Research Group
in Analytic Philosophy

From Carnap to Cochrane: Amalgamating Evidence for Causal Claims and the Principle of Total Evidence

    Bert Leuridan  (Ghent University, Belgium)

27 November 2013  |  15:00  |  Seminari de Filosofia UB

Abstract

For many causal claims there exist overwhelming amounts of – often discordant – evidence. This is pre-eminentlythe case in the biomedical sciences. As a remedy, approaches for evidence amalgamation such as systematic reviews andmeta-analysis have emerged.

In this paper, I will focus on the Cochrane Collaboration – an institution striving for evidence-based health care which publishes ‘Systematic Reviews’ on the efficacy of certain interventions (e.g. antibiotics) for certain health problems (e.g. bronchitis) – and on recent critical assessments of its methodology in philosophy of science.Jacob Stegenga (2011), for example, devotes much attention to the Cochrane Collaboration. Its predilection for RCTs, Stegenga argues, violates the ‘principle of total evidence’ (Carnap 1947). This principle states that to determine the degree of confirmation of a hypothesis, one has to take into account the total evidence available. Likewise, Howick (2011) defends the Cochrane Collaboration, saying that it satisfies that very same principle.

It is not my primary aim to find out who is right and who is wrong. Instead, I want to investigate the following, more specific research questions: What precisely is the Principle of Total Evidence? And can we invoke it to blame or praise current practices of evidence amalgamation? The upshot will be that we should not invoke the PTE simpliciter since it is not a rational principle. As such, it cannot be used to blame or praise current practices of evidence amalgamation. However, more nuanced, local and contextualized versions of the PTE can be rational principles. I will end by describing a multi-dimensional framework for comparing and assessing such local principles of total evidence that are at work in actual scientific practice.

 

Carnap R. (1947), “On the application of inductive logic”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 8, 133-148.

Howick J. (2011), The Philosophy of Evidence-Based Medicine. Chichester, West Sussex, UK : Wiley-Blackwell, BMJ Books

Stegenga J. (2011), “Is meta-analysis the platinum standard of evidence?”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, doi:10.1016/j.shpsc.2011.07.003.