Research Group
in Analytic Philosophy

Sober on A Priori Explanatory Models in Natural Selection

17 April 2013  |  15:00  |  Seminari de Filosofia UB

Abstract

In several works, Elliot Sober claims that


(S) Explanatory models in Naturals Selection (NS) (and few other theories) are a priory in a sense in which explanatory models in Classical Mechanics (CM) (and many other theories) are not.

I asses (S) according to three possible interpretations of 'a priori explanatory model' one can find in Sober's works. I argue that, according all three, NS qualifies as using a priory explanatory models if and only if CM does (according one interpretation, neither CM nor NS qualify; according to the other two, both NS and CM qualify). All three interpretations make then (S) untenable. Thus, in absence of a new, different interpretation of 'a priory explanatory model', and regardless other possible differences, NS and CM do not differ in the respect aimed by Sober. The analysis of the third interpretation will also show that all highly unified theories have an epistemologically peculiar component.