. First of all, there was a clear difference between Llull's approach of Islamic scriptures and the approach of Martí and Riccoldo. While Llull barely mentioned Islamic sources, and only discussed the life of Muhammad when absolutely necessary for his argumentation, Riccoldo and Martí discussed Islamic scriptures at length, since they saw it as the crux of their argumentation. The reason why they believed in the inferiority of Islam, was the fact that

their scriptures were so deeply un-Christian. A clear overview – with perhaps a discussion – would therefore be enough to explain the evilness of Islam.

Ramon Llull did not share this tactic. He believed that the differences between Islam and Christianity were based on deeper logical, philosophical issues. A deep dive into the Qur'ān and the Sunna would be an unnecessary distraction from the real, deeper differences between Christianity and Islam, which were based on the attributes of God and the belief – or disbelief – in the Trinity. The works of Riccoldo and Martí, in particular the *De seta Machometi* by Martí and the *Contra legem saracenorum* by Riccoldo, were supposed to get under the skin of the reader: by focusing on sin and shame, one might find ways to demonize Islam and to create a scare mechanism among fellow Christians.

When viewing this particular difference between Llull on the one hand, and Riccoldo and Martí on the other, one might be tempted to argue that Llull's point of view was more objective, more rational and more nuanced, while Riccoldo and Martí were more emotive, with a less intellectual and more shallow grasp of the Islamic intellectual world. This idea could arguably be defended, but does not work completely. Martí and Riccoldo did not *only* base their reasoning on emotive arguments against Islam. Riccoldo also highlights where Muslims might have some kind of moral – albeit never religious – high ground – at least, when it comes to their customs. Ramon Llull's philosophical system never highlights any redeeming quality of Islamic religious custom, since it would not fit his larger image of Islam. Martí discusses certain philosophical particularities of Islam, which were also known and discussed in the Christian world at the time due to the new accessibility of Islamic metaphysics. Ramon Martí distilled Islamic arguments in his *Explanatio symboli* and in his *Pugio fidei*. He always addressed the Islamic – or Averroist – arguments in a more schematic, more objective manner, while Ramon Llull misrepresented certain dialogues. As mentioned in the chapter on Ramon Martí, Llull's account of the Islamic point of view served in the first place to explain his own overarching philosophical world view, and the correct reference to Islamic thoughts was only secondary. Martí did not have the same philosophical 'burden' to prove his philosophical mechanisms, which left him relatively free to discuss Islamic philosophy in a more objective light. The greatest difference between Riccoldo and Martí on the one hand, and Llull on the other, is the central presence of the *Ars* in Llull's view of the world.

The ideal vision of Ramon Llull, as someone who was less intellectually biased or even more friendly towards Islam than his contemporaries, or as someone who could even nuance the existing image of the Islamic other, is not very accurate. Ramon Llull never went beyond the existing paradigms about Islam, even if his interpretation of Islamic culture was more sterile and less visceral or emotive than that of his contemporaries. This is not to say that Ramon Llull's understanding of Islam was not in any way genuine. However, his descriptions of Islamic culture, and of Muslims themselves, needed to fit his own mold of how they were supposed to be and act according to what would be implied by the philosophical and theological differences between Christians and Muslims as Llull describes them in the *Ars*. Llull was not inherently different from his contemporaries in his views of Islam, although his approach to them was more intellectually empathic – since he used shared philosophical truths as a base of his argument instead of vitriolic attacks – and less overtly hostile. Llull had the same end-all-be-all purpose as his contemporaries, being

that he did not inherently wish for dialogue for the sake of dialogue, but ideally for the sake of conversion and for keeping anyone from believing in Islam.

PART IV: CONCLUSION

Throughout the previous parts of this dissertation, I endeavoured to map out the particularities of Llull's ideas concerning mission and preaching Christian doctrine, as apparent from the *Disputatio Raimundi*. The main question at stake was "what was Ramon Llull's own method of bringing about the conversion of Muslims?". In order to establish the framework of my research, and to define the uniqueness of the *Disputatio Raimundi*, I first researched the place of the *Disputatio Raimundi* in Llull's œuvre, in relation to both its goal and its content. Secondly, I compared the *Disputatio Raimundi* to Islamic theological debates, and I investigated the manner in which Llull's philosophy was related to the theories of Islamic thinkers. Thirdly, I clarified to some extent how Llull related to 13th century tendencies in Christian mission by comparing his method, as apparent in the *Disputatio Raimundi* with the methods used by Ramon Martí and with the voice of Riccoldo da Monte di Croce. The conclusions made in these three parts contribute to the formation of an answer to the central questions which will be discussed here.

