17 May 2023 | 15:00 | Seminari de Filosofia UB
This talk will have three parts:
(1) First, I will consider the initial argumentation in Judith J. Thomson’s seminal paper A defense of abortion. Thomson’s initial argumentation is based on the now classic Violinist example. I will consider one objection to Thomson’s initial argumentation that she herself considers, as well as her reply to that objection. I will argue that Thomson’s reply is not satisfactory. I will then offer two different alternative replies to the objection. In particular, Reply-(ii) will involve presenting the Hospital visitor example. I will argue that this example can be used to fulfill Thomson’s aim, while crucially avoiding one undesirable feature of the Violinist example.
(2) Then, I will describe, more generally, Thomson’s overall argumentation in her paper, and raise some possible difficulties for it.
(3) Finally, I will argue that we reach some (perhaps) surprising conclusions if we consider together both the possible difficulties mentioned in (2), and Reply-(ii) (which I will have provided in defense of Thomson’s initial argumentation) mentioned in (1).