Research Group
in Analytic Philosophy

Abstract

The old argument from illusion (OAFI) reached a metaphysical conclusion (that we are only ever immediately aware of internal objects) from an epistemic premise (that subjects who are victims of undiscoverable illusions or hallucinations are justified in believing the same propositions as their undeceived counterparts). The OAFI is not very popular nowadays, but traditional epistemological views can be presented and defended in terms of a new argument from illusion (NAFI) which does not have the metaphysical conclusion of the OAFI. Those traditional views have come under attack from the “knowledge-first” camp. Knowledge firsters wield the distinction between justification and excuses and the anti-luminosity argument in opposition to the traditional views. In this paper I argue that the OAFI is compatible with the distinction between justification and excuses, that it is also compatible with the anti-luminosity argument, and that it really is independent from the metaphysical conclusion of the OAFI.