Part one provides a general outline of Llull's thought during the time in which he went to Bijāya, and it shows how Llull used his own theological arguments specifically during a discussion with a non-Christian. It shows how Llull believed one should practice interreligious dialogue at the time of the *Disputatio Raimundi*, and how one should prove the Trinity using the correlative theory. The focus is on the relatively unique place of the *Disputatio Raimundi*, which was written as an actual account of a debate between Llull and an Islamic scholar, based entirely on the correlative theory. It becomes apparent that the *Disputatio* looked somewhat different from Ramon Llull's earlier works, such as the *Llibre del gentil* and the *Llibre de contemplació*, due to the specific necessities of the work. An example could be the uniqueness and concreteness of the arguments, the numbering of the attributes (the order of which is defined by 'Umar's preferred division between essential and non-essential attributes), and the addition of the attributes 'nature' and 'substance' (which is discussed in part two).

Part two provides an answer to the same questions, but it also shows how Llull believed one should relate to Islamic theological questions. This part shows how Llull's own theology concerning the divine was inherently connected to Islamic philosophical concepts, which Llull accepted as valuable as far as they could be applied to a Christian framework. Part two mainly answers the question how Llull believed one should deal with contact between religions, how one should argue, and which attitude one should adopt in dealing with Muslims. However, it also shows a bit of intellectual dishonesty on Llull's part, when he twisted a few Islamic debates in order to fit the narrative of the *Disputatio Raimundi*.

Part three shows how and why Llull chose his particular philosophical technique, and why this was both a reaction and a consequence of his *Zeitgeist*. In the end, the questions mentioned above lead to a critical reflection about the very nature of the contents of Llull's *Disputatio Raimundi*. For example, in the questions just mentioned, it becomes apparent that the intellectual ambition of Ramon Llull shaped his writing of the *Disputatio Raimundi*,

which opens the debate on the role of fictionality and the purpose of the *Disputatio Raimundi*.

1. HOW SHOULD CHRISTIANS DEBATE THE TRINITY WITH NON-CHRISTIANS?

In Ramon Llull's *Disputatio Raimundi*, Llull stresses the importance of debating the Trinity with the Muslim other. Other than his contemporaries, Llull did not believe in a paradigm where the Trinity would be defended by referring to authoritative sources, for example, the Old Testament. Ramon Martí went to great lengths to prove the validity of the Old and New Testaments in Islam, and the relevance of having a discussion based on these sources. Another tactic by Ramon Martí was referring to Christian theologians and their rationalization of the Trinity, even though they likewise did not invent insurmountable evidence for the Trinity.

Llull believed that the Trinity was not simply an incomprehensible dogma, prescribed by the New Testament and foreshadowed in the Old, which had to be simply believed in and which could not be proven. In Llull's ideal of an interfaith dialogue, the Trinity could and should be backed up by reason and logic. The focus of Ramon Llull was not merely the defense but also the proof of the existence of the Trinity – without making *a priori* assumptions about God at all, and without being spurred on by any kind of authority. The answer to the question concerning the proof of the Trinity was the correlative theory, which proved the existence of the Trinity from a purely logical point of view. Llull believed that the fact that the correlative theory was supposedly not based on any kind of assumption or dogma (especially in the *Ars generalis ultima*), but still proved the Trinity, would make it more believable to an Islamic audience, which likewise would not have any reason to assume the existence of the Trinity beforehand.

In the *Disputatio Raimundi*, the Trinity is defended against a few major critiques from Islam: (a) that the Trinity implies difference in God, and thus the destruction of God's unity, and (b) that the Trinity is impossible, due to the fact that God is infinite, that He is not particular, that He has no substance and therefore can receive no accidents and more specifically no number. Apart from these major points of critique, the character 'Umar should be read as a partial misrepresentation of some Islamic points of debate. 'Umar sometimes reverses the correlative theory, after which the character Raimundus replies by referring to the actual correlative theory and the theories of the *Ars*, all of which are based on the genuine Islamic standpoints. It is clear, therefore, that the *Disputatio Raimundi* was written with a certain goal in mind: it primarily meant to show how to prove the Trinity, based on the *Ars*. What Raimundus refutes is not always the Islamic point of view which 'Umar supposedly subscribes to, but also the subversion of the theories of the *Ars*. In the *Ars*, Ramon Llull interprets Islam as a religion which does not believe in the co-essential nature of the attributes. The main point in both the *Ars* and the *Disputatio Raimundi* is to prove the contrary to this position of Islam. The co-essentiality of the attributes of God is the end-all-be-all of the entire argumentation of the *Disputatio Raimundi*: it leads to Raimundus' evidence for the Trinity and defines the voice of 'Umar.

