Research Group
in Analytic Philosophy

Abstract

In this paper, I consider and oppose the view which has been argued for in a number of places by Rowland Stout (1996, 1997, 2003),  that processes are best thought of as continuants, to be differentiated from events mainly by way of the fact that the latter, but not the former, are entities with temporal parts. In the main, the content of the paper will be negative; I shall try to show that Stout’s starting point for thinking about the event-process distinction is flawed, and that his arguments for conceiving of processes as continuants are faulty - partly, though perhaps not entirely, as a result of this erroneous starting point. However, I also want to argue that there are also important insights in Stout's position, which more traditional conceptions are in danger of failing to accommodate. I try to show how it is possible to make space for the recognition of those insights without embracing a position as radical (and implausible) as Stout's own.