Research Group
in Analytic Philosophy
About Ourselves
Duration: 2014 - 2017
Code: FFI2013-47948-P
Principal Investigator
All researchers
Manuel García-Carpintero (U. Barcelona)Marie Guillot (2016)
Ivan Milić
Francesc Pereña (U. Barcelona)
Josep-Lluís Prades (U. Girona)
Carlota Serrahima (2021)
Marta Campdelacreu (U. Barcelona)
Summary
In the 1960s and 1970s Castañeda, Perry and Lewis argued that, among de re or singular thoughts, thoughts about oneself “as oneself” – de se thoughts – raise special issues. Perry and Lewis offered contrasting accounts: while Lewis aims to account for de se thoughts by taking the subject away from de se contents, which are thus properties instead of complete traditional propositions, Perry offers an account compatible with traditional views. This issue has recently become a hot topic of debate, on different counts. First, there is a debate whether natural languages include expressions specifically devoted to the ascription of de se thoughts. Second, some recent proposals to relativize truth appeal to de se contents, understood along the lines that Lewis' suggested. Third, there have been proposals to characterize in such terms the content of conscious perceptual experiences and related matters, such as the primary/secondary quality distinction. This project aims at clarifying the nature of first-personal thoughts, investigating in particular whether the Lewisian view is required to account for the indicated phenomena, or a Perrian view could properly account for them. The project aims to investigate also whether an account of de se thoughts should be able to explain epistemological aspects of subjectivity such as the phenomenon of Immunity to Error through Misidentification, and, if so, how the Lewisian and Perrian accounts fare in that respect. Similarly, the project aims to investigate whether an account of de se thoughts presupposes an account of self-knowledge – the apparently privileged knowledge we have of our own states – and, if so, once again to compare how the Lewisian and Perrian accounts fare in that respect. Finally, we want to explore the relevance of accounts of de se thoughts for issues concerning the metaphysics of persons.
Publications
Manuel García-Carpintero. 2018
De Se Thoughts and Immunity to Error through Misidentification
Synthese 195, 3311-3333, DOI: 10.1007/s11229-015-0817-y.
Ivan Milić, Javier González de Prado Salas. 2018
Recommending beauty: semantics and pragmatics of aesthetic predicates
Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (2): 1-27
Ivan Milić, Stefan Reining . 2017
A Wittgensteinian Role-Based Account of Assertion
Philosophical Investigations 40 (2): 139-153
Ivan Milić. 2017
Against Selfless Assertions
Philosophical Studies 174 (9): 2277-2295
Marta Campdelacreu. 2016
Sutton's Solution to the Grounding Problem and Intrinsically Composed Colocated Objects
Crítica 2016, pp. 77-92
Manuel García-Carpintero. 2016
Mark Richard’s Truth and Truth-Bearers
Notre Dame Philosophical Review
Manuel García-Carpintero. 2016
Token-reflexive Presuppositions and the De Se
García-Carpintero, M. & Torre, S. (eds.), About Oneself, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, 179-199.
Manuel García-Carpintero. 2016
Recent Debates on Learning from Fiction
Teorema 35(3), 5-20
Manuel García-Carpintero. 2016
Relatar lo ocurrido como invención: una introducción a la filosofía de la ficción contemporánea
Editorial Cátedra, Madrid
Marie Guillot. 2016
I Me Mine: on a Confusion Concerning Subjective Character
Review of Philosophy and Psychology. [Download PDF ]
Marie Guillot. 2016
Thinking of Oneself as the Thinker: the Concept of Self and the Phenomenology of Intellection
Philosophical Explorations. Forthcoming.
Manuel García-Carpintero. 2015
Accommodating Presuppositions
Topoi, DOI: 10.1007/s11245-014-9264-5
Manuel García-Carpintero. 2015
Contexts as Shared Commitments
Frontiers in Psychology, 6:1932, 2015, DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01932.
Manuel García-Carpintero. 2015
Is Fictional Reference Rigid?
Organon F 22, suppl. 1, 145-168.
Ivan Milić. 2015
A Note on Existentially Known Assertions
The Philosophical Quarterly 65 (261): 813-821
Manuel García-Carpintero. 2014
Understanding Anaphoric Dependence: A Reply to Glezakos
Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad de Costa Rica 53, 136, suppl. vol. (2014), 119-124.
Marie Guillot. 2014
Identification-Free at Last. Semantic Relativism, Evans's Legacy and a Unified Approach to Immunity to Error through Misidentification
Teorema, Vol XXXIII/3 (autumn 2014). Winner of the 2013 Teorema Essay Prize. [Advanced draft ]Marie Guillot, joint work with Alexandre Billon. 2014
Can Fregeans Have I-Thoughts?
In Juan Diego Moya Bedoya and David Suárez-Rivero (eds), Gottlob Frege’s Puzzle. A Reexamination of the Cognitive Significance Phenomenon. Rev. Filosofía Univ. Costa Rica. 53 (136 Extraordinary), 9-15, May-August 2014, p. 97-105. [Download PDF ]
