

reparación posterior renacentista. Y si ya se contaba con los rastros del primer Renacimiento –sobre todo en Sibiuda y Nicolás de Cusa⁸⁴–, que enlazarían con la influencia de Llull en la filosofía moderna,⁸⁵ aquí hemos señalado su rastro más temprano aún, en el momento de la introducción de este movimiento en la península Ibérica –en concreto, en el Humanismo catalán–, con lo cual se complementa aquel recorrido.⁸⁶

de pensamiento en un humanista del siglo XIV?, en «Studia Philologica Valentina» 10, M. A. CORONEM-Y J. BELTRAN (Eds.), *Pensamiento humanístico y reformas: Orígenes y desarrollos* (2007), pp. 65-94.

⁸⁴ M. BATLLORI, en *Ramon Llull i el lul·lisme*, cit., después de tratar a modo de sinopsis *El lul·lisme a Itàlia*, pp. 221-335, se centra en dos etapas *El lul·lisme del Renaixement*, pp. 337-391, y finalmente *El lul·lisme del Barroc*, pp. 393-465. Cabe recordar también su rastreo de los viajes lulianos a Italia (*Ibid.*, pp. 221-250); los viajes a Pisa concretamente son los 13º y 14º, y a Messina, el 15º.

⁸⁵ Esta comunicación de hecho subraya la vía frecuentada por el profesor Batllori, quien apuntó raíces humanistas en Llull y, con una bella imagen, otorgaba al lulismo el paso por el umbral de la modernidad: «Amb bons auguris traspasa Ramon Llull l'auri llindar del Renaixement, talment com Alfons el Magnànim traspassava el portal de Nàpols», *Ibid.*, p. 348 (véase en concreto el capítulo *El lul·lisme del primer Renaixement*, pp. 337-349). Ahora bien, Batllori, se refiere a la expansión europea cuatrocentista propiciada –que no propulsada– por el Magnánimo, o sea unos decenios después que Metge.

⁸⁶ El recorrido de expansión del movimiento hispánico, que según las leyes de la geografía y la historia, acabaría en el impulso científico del Portugal de los descubrimientos (M. BATLLORI, *De l'Humanisme*, cit., p. 29), me invita, en referencia a Llull, a plantear si esta línea era espiral, o sea de ida y vuelta; con ello apunto a la hipótesis –no excluida pero tampoco documentada– acerca de su relación con Dante. Si Batllori la posibilita gracias al punteo de sus viajes a Italia, añadido un detalle a través del arte –la figura del primer gentil, en el baptisterio de Pisa, que parece representar a Job (*Un llibre català, un gentil italià i la cultura europea*, en A. M. COMPAGNA-A. DE BENEDETTO-N. PUIGDEVALL I BAFALUY (Eds.), *Napoli, Paesi Catalani, Europa. Momenti di cultura catalana in un millennio. Arte, letteratura, lingua e storia. Atti del VII Convegno dell'AISC (Napoli, 22-24 maggio 2000)*, I (Romanica Neapolitana 31), Liguori, Nápoles 2003, pp. 59-81)– y la posible lectura de *Lulio* en vez de la incomprensible *Lucia* en la *Divina Comedia* (*Si Lucia fos Lulio*, en J. MASSOT (Ed.), *Estudis de Llengua i Literatura en honor de Joan Veny*, II (Biblioteca de l'Abat Oliba 190) Publicaciones de la Abadía de Montserrat, Barcelona 1998, pp. 51-68). Cabe añadir mi punto de apoyo principal: la nota clave en la filosofía luliana –el Dios amoroso y benevolente– se adecua perfectamente a las citas adjudicadas a Lucia, así como también puedo comentar que esta tesis se ha visto apoyada debido a la incongruencia de la tesis tradicional, que le adjudicaba la figura de la santa a causa de problemas de la vista por parte de Dante (*Detrás de los orígenes del Humanismo*, cit., p. 21, nota 27).

Con esta pregunta quisiera hacer de esta comunicación un planteamiento abierto, dada la importancia que una relación real podría tener en el curso de la historia de la cultura; ya que del Humanismo –aun sin haberse realizado en plenitud ni tampoco entendido bien– desciende nada menos que el Renacimiento.

Marcia L. Colish

The Book of the Gentile and the Three Sages: Ramon Lull as Anselm Redivivus?

Ramon Lull's interreligious dialogue, the *Book of the Gentile and the Three Sages* (1274/76), is an early attempt by the Majorcan lay theologian to apply reason to religious faith. Contemporaries gave him a mixed review. Lull was denounced as a heretic in 1376 by the Aragonese Inquisitor-General and by a papal bull. In later medieval and early modern times, condemnations and exonerations proliferated. Modern Neo-Thomism launched another round of criticism and defense of Lull on reason and faith.¹ Recent scholarship has revalued Lull in new ways.² Catalanologists have hailed his contributions to their language, with a five-volume dictionary devoted to that topic alone.³ Other Lullists, finding Thomism

¹ For Lull pro and con through the sixteenth century, the basic survey remains T. CARRERAS Y ARTAU - J. CARRERAS Y ARTAU, *Historia de la filosofía española*, vol. 2: *Filosofía cristiana de los siglos XIII al XV*, Real Academia de Ciencias Exactas, Físicas, y Naturales, Madrid 1943, pp. 30-44, 91-99. Dealing primarily with the early modern period but reprising medieval criticisms of Lull is A. MADRE, *Die theologische Polemik gegen Raimundus Lullus. Eine Untersuchung zu den Elenchi Auctorum de Raimundo Male Sententium, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters*, n. F. 11, Aschendorff, Münster 1973, with an important discussion of modern neo-scholastic reactions to Lull at pp. 95-140. For other recent works on late medieval and early modern views of Lull, see J. N. HILLGARTH, *Ramon Lull and Lullism in Fourteenth-Century France*, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1971, esp. pp. 13-21, 213, 259-260, 269-270, 283-288, 318; M. D. JOHNSTON, *The Reception of the Lullian Art, 1450-1530*, in «Sixteenth-Century Journal» 12 (1981), pp. 31-48; A. BONNER, *Introduction to Selected Works of Ramon Llull*, ed. and trans. A. Bonner, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1985, vol. I, pp. 71-78, 101-102 and, following MADRE but giving only the pro-LULL side of the story, ID., *El arte luliano como método del Renacimiento al Leibniz*, in F. DOMÍNGUEZ-J. DE SALAS (Eds.), *Constantes y fragmentos del pensamiento luliano*, Max Niemeyer, Tübingen 1996, pp. 160-172. On LULL in Renaissance France, see J. M. VICTOR, *The Revival of Lullism at Paris, 1494-1516*, in «Renaissance Quarterly» 28 (1975), pp. 504-534; ID., *Charles de Bovelles and Nicholas Pax. Two Sixteenth-Century Biographers of Ramon Lull*, in «Traditio» 32 (1976), pp. 313-345; J. GAYÀ ESTERLICH, *Algunos temas lulianos en los escritos de Charles de Bovelles*, in «EL» 34 (1980), pp. 49-69; P. E. HUGHES, *Léfévre. Pioneer of Ecclesiastical Renewal in France*, Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, MI 1984, pp. 11-12, 26, 49-51, 64-67.

