Research Group
in Analytic Philosophy

Abstract

This paper compares two approaches to epistemic warrant and its normatively in terms of functions. Tyler Burge in ‘Perceptual Entitlement’ (2003) and ‘Entitlement: The Basis of Empirical Warrant’ (2019) argues (1) that the function of every belief is to be true, so (2) every belief should be reliably true. Warrant partly consists in meeting this norm. In ‘Epistemic Entitlement’ (2012) and ‘Warrant, Functions, History’ (2014) I argue that (1) some belief-forming structures or processes have the etiological function of forming reliably true beliefs, so (2) such processes should form reliably true beliefs. Warrant partly consists in meeting this norm. Burge and I agree that warrant consists in meeting norms associated with functions. We disagree over the function and the scope and rationale for the relevant norms. The paper includes a detailed presentation of Burge’s account, an overview of etiological accounts of functions in terms of selected-effect and self-re-producting effects, a sketch of my account of warrant in terms of the normal functioning of the belief-forming process when the process has forming reliably true beliefs as an etiological function, and an argument against Burge’s apriori claim that every functional item should reliably fulfill its function and its application to belief.