Research Group
in Analytic Philosophy

Abstract

Hylomorphism is the position popular among neo-Aristotelian metaphysics according to which unified wholes (such as presumably organisms) are in some sense compounds of matter (hylç) and form (morphç). Neo-Aristotelians also often find themselves drawn to an account of substancehood which centers on the idea that the substances are just those entities which are ontologically independent, according to some preferred notion of ontological independence. But if such alleged substance candidates as organisms are to be construed as compounds of matter and form, one wonders whether they will not then turn out to be ontologically dependent on entities numerically distinct from themselves (viz., their form and possibly their matter as well) and thereby jeopardize their status as substances. In this talk, I will examine the tension between two prominent strands within neo-Aristotelian metaphysics, hylomorphism and independence criteria for substancehood, and explore some possible resolutions to this apparent conflict.