Research Group
in Analytic Philosophy

Abstract

Do we need to postulate a Language of Thought in order to account for thinking, at least in some of its forms? Do we even, occasionally at least, think in a Language of Thought? The paper claims that inner speech, conceived as internalized natural language, can do all the work that we can reasonably expect a Language of Thought to do without inheri?ng its problems. I first discuss different versions of the Language of Thought Hypothesis (LoTH) and try to explain its appeal while also poin?ng out some of the more pressing problems the LoTH faces. I then turn to inner speech, put forward a working definition, and examine what inner speech can do for us. As I point out, the account of inner speech suggested here does not run into any of the problems that the LoTH is confronted with. I close by outlining an account of how (inner or outer) speech is produced that obviates the need to postulate a prior thought in a Language of Thought.