Research Group
in Analytic Philosophy
Reference, Self-Reference and Empirical Data
Duration: 2012 - 2015
Code: FFI2011-25626
Principal Investigator
All researchers
Genoveva Martí (ICREA-UB)Sergi Oms (U. Barcelona)
Laura Ortega
Laura Pérez
Giuliano Torrengo (U. Barcelona
)
Pilar Terrés
Joan Bertran (UB)
Michael Devitt (CUNY)
Mario Gómez Torrente (UNAM)
Genoveva Martí (ICREA-UB)
Sergi Oms (UB)
Laura Ortega (UB)
Laura Pérez (UB)
Stefan Reining (UB)
Pilar Terrés (UB)
Giuliano Torrengo (UB)
Jordi Valor(UVEG)
Åsa Wikforss (Stockholm U.)
Elia Zardini (UB)
Summary
Experimental Philosophy is a relatively recent movement that questions the supposedly traditional philosophical methodology. Traditional philosophers, according to experimentalists, use exclusively their own judgments to determine whether the consequences of the principles they defend, or attack, are intuitively correct, and they do so usually via mental experiments in which they try to gauge what, according to the principles in question, one would have to say in the conditions described in the hypothetical scenario. Experimental philosophers, on the other hand, advocate the collection of data through surveys that elicit the intuitive judgments of subjects, philosophers and non-philosophers alike, in order to test the adequacy of theoretical principles or claims. The impact of the new movement has been quite strong and has generated an intense debate on the role of intuitions in Philosophy, whose intuitions should count, and why. Even though this debate affects all philosophical domains, the focus of our project lies in the field of semantics. We will develop two research lines. The first research line will be the semantics of general terms, both kind terms and terms for artifacts. The second will cope with the characterization of the type of circularity which produce semantic paradoxes. In both research lines, a central concern will be the discussion of the role played by intuitions and experimental data in philosophical theorizing.
Total budget: 74,700
1 predoctoral FPI scholarship
Publications
Genoveva Martí. 2015
Reference without cognition
A. Bianchi (ed.) On Reference. Oxford University Press
Genoveva Martí. 2014
For the Disunity of Semantics
Mind & Language, 29/4: 485-489
Genoveva Martí. 2014
Reference and Experimental Semantics
Edouard Machery and Elizabeth O’Neill (eds.): Current Controversies in Experimental Philosophy. New York. Routledge, pp. 17-26
Giuliano Torrengo. 2013
The Grounding Problem and Presentist Explanations
Synthese, 190: 2047–2063 (online: http://rd.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-011-9955-z)
Giuliano Torrengo, R. Ciuni. 2013
Presentism and Cross-temporal Relations
in R. Ciuni, K. Miller, G. Torrengo (eds.) New Papers on the Present. Focus on Presentism, Philosophia Verlag: 211-252
Giuliano Torrengo. 2013
Yet Another Confusion about Time Travel
Disputatio 1, 35: 49-56
Giuliano Torrengo. 2013
Time Travel and the Thin Red Line
in P. Graziani and M Sangoi (eds.) Open Problem in the Philosophy of Science, London, College Publications: 245-258.
Genoveva Martí. 2012
Reference
García-Carpintero, M. and Kölbel, M.: Continuum Companion to the Philosophy of Language. London. The Continuum International Publishing Group (2012), pp. 106-124.
Genoveva Martí. 2012
Empirical Data and the Theory of Reference
Kabasenche, W.; O'Rourke, M.; Slater, M. (eds.): Topics in Contemporary Philosophy: Reference and Referring. MIT Press: 63-82
Giuliano Torrengo, Roberto Ciuni. 2012
Presentism and Cross-temporal Relations
forthcoming in R. Ciuni, K. Miller, G. Torrengo (eds.) New Papers on the Present. Focus on Presentism, Munich, Philosophia Verlag
Giuliano Torrengo, Andrea Borghini. 2012
The Metaphysics of the Thin Red Line
in (eds.) F. Correia, A. Iacona, Around the Tree, Berlin, Synthese Library, Springer Verlag: 105-125
Giuliano Torrengo. 2012
Time and Simple Existence
Metaphysica, 13: 125-130
Giuliano Torrengo. 2012
Commentary of ‘Minimizing Marriage. Marriage, Morality, and the Law’, E. Brake,
Humana.mente — Journal of Philosophical Studies, 22: 211-224
