The project centres on the thesis that justification – both in its propositional and doxastic varieties – can coherently and fruitfully be conceived as a type of ignorance: proposition p is justified in one’s situation just in case one is in no position to know that one is in no position to know p; and for one’s belief in p to be justified is for that belief to be held under conditions under which one is in no position to know that one does not know p. This thesis is in line with the so-called knowledge-first approach in epistemology; and the project can be understood as contributing to this theoretical paradigm. The notions of knowledge and of being in a position to know, and their relation, stand in need of clarification, and so does the logic governing these notions. It needs to be assessed whether, flanked by such a logic, the thesis admits of systematic defence, whether it fulfils all relevant theoretical desiderata, whether it can fruitfully be applied to problem cases such as the lottery and preface paradoxes, and how it compares to recently proposed competitors. The thesis pronounces on what it is for a proposition to be justified, and what it is for a belief to be held under conditions under which that belief is justified. As such, it is silent on what determines these states of affairs to obtain. The traditional debate between internalists and externalists about justification turns on this very issue, with internalism being a general claim to which externalists take exception. A systematic account of the metaphysical grounds of justification as ignorance must accordingly be devised, and the question be asked whether it is hospitable to internalist ideas.