Research Group
in Analytic Philosophy

Abstract

In the first lecture, I propose a new reading of Franz Brentano’s main texts on consciousness. My starting point is the formulation of two theses on awareness that Brentano proposes at the very beginning of the second chapter of the second book of his Psychology of an empirical standpoint. My working hypothesis is based on the principle of the unity of consciousness, which is the key to most of the problems usually associated with Brentano’s theory of consciousness. I examine three of these problems in the second part of this study, namely the problems of duplication, of regression and of complexity. In the last part, I propose an analysis of the principle of the unity of consciousness that takes into account Brentano's writings after the publication of his Psychology and I evaluate the bearing of the changes in Brentano's theory of consciousness in his writings published posthumously on current controversies regarding the interpretation of Brentano.