Research Group
in Analytic Philosophy

Abstract

The higher-order approach to consciousness is committed to the core claim that what it is to be in a conscious mental state is to be aware of oneself as being in that state by way of a suitable higher-order state (or meta-representation). In this talk, I explore the theoretical merits of this approach and its varietals. First, I outline the central motivations and reasons for adopting this approach over the competing first-order approach to consciousness, which denies that meta-representation is required for one to be in a conscious state. Next, I distinguish among a number of different versions of this approach that have emerged from recent theorizing, and discuss their respective virtues and drawbacks.  Finally, I examine how the higher-order approach can help us make progress on difficult questions relating to the nature of phenomenal consciousness, the function of consciousness, and the presence of consciousness in non-human animals and artificial systems.