Research Group
in Analytic Philosophy

Abstract

Strevens deploys a non-symmetric relation of entanglement between properties in his account of the explanation of patterns. While he grants that this relation is "conspicuously noncausal" (Depth, p. 230), Strevens nevertheless insists that the "ability of mathematics to represent relations of causal dependence -- wherever it comes from -- is what qualifies it as an explanatory tool" (Depth, p. 331). In this paper I argue that some mathematical explanations are not causal explanations. It follows that Strevens' attitude towards mathematical explanation is incorrect. Still,  Strevens' notion of entanglement can be usefully adapted to these cases because mathematical properties may be entangled in the manner Strevens requires for explanatory relevance. The main example discussed is the explanation of Plateau's laws for the structure of soap-film surfaces.