² For guides to recent scholarship, see A. BONNER, *The Current State of Studies on Ramon Llull's Thought*, in «Catalonia Review» 2 (1989), pp. 139-150; C. LOHR and A. BONNER, *The Philosophy of Ramon Lull. A Survey of Recent Literature*, in «Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévale» 68 (2001), pp. 170-179.

³ M. COLOM MATEU (Ed.), *Glossari General Lul·lià*, 5 vols., Editorial Moll, Mallorca 1982-85. See also the extensive citations of Lull's vocabulary in J. COROMINAS et al. (Eds.), *Diccionari etimològic i complimentari de la llengua catalana*, 10 vols. Curial Edicions Catalanas, Barcelona 1980-2001; A. BONNER - M. I. RIPOLL PERELLÓ, *Diccionari de definicions lul·lianes*, Universitat de Barcelona, Barcelona 2002, is more conceptually oriented and focuses on definitions in Lull's later works. My thanks to J. BUNSEN CARDENAS for the COROMINAS reference. For

passé, now seek to vindicate him as an Anselm of Canterbury *redivivus*.⁴ This paper seeks to challenge that thesis. I will treat two issues: Anselm and Lull on the probative force of hypothetical syllogisms, and Anselm and Lull on necessary reasons, focusing on the *Book of the Gentile* for Lull and the *Monologion*, *Proslogion*, *Contra Gaunilonem*, and *Cur deus homo* for Anselm, although with some attention to their other works.

A description of the *Book of the Gentile* is useful, as it is less well known than Anselm's works. Written in Catalan, and translated into Latin in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries,⁵ it has a preface and four books. The preface introduces the Gentile, deemed to have no philosophical or religious convictions whatsoever. All Lull grants him is the fear of death as personal annihilation. The work seeks to provide grounds for belief in life after death. Three sages, a Jew, a Christian, and a Muslim, engage the Gentile. But first they meet Lady Intelligence. She summarizes divine attributes and human virtues and vices, and tells the sages how to argue for them. As they interact with each other, and with the Gentile, they display collegiality, courtesy, and amity. At least initially, they accent beliefs they hold in common.

This high level of civility is found above all in Bk. 1, on God's existence and nature, and human ethics. God's justice entails the perdurance of His rewards and punishments for

recent scholarship on this aspect of Lull studies, see J. MARTÍ I CASTELL, *Ramon Llull, creador del la llengua literària*, in «SL» 35 (1995), pp. 31-49, with extensive bibliography.

⁴ S. GARCÍAS PALOU, *San Anselmo de Canterbury y el beato Ramon Llull*, in «EL» 1 (1957), pp. 63-89; ID., *Las «rationes necessariae» del bto. Ramón Llull, en los documentos presentados, por él mismo, a la sede Romana*, in *Ibid.* 6 (1962), pp. 323-324; L. EJO GARAY, *Las «razones necesarias» del Beato Ramón Llull, en marco de su época*, in *Ibid.* 9 (1965), pp. 23-68; M. DE GANDILLAC, *Le rêve logique de Raymond Lulle*, in «Revue philosophique de la France et de l'étranger» 157 (1967), p. 192; J. N. HILLGARTH, *Ramon Lull and Lullism*, cit., pp. 6, 21, 24-26, 237-238, 257; B. M. XIBERTA, *La doctrina del maestro Ramón Llull sobre la demostración de los dogmas juzgadas a la luz de la historia de la teología*, in «EL» 18 (1974), pp. 156, 158, 161-162, 165; M. D. JOHNSTON, *The Spiritual Logic of Ramon Llull*, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1987, pp. 4, 5-7, 10-11, 19-20, 82, 108, 118-119, 133, 313; ID., *The Evangelical Rhetoric of Ramon Llull. Lay Learning and Piety in the Christian West around 1300*, Oxford University Press, New York 1996, pp. 23-24, 34-36; E. COLOMER, *Raimund Lulls Stellung zu den Andersgläubigen. Zwischen Zwie- und Streitsgespräch*, in B. LEWIS- F. NIEWÖHNER (Eds.), *Religionsgespräche im Mittelalter*, Otto Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden 1992, p. 227; ID., *La actitud compleja y ambivalente de Ramon Llull ante el judaísmo y el islamismo*, in F. DOMÍNGUEZ - J. DE SALAS (Eds.), *Constantes y fragmentos*, cit., pp. 78, 90; D. DE COURCELLES, *La parole risquée de Raymond Lulle. Entre le judaïsme, le christianisme et l'islam*, Vrin, Paris 1993, pp. 49-50; C. LOHR, *Raymond Lull and Thirteenth-Century Religious Dialogue*, in H. SANTIAGO-OTERO (Ed.), *Diálogo filosófico-religioso entre el cristianismo, judaísmo, y islamismo durante la edad media en la península ibérica*, Brepols, Turnhout 1994, pp. 125-127; C. LOHR, *Ramon Llull. Philosophische Anstöße zu einem Dialog der Religionen*, in ID. (Ed.), *Anstöße zu einem Dialog der Religionen. Thomas von Aquin, Ramon Llull, Nikolaus von Kues*, Verlag der katholischen Akademie der Erzdiözese Freiburg, Freiburg i. B. 1997, pp. 38, 48-49; J. JUDYCKA, *Anselmian Echoes in Ramon Lull's Thought*, in R. MAJERAN-E. I. ZIELIŃSKI (Eds.), *Saint Anselm. Bishop and Thinker*, University Press of the Catholic University of Lublin, Lublin 1999, pp. 323-336; J. V. TOLAN, *Saracens. Islam in the Medieval European Imagination* Columbia University Press, New York 2002, pp. 256-274.

⁵ RAMON LLULL, *Llibre del gentil e dels tres savis*, ed. A. Bonner (NEORL, 2), Patronat Ramon Llull, Palma de Mallorca 1993; Cf. ID., *Liber de gentili et tribus sapientibus*, MOG II, ii, pp. 21-114; *The Book of the Gentile and the Three Wise Men*, in *Selected Works of Raymond Lull*, cit., vol. I, pp. 95-305. At vol. I, pp. XXXI, 101-102, BONNER provides data on the translations, MSS., and editions of the work. Some scholars oppose the current consensus that the work was first written in Catalan, stated by BONNER and confirmed by R. FRIEDLEIN, *Der Dialog bei Ramon Llull. Literarische Gestaltung als apologetische Strategie*, Max Niemeyer, Tübingen 2004, p. 59, arguing that it was originally written in Arabic, although they acknowledge that no Arabic version has ever come to light; see M. DE GANDILLAC, *Le rêve*, cit., pp. 190-191; J. N. HILLGARTH, *Ramon Lull and Lullism*, cit., p. 7.

human choices, requiring the immortality of the soul and the resurrection of the body. Lull does not specify which of the three sages makes these points. It could be any of them. Still, at the end of Bk. 1, they acknowledge that their faiths do differ on posthumous rewards and their attainment. Each then explains his religion's specifics, one-on-one with the Gentile. Bk. 4 ends with the sages forestalling the Gentile's statement of a specific commitment and their assertion that reason will tell them what it is. The sages then close the dialogue by agreeing to remain in friendly conversation.

While Lull's *Gentile* poses substantive questions to the sages, as an interlocutor he has little in common with the disciple in Anselm's dialogic works. There are also striking differences in the modes of argument used by Anselm and Lull. I begin with the understanding of hypothetical syllogisms and their applicability to theological research.