The *Disputatio Raimundi* shows the importance of the *Ars* as a shaping factor throughout Llull's œuvre. It could be that every single work written by Llull was influenced by the

Ars, and written according to its rules. In 1308, the time when Lull wrote his *Disputatio Raimundi*, he also finished his *Ars generalis ultima*. Therefore, one could argue that Lull might have used the methods prescribed in the *Ars generalis ultima* in his mission to Bijāya, and that he also used the *Ars* as a shaping factor afterwards, when he wrote the debate down by heart. Arguably, the elements of the *Ars* were so pervasive in Lull's writing and in his whole thinking, that it could have changed his recollection of the debate in the extreme case, or that he at least felt the need to fit each of his writings in this greater plan, including those works which were supposedly notes of real events. The pervasive influence of the *Ars* on Lull's conscience must above all be underlined, and one should wonder whether most, if not all, of Lull's works were written to reflect his *Ars*.

It is interesting to see that Raimundus' opinions are based on real philosophical theories, present in the Islamic world, which were at one point thought out by Ibn Sīnā, Ibn Rušd and others. 'Umar does not always represent the Islamic point of view, but sometimes also the reversal of Lull's *Ars* and the logical tendencies in Lull's œuvre. This could mean that the character of 'Umar is supposed to show how Raimundus' voice is a much more solid reaction to Islamic theories. 'Umar's arguments should be read as the onset of Raimundus' arguments, not as fully independent thought patterns. Therefore, the *Disputatio Raimundi* should not really be called a genuine account of a dialogue with Islam, but rather a practical explanation of how to prove the Trinity, using the logic of the *Ars*.

2. HOW SHOULD ONE ANSWER THE QUESTIONS OF ISLAMIC SCHOLARS, REGARDING THE NATURE OF GOD?

Throughout the *Disputatio Raimundi*, Raimundus aims to find the answers to the questions asked by the Islamic philosophers who were known in Lull's time. The main questions concerned the nature of the divine attributes: could one ever claim that the attributes of God belonged to God's essence, or would this damage God's unity? This was only one of the voices in a very convoluted debate, where the attributes of God – which could contain any variety of possible attributes – were either deemed essential to Him, rooted within His essence, or describing the act of God within creation. Ramon Lull did not seek to give a detailed overview of every voice in the dialogue, but rather, wished to form one answer to a complicated question. Ramon Lull chose one particular interpretation of the Islamic dialogue concerning the attributes of God, but the theory which he based on this interpretation could answer every question asked in Islamic dialogue – this, at least, was Lull's primary intention. Lull sought to (a) map out the attributes of God, and (b) define their relation to God's essence, in a way which could be logically and rationally upheld. Ramon Lull wished to convince the Islamic intellectual world of the premise of his correlative theory – regarding the number and nature of the divine attributes and their connection to God's essence – before he explained the Trinity.

The theory of the *Ars*, as expressed literally in the *Disputatio Raimundi*, was also meant to reconcile the Trinity with the Islamic *tawhīd*. Ramon Lull never denied the validity of the *tawhīd* or any kind of issue Muslims would take with the Trinity. Rather, Lull's correlative theory was meant to explain the fact that the Trinity did not subvert the rules of the *tawhīd*. In order to prove this, Lull needed to place the Trinity within the context of the Islamic bipartite notion of monotheism: that there could not be multiple gods, and that God

could not intrinsically be differentiated or divided. In the Islamic point of view, the Trinity implies difference within God, and the existence of accidents, while God is neither a finite nor material entity which can receive accidents. The attribution of number or personhood, according to Islamic dogma, would imply the existence of a defined and particular nature or substance, which can receive accidents, like number. God cannot be able to receive accidents due to His infinity, eternity and perfection, since He does not have a defined, particular nature to which a ternary number could be ascribed. Llull attempted to find an answer by redefining the metaphysical level on which the Trinity took place. The correlative theory was meant to establish that God's Persons were not accidental, but essential; that God did have a nature and a substance, even though it is a spiritual one which can only ever be attributed to God; that an entity which is purely spiritual can have a form of difference which is co-essential to Him, and does not imply the subversion of His unity by the existence of differentiation. The very concepts of nature and substance were reinterpreted by Llull, who ascribed a different meaning to them, as long as they pertained to a purely spiritual substance. In Llull's mind, differentiation and unity could be reconciled within God alone, since there is no matter, time or space which keeps the Persons from being essentially the same.

