Research Group
in Analytic Philosophy
Knowledge, Reference and Realism
Duration: 2012 - 2015
Code: FFI2011-29560-C02-01
Principal Investigator
All researchers
Manuel Pérez Otero (U. Barcelona)Giuliano Torrengo (U. Barcelona
)
Claudia Picazo
Gemma Celestino (UB);
Ekain Garmendia (UNAM)
Giuliano Torrengo (UB);
Ignacio Vicario (Univ. Autónoma de Madrid);
Claudia Picazo (UB)
Summary
This project has five main objectives:
(i) To continue the compatibilist approach to the supposed conflict between externalism and self-knowledge that started in the previous project (“Discriminability: Representation, Belief, and Skepticism”). This task includes a reply to Boghossian’s incompatibilist arguments grounded on the fact that we know a priori whether a given reasoning is logically valid or not.
(ii) To apply the characterization of the concept of begging the question (and assuming compatibilism between externalism and self-knowledge) to an epistemological issue which is relevant for the realism/antirealism debate: it will be advanced an interpretation and defence of Putnam’s argument for the thesis that we are not brains in a vat.
(iii). Analysis of the conditions for the reference of proper names and de re beliefs. Such an analysis will include: (a) to work out a theoretical model of understanding assertions about singular objects not dependent of acquaintance with the object; (b) to develop a descriptivist semantics for names of fictional entities, and to examine which modal ontology fits with that semantics.
(iv). Study of intentional action in connection with the options that are open for an agent, with the further aim of determining which conception of counterfactual possibility is better to identify those options.
(v). Analysis of the ontology of time from the perspective of the contrast between two corresponding forms of the realism/antirealism debate. This includes: (a) a study of the connections between presentism and tense-realism; (b) an analysis of the notion of temporal perspective, and its explanatory import in semantics and metaphysics; (c) to support the tenet that tense anti-realism and eternalism are explanatorily satisfying and ontologically acceptable positions.
Publications
Manuel Pérez Otero. 2016
Pluralismo plural en la concepción de Wittgenstein sobre seguir una regla
Daimon. Revista Internacional de Filosofía 67, pp. 73-81.
Manuel Pérez Otero. 2016
Variedades del escepticismo y del anti-escepticismo
Análisis Filosófico 36/1, pp. 7-27.
Manuel Pérez Otero. 2015
El carácter singular de ciertos términos y conceptos generales según Wittgenstein
Cristina Bosso (compiladora) El concepto de filosofía en Wittgenstein, Buenos Aires: Prometeo.
Manuel Pérez Otero. 2014
Boghossian’s Inference Argument against Content Externalism Reversed
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 89, Issue 1, pp. 159-181. First published online: July 2012; DOI: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2012.00613.x.
Manuel Pérez Otero. 2013
Kripke: reorientaciones en el giro lingüístico-representacional
Perspectivas en la filosofía del lenguaje, David P. Chico (coord.), Zaragoza: Prensas de la Universidad de Zaragoza, pp. 242-272.
Manuel Pérez Otero. 2013
Contingentism about Individuals and Higher-Order Necessitism
Theoria, vol. 28/3, pp. 393-406.
Manuel Pérez Otero. 2013
Purposes of Reasoning and (a New Vindication of) Moore’s Proof of an External World
Synthese, vol. 190, pp. 4181-4200. DOI: 10.1007/s11229-013-0256-6.
Giuliano Torrengo. 2013
Time Travel and the Thin Red Line
in P. Graziani and M Sangoi (eds.) Open Problem in the Philosophy of Science, London, College Publications: 245-258.
Giuliano Torrengo. 2013
Experimental Philosophy and Metaphysics
Methode. Analytical Perspective, II, 2: 195-205
Giuliano Torrengo. 2013
Una nota sulla filosofia dei viaggi nel tempo [A note on the Philosophy of Time Travel]
U. Curi (ed.), Pensare il Tempo. Tra Scienza e Filosofia, Milano, Mimesis: 137 - 150
Giuliano Torrengo. 2013
Yet Another Confusion about Time Travel
Disputatio 1, 35: 49-56
Giuliano Torrengo, R. Ciuni. 2013
Presentism and Cross-temporal Relations
in R. Ciuni, K. Miller, G. Torrengo (eds.) New Papers on the Present. Focus on Presentism, Philosophia Verlag: 211-252
Giuliano Torrengo. 2013
The Grounding Problem and Presentist Explanations
Synthese, 190: 2047–2063 (online: http://rd.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-011-9955-z)
Manuel Pérez Otero. 2012
La prueba de Putnam contra el escepticismo radical: dos reinterpretaciones basadas en el autoconocimiento
Crítica, vol. 44, pp. 35-63.
Manuel Pérez Otero. 2012
Los propósitos de razonar, ilustrados con el argumento externista anti-escéptico de Putnam
Theoria, 27/1, núm. 3, pp. 55-74
Giuliano Torrengo. 2012
Commentary of ‘Minimizing Marriage. Marriage, Morality, and the Law’, E. Brake,
Humana.mente — Journal of Philosophical Studies, 22: 211-224
Giuliano Torrengo. 2012
Time and Simple Existence
Metaphysica, 13: 125-130
Giuliano Torrengo, Andrea Borghini. 2012
The Metaphysics of the Thin Red Line
in (eds.) F. Correia, A. Iacona, Around the Tree, Berlin, Synthese Library, Springer Verlag: 105-125
Giuliano Torrengo, Roberto Ciuni. 2012
Presentism and Cross-temporal Relations
forthcoming in R. Ciuni, K. Miller, G. Torrengo (eds.) New Papers on the Present. Focus on Presentism, Munich, Philosophia Verlag
Giuliano Torrengo. 2011
The Modal Dimension
Humana.Mente Journal of Philosophical Studies, 2011, Vol. 19, 105–120