Hypothetical syllogisms were invented by the Stoics and attached to the Aristotelian logical curriculum in late antiquity, whence they made their way into the Middle Ages. While transmitted by Cicero, Martianus Capella, and Cassiodorus, they found their fullest exponent in Boethius.⁶ In his treatise on hypothetical syllogisms, he rings changes on three of its five main types: «If A then B. But A, therefore B»; «Either A or B. But A, therefore not-B»; and «Not both A and B. But A, therefore not-B». Boethius recognizes that these syllogisms demonstrate nothing about reality as such.⁷ Unlike categorical syllogisms, on which he also wrote, their validity is purely formal, intra-logical. This feature of hypotheticals was also recognized by non-specialists. Augustine cites the «if/then» form in *De doctrina christiana*, distinguishing clearly between the rules of valid inference and the truth of propositions. Hypotheticals may yield valid inferences. But with respect to truth they are irrelevant.⁸ Indeed, in *Contra Academicos*, he charges the Academics with reducing logic as such to «if/then» arguments in order to support their claim that no reasoning is probative.⁹ Even as banal a commentator as Isidore of Seville flags the fact that «if/then» hypotheticals bypass the rules governing demonstrative syllogisms.¹⁰

Hypotheticals continued to receive attention and understanding from tenth- and eleventh-century masters such as Gerbert, Notker of S. Gall, Abbo of Fleury, Garlandus Compotista, and Lanfranc. Many of the surviving MSS. of Boethius on hypotheticals were copied then at centers connected with these figures, as well as at Monte Cassino, S. Emmeran, Orléans, Toul, Chartres, and Cluny.¹¹ That Anselm was well aware of their nature and uses is not surprising.

⁶ M. L. COLISH, *The Stoic Hypothetical Syllogisms and Their Transmission in the Early Middle Ages*, in «Res Publica Litterarum» 2 (1979), pp. 19-26, repr. in EAD., *The Fathers and Beyond. Church Fathers between Ancient and Medieval Thought* Ashgate, Aldershot 2008, n. III; BOETHIUS, *De hypotheticis syllogismis*, ed. and trans. L. Obertello, Paideia, Brescia 1969 and OBERTELLO'S Introduction at pp. 20-23, 33-34, 51-124, 144-154, 194-196; K. DÜRR, *The Propositional Logic of Boethius*, North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam 1951, pp. 10-13; A. SPECA, *Hypothetical Syllogistic and Stoic Logic*, Brill, Leiden 2001, pp. 67, 79, 82-84, 133.

⁷ Good recent accounts include A. SPECA, *Hypothetical Syllogistic*, cit., pp. 30, 46 and S. BOBZIEN, *Logic*, in B. INWOOD (Ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Stoicism*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2003, pp. 110-111.

⁸ AUGUSTINE, *De doctrina christiana*, 2.34.53, ed. I. Martin - K.-D. Daur, CCL 32, p. 69.

⁹ ID., *Contra academicos*, 3.11.23, 3.13.29, ed. W. M. Green, CCL 29, pp. 48, 51-52.

¹⁰ ISIDORE OF SEVILLE, *Etymologiarum sive originum libri XX* 2.19.1-17, esp. cc. 7-9, 14-15, ed. W. M. Lindsay, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1911, repr. 1971, vol. I, pp. 88-91.

¹¹ A.-M. JACQUIN, *Les «rationes necessariae» de Saint Anselme*, in *Mélanges Mandonnet*, Vrin, Paris 1930, pp. 72-73; O. G. DARLINGTON, *Gerbert the Teacher*, in «American Historical Review» 52 (1946), p. 464; L. O-

In his classic study of Anselm's logic, Desmond P. Henry shows that such is the case.¹² Several scholars list hypotheticals in Anselm's theological works, but without analyzing their use.¹³ Some even rewrite as hypothetical arguments proofs which Anselm did not frame that way.¹⁴ But Henry, and Gillian Evans, point us in the right direction. Henry notes that Anselm uses the "if/then" form in his *Epistola de incarnatione Verbi* to expose as fallacious the claim that if the Son is incarnated, then so is the Father. In *Cur deus homo* – a point to which I will return – Henry observes that Anselm applies the same hypothetical to whether God created human beings to make up the ranks of the fallen angels.¹⁵ Evans shows that Anselm uses both "if/then" and "either/or" forms with technical precision, especially in *Cur deus homo*. He does so to query "What if?" as a thought experiment, to clear the decks of false possibilities, and to show "the absurdity of applying the method of hypothesis to the discussion of the unchanging properties of the divine nature".¹⁶

We can expand the insights of Henry and Evans. In the *Monologion*, Anselm cites hypotheticals only to critique or reformulate them. He presents arguments we can schematize as "either A/or B, C, or D". Having rejected B, C, and D, he concludes that A holds. But the incommensurability he finds between A and B, C, and D is either a causal impossibility or a contradiction in terms.¹⁷ He recasts a hypothetical formula as a declarative statement with a

BERTELLO in BOETHIUS, *De hypotheticis syllogismis*, cit., pp. 154-166; L. OBERTELLO, *Boezio, Garlando Compositista, Abelardo, e la sillogistica ipotetica nel medioevo*, in ID., *Boezio e dintorni. Ricerche sulla cultura medioevale*, Nardini, Firenze 1989, pp. 179-198; L. MINIO-PALUELLO, *Nuovi impulsi allo studio della logica. La seconda fase della riscoperta di Aristotele e di Boezio*, in *La scuola nell'Occidente latino dell'alto medioevo*, Centro di Studi sull'Alto Medioevo, Spoleto 1972, vol. 2, pp. 743-766; O. LEWRY, *Boethian Logic*, in M. GIBSON (Ed.), *Boethius. His Life, Thought, and Influence*, Blackwell, Oxford 1981, pp. 90-103; M. M. TWEEDALE, *Logic (i). From the Late Eleventh Century to the Time of Abelard*, in P. DRONKE (Ed.), *A History of Twelfth-Century Philosophy*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1988, pp. 202-204; S. GERSH, *Anselm of Canterbury*, in *Ibid.*, pp. 256-257, 261-262; S. J. NELIS, *What Lanfranc Taught, What Anselm Learned*, in «Haskins Society Journal» 2 (1990), pp. 75-82; H. E. J. COWDREY, *Lanfranc. Scholar, Monk, and Archbishop*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2003, pp. 48-50. Abbo of Fleury has been particularly well studied in this connection. See ABBO OF FLEURY, *De syllogismis hypotheticis*, ed. and trans. F. Schupp, Brill, Leiden 1997; F. SCHUPP, *Abbon de Fleury et la logique. Quelques questions historiques et systématiques*, in B. OBRIST (Ed.), *Abbon de Fleury. Philosophie, science et comput autour l'an mil*, Centre d'Histoire des Sciences et des Philosophies Arabes et Médiévales, Paris 2004, pp. 43-59; P. RICHÉ, *Abbon de Fleury. Un moine savant et combatif (vers 950-1004)*, Brepols, Turnhout 2004, pp. 98-101. See also M. MOSTERT, *The Library of Fleury. A Provisional List of Manuscripts*, Verloren Publishers, Hilversum 1989, pp. 24-27, and for the MS. of Abbo's treatise on hypotheticals, now Paris BN lat. 6638, ff. 1-16, *Ibid.*, item BF 1089, p. 213.