It becomes apparent, especially after the comparison of Ramon Llull with his contemporaries Ramon Martí and Riccoldo da Monte di Croce, that Ramon Llull's conversion method was characterized by a form of theological patience. He never attempted to impose a Christian mindset *ab initio*, by denying the validity of Islamic theological claims. Rather, he accepted Islamic theology as a whole, without ridicule or the destruction of Islamic theological concepts. Rather, Llull sought to redirect the standards of Islamic philosophy, to fit a Trinitarian mindset. The correlative theory, which was at heart based on Islamic theology, placed the Trinity above Islamic concerns about the unity of God and the logic behind divine personhood. It is only after the establishment of a Trinitarian view that Llull can criticize Islam and commend Christianity.

In this way, one might argue that Llull was relatively less guided by intellectual taboos concerning the dealings with Islam than his contemporaries. While it would have been encouraged to base one's opinion of Islam on a theological evisceration and on a purely negative evaluation of Islamic religious traditions and culture without any other conclusion, Llull refused to do so. His choice to include Islamic claims against Christian dogma in the shaping of his *Ars*, and his supposed capability of proving the Trinity without the assumption of an underlying faith was quite new, and would not have been *bon ton* in general. Riccoldo da Monte di Croce included positive evaluations of Islamic culture – which are absent in the *Disputatio* – but he does not go that far that he would attempt to understand and incorporate Islamic philosophical concepts in his interpretation of his own faith. This did not mean that Llull was entirely independent of the intellectual taboos, however. Throughout the *Disputatio Raimundi*, Raimundus will never refer to Islam with a welcoming mindset. Every time when he refers to Islam or Islamic culture directly, it is in the spirit of critique and not acceptance. The relative openness of Ramon Llull to Islamic thought cannot be compared to modern concepts of open-mindedness. Llull's interest was in the first place aimed towards bringing about conversion of Muslims, and not towards an understanding of Islamic culture and philosophy. What one might consider 'openness' was, in fact, simply a means to an end.

Even though Llull's incorporation of Islamic concepts in his *Disputatio Raimundi* was relatively revolutionary (since he, Ramon Martí and Riccoldo da Monte di Croce were one of the very few engaging with the Arabic language), this did not mean that he aimed to provide his reader with an overview of Islamic theology for the sake of understanding. The *Disputatio Raimundi* was meant for a Christian audience, and sought to reinforce the faith of its readers, not to broaden their horizon. The focus of the *Disputatio Raimundi* was in the first place on the logical proof of the Trinity and other Christian dogma, and not necessarily on understanding Islam. This is why the *Disputatio Raimundi* does not always follow a loyal construction of Islamic arguments. It also explains why 'Umar's arguments often seem to follow the *Ars* and not in the first place Islamic philosophy. By reading the *Disputatio Raimundi*, a reader would have sufficient understanding of Christianity to defend him- or herself intellectually against any kind of metaphysical doubt, whether it would come from occupation or imprisonment in Islamic territory, or the arguments against Parisian Averroists. In a way, some of Llull's arguments in the *Disputatio* could be seen as 'stock arguments', which could be used against any kind of non-Christian opponent. A few of Llull's arguments in the *Disputatio Raimundi* were also present in his works against Averroism, for example, or some of his comparisons in the *Disputatio Raimundi* could also be found in his earlier works, separately from the Islamic theme of the *Disputatio Raimundi*.

3. HOW SHOULD ONE DEAL WITH INTERRELIGIOUS ECOUNTER BETWEEN CHRISTIANS AND MUSLIMS?

Many times in the *Disputatio Raimundi*, Raimundus lambasts 'Umar (and by extension his faith) for having a material, temporal outlook on God. According to Llull, 'Umar's attachment to logic, science and metaphysics, which is completely directed towards the logic of the temporal and the finite, impedes him to fully understand the divine. Many times, Llull underlines that the logic of God stands above the logic of the created universe. Form, substance and matter behave differently and should be contemplated about differently when they are attached to the divine. It is a materially oriented culture, which subjugates God to logical standards, coming from our human experience, Raimundus seems to argue.

