Research Group
in Analytic Philosophy

Abstract

In Naming and Necessity Kripke argues ‘intuitively’ for the claim that

proper names are rigid. Unlike him, I attempt to derive rigidity, or

something close to it, from other facts about our use of referring

expressions and of language more generally, relying on a principle first

formulated by Buridan. I dub the related derived principle, the independence

of reference. I then discuss a difficulty in accepted formulations of the

rigidity claim, stemming from the fact that the same name can be used to

name different particulars. This difficulty might force us to adopt a weaker

or revised form of the rigidity claim, which is very close to the principle

of the independence of reference; a result that in its turn suggests that it

might be best to consider the related principle as saving whatever can be

saved of the rigidity claim. Additional facts concerning the behaviour of

referring expressions in modal contexts, unexplained by the rigidity claim

but derivable from the principle of the independence of reference, are

discussed as well, the discussion supporting the same conclusion.