¹² D. P. HENRY, *The Logic of Saint Anselm*, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1967, pp. 95, 240-243. See also J. HOPKINS, *A Companion to the Study of St. Anselm*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 1972, pp. 28, 34; G. R. EVANS, *Anselm and a New Generation*, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1980, pp. 174-176; R. W. SOUTHERN, *Saint Anselm. A Portrait in a Landscape*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1990; S. J. NELIS, *What Lanfranc Taught*, cit., pp. 75-82; EAD., *The Boethian Anselm*, in «Haskins Society Journal» 3 (1991), pp. 131-139.

¹³ Noted in J. HOPKINS, *Companion*, cit., pp. 6-7, 75, 110-113, 114-115, 118, 248-249.

¹⁴ On the *Monologion*, see J. HOPKINS, *Companion*, cit., p. 68; on the *Proslogion*, see S. J. NELIS, *Boethian Anselm*, cit., pp. 131-139; on the *De veritate*, see T. J. HOLOPAINEN, *Dialectic and Theology in the Eleventh Century*, Brill, Leiden 1996, pp. 51-52.

¹⁵ D. P. HENRY, *The Logic of Saint Anselm*, cit., pp. 248-249.

¹⁶ G. R. EVANS, *Anselm and a New Generation*, cit., pp. 175-176, 185; the quotation is at p. 176.

¹⁷ ANSELM OF CANTERBURY, *Monologion* 6, 7, 17, 18, in *Opera omnia*, ed. F. S. Schmitt, 6 vols., Nelson, Edinburgh, 1938-61, reprint. Frommann Verlag, Stuttgart 1968, vol. I, pp. 20, 21, 31-32, 32-33. Pagination in the reprint,

subject and predicate.¹⁸ He also posits an "if" clause which states as true an untrue condition, so that its "then" clause is also untrue. Since both premises are false, *nefas est dicere* that the conclusion is true.¹⁹ He grounds these tactics on the notion that no syllogism referring to temporal possibilities is true unless truth exists. And God, as truth itself, is unbounded by time.²⁰ In the *Monologion*, Anselm introduces hypothetical reasoning only to delegitimize it.

Although legions of scholars have misread Anselm's *Proslogion* proof as a syllogism of one kind or another, his famous formula is not the premise of a syllogism. *Et quidem credimus te esse aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari possit* is, rather, a personal, indeed a collective, statement of faith, asserting the accuracy of this understanding of the divine nature. Anselm seeks to show that claims incompatible with it are self-contradictory and lacking in rectitude; they fail to affirm that what is, is. Putting the point in trendier language, some scholars view Anselm's formula as a speech act, that is, a statement that is not abstract or neutral but concrete and performative, affirming a status-recognition or status-change.²¹ The one text connected with the *Proslogion* proof where Anselm invokes a hypothetical is in *Contra Gaunilonem*. As is well known, Gaunilo argues that our possession of an intramental concept, such as a perfect island, does not entitle us to conclude that it corresponds to an extramental reality.²² Anselm replies that this objection is not responsive.²³ He had not argued that intramental existence is an antecedent entailing extramental existence as its consequent. Rather, he had argued – now recasting his initial formula as a hypothetical – that if the being it denotes exists, then it conforms to its own definition. It must therefore be the supreme being, which, unlike islands, however perfect, cannot not be.²⁴

Hypotheticals do occur more frequently in *Cur deus homo*. Anselm cites the "if/then" form repeatedly in Bk. 1.1-12. Translations notwithstanding, the verbs Anselm uses in these passages are not conditionals or subjunctives but present tense indicatives. They are all "Why not?" questions: Why can't mankind be saved by another intelligent created being? Why doesn't the almighty and benevolent God simply save us by fiat? On the latter

used for all Anselm references, is identical to that in the original edition.

¹⁸ *Ibid.* 14, vol. I, p. 27.

¹⁹ *Ibid.* 7, vol. I, p. 21; similarly, with the same language, *Proslogion* 5, vol. I, p. 108.

²⁰ *Ibid.* 18, vol. I, pp. 32-33.

²¹ ANSELM OF CANTERBURY, *Proslogion* 2, 3, 4, 5, 15, vol. I, pp. 103-105, 112. I argued earlier along these lines in M. L. COLISH, *The Mirror of Language. A Study in the Medieval Theory of Knowledge*, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln 1983, 2nd rev. ed., ch. 2. In addition to scholars cited there, see R. CAMPBELL, *Anselm's Theological Method*, in «Scottish Journal of Theology» 3 (1979), pp. 541-546; R. W. SOUTHERN, *Saint Anselm*, cit., pp. 64, 80, 117, 118, 128, 173; A. J. VANDERJAGT, *The Performative Heart of Anselm's Proslogion*, in D. E. LUSCOMBE-G. R. EVANS (Eds.), *Anselm. Aosta, Bec, and Canterbury*, Academic Press, Sheffield 1996, pp. 229-237; F. VAN FLETEREN, *Augustine's Influence on Anselm's Proslogion*, in *Ibid.*, pp. 56-59; J. L. SCHERB, *Anselm's philosophische Theologie. Programm, Durchführung, Grundlagen*, Kohlhammer, München 2000, pp. 36-37. E. A. SYNAN, *Prayer, Proof, and Anselm's Proslogion*, in A. FINKEL-L. FRIZZELL (Eds.), *Standing before God. Studies in Prayer in Scripture and in Tradition with Essays in Honor of John M. Oesterreicher*, Ktav, New York 1981, pp. 267-268 agrees although he rejects the idea that the *Proslogion* formula is a definition. For speech-act theory in this connection, see R. CAMPBELL, *Anselm's Theological Method*, cit., p. 546 and A. J. VANDERJAGT, *Performative Heart*, cit., p. 236.

²² GAUNILO, *Pro insipiente* 3, 5-7, vol. I, pp. 126, 127-129.

²³ ANSELM OF CANTERBURY, *Contra Gaunilonem* 1-6, 8, vol. I, pp. 131-136, 137-138.

