Research Group
in Analytic Philosophy

Abstract

Let “monism” be the view that there is only one basic object – the
world. Monists face the question of whether there are also non-basic
objects. This is in effect the question of whether the world
decomposes into parts. Jonathan Schaffer maintains that it does, Terry
Horgan and Matjaž Potrč that it does not. In this paper, I propose a
compromise view, which I call ‘Kantian monism.’ According to Kantian
monism, the world decomposes into parts insofar as an ideal subject
under ideal conditions would divide it into parts, but it does not
decompose into parts in and of itself, that is, in an entirely
mind-independent manner. After articulating Kantian monism more
precisely, I present three consideration in support of preferring it
over more standards varieties of monism.