Research Group
in Analytic Philosophy

Abstract

A few people have argued that friends enjoy and are subject to a special epistemic status. For example, so it is argued, they should sometimes, on account of friendship, believe against the evidence (Keller 2004). Or, it is claimed, the testimony of friends has a different epistemic status (O'Brien 2009). The sentiment expressed in the title of this talk can also be expressed in less exaggerated soundbites, such as "If a friend asks me a favour, I do not demand explanations, I just do it.". This is a popular sentiment, many people would endorse at least in one of the milder formulations. But it sounds like an expression of the mentioned views about the epistemic status of friends. In this paper, I want to explain the appeal of these soundbites in ways that concede neither a special epistemic status of friends, nor requirements on friends that go against epistemic norms. All we need to assume to explain this is the view that friendship makes requirements on our preferences.