²⁴ *Ibid.* 4, 5, vol. I, pp. 133-134, 135.

point, Anselm says that we should attribute no limitations, or anything unfitting, to God, despite the nature of privative language. Attributing the unfitting to God parallels such formulae as "If water is dry, then fire is wet". Both premises are contrary to fact. The same applies to any conclusion they yield. At best, "if/then" arguments are plausible, at least if they describe behavior fitting to God.²⁵

As in the *Monologion*, in the *Cur deus homo* Anselm offers a hypothetical argument which he immediately subverts, in this case an "either/or". Either God's honor should be ignored, or sinners should be punished, otherwise either God's justice would be frustrated or He would lack the power to enforce it. We can entertain neither of these options. A real disjunction does not apply, since each side of each part of the double "either/or" states a condition that does not rule out the condition with which it is paired. Here Anselm shifts to conditional and subjunctive verbs, as he does in discussing contrary-to-fact-conditions and events that might have been possible had they occurred.²⁶ As for the fallen angels, Anselm's "either/or" actually refers to God's knowledge. Either God does not know how many rational creatures ought to exist, or He does know and thus replaces the fallen angels with an appropriate number of human beings. Either the fallen angels ought to be replaced, or the number of rational creatures in existence would be smaller than what God foreknows to be their perfect number. Here, Anselm posits alternatives that are mutually exclusive, enabling him to draw the desired conclusions. At the same time, he stipulates that these conclusions are controlled by what is appropriate to God.²⁷

From Bk. 2.10 onward, Anselm shifts the *Cur deus homo* analysis to premises about Christ's nature and actions viewed as historical data. These data are necessary in the sense that the past itself is necessary: Past options, once acted upon, cease to be possible.²⁸ This leads to my second theme, necessity and necessary reasons. Anselm is familiar with Aristotle's teaching as reprised by Boethius. Boethius distinguishes simple necessity, an ineluctable feature of a being's intrinsic nature, from conditional necessity, which obtains incontrovertibly when it obtains, but which may or may not obtain.²⁹ Anselm rephrases this distinction as one between antecedent and consequent necessity. Antecedent necessity includes the inexorable natural laws producing effects from their causes. While God is necessary in that He exists in an unqualified way, no necessity exists in God in that nothing but God causes His actions, and He is not constrained by anything else, whether necessary or possible.³⁰ In all these respects, Anselm's understanding of necessity is logical, but also metaphysical, since the antecedents from which consequents flow are their cause or ground of being.

²⁵ ANSELM OF CANTERBURY, *Cur deus homo* 1.5, 1.6, 1.9, 1.12, vol. 2, pp. 52, 53-55, 61-64, 69-70. The point regarding the limits of hypotheticals is stated at 1.12, vol. 2, p. 70.

²⁶ *Ibid.* 1.13, 2.19, vol. 2, pp. 71, 130-131.

²⁷ *Ibid.* 1.16, vol. 2, pp. 74-75. See also 1.18, 2.1, 2.4, 2.8, vol. 2, pp. 76-84, 97-98, 99, 102-104 for examples based on "if/then" and "either/or" models.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 2.11, vol. 2, pp. 111-112.

²⁹ BOETHIUS, *De consolazione philosophiae*, 5.6.27, ed. L. Bieler, CCSL 94, p. 103.

³⁰ ANSELM OF CANTERBURY, *Cur deus homo* 2.17, vol. 2, pp. 122-126; see also *Contra Gaunilonem* 4 and *De concordia* 1.2, vol. 1, pp. 133-134; vol. 2, pp. 247-250. Some scholars limit the horizons on Anselm on necessary reasons to these definitions; see T. J. HOLOPAINEN, *Necessity in Early Medieval Thought. Peter Damian and Anselm of Canterbury*, in P. GILBERT-H. KOHLENBERGER-E. SALMANN (Eds.), *Cur deus homo*, Pontificio Ateneo S. Anselmo, Roma 1999, pp. 222-223, 232-234; M. ALBERTO, *Significato e usus loquendi nel Cur deus homo*, in *Ibid.*, pp. 406-407.

At the same time, Anselm's view of necessary reasoning in theology has engendered diverse scholarly appraisals, ranging from rationalism to fideism to mysticism.³¹ His views on this subject are in fact nuanced and far from monolithic. In *De processione Spiritus Sancti*, his norm is what Holy Scripture states expressly and what follows from Scripture by rational necessity, so long as no reason opposes it. In this context, polemic with the Greek church, this means the correct, i.e. the Roman, interpretation of Scripture and tradition.³² In the *Monologion*, he offers a more qualified norm. Unless contradicted by a greater authority, he says, what he concludes should be accepted, "as if by necessary reasons, as they seem to me": *ex rationibus quae mihi videbuntur, quasi necessarium concludatur*. This necessity is not absolute and it holds only for the time being: *non ob hac tamen omnino necessarium, sed a tantum sic interim videri posse dicatur*.³³

The *Proslogion* and its pendant offer no express essay on method. Anselm may have recycled Augustine as the source for his famous formula, and as a model on prayer as a research method, but he does not reference authority. In *Cur deus homo*, he is more forthcoming, although his avowed principles contain even more qualifications than those of the *Monologion*. He states that he will argue *remoto Christo*, as if nothing had been revealed or handed down about Christ. He will rely on arguments *non minus aperta ratione et veritate [...] atque ex necessitate [...]*.³⁴ Anselm attaches several conditions to this norm. First, he will need the help of Boso, his interlocutor, and of God. Second, even if he appears to be drawing rational conclusions, they are acceptable only if confirmed by a greater authority. Third, they should be accepted provisionally, pending either divine revelation or an argument advanced by a wiser mind. Fourth, however wise, all conclusions on this subject are partial in the light of superior reasons that remain hidden.³⁵ Finally, we should accept nothing at all inappropriate to God and reject nothing at all reasonable. "For in God's case, just as what follows from any impropriety, however slight, is impossible, so even a small reason, if not refuted by one greater, follows by necessity": *Sicut enim in deo quamlibet parvum inconueniens sequitur impossibilitas, ita quamlibet parvam rationem, si maiori non vincitur, comitatur necessitas*.³⁶ Commentators have recognized that congruence with the divine nature as it is believed to be, and the limited and provisional nature of theological statements, condition rational arguments in Anselm's sight.³⁷ Yet, even with such limits, they may yield necessary conclusions, an option he

³¹ A useful historiographical overview is supplied by N. ALBANESI, *Cur deus homo. Logica della redenzione. Studio sulla teoria della soddisfazione di S. Anselmo arcivescovo di Canterbury*, Editrice Pontificia Università Gregoriana, Roma 2002, pp. 13-80, 156-163; he himself opts for the mystical view at pp. 156-163. Other accounts include, on the side of a *a priori* rationalism, M. ENDERS, *Das Thema und die rationale Methode von «Cur deus homo»*, in P. GILBERT-H. KOHLENBERGER-E. SALMANN (Eds.), *Cur deus homo*, cit., pp. 333-366; and, attacking both *a priori* rationalism and mysticism in favor of a theological poetics referencing Augustine's *ordo amoris*, M. B. PRANGER, *The Artificiality of Christianity. Essays on the Poetics of Monasticism*, Stanford University Press, Stanford 2003, pp. 107, 117-121, 122, 127, 137-139, 154-156, 168-172.

³² ANSELM OF CANTERBURY, *De processione Spiritus Sancti* 2, vol. 2, p. 209.

³³ *Id.*, *Monologion* 1, vol. 1, p. 14. My translation here and elsewhere in this paper.

³⁴ *Id.*, *Cur deus homo* praefatio, vol. 2, pp. 42-43.

³⁵ *Ibid.* 1.2, vol. 2, p. 50.

³⁶ *Ibid.* 1.10, vol. 2, p. 67; see also 1.20-1.21, 1.25, vol. 2, pp. 87-89, 94-96.

³⁷ Excellent brief statements are provided by W. J. COURTENAY, *Necessity and Freedom in Anselm's Conception of God*, in *Die Wirkungsgeschichte Anselms von Canterbury*, Analecta Anselmiana, Frankfurt 1975, vol. 4/2, pp. 39-

does not grant to those based on hypothetical syllogisms.

