Research Group
in Analytic Philosophy

Abstract

I first distinguish two pairs of views, one pertaining to intentionality,
the other to the nature of reality.  Thus, I distinguish descriptivism—a
view of intentionality on which the mind relates to a thing in the world
only by means of some entity distinct from that thing that characterizes
uniquely and so descriptively fits that thing in the world—from
anti-descriptivism.  I also distinguish ontological realism—a view of the
nature of reality on which there are kinds and individuals that exist
independently of thinking beings, in the sense that they would exist as
the very entities they are even had there never been any linguistic or
mental activity—from ontological antirealism.  A popular position, held
by many prominent philosophers, such as Frege, David Lewis, Frank
Jackson, among others, is one that combines descriptivism and ontological
realism.  The purpose of this paper is to argue that this combination of
views is incoherent and, therefore, untenable.  After presenting this
argument, I consider some responses to it, and discuss the allure of a
realist descriptivism, attempting to present some explanation of how the
problem for this position has been overlooked.  An upshot of my argument
is that an account of how the mind engages the world entails a certain
view of what the world is like.  I close by considering some consequences
of this result.