This outlook on the Islamic point of view did not mean that Ramon Llull, or indeed the character Raimundus, dismissed Islamic claims *ab initio*. Instead of denying the validity of Islamic claims, or just scandalizing the point of view of the Muslim other, Llull accepted 'Umar's arguments. Raimundus' reply takes certain Islamic standards into account, which he accepts in their nuance and validity. Ramon Llull redirected Islamic thought to prove Christianity, instead of destroying Islamic concepts at the root, like many of his contemporaries did. For example, rather than criticizing the thought of Ibn Sīnā, Llull accepted and reinterpreted his thought to prove the Christian Trinity. Ramon Llull does not disagree with Islamic concepts about the divine, but believes that Muslims come to the wrong conclusion. The *Ars* can guide them into the right direction.

That being said, Ramon Llull inherently believed that logic was the only possible method of bringing about the conversion of Muslims. Since Muslims questioned the Trinity from a philosophical point of view (logic) and from a theological point of view concerning

monotheism (*tawhīd*), the answer should be made on those two areas of thought. Any other kind of method would be less effective. A method in which the Qur'ān would be employed to establish Christian theology would not be sufficient, since a tendentious or partial reading of religious sources would only arouse hostility and only invite a correction. A method in which Christianity would be proven by referring to Christian sources would likewise not achieve any success, since Muslims would have no reason to accept the authority of Christian scriptures above their own. Insulting Muhammad or criticizing Islamic religious history and customs would likewise amount to nothing. It would either arouse hostility or destroy one's opponent's certainty in their religion, without any other kind of religion in return, leaving them without faith. Lastly, Ramon Llull also shied away from a method of preaching where one philosophically defended the Trinity from criticism, without providing any concrete evidence. In this case, one's opponent would perhaps be incapacitated in their reasoning, if at all, but they would not necessarily accept the Trinity themselves. Only defending the Trinity against arguments of non-Christians would perhaps be enough to reinforce the faith of a doubtful Christian, but it would not be enough to persuade a person who has no reasons or motivations to accept the Trinity *ab initio*. Therefore, Llull believed that Muslims should be introduced to a logical system, based on a kind of metaphysics which was accepted in Islam, which established the Trinity as a necessary consequence of logic.

This does not mean that Llull blindly takes over the Islamic interpretation of logic, and simply reinterprets its standards to fit a Trinitarian mold. While Llull did believe in the use of logic, this did not mean that he believed in applying the same logic of the temporal and the created to the divine. While many Islamic philosophers – and perhaps some Western Averroists – would use a rigid interpretation of metaphysics to argue that accidents (personhood, attribute, number) cannot be applied to God, since He is not a defined, finite substance, Llull lambasted this form of metaphysics, where temporal and earthly interpretations of philosophical categories were applied to God. Llull agreed with the use of logic, but he made a clear distinction between 'temporal logic' and 'divine logic'. Ramon Llull redefined the category of substance in connection to God, by stressing its immateriality and by calling God a "spiritual substance". The role of immateriality, the infinite and the eternal was important for Llull's reinterpretation of Aristotle's metaphysics, which served his view of the Christian God. This was not widely accepted in Islam, where metaphysics was rooted in a world view which was oriented more towards natural science and philosophy. Ramon Llull hinted that the Islamic interpretation of metaphysics was perhaps too material, and less exalted than his interpretation. In order to prove Christian dogma through logic, Llull needed to show that his form of logic was based more directly on the divine, and that the Islamic interpretation of logic did not do much justice to God's divinity.

4. WHAT DOES THIS MEAN FOR THE DISPUTATIO RAIMUNDI?

The logic of the *Disputatio Raimundi*, and the position and importance of the work in the larger œuvre of Ramon Llull, brings us to the question what the purpose of the work was and, attached to that question, whether it was a truthful retelling of the events in Bijāya. As I said before, the *Disputatio Raimundi* served a clear goal in its connection to the *Ars*. While the *Ars* gave a general, supposedly unbiased outline of an interpretation of metaphysics

