Research Group
in Analytic Philosophy

The Ground Between the Gaps

    Jonathan Schaffer (Rutgers)

11 June 2014  |  15:00  |  Seminari del Departament de Lògica, Història i Filosofia de la Ciència. UB (Room 4047)

Abstract

Suppose that an infinite mind were given all the fundamental facts plus an analysis of all higher level concepts. Would she be in position to infer all the remaining facts? For instance, if she were given the full distribution of Hs and Os, and a conceptual analysis of 'water', would she be in position to infer the facts about the distribution of water? I will argue that she would face two "explanatory gaps": (1) she would face the "mereological gap" in going from the distribution of Hs and Os to the distribution of H2O, and (2) she would face "the conceptual gap" in going from the distribution of H2O to the distribution of water. Much of the debate in the literature has concerned whether she can cross the conceptual gap, but I will argue that she cannot cross the mereological gap unless sheis also given substantive metaphysical principles about when mereological composition occurs and what mereological composites are like. Without being given substantive metaphysical principles concerning what grounds what she will be able to infer nothing. With such principles she might be able to infer everything, including the mental states of creatures in a physical world.