Research Group
in Analytic Philosophy

Duration: 2020 - 2023

Code: PID2019-105728GB-I00

Principal Investigator

Manuel Pérez Otero (perez.otero@ub.edu)

All researchers

Olga Fernández Prat (Univ. Autónoma de Barcelona)

Ignacio Vicario (Univ. Autónoma de Madrid)

Ainhoa Fernández (Univ. del País Vasco)

Hemdat Lerman (University of Warwick)

Claudia Picazo (Univ. de Granada) 

Daniel Quesada (Univ. Autónoma de Barcelona)

Summary

Russell highlighted certain deep-seated intuitions about the singular nature of some thoughts. For example, the belief of a subject, S, about a certain perceived particular object, X, would not be identical to a subsequent belief that S could form (applying the same method and in almost identical circumstances) if the perceived object is not X. The corresponding propositional content is singular: its identity depends (among other factors) on X. These questions have an impact on philosophy of the mind, but also on philosophy of language and epistemology. We will use “doxastic etiology” to refer to the processes (methods, procedures, etc.) whose result is that someone comes to form and/or maintain a certain belief. Our project will address various issues about knowledge, epistemic justification and singular reference from a perspective that takes into account the doxastic etiology. Metaphilosophical questions related to these discussions will also be addressed.

     We specifically contemplate these specific objectives:

1. To elucidate certain traits of knowledge and epistemic justification taking into account the doxastic etiology. Such traits involve: (a) the phenomenon of cognitive penetration; (b) memory operations; (c) the differences between antagonic versions of virtue epistemology.

2. To analyze singular reference (in language and thought), taking into account a number of problems: (a) the conditions required for there to be direct knowledge [acquaintance] of the singularized object; (b) the problems posed by indexical expressions to communication, addressed from an view inspired by P. Hanks’ theory; (c) the links between the phenomenal character of conscious perceptual experiences and their fallible character; (d) to develop a demonstrative conception of phenomenal concepts.

3. To explore the feasibility of elucidating the phenomenon of immunity to error through misidentification (EMI) by invoking an analysis of de se beliefs.

4. To study certain issues concerning the nature of philosophical theses: (a) the metaphilosophical assumptions that surround the critical receptions of certain definitions of knowledge (virtue epistemology; Williamson) and discussions about analysis of humor; (b) the contrasts between Russell’s conception of philosophical analysis and those that can be attributed–on the one hand–to his Hegelian idealist teachers, and–on the other–to Moore; (c) the role played by intuitions in philosophy, questioned by some practitioners of survey-inspired philosophy, partially clarified with an analysis of the various types of experimentation.

Total budget: 24200 €