It used to be thought that post-Anselmian scholastics found his approach outmoded.³⁸ Recent scholars have shown that his influence was more extensive, particularly among Franciscans.³⁹ Anselm's God, unconstrained by any necessity, also resonated with scholastics debating God's absolute and ordained power.⁴⁰ Nor did his sensitivity to the limits of hypothetical syllogisms lapse in the sequel.⁴¹ It is moot whether this Latin tradition was known to Lull. No consensus exists on how, following his conversion in 1263, he acquired his education, and whether Cistercians, Franciscans, or Dominicans may have been involved.⁴² We do know that, having bought a Muslim slave in order to learn Arabic, Lull translated Al-Ghazzali's

64, reprt. in ID., *Covenant and Causality in Medieval Thought. Studies in Philosophy, Theology, and Economic Practice*, Variorum Reprints, London 1984, n. I; M. M. ADAMS, *Elegant Necessity, Prayerful Dispute. Method in Cur deus homo*, in P. GILBERT-H. KOHLENBERGER-E. SALMANN (Eds.), *Cur deus homo*, cit., pp. 367-396; M. PERKAMS, *Rationes necessariae-rationes verisimiles et honestissimae. Methoden philosophischer Theologie bei Anselm und Abelard*, in G. E. M. GASPER-H. KOHLENBERGER (Eds.), *Anselm and Abelard. Investigations and Juxtapositions*, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto 2006, pp. 143-147. Also useful for some aspects of these stipulations are J. HOPKINS, *Companion*, cit., pp. 48-52, 65, 202-203, 249-250, 252-253; R. CAMPBELL, *Anselm's Theological Method*, cit., pp. 546-556; D. BROWN, «Necessary» and «Fitting» Reasons in Christian Theology, in *The Rationality of Religious Belief. Essays in Honour of Basil Mitchell*, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1987, pp. 214-219; M. ROOT, *Necessity and Unfittingness in Anselm's Cur deus homo*, in «Scottish Journal of Theology» 40 (1987), pp. 215-216, 229; R. W. SOUTHERN, *Saint Anselm* cit., pp. 125-126, 180-181, 201-203, 227; T. J. HOLOPAINEN, *Dialectical Theology*, cit., pp. 119-55; K. M. STALEY, *Divinity, Necessity, and Freedom in Anselm of Canterbury*, in J. L. FORTIN (Ed.), *Saint Anselm. His Origins and Influence* Edwin Mellen, New York 2001, pp. 85-95. For Anselm on rectitude as the criterion of theological appropriateness, the classic study remains R. POUCHET, *La rectitudo chez Saint Anselme. Un itinéraire augustinien de l'âme à Dieu*, Études Augustiniennes, Paris 1964.

³⁸Argued as early as F. S. Schmitt in his ed. of ANSELM, *Opera omnia*, cit., vol. 1, pp. 3, 91, 169; followed by G. R. EVANS, *Anselm and a New Generation*, cit., M. L. COLISH, *The Mirror of Language*, cit., p. 106; R. W. SOUTHERN, *Saint Anselm*, cit., p. 370.

³⁹J. CHÂTILLON, *De Guillaume d'Auxerre à Thomas d'Aquin. L'argument de Saint Anselme chez les premiers scolastiques du XIIIe siècle*, in *Spicilegium Beccense*, Abbaye Notre Dame-Vrin, Le Bec-Hellouin-Paris 1959, vol. I, pp. 209-231, reprt. in ID., *D'Isidore de Seville à Saint Thomas d'Aquin. Études d'histoire et de théologie*, Variorum Reprints, London 1985, n. X; M. ROBSON, *Anselm's Influence on the Soteriology of Alexander of Hales. The Cur deus homo*, in P. GILBERT-H. KOHLENBERGER-E. SALMANN (Eds.), *Cur deus homo*, cit., pp. 199-219; S. MATTHEWS, *Reason, Community, and Religious Tradition. Anselm's Argument and the Friars*, Ashgate, Aldershot 2001; C. J. MEWS, *Saint Anselm and the Development of Philosophical Theology in Twelfth-Century Paris*, in G. E. M. GASPER-H. KOHLENBERGER (Eds.), *Anselm and Abelard*, cit., pp. 196-222. For positive influences on AQUINAS, see J.-P. TORRELL, *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, trans. R. Royal, Catholic University of America Press, Washington 1966, vol. I, p. 266.

⁴⁰W. J. COURTENAY, *Capacity and Volition. A History of the Distinction of Absolute and Ordained Power*, Pierluigi Lubrina, Bergamo 1990, pp. 31-92; L. MOONAN, *Divine Power. The Medieval Power Distinction up to Its Adoption by Albert, Bonaventure, and Aquinas*, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1994, although Moonan treats this theme as essentially a problem in logic.

⁴¹As is noted by J. SPRUYT, *Thirteenth-Century Positions on the Rule «Ex impossibili sequitur quidlibet»*, in K. JACOBI (Ed.), *Argumentationstheorie. Scholastische Forschungen zu den logischen und semantischen Regeln korrekten Folgern*, Brill, Leiden 1993, pp. 170-181, some scholastics in the late thirteenth century argued that "if/then" syllogisms, in order to be valid, had to denote a cause-effect relationship between the antecedent and the consequent, while others insisted on the classical and early medieval view that causes of being should not be confused with causes of logical entailment, and that hypothetical syllogisms of this type do not yield proofs about extramental realities.

⁴²A. BONNER, in *Selected Works*, cit., vol. I, pp. 17-23; M. D. JOHNSTON, *Spiritual Logic*, cit., pp. 10-11.

Logic into Catalan verse in ca. 1275. Ghazzali wrote this work before the *crise de conscience* leading to his misgivings about philosophy. It is a straightforward account of Aristotelian syllogistic, amplified by hypothetical syllogisms. Ghazzali distinguishes demonstrative syllogisms, both the cause-to-effect and the effect-to-cause types, from hypotheticals, of which he cites the "if/then" and "either/or" forms. While hypotheticals yield formally valid conclusions when their consequents are congruent with their antecedents, they tell us nothing about extramental reality. That honor is confined to demonstrative syllogisms, which have a subject and predicate structure and whose premises can be verified in the real world. Demonstratives yield necessary conclusions that are "true, credible, indubitable, and without deception".⁴³ Scholars competent to compare Lull's version with the Arabic text as well as with the Latin translations of Ghazzali made in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries agree that he departs notably from his source. Lull adds material that Ghazzali would have found bizarre and omits or blurs Ghazzali's lucid specifications. His addenda include the claim that God's existence, and the doctrines of the Trinity and Incarnation, can be demonstrated logically. But these proofs are persuasive only if theologically seemly, and only to minds granted divine illumination.⁴⁴ Lull does not explain whether he means Bonaventure's pan-illuminationism, or our natural rational endowment, or something else.