which led to the undeniability of the Trinity without making this direction abundantly clear, it was the *Disputatio Raimundi* that showed how to use the *Ars* as a means to prove the Trinity. The *Disputatio Raimundi* served as an example for the *Ars*, which was a general guide for logical thinking. This greater purpose, for which the *Disputatio Raimundi* was written, probably overruled every concern about the truthfulness of the recounting of the events of the *Disputatio Raimundi* during Llull's writing of the work. In reality, it becomes apparent that the arguments made by 'Umar would not necessarily make sense in every case. A Muslim scholar might not arrange his or her arguments based on the systematic listing of the attributes of God, a method which Ramon Llull had already used in many of his previous works. Moreover, the arguments which the Islamic scholar makes are only based on a few major topics, all of which are a subversion of the main logical pillars of the *Ars*. One could easily assume that the Islamic scholar 'Umar was a literary invention, and that his arguments were meant to guide and introduce Llull's. The conversation in the *Disputatio Raimundi* was between Raimundus and anti-Raimundus, and not in the first place between the historical Llull and his Islamic captor. The *Disputatio Raimundi* was, in fact, a fictional, Lullian dialogue quite like the *Llibre del gentil*, even though it was set at the background of actual events from Ramon Llull's life. In an extreme interpretation of the literary connection between the *Disputatio Raimundi* and Llull's previous works, it could be argued that the debate between Llull and the Islamic scholar is not a historical fact and cannot be proven to have happened. The similarities between the *Disputatio Raimundi* and earlier fictional dialogues by Llull could point to the complete fictionality of the *Disputatio Raimundi*, quite like the *Llibre del gentil*. This argument could easily be defended, since there is very little historical proof for any intellectual gathering or debate within the dungeon, during Llull's incarceration, except Llull's own word. There were absolutely no records made of the discussion, and Llull even claims to have lost his own notes. However, it seems too far to completely deny the historicity of the very event itself. Ramon Llull often referred to true events in his life throughout his works. He remained consistent in his recollection of the events in his life, which can be assumed to have really transpired – even though Llull might have reimagined certain events and conversations. Ramon Llull's claim that the discussion in Bijāya took place likewise remained consistent throughout the rest of his œuvre, for example, in the *Vita coetanea*.⁹⁵⁶ Llull did not refer consistently to other completely fictional dialogues in his œuvre as actual historical events. While Llull wrote many of his works (except, perhaps, the many systematic renditions of the *Art*) as stories and embellished narratives, there was still some distinction between reality and fiction. This means that the *Disputatio Raimundi* should be seen as a semi-fictional, embellished version of the events, instead of a completely fictional work like the *Llibre del gentil*. Perhaps the telling of the events of the *Disputatio Raimundi* was based on what Ramon Llull afterwards would have wished to have transpired, an idealized version of a debate which might have been more chaotic or less elaborate. It is a realistic possibility that Ramon Llull had truly made notes of an actual debate which actually had taken place, and that he did end up losing his notes during a shipwreck. While Ramon Llull made the finishing touches to the *Ars generalis ultima*, he might have used the very logic and the

⁹⁵⁶ Cf. for example, Raimundus Lullus, *Liber de acquisitione Terrae Sanctae*, ed. by Fernando Domínguez Reboiras, Turnhout: Brepols, 2017, CCCM, 266, ROL, XXXVIII, 2, pp. 218-219; cf. Raimundus Lullus, *Vita coetanea*, CCCM, 34, ROL, VIII, pp. 296-302.

interpretation of Islam as apparent in the *Ars* to compile the *Disputatio Raimundi*. The fact that the *Ars generalis ultima* and the *Disputatio Raimundi* were partially compiled side by side could have influenced the contents of both works.

While the story behind the *Disputatio Raimundi* was probably semi-true, it is clear that it served a certain purpose in Llull's œuvre. Certain works written by Llull served to guide the religious meditation of a Christian audience, such as the *Llibre de contemplació* and the *Cent noms de Déu*. Other works were meant to map out Llull's philosophy and his world view, or at least a part of it. An example of this category is the *Ars generalis ultima*. Other works served to give Llull's opinion on a certain topic, according to the *Ars*. This category often – but not always – took the form of a dialogue and dealt with the topic of interreligious or philosophical debates. An example of this category is the *Llibre del gentil*. It is clear that Llull wrote the *Disputatio Raimundi* as a part of the third category, where he set out to provide his thought about dialogue with Islam based on the *Ars generalis ultima*. Like all of the dialogues which he wrote, the opponent was at least partially a strawman, meant to introduce and question Llull's thought, after which Llull replies by sharing his own philosophical truth. The *Disputatio Raimundi*, in as far as it was a retelling of the events in Bijāya, has its own place within Llull's œuvre, where it fulfills its own typical function of a work where the main thoughts are outlined and shaped by debate.

