Research Group
in Analytic Philosophy

Abstract

I argue for contextualism about predicates of personal taste and offer a proposal of how resilient disagreements are to be explained. Several authors, for instance López de Sa (2008), Sundell (2011), or Huvenes (2012), have recently defended contextualism from the accusation that it faces the problem of lost disagreement. These authors have proposed that a proper account of the resilient disagreement in the cases studied is to be achieved by an appeal to pragmatic processes, or to conflicting nondoxastic attitudes. I propose that the existing contextualist solutions are incomplete as they stand (and are subject to objections because of this). What is needed is an account that explains why failed presuppositions of commonality (López de Sa), disputes over the appropriateness of a contextually salient standard (Sundell), and differences in non-doxastic attitudes (Sundell and Huvenes) give rise to conflicts. I propose that conflicts arise insofar as they create coordination problems.