Less frequently noted are the logical teachings of Ghazzali that Lull ignores or confuses. Absent is Ghazzali's crisp distinction between the probative force of demonstrative and hypothetical syllogisms. Lull treats the "if/then" syllogism as yielding necessary conclusions in theology as in other areas, in a manner no different from categorical syllogisms.⁴⁵ In discussing the meanings of words, Ghazzali lists the univocal, the diversivocal, the multivocal, the equivocal, and the convenient. Univocals apply in the same way to more than one individual. Diversivocals are synonyms, different words denoting the same things. Multivocals are different terms for different things. Equivocals apply the same terms to different things, literally to one and figuratively to another. Convenient words, also called conventional or ambiguous, stand midway between univocals and equivocals, as with "being" and "to be", which can denote both substance and accidents.⁴⁶ In Lull's hands, Ghazzali's convenience becomes *convenientia*, the norm of theological congruity. Synonyms morph into Lull's doctrine of *equiparancia*, by which he seeks to equate correlatives and identify antecedents with consequents. In no way can this doctrine be confused with the equipollent arguments used by Lanfranc and Anselm.⁴⁷

⁴³C. LOHR (Ed.), *Logica Algazalis. Introduction and Critical Text*, in «Traditio» 21 (1965), pp. 223-90. Lohr discusses the dating of the Latin translations at pp. 228-230; on hypothetical syllogisms, pp. 253-254, 259; the quotation is at p. 259: «vera, credibilis, sine dubietate et sine deceptione». My translation.

⁴⁴J. RUBIÓ BALAGUER (Ed.), *La Lògica del Ghazzali posada en rims per en Ramon Lull*, in «Anuari de Institut d'Estudis Catalans» 5/1 (1913-14), II. 257-265, 639-647, 679-702, 728-770, 1321-1323, 1366-1373, pp. 335, 341-342, 349. Departures from GHAZZALI are noted by the editor, pp. 321-323; J. N. HILLGARTH, *Ramon Lull and Lullism*, cit., pp. 7, 15, 19-20; M. D. JOHNSTON, *Spiritual Logic*, cit., pp. 31-44.

⁴⁵J. RUBIÓ BALAGUER (Ed.), *La Lògica*, cit., II. 358-363, 432, 505-512, 669-670, pp. 337, 338, 341. Noted by M. D. JOHNSTON, *Spiritual Logic*, cit., p. 140.

⁴⁶C. LOHR (Ed.), *Logica Algazalis*, cit., pp. 245-46.

⁴⁷J. RUBIÓ BALAGUER (Ed.), *La Lògica*, cit., on convenientia: II. 799-1079, 1224-1235, pp. 343-346, 347-348; on equiparancia: II. 1444-1446, p. 350. On equipollent argumentation in Lanfranc and Anselm, see M. L. COLISH, *Mirror*, cit., pp. 92, 95-103; R. W. SOUTHERN, *Saint Anselm*, cit., pp. 51-52; H. E. J. COWDREY, *Lan-*

The problem here lies not only in Lull's misconstruction of Ghazzali but also in the imprecision of his Catalan. His use of key terms is anything but technical, both in his translation of Ghazzali and elsewhere in his *oeuvre*. For him, *equiparancia* can mean equality, association, parity, brotherhood, or sisterhood: *egalitat, companyia, parietat, ffraternitat, sororitat*.⁴⁸ Some of these terms refer to essential qualities and others to accidental relationships. For Lull, *demonstratió* refers not only to necessary proofs, which, as noted, he thinks follow from hypothetical arguments, but also to what is merely possible; to an unexcogitated or non-verbal indication of a state of affairs; and to anything that reports, displays, reflects, or illustrates something else, whatever its epistemic content and valency.⁴⁹ Lull also applies *necessari* and its cognates, which he was the first Catalan writer to use, to apodictic theological proofs; to indigence, the lack of what one needs or requires; to duties or obligations externally imposed; and to whatever one must do to obtain an objective.⁵⁰

When Lull's Catalan works, including the *Book of the Gentile*, were translated into Latin, these terminological problems were often exaggerated, explaining why scholastics of whatever stripe were disconcerted by his logic.⁵¹ Modern commentators disagree on its nature and merits.⁵² Some defend the probative force of his reasoning;⁵³ some limit its application to equiparant arguments.⁵⁴ Others maintain that Lull's logic was not designed to be probative, accenting his comments on theological congruence, faith, and illumination.⁵⁵

franc, cit., p. 58.

⁴⁸ J. RUBIÓ BALAGUER (Ed.), *La Lògica*, cit., ll. 1444-1446, p. 350.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, ll. 241-246, 669-670, pp. 335, 341; M. COLOM MATEU, s.v. *Demonstratió*, in *Glossari*, cit., vol. 2, pp. 42-44. Lull's imprecision in the use of this term has been noted by M. D. JOHNSTON, *Spiritual Logic*, cit., pp. 109-120, esp. pp. 110-111, 118-119; W. W. ARTUS, *Faith and Reason in Aquinas and Lull*, in «SL» 35 (1995), p. 65; as Artus observes, the term, for Lull, "did not carry in ordinary usage the meaning of strict demonstrative truth in an Aristotelian sense". A. BONNER, *The Art and Logic of Ramon Lull. A User's Guide*, Brill, Leiden 2007, pp. IX, X, 12, 16-21, 65-67, 256-257, agrees, although presenting these departures, and others noted in this paragraph, with studied neutrality, as merely descriptive of Lull's originality.

⁵⁰ M. COLOM MATEU, s.v. *Necessari*, s.v. *Rahons*, in *Glossari*, cit., vol. 3, p. 409; vol. 4, pp. 304-305; J. COROMINAS et al., s.v. *Necesitat*, in *Diccionari*, cit., vol. 5, pp. 890-891.

⁵¹ As noted by R. CORDESCHI, *I sillogismi di Lullo*, in V. M. ABRUSCI-E. CASARI-M. MUGNAI (Eds.), *Atti del convegno internazionale della logica, San Geminiano, 4-8 dicembre 1982*, CLUEB, Bologna 1983, pp. 259-261.

⁵² An excellent anatomization to its date is provided by J. J. E. GRACIA, *La doctrina Luliana de las razones necesarias en el contexto de algunas de sus doctrinas epistemológicas y psicológicas*, in «EL» 19 (1975), pp. 25-40. More recently, see C. LOHR, *Ramon Lull's Theory of Scientific Demonstration*, in K. JACOBI (Ed.), *Argumentationstheorie*, cit., pp. 729, 730, 742-43, arguing for the coherence of Lull's logic, and A. BONNER, *Art and Logic*, cit., *passim*.

⁵³ T. CARRERAS Y ARTAU-J. CARRERAS Y ARTAU, *Historia*, cit., vol. 2, p. 129 n. 78; A. BONNER, *L'Art de Ramon Lull com a sistema lògica*, in J. MASSOT i MUNTANER (Ed.), *Lògica, ciència, mística i literatura en l'obra de Ramon Lull*, Curial, Barcelona 1986, pp. 35-58; L. BADIÉ, *Teoria i pràctica de la literatura en Ramon Lull*, Quaderns Crema, Barcelona 1991, pp. 23-25; C. LOHR, *Ramon Lull and Thirteenth-Century*, cit., pp. 117-28; J. V. TOLAN, *Saracens*, cit., pp. 256-274.

⁵⁴ W. W. ARTUS, *Faith and Reason*, cit., pp. 64-65; J. M. RUIZ SIMON, *L'Art de Ramon Lull i la teoria escolàstica*, Quaderns Crema, Barcelona 1999, pp. 31-45; J. JUDYCKA, *Anselmian Echoes*, cit., pp. 327-328.

⁵⁵ L. EIJO GARAY, *Las «razones necesarias»*, cit., pp. 25-38; B. M. XIBERTA, *La doctrina del maestro Ramon Lull*, cit., pp. 152-79; S. GARCÍAS PALOU, *San Anselmo*, cit., pp. 63-89; R. SUGRANYES DE FRANCH, *Le «Livre du Gentil et des Trois Sages» de Raymond Lulle*, in M.-H. VICAIRE-B. BLUMENKRANZ (Eds.), *Juifs et judaïsme de Languedoc, XIIIe siècle-début XIV siècle*, Édouard Privat, Toulouse 1977, pp. 322-324, 333; R. CORDESCHI, *I sillogismi di Lullo*, cit., pp. 261-264; M. D. JOHNSTON, *Spiritual Logic*, cit., pp. 109-120; ID., *Evangelical Rhetoric*, cit., pp. 34-36; C. LOHR, *Ramon Lull. Philosophische Anstöße*, cit., pp. 38, 48-49. A *sui generis* approach is offered by H. DIDIER, *Raymond Lulle*, Didier, Paris 2001, p. 133, who regards Lull's arguments as referring to Jungian archetypes.

They view his conclusions as merely probable, preserving God's mystery.

What of Lull's claims, and actual practices, in the *Book of the Gentile*? At the start, Lady Intelligence instructs the three sages to persuade the Gentile by means of necessary rational demonstrations, *rahons demostratives necessaries*.⁵⁶ Elsewhere in her speech, however, she alerts us to the porosity of this principle, as well as others that Lull invokes. She indicates seven uncreated virtues, the divine attributes of goodness, greatness, eternity, power, wisdom, love, and perfection. These do not contradict each other and are co-equal,⁵⁷ an observation that obscures the range of logical distinctions between identity and mutual exclusion. She then indicates seven created, or human, virtues, the cardinal and theological virtues. Neither do they contradict each other; nor can they conflict with the uncreated virtues – a point to which I will return. The better the created virtues are, she adds, the more they "demonstren" the uncreated ones.⁵⁸ "Demonstrate" here simply means to refer to or indicate.

Bk. 1 opens with a generic idea of necessity. Its goal is to "demonstrate to the Gentile what he needs to know": *demonstrem ço que li es necessaria cosa a saber*.⁵⁹ Lull then presents his proofs of God's existence and prime attributes. The degrees-of-being argument, which he thinks brooks no objection, establishes God's existence. He then asserts God's greatness and goodness as an obvious correlative of being that requires no proof, *maniffesta cosa es al human enteniment*.⁶⁰ He then infers the other divine attributes from these, using equiparancia and convenientia as grounds for concluding what he wants to prove.⁶¹ He does not explain whether being is a prime attribute on which the others depend, and does not see any difference in epistemic weight between self-evident first principles and what we can infer from them. He is equally unaware of the doctrine of the transcendentals, available in Arabic as well as Latin.⁶²

In Bk. 1.26, Lull considers how the divine virtues accord with each other, and how human virtues accord with them, using "if/then" hypotheticals and leaping from their conclusions to existential statements about God. Two examples will have to suffice. He posits that if an eternal being were not self-sufficient but were sustained by another, non-eternal being, then the latter being would be more powerful than the former. This conclusion fails, and its

⁵⁶ RAMON LLULL, *Llibre del gentil*, cit., prologue, p. 12. See A. BONNER, *Art and Logic*, cit., p. 273.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 1.1, p. 14. My translation.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.* 1.1, p. 15.

⁶¹ *Ibid.* 1.1, p. 16.

⁶² J. A. AERTSEN, *Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals. The Case of Thomas Aquinas*, Brill, Leiden 1996, traces the tradition from Aristotle and Avicenna through Aquinas. L. VALENTE, *Names That Can Be Said of Everything. Porphyrian Tradition and Transcendental Terms in Twelfth-Century Logic*, in «Vivarium» 45 (2007), pp. 298-310, shows that this doctrine was available in the school tradition via Boethius prior to the reception of Aristotle and Avicenna. For this doctrine as available in Arabic texts, see also C. LOHR, *The Islamic «Beautiful Names of God» and the Lullian Art*, in H. J. HAMES (Ed.), *Jews, Muslims, and Christians in and around the Crown of Aragon. Essays in Honour of Professor Elena Lourie*, Brill, Leiden 2004, pp. 197-205.

impossibility proves God's existence: *per la qual impossibilitat es provut Deus esser*.⁶³ And, if a gap between wisdom and love can exist in human beings, then such a gap cannot exist in God. For attributes that may or may not coincide in lesser beings must coincide in a superior being. This claim proves that God's wisdom and love coincide and are perfect, and also that God exists: *es provat que Deus es*.⁶⁴

It is only at the close of Bk. 1 that Lull qualifies the working conditions of necessary reasons as he presents them in the above passages. God also has to exist, he observes, because we need to have a correct faith, which only God's grace and illumination supply. For if God did not exist, then the accuracy of our beliefs would be fortuitous, and we would not know how to live so as to gain an eternal reward. But God enables us both to believe the truth and to understand our faith by necessary reasons, *rahons necessaries*.⁶⁵ Lull elides the point that we can test the accuracy of our faith only *ex post facto*, in the next life, and does not clarify the relationship between the stipulation he mentions here and his treatment of logic elsewhere.

Time permits only one further example, which I draw from the Christian sage on the Incarnation. Lull's prologue to Bk. 3 states that he will prove this doctrine sufficiently, *sufficiement provar*.⁶⁶ This assertion does not indicate his grasp of the difference between sufficient and necessary proof. Again, he uses a hypothetical argument. If we attribute creation to God, which is not as excellent as removing sin and guilt from good creatures, then we should attribute to God the recreation of the fallen humanity all the more. Taking as read the claim that creation is inferior to recreation, he adds that God demonstrates His excellence by joining an uncreated good – the divine nature – with an uncorrupted created good – Christ's human nature. God recreates fallen humanity through Christ's suffering, although Lull does not explain how this works, wrapping things up with the following syllogism: If the Son of God had not become incarnate and had not died as a man, then we would all suffer eternal hell-fire: *Et si lo Ffill de Deu no si encarnás e no murís en quant era home, tuit ffõrem en ffõc infernal perdurablement*.⁶⁷

A satisfying conclusion, at least for Lull. Would it have been one for Anselm? I propose a thought experiment by way of my own conclusion. Even confining Anselm's assessment to the Arabic sources available to Lull, it is difficult indeed to envision Anselm giving him high marks. Anselm would have recommended a refresher course in logic, judging Lull severely deficient for his conceptual confusion and lexical imprecision. Lull's use of hypothetical syllogisms as yielding necessary conclusions about the real world, and *a fortiori* about God, and his vagueness on the conditions qualifying necessary reasons, would obliterate for Anselm any surface similarities between Lull and himself. Brief though it is, this juxtaposition of the *Book of the Gentile* with Anselm's major works suggests the tendentiousness of the scholarly effort to normalize Lull in the medieval Christian tradition by Anselmianizing him. Whether one finds Lull's thought persuasive or not, original or merely idiosyncratic, he was no Anselm *redivivus*.

⁶³ RAMON LLULL, *Llibre del gentil*, cit., 1.3, p. 17.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 1.5, p. 18.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 1.5, pp. 37-38. The quotation is at p. 38.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 3 prologue, p. 89.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 3.6, p. 117.