Research Group
in Analytic Philosophy

Abstract

This paper presents and defends a moral encroachment approach to memory. On this view, moral considerations, of justice and fairness, should influence whether recollections of the past are counted as genuine memories. It will be shown that some recollections of the past pose a risk of substantial epistemic, affective, and practical harms to those whose behaviours are recalled, preventing them from gaining recognition for their behaviours, expressions of agency, their autonomous choices, and their individuality. Furthermore, this risk is disproportionately faced by members of marginalised groups. Treating these recollections as genuine memories provides the message that they have epistemic authority, which can bring further harms and wrongs. Therefore, there is moral value to not treating the recollections as genuine memories: by denying them memory status, it is possible to reduce the harms and wrongs associated with them being treated as epistemically authoritative. If this happens, the classification of some recollections as not genuine memories will be driven by moral considerations. Therefore, there is a case for moral considerations to influence whether some recollections are counted